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Making Italy understand Hegel would mean regenerating the country. I, for myself, believe that should you 
begin, you will witness elements of a new life, which you were not expecting, emerging along the way.  
 
- Pasquale Villari, Lettera a Bertrando Spaventa, 1850 
 
 
 
If philosophy is not a mere intellectual exercise driven by vanity, but that true form of human life in 
which all earlier moments of spirit are epitomised and find their true meaning, it is natural to think 
that a true people may recognise and acquire true consciousness of itself when looking at its 
philosophers. Where this acknowledgment is missing, foreign importation is useless; this is because 
consciousness of oneself is not a commodity, which can be bought, shout it be missing; it is 
consciousness of our true selves, our true selves. 
 
- Bertrando Spaventa, Della nazionalità della filosofia, 1861 
 
 
 
Vesuvius, are you a ghost, or the symbols of light, or a fantasy host? 
In your breast, I carry the form, the heart of the Earth and the weapons of warmth. 
 
- Sufjan Stevens, Vesuvius, 2010 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the reception, circulation and revision of Hegel’s thought, most notably 
his philosophy of history, in Neapolitan intellectual history during the Risorgimento, 
approached from a transnational perspective. In particular, attention will focus on five inter-
related themes: (i) the complex set of intellectual exchanges and encounters enabling the 
penetration and popularisation of Hegel’s philosophy in Naples; (ii) the ongoing revision, 
taking place during the early decades of the nineteenth century, of Giambattista Vico’s 
historicism via debates that ultimately deployed an image of the Neapolitan thinker as a 
theorist of historical time, on the one hand, and the proponent of an idealist account of it, on 
the other; (iii) the amalgamation of a Hegelian notion of absolute historical development and 
Vichian historicism taking place in the southern capital’s private schools of philosophy, 
enabling historians to view Neapolitan Hegelianism as the result of a broad transnational 
encounter, yet closely rooted in local contexts and debates; (iv) the ways in which, in response 
to ongoing experiences of political change, most notably the 1848 Revolution and the 
emancipation of the Italian peninsula, Neapolitan Hegelianism was systematically deployed 
in support of – and in opposition to – different strands of Risorgimento political thought: it 
came to support, in fact, a form of democratic constitutionalism reminiscent of the Jacobin 
ideas informing the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, in direct opposition to moderate 
Piedmontese liberalism; and (v) the shaping of a transnational cosmopolitan sensitivity 
among Neapolitan Hegelians, ultimately merging the political ambitions connected with the 
emancipation and unification of Italy with the negotiation of a vantage point for the country 
in the intellectual and philosophical lives of modern European nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
i. Hegelians on the Slopes of Vesuvius 
 
This thesis examines the reception, circulation and revision of Hegel’s thought, most notably 
his philosophy of history, in Neapolitan intellectual history during the Risorgimento, 
approached from a transnational perspective. How these issues are addressed in the 
individual chapters of this thesis is identified in section four of this introduction.  
During the nineteenth century, the southern Italian city of Naples, capital of the 
Kingdom of Naples until 1816 and of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies until 1861, could pride 
itself on having a cultural, artistic and philosophical landscape able to compete with – and, in 
many respects, outdo – most other European capitals. Especially within the realm of 
philosophical speculation, Neapolitan intellectuals managed to produce truly remarkable 
innovations, attracting the attention of local and foreign observers alike.1 In 1864, Theodor 
Sträter, professor of philosophy at the University of Bonn and correspondent of the Berlin-
based periodical Der Gedanke, penned a letter from Naples, emphasising how the 
philosophical sensitivities present in the “splendid” city of Naples exhibited an exquisitely 
“modern” spirit.2 He enthusiastically reported: 
 
If modern philosophy is to ever have a future and be characterised by a more intense life and 
richer development, these innovations will not take place in Germany, France or England. 
Rather, they will occur in Italy and, in particular, on these marvellous southern shores, where 
Greek philosophers once laid their immortal thoughts. What elevates Neapolitans’ way of 
doing philosophy above the suffocating and stale bookish erudition of the Germans is their 
inherent vitality, their intense energy, their lively temperament […]: here philosophy has 
finally become what it has always been meant to be – life, action, personal character, a proper 
religion of the heart, rather than a mere occupation of the mind.3 
 
                                                           
1 Calaresu, M. (1999) Looking at Virgil’s Tomb: The End of the Grand Tour and the Cosmopolitan Ideal in Europe, 
pp. 138-61; Chorley, P. (1965) Oil, Silk and Enlightenment: Economic Problems in Eighteenth-Century Naples, pp. 
150-51, 177-78; Davis, J. (2006) Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1760-1860, 
p. 15; Moe, N. (2002) The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question, pp. 37-52; Naddeo, B. 
A. (2005) Cultural Capitals and Cosmopolitanism in Eighteenth-Century Italy: The Historiography and Italy on the 
Grand Tour, pp. 183-99; Robertson, J. (2005) The Case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760, 
pp. 94-146  
2 Sträter, T. (5.12.1864) Gli hegeliani di Napoli, p. 11. Der Gedanke was published between 1860 and 1884, even 
if its issues appeared regularly only during the 1860s. For information on Der Gedanke’s history and relationship 
with Naples, see: Carfagna, E. (2004) Stato nazionale e filosofia della storia. La rivista ‘Der Gedanke’ negli anni 
sessanta dell’ottocento, pp. 3-35 
3 Sträter, T. (5.12.1864), pp. 11-12 
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For Sträter, the “historical relevance” of the Neapolitan philosophical “school” had to 
do with its ability to “formulate in the most acute manner the problems of modern thought” 
by establishing “a relationship between the Italian and European” philosophical landscapes.4 
In summary, by engaging with European traditions of thought and devising thematic and 
methodological continuities with their own intellectual history, Neapolitan authors had 
succeeded not only in partaking in a fundamentally modern experience of philosophical life, 
but also in positioning themselves at the forefront of a transnational, European cultural 
movement.5 This operation, due to its sheer ambition and scope, was certainly no easy task. 
Yet, as noted by Sträter, southern thinkers could achieve this by relying on a precious 
instrument: Hegel’s philosophy. However, the presence of the German thinker’s ideas in the 
southern capital, coupled with its implications in the context of the Italian Risorgimento, was 
far from being unproblematic and, as such, it deserves the extensive examination offered by 
this study. 
In particular, this thesis will direct its attention to five inter-related themes: (i) the 
complex set of intellectual exchanges and encounters enabling the penetration and 
popularisation of Hegel’s philosophy in the southern capital; (ii) the ongoing revision, taking 
place during the early decades of the nineteenth century, of Giambattista Vico’s historicism 
via debates that ultimately deployed an image of the Neapolitan thinker as a theorist of 
historical time, on the one hand, and the proponent of an idealist account of it, on the other; 
(iii) the amalgamation of a Hegelian notion of absolute historical development and Vichian 
historicism, promoted by the southern capital’s private schools of philosophy, enabling 
historians to view Neapolitan Hegelianism as the result of a broad transnational encounter, 
yet closely rooted in local contexts and debates; (iv) how, in response to ongoing experiences 
of political change, most notably the 1848 Revolution and the emancipation of the Italian 
peninsula, Neapolitan Hegelianism was systematically deployed in support of – and in 
opposition to – different strands of Risorgimento political thought: it came to support, in fact, 
a form of democratic constitutionalism reminiscent of the Jacobin ideas informing the 
Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, in direct opposition to moderate Piedmontese liberalism; and 
                                                           
4 Sträter, T. (3.2.1865) Brief über die Italienische Philosophie, pp. 70-71 
5 Gallo, F. (2015) Philosophical Revolution and the Shaping of European Consciousness: Bertrando Spaventa’s ‘La 
Filosofia Italiana nelle Sue Relazioni colla Filosofia Europea’, pp. 213-22; Gallo, F. (2017) Francesco De Sanctis 
interprete del rinascimento, pp. 59-74 
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(v) the shaping of a transnational cosmopolitan sensitivity among Neapolitan Hegelians, 
merging the political ambitions connected with the emancipation and unification of Italy with 
the negotiation of a vantage point for the country in the intellectual and philosophical lives 
of modern Europe.  
 As the title of this thesis shows, the chronological extremes of the present research 
are represented by the years 1799 and 1861; this choice is not accidental. As will become 
clear in various sections of this work, the historical memory of the 1799 Revolution was crucial 
in the definition of Neapolitan intellectuals’ philosophical sensibility and political agenda 
during the nineteenth century. In particular, chapter two will examine how, reflecting on the 
historical significance of 1799, the southern émigré Vincenzo Cuoco provided a substantial 
revision of Giambattista Vico’s philosophy of history; chapter four will then detail how the 
historical memory of the 1799 Revolution was central to Neapolitan Hegelians’ political 
reflections on the experience of 1848 and to their support for the cause of the Unification.  
The choice of 1861 as the chronological endpoint of the thesis has both a symbolic, as 
well as a practical nature: this year is conventionally adopted to mark the fulfillment of the 
Risorgimento, with the creation of the Kingdom of Italy being formally declared on 18 
February 1861. At the same time, as chapter five will show, Bertrando Spaventa’s theory of 
European thought’s “circularity” saw the light of day in the final months of 1861: this 
contribution, while summarising several themes theorised by his fellow Hegelian thinkers 
during the 1830s, ‘40s and ‘50s, also represented the thematic and, to a large extent, 
ideological endpoint of southern idealists’ speculation. Lastly, the year 1861 witnessed 
important changes in Neapolitan Hegelians’ lives, with some of them, such as Francesco De 
Sanctis and Silvio Spaventa, fully embarking on a political career and consequently leaving 
active philosophical speculation behind.  
 Although this thesis is significantly indebted to a transnational approach, it is also 
important to mention its geographical coordinates. While the city of Naples will systematically 
remain the central focus of this thesis, it will often hover among transnational, national and 
local levels of analysis: in particular, a transnational approach will be the dominant one in 
chapters one and five, with the former detailing the complex intellectual encounters enabling 
Hegelianism’s penetration in Naples from Germany via France, and the latter discussing 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ engagement with a fundamentally European dimension of philosophy, 
in response to the progressive marginalisation of Italy in the continent’s intellectual life. A 
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national perspective will then be useful in interrogating, in chapters two and four, the ways 
in which the reception of Hegel’s ideas stood in relation to local debates on philosophy of 
history, on the one hand, and Risorgimento political thought, on the other. Chapter three, 
instead, will draw attention to the often-neglected context of Neapolitan ‘private’ schools of 
philosophy, highlighting their contribution to the amalgamation of Hegelianism and Vichian 
historicism.  
 
 
 
ii. Background and Existing Research 
 
Given the range of topics explored, and the presence of different levels of analysis, this thesis 
will engage with a wide variety of historiographical trends and debates. Generally speaking, 
this work is an attempt to encourage the study of Hegel and his receptions within the context 
of anglophone intellectual history, which has notoriously focused little attention on him. 
Some philosophy researchers, as highlighted by Frederick Beiser in his 2002 study Hegel, 
treated the German philosopher “as a historical figure” and tried to examine him “in his 
historical context”.6 Their attempts to understand philosophy historically, however, are quite 
distinct from a well-defined intellectual history approach. The study of Hegel and his 
reception is therefore also an opportunity, for historians of ideas, to grant greater 
methodological rigour to the existing body of knowledge on Hegel’s contribution to European 
thought and history. 
Hegel’s philosophy of history, however, whose reception is the central theme of this 
thesis, remains an often-neglected subject even among philosophy researchers: as part of a 
movement spearheaded by Charles Taylor’s popular 1975 volume Hegel, scholars’ attention 
has systematically left the metaphysical themes characterising Hegel’s philosophy – and very 
prominent in his views on historical development – behind.7 Writing under the spell of 
positivism, pragmatism, political philosophy or philosophy of language, scholars have 
                                                           
6 Beiser, F. (2002) Hegel, pp. 3-4. Beiser, in particular, referred to: Dilthey, W. (1912) Die Jugendgeschichte 
Hegels; Haering, T. (1929) Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk; Haym, R. (1857) Hegel und Seine Zeit 
7 Taylor, C. (1975) Hegel, pp. 363-462; Beiser, F. (2007) Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship since the 1960s, p. 
70 
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generally championed a markedly anti-metaphysical attitude.8 As a result, traditional 
approaches to Hegel have usually revolved around attempts to render his ideas more 
palatable to sensitivities accustomed to an analytical approach. Works by John McDowell and 
Robert Brandom, in this sense, concentrated on Hegel’s relevance with regards to philosophy 
of mind and epistemology.9 In a similar manner, scholarly attention on the German thinker 
has often been characterised by attempts to interpret his political philosophy through the 
lens of contemporary political theory, as a means to liberate it from its perceived abstract or 
metaphysical tendencies.10  
 Only in recent years, the “traditional interpretations that have dominated the 
reception of Hegel” have been “increasingly recognised as inadequate to his thought”.11 Yet, 
anglophone scholarship on several aspects of his philosophy still remains limited in extent 
and riddled with a number of problems. Henry Silton Harris’ volume Hegel’s Ladder, for 
example, operated a genuine attempt to bring Hegel’s philosophy of history to English-
speaking researchers’ attention. At the same time, while correctly illustrating the relationship 
between history and Reason discussed in the Phänomenologie des Geistes, it consistently 
overlooked the relevance of the philosopher’s lectures held in Berlin in 1820, 1822 and 1830, 
and published in 1837 as Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte.12 More recent 
studies, however, succeeded in addressing these imbalances: Eric M. Dale’s 2014 book Hegel, 
the End of History and the Future, for instance, rehabilitated the metaphysical connotations 
of the thinker’s philosophy of history, drawing particular attention to how this stood in 
relation to Herder’s and Fichte’s views on the same matter.13 Similarly, a 2017 volume edited 
by Rachel Zuckert and James Kreines, Hegel on Philosophy in History, could rely on a plurality 
of contributions examining Hegel’s tendency to “understand philosophy historically”.14  
                                                           
8 See, for example: Engelhardt, T. & Pinkard, T. (1994) Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the 
Authoritarian State; Hartmann, K. (1972) Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View, pp. 101-24; Pinkard, T. (1988) Hegel’s 
Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility; Pippin, R. (1989) Hegel’s Idealism; White, A. (1983) Absolute Knowledge: 
Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics; Wood, A. (1990) Hegel’s Ethical Thought 
9 Brandom, R. (1994) Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment, pp. 85-116; 
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, pp. 43-54, 83 
10 Franco, P. (1999) Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom; Neuhouser, F. (2000) Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory 
11 Redding, P. (1996) Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 246 
12 Harris, H. S. (1997) Hegel’s Ladder: The Pilgrimage of Reason and the Odyssey of Spirit, I, pp. 39-47, 63-70 
13 Dale, E. M. (2014) Hegel, the End of History and the Future, pp. 111-60 
14 Zuckert, R. & Kreines, J. (2017) Introduction, p. 5; see, for example: Redding. P. (2017) Aristotelian Master and 
Stoic Slave: From Epistemic Assimilation to Cognitive Transformation, p. 72; Sidgewick, S. (2017) Remarks on 
History, Contingency and Necessity in Hegel’s Logic, p. 48 
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 If research on Hegel’s philosophy of history in the English-speaking world can be 
deemed to have developed only slightly past its infancy, the study of its receptions appears 
to be an even less charted territory.15 This is primarily due to the fact that the only substantial 
attempt to provide a broader illustration of Hegel’s European receptions is represented by a 
2013 volume edited by Lisa Herzog, Hegel’s Thought in Europe: Currents, Crosscurrents and 
Undercurrents. Adopting a comparative approach, this book claimed to be “the first to offer 
a broad perspective on different European non-Marxist receptions of Hegel’s philosophy in 
their different social and cultural contexts”.16 While providing interesting insights regarding 
some of the lesser-known aspects of Hegel’s receptions, such as the Russian and Danish ones, 
this book did not direct its focus to the thinker’s philosophy of history, restricting its 
discussion to its influence on Collingwood’s recognition of “the affinity between philosophy 
and history”.17  
 Plotted against other scholarly traditions, English-speaking researchers’ lack of 
attention to Hegel’s philosophy of history and its receptions, despite being understandable 
on the basis of anglophone countries’ markedly analytical traditions that made them less keen 
on engaging with the abstract nature of Hegel’s historicism, appears problematic. German 
scholarship, for example, can conveniently rely on a broader array of works reflecting on the 
philosopher’s receptions. Two issues of the Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung, for example, 
engaged with Hegel’s presence in nineteenth- and twentieth-century French philosophy, 
while a third one enlarged the scope of the analysis so as to include the far East.18 Similarly, 
several articles published in Hegel-Studien concentrated on commonly neglected contexts, 
such as the Netherlands, Spain and Scandinavia.19 Another notable example is represented 
                                                           
15 The only notable exception being Hegel’s reception by Marx and later Marxists. An overview of the 
historiography concerned with Marx’s reception of Hegel can be found in: Levine, N. (2006) Divergent Paths: the 
Hegelian Foundations of Marx’s Method, pp. 1-88; see also: Levine, N. (2012) Marx’s Discourse with Hegel, pp. 
278-97; Stedman Jones, G. (2011) The Young Hegelians, Marx and Engels, pp. 556-66 
16 This publication collected contributions initially presented at the conference “The Many Colours in 
Hegelianism – Hegel’s Philosophy and its International Reception”, taking place in Oxford on June 4 and 5, 2010. 
See: Herzog, L. (2010) The Many Colours in Hegelianism – Hegel’s Philosophy and its International Reception, pp. 
120-23; Herzog, L. (2013) Hegel’s Thought in Europe: Currents, Crosscurrents and Undercurrents, p. 3 
17 Browning, G. (2013) Rethinking Collingwood’s Hegel, p. 177 
18 see Schneider, H. (ed.) (2000) Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung, VI; Schneider. H. (ed.) (2001) Jahrbuch für 
Hegelforschung, VII; Schneider, H. (ed.) (2006) Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung, X 
19 Alvarez-Gómez, M. (1971) Zur gegenwärtigen Hegel-Rezeption in Spanien, pp. 279-94; de Folter, R. J. (1979) 
Van Ghert und der Hegelianismus in der Politik der Niederlande, pp. 243-77; Manninen, J. (2007) Staat und 
Bildung. Folgen und Folgerungen aus der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie in Finnland im Jahre 1830-1831, pp. 31-
50; Stewart, J. (2004) Johan Ludvig Heiberg and the Beginnings of the Hegel Reception in Denmark, pp. 141-81 
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by a 2011 volume edited by Thomas Wyrwich, Hegel in der neueren Philosophie, investigating 
Hegel’s reception in Germany and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, focusing 
on four thematic areas: neokantianism, phenomenology and ontology, Marxism, and 
postmodern philosophy.20 Ulrich Schneider, then, provided an interesting discussion of the 
“idiosyncratic” and often “improper” receptions enjoyed by Hegel in France, drawing 
particular attention to the ways in which French intellectuals’ initial engagement with the 
German thinker’s theories revolved around the systematic appropriation of his philosophy of 
history.21 In discussing Victor Cousin’s reception of Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie and the 
impact this process had among Neapolitan Hegelians, chapter one of this thesis is 
substantially indebted to this perspective.   
Important contributions to the study of Hegel’s reception were also provided by 
French scholars.22 The most substantial of these is represented by Alexandre Koyré’s 1961 
Parisian lectures on Hegel, which help to clarify Schneider’s characterisation of Hegel’s French 
reception as “idiosyncratic”. In his lectures, Koyré drew attention to the early nineteenth-
century French intellectual context, arguing that debates taking place in the country widely 
encouraged reliance on scientific thought, rather than the appropriation of idealist 
argumentation, or Hegel’s notorious anti-mathematicism.23 When discussing aspects of 
Hegel’s French reception, chapter one of this thesis will endorse Koyré’s arguments in order 
to illustrate how Victor Cousin amalgamated Hegel’s philosophy of history with his own 
psychologist tendencies. 
 German-speaking researchers engaging with Hegel’s reception occasionally touched 
upon its Italian example. Dina Edmundts, for instance, invited an illustration of the intellectual 
encounter of Vichianism and Hegelianism, pointing out that it was on the basis of their 
                                                           
20 Wyrwich, T. (ed.) (2011) Hegel in der neueren Philosophie; see also: Biemel, W. (1974) Die Phänomenologie 
des Geistes und die Hegel-Renaissance in Frankreich, pp. 643-55; Fetscher, I. (1953) Hegel in Frankreich, pp. 3-
15 
21 Schneider, U. J. (2009) Der französische Hegel, p. 8; see also: d’Hondt, J. (2009) Die populäre Hegel-Rezeption 
in Frankreich, pp. 19-31; Kelly, M. (1992) Hegel in France; Pillen, A. (2003) Hegel in Frankreich: vom unglücklichen 
Bewusstsein zur Unvernunft; Vermeren, P. (2009) Victor Cousins Hegel, pp. 33-48 
22 See, for example: Canguilhem, G. (1948) Hegel en France, pp. 282-97; Descombes, V. (1979) Le Meme et 
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respective attempts to devise a “uniform historical reality” that Italian intellectuals regarded 
the two thinkers as compatible with one another during the nineteenth century.24 This issue 
will be discussed in chapters two and three. Patrizia Hucke, then, adopted a comparative 
perspective to investigate the relationship between Karl Rosenkranz and Augusto Vera’s 
receptions of Hegel’s Logic, with which this thesis will take issue in chapter one.25 Maryam 
Mameghaian-Prenzlow further expanded on the intellectual encounter between Hegel’s 
thought and Italian intellectuals in her discussion of Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa’s 
Hegelianism, viewing the two brothers as the chief exponents of an idealist sensitivity in the 
peninsula.26 This topic will be discussed at various stages throughout this thesis: in particular, 
while the characterisation of Bertrando Spaventa as the leading figurehead of Neapolitan 
Hegelianism will be repeatedly endorsed, chapter four will contest the characterisation of 
Silvio as a Hegelian thinker after 1848. Further, Francesco De Sanctis’ “critical Hegelianism”, 
which this thesis will examine in chapter three, was the subject of an article by Marcello Pocai, 
who interrogated how De Sanctis’ version of Hegelianism came about as a result of several 
layers of revision.27 This thesis, however, will attempt to move beyond these works’ rather 
uncritical accounts of the intellectual developments they describe, placing greater emphasis 
on their transnational nature, on the one hand, and their relationship with the experience of 
changing socio-political contexts, such as the revolutionary turmoil of 1799 and 1848, the 
unification of Italy and the definition of Italy’s relation to Europe, on the other.  
 The most substantial scholarly attempts to explore Hegel’s Italian reception have 
unsurprisingly been provided by Italian researchers. The most notable contributions were 
penned by the two best-known commentators of the Risorgimento, Benedetto Croce and 
Giovanni Gentile. The former reflected on Hegel’s reception, especially among Neapolitan 
intellectuals, in a series of publications written during the first half of the twentieth century.28 
While he shared an evident intellectual affinity with nineteenth-century Neapolitan idealist 
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thinkers, Croce also had another reason to sympathise with them: his uncles were Bertrando 
and Silvio Spaventa. When a devastating earthquake hit the town of Casamicciola on July 28, 
1883, Croce’s home was completely destroyed and his entire family killed. As a result, Silvio, 
who, at the time was serving as Undersecretary for Internal Affairs among the ranks of the 
liberal Destra storica, invited his nephew to move into his home in Rome, where he spent 
three years, representing an important moment in his intellectual formation.29  
The influence of Silvio Spaventa had a profound effect on Croce’s discussion of 
Neapolitan Hegelianism and, broadly speaking, his interpretation of the Risorgimento.30 The 
tone of Croce’s argumentation was exceptionally teleological and, as it described Hegelianism 
as characteristically connected to the Piedmontese liberal ideology and the experience of the 
moderate Right in the years following the 1861 Unification. His verdict on Hegel’s Italian 
reception, in this sense, hinged on the acknowledgment that it was precisely thanks to Italian 
patriots’ contribution to the political history of the Risorgimento that the “conception, 
development and perfecting of liberty” theorised by Hegel had been turned into practice and 
active political life.31 
The discussion of Hegelianism from the standpoint of liberalism was not mere 
conjecture on the part of Croce. Rather, it was a consequence of his dialectic interpretation 
of history, which he termed “absolute historicism”.32 Already with his 1902 Estetica come 
scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale, Croce began articulating a historicist vision 
centered upon the dialectics of Spirit and the synthetic unity of its historical realisations.33 He 
insisted on this theme in the 1906 essay Ciò che é vivo e ciò che é morto della filosofia di Hegel, 
whose 1913 edition, published with the title Saggio sullo Hegel, quickly became a best-seller, 
maintaining that Hegel’s greatest accomplishment had been the theorisation of historical 
dialectics.34 Moreover, because the German philosopher had been “largely misunderstood” 
for decades, Croce claimed that Hegel’s canonical characterisation as an advocate of “pure 
idealism” was mistaken, suggesting that he should instead be regarded as a theorist of a 
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historicist understanding of reality. This, by positing the absolute identity of ideas and facts, 
resembled Neapolitan Hegelians’ amalgamation of Hegelianism and Vichianism discussed in 
chapters two and three of this thesis.35 This perspective, central to the making of Croce’s own 
historicism, was maintained, once again, in the 1909 volumes Logica come scienza del 
concetto puro and Filosofia della pratica, as well as the 1916 Teoria e storia della storiografia, 
which, in a markedly Hegelian fashion, reasoned around the postulation of philosophy 
(understood as Spirit’s self-generating activity) and history’s absolute identity.36 
History, according to Croce, seen as Spirit’s progressive self-realisation, was 
synonymous with the history of freedom, labelled “the explanatory principle of historical 
course” and “the moral ideal of humanity”.37 This ideal acquired a meta-political connotation 
in the opening pages of Croce’s Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono, discussing the 
emergence of a “religion of freedom” (“religione della libertà”) that found, after the 
Napoleonic age, its realisation in liberal political forms.38 Alongside the characterisation of 
the nineteenth century and, in consequence, of the Risorgimento as the progressive unfolding 
of liberty came a powerful indictment of present-day “antidemocratic” forces opposing liberal 
regimes.39 Similarly, in Storia d’Italia, a text written while witnessing the “destruction of all 
that we held dear and sacred in the world” during the inter-war years, the illiberal, 
antidemocratic and nationalist tendencies promoted by D’Annunzio, socialists and Mussolini 
were seen as liberal Italy’s chief enemies.40 Thus imagined, Hegel’s works did not merely 
represent, for Croce, a source of philosophical inspiration: rather, they informed his reading 
of Italian and European history that championed liberalism as a historically necessary 
alternative to nationalisms, socialism and fascism. 
Giovanni Gentile’s articles published in 1912 in the periodical La Critica also constitute 
a precious source of information concerning Hegel’s Italian reception.41 Yet, while these 
writings provide valuable insights concerning the emergence of a Hegelian movement in 
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Naples, they appear to be inspired by a teleological approach akin to Croce’s, albeit informed 
by a radically different ideological and political inclination. While Croce had reflected on the 
perceived connection between Hegelianism and liberalism, Gentile drew attention to the 
alleged anti-liberal use of Hegel’s philosophy among Neapolitan Hegelians, especially after 
1848 and in the works of Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa. In Bertrando’s political writings of 
the 1850s, for instance, Gentile found a theorisation of an ethical State, which he identified 
with the fascist project.42 Following Spaventa in believing that the ethical purpose of the State 
was to reconcile the inner divisions of the national community in a common will, the Sicilian 
philosopher maintained that an authoritarian state was especially able to accomplish this 
goal, even if doing so meant resorting to extreme forms of coercion.43 Broadly speaking, this 
attitude reflected Gentile’s own political allegiances and, in particular, his interpretation of 
the Risorgimento, famously understood as the antechamber of the fascist experience.44 
Being inseparable from their proponents’ political sympathies, Croce and Gentile’s 
verdicts on the presence of Hegel’s philosophy among Italian intellectuals, reflecting broader 
considerations on the historical significance of the Risorgimento, understandably resulted in 
later historiography’s attempts to disentangle the analysis of Hegel’s reception from the 
ideological superstructures imposed by Croce and Gentile.45 Central to historians’ attempt to 
move beyond their predecessors’ interpretations was a tendency to examine in greater detail 
the intellectual exchanges that led to the emergence of a Hegelian school of thought in the 
southern capital and the rest of the peninsula. Mario Rossi’s Sviluppi dello hegelismo in Italia, 
for instance, was the first to examine closely the encounter of Italian and German 
intellectuals, looking, especially in the first sections of the book, at the contexts enabling 
Italian thinkers to engage with Hegel’s works in their original language.46 Later studies by 
Luciano Aguzzi and Piero Di Giovanni expanded on Rossi’s arguments, ultimately underlining 
the centrality of Ottavio Colecchi, Domenico Mazzoni and Giambattista Passerini in the initial 
reception of Hegel in Italy, applauding these authors for establishing a direct avenue of 
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exchange between Italian and German intellectuals.47 Chapter one of this thesis will take issue 
with these interpretations, challenging the idea that those thinkers could rely on a substantial 
knowledge of Hegel’s works, due to their allegiance to different philosophical agendas, on the 
one hand, and contextual factors, on the other. As a result, chapter one will argue that 
Hegelianism made its way to the southern capital thanks to a more complex intellectual 
exchange, connecting Germany to Naples via France.   
The name of Augusto Vera was also commonly referenced in connection with the 
popularisation of Hegel’s ideas in Italy, primarily thanks to his translations from German to 
French of Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften and Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Geschichte.48  Chapter one will contest the alleged centrality of Vera’s 
contribution, suggesting that, due to his superficial, and often erratic, knowledge of Hegel’s 
thought, as well as contextual factors, his importance in the dissemination of idealist 
philosophy in the Italian peninsula was ultimately exaggerated by later commentators.  
Research on Hegel’s reception in Italy, then, often highlighted the presence of 
historicist motives borrowed from Giambattista Vico’s historicism in Neapolitan Hegelians’ 
written output.49 Expanding on this tradition, chapter two will concentrate on the early 
nineteenth-century re-discovery of Vico’s philosophy of history, focusing on debates 
concerned with the nature of historical development, representing the intellectual context 
informing Hegel’s reception. More importantly, drawing upon historiographical insights by 
Isaiah Berlin, Arnaldo Momigliano and Joseph Mali, chapter two will attempt to view 
ninteteenth-century debates on Vico from a transnational perspective, ultimately suggesting 
that Vichianism and Hegelianism’s encounter in the Mezzogiorno was enabled by a broader, 
European, re-imagining of the Neapolitan thinker’s historicism consistent with the emerging 
idealist worldview.50 By reflecting on how Neapolitan Hegelians wove aspects of Hegel’s 
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Geschichtsphilosophie into the fabric of Vico’s historicism, these observations will be useful, 
in chapters two and three, in characterising Hegel’s Neapolitan reception as a process of 
systematic amalgamation with the local tradition of thought, rather than mere appropriation 
or passive absorption. 
Italian scholarship on Hegelianism’s local reception, then, often concentrated almost 
univocally on the main writings by a select number of authors, primarily Francesco De Sanctis 
and Bertrando Spaventa. In La cultura filosofica napoletana dell’ottocento, for example, 
Guido Oldrini reflected on the emergence of a philosophical sensitivity encouraging a greater 
engagement with foreign forms of thought, but his analysis revolved chiefly around a 
discussion of Francesco De Sanctis’ lectures on the history of literature and Bertrando 
Spaventa’s 1850 work Pensieri sull’insegnamento della filosofia.51 In a similar manner, Nicola 
Caputo, in his 2006 monograph Bertrando Spaventa e la sua scuola. Saggio storico-teoretico, 
aimed at reconstructing the philosopher’s intellectual development, but ultimately provided 
only a detailed analysis of his relationship to Ottavio Colecchi.52 Additionally, studies by 
Gaetano Origo and Giovanni Rota singled out Bertrando’s theory of European thought’s 
circularity, initially appeared in his university lectures of 1860-61, as illustrative of his broader 
philosophical outlook, hence largely overlooking the importance of texts written during the 
previous two decades, let alone of other authors.53  
While the textual analysis operated by these contributions is remarkable, especially in 
the case of the often-referenced volume by Oldrini, this thesis will attempt to provide a wider 
and richer understanding of Neapolitan Hegelianism, concentrating more closely on 
contributions by often neglected authors and interrogating commonly overlooked contexts. 
In particular, chapters one and three will detail the process by which southern Italian thinkers, 
mainly Stefano Cusani and Stanislao Gatti, attempted to disaggregate Hegel’s philosophy of 
history from Victor Cousin’s composite philosophical approach, known as “eclecticism”. 
Moreover, chapter three will discuss the teaching of Hegel in Naples’ private schools of 
philosophy, whose examination is of prime importance in articulating a convincing definition 
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of Neapolitan Hegelianism’s character and intellectual agenda. Chapter four will concentrate 
on both Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa’s writings for the periodical Il Nazionale, whose use of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history in support of the Revolution of 1848 has been analysed by only 
a very limited number of studies.54 Chapter five, instead, will supplement historians’ reading 
of Bertrando Spaventa’s theory of European thought’s circularity, illustrated in the volume La 
filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea, by viewing this text in relation to 
its intellectual context, represented by the transnational sensitivities being developed in 
Naples during the late 1830s and ‘40s, broader Italian debates concerned with the 
relationship between Italian philosophy and its modern European counterpart, as well as 
Bertrando’s own writings of the 1850s.  
 Furthermore, it must be noted how Italian scholarship on Hegelianism’s presence in 
the peninsula endeavoured to address the often-problematic relationship between 
Neapolitan Hegelian thinkers and the political history of Italy during the Risorgimento. These 
attempts placed very little emphasis on the profound theoretical and political differences 
emerging between Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa after the defeat of the 1848 Revolution. 
These studies almost exclusively focused on Silvio, underlining his use of Hegelianism, 
particularly the German thinker’s notion of Rechtsstaat, as a means to provide an ideological 
and philosophical backbone to Piedmontese liberalism.55 Chapter four of this thesis will take 
a strong stance against these scholarly verdicts, suggesting that the characterisation of Silvio 
Spaventa as a Hegelian thinker after 1848 is untenable.  
It may also come as a surprise to notice that only a small number of studies 
approached Bertrando Spaventa’s writings from the same perspective, interrogating their 
relevance to the political history of the Risorgimento, despite the significant attention paid 
by historians to his philosophical reflections.56 Many of these studies, however, especially the 
often-cited works by Sergio Landucci and Giuseppe Vacca, investigated Spaventa’s 
Hegelianism via the study of its influence on Antonio Labriola and Antonio Gramsci’s Marxism 
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and, in this sense, did not provide an exhaustive illustration of Bertrando’s own relationship 
with political debates and experiences taking place before 1861.57 In response to these 
problems, chapter four will reflect on Spaventa’s involvement in the revolutionary turmoil of 
1848, via an analysis of his writings for Il Nazionale. In this thesis, the discussion of these texts, 
while showing how the author defended a democratic form of constitutionalism, will remain 
disconnected from its reception among later thinkers. Furthermore, the examination of 
Bertrando’s written output published during the 1850s will reveal the extent to which the 
democratic orientation resulting from his involvement with Il Nazionale in 1848 remained 
central to his political vision even during the following decade, reflecting an attitude often 
overlooked by historians. This will ultimately enable chapter four to rethink the broader 
relationship between Hegelianism and Risorgimento political thought. 
 Re-defining the links between Neapolitan Hegelianism and the experience of the 
Risorgimento will then inevitably urge this thesis to come to terms with larger scholarly 
debates on this period of Italian history. Crucially, the role of southern idealist thinkers was 
often ignored by recent studies. In La nazione del Risorgimento, for instance, Alberto Mario 
Banti’s discussion of the period relied extensively on a historically debatable notion of 
“Risorgimento canon”, which has been contested, primarily on methodological grounds, by 
later commentators.58 Additionally, Banti’s study largely neglected the Mezzogiorno’s 
philosophical input in the process of Italian emancipation and unification. Christopher 
Duggan, in his well-known 2007 volume The Force of Destiny, managed to disentangle the 
study of the Risorgimento from Banti’s approach, disclosing a deeper relationship between 
political ideals and the experience of this period. While Duggan’s book traced the genealogy 
of Risorgimento political thought back to European romantic ideals, an intuition that chapters 
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two and four of this thesis will be indebted to, German idealism, as well as its various 
receptions, remained extraneous to his analysis.59  
In her 2010 study Italian Vices, Silvana Patriarca concentrated on the definition of an 
Italian national character hinging on the internalisation of a number of foreign stereotypes of 
Italian attitudes.60 Her emphasis on European imagination’s impact on Italy, however, left 
little room for the discussion of those contributions, such as Neapolitan Hegelians’, operating 
a positive re-evaluation of the country’s national character vis-à-vis a transnational, European 
experience of modernity. Chapter five of this thesis, therefore, will attempt to address this 
imbalance. Lastly, in a series of works, most notably The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society 
and National Unification in 1994, Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to the 
Nation State in 2009 and The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in 19th Century 
Italy, edited with Silvana Patriarca in 2012, Lucy Riall attempted to mediate among competing 
interpretations of the Risorgimento, while, at the same time, rehabilitating some of the most 
commonly underrepresented narratives, such as the intersection of gender norms and 
military ideals or the history of emotions, but failed, despite her emphasis on the 
Mezzogiorno, to turn her attention to Neapolitan Hegelians’ role in the cultural and political 
emancipation of Italy, a topic that will be amply discussed in chapters four and five of this 
thesis.61 
This research will be particularly sensitive to recent scholarly developments 
encouraging a transnational approach to the study of Italian history. In a recent special issue 
of Modern Italy, Oliver Janz and Lucy Riall drew attention to the need, for historians, to 
challenge “the sense of exceptionality that has been such a dominant feature of Risorgimento 
historiography”, urging to view the process of Italian emancipation and unification as 
characterised by an ongoing engagement with a European dimension of political and 
intellectual life.62 As a result, historical research has interrogated the articulation of Italy’s 
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national character and the development of political ideals during the nineteenth century 
beyond a national framework. David Laven and Laura Parker, for example, located Venetians’ 
relationship with the Habsburg empire within a transnational cultural space, suggesting that 
an indiscriminate reliance on national categories of analysis within the “multinational” empire 
might “distort” researchers’ perception of its history.63 
In Risorgimento in Exile, Maurizio Isabella provided an analysis of this period from the 
perspective of patriots in exile, examining the latter’s impact on the period’s political thought 
and imagination, and hinging on “forms of intellectual transnationalism” pointing to “multiple 
ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states”.64 
Hovering skilfully between intellectual and cultural history, Axel Körner explored the 
internationalisation of Italian opera theatres during the nineteenth century and, in his most 
recent book, America in Italy, he investigated the ways in which Risorgimento political 
thought was shaped by debates on the American Revolution and the US constitution, seen 
under the light of a European intellectual tradition, ranging from Giambattista Vico to Voltaire 
and Montesquieu.65 This thesis will be greatly indebted to the transnational approach taken 
by these works, as it will consider not only how Hegelianism influenced Italian philosophy, 
but also how southern intellectuals employed concepts borrowed from the local tradition to 
interpret and, to a large extent, revise Hegel’s ideas. 
A transnational understanding of the Risorgimento, in this sense, revolves around the 
investigation of the ongoing dialogue between the endogenous and exogenous forces acting 
upon the process of Italian unification, the articulation of the peninsula’s national character 
and, broadly speaking, Italians’ imagination. This entails the need to take issue with 
historiographical traditions understanding Italian intellectuals’ engagement with foreign 
ideas as a passive process of reception and demonstrate, instead, how these were 
systematically amalgamated with Italy’s own past and cultural traditions. This approach is by 
no means confined to the study of the Risorgimento. In a recent study entitled Italien in 
Europa. Die Zirkulation der Ideen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, for instance, Thomas Kroll and 
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Frank Jung expanded on a historiographical approach initiated by Franco Venturi and Carlo 
Capra, and proceeded to highlight the centrality of Italian eighteenth-century intellectual 
history within an increasingly transnational picture of the European Enlightenment.66  
Moreover, in his 2005 study The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 
1680-1760, John Robertson argued against John Pocock’s fragmentation of the 
Enlightenment into a multiplicity of separate traditions, and, adopting a comparative 
methodology, he investigated “similarity amid difference: the presence of a common 
Enlightenment in the two very different ‘national’ contexts of Scotland and Naples”.67 Central 
to Robertson’s volume was the thesis that intellectuals in Naples and Scotland, such as 
Giambattista Vico, Antonio Genovesi and David Hume, even if writing in geographically 
different contexts, “saw themselves as members of a wider, European intellectual 
movement”.68 As such, they shared common intellectual preoccupations and contributed in 
equal measure to the emergence of “one Enlightenment”, defining “the cause of human 
betterment on earth” in terms of political economy.69 The views presented in these works, 
especially Robertson’s framing of Vichianism in a European context, will be of prime 
importance for this thesis: for instance, as chapter two will demonstrate, debates on 
Giambattista Vico’s historicism during the early decades of the nineteenth century went well 
beyond the Italian context, and acquired an unquestionably European dimension, 
representing the context for Hegelianism’s revision in Italy and, to a large extent, France. 
Other studies adopted a transnational framework in order to view the Risorgimento 
as part of a Mediterranean experience of modern political and intellectual life, following and, 
in many respects, reacting to Fernand Braudel’ discussion of the sea as a category of historical 
analysis.70 Gilles Pécout, for example, characterised the Risorgimento as a narrative of the 
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Mediterranean regions, rather than one merely taking place in them.71 In a similar manner, 
Marta Petrusewicz explored the “Mediterranean dimension” of southern Italy, highlighting 
the presence of relational networks and commercial practices giving the Mezzogiorno an 
idiosyncratic status, on the one hand, but emphasising its centrality, on the other, within a 
context understood as a “fragmented topography of micro-regions”, a splintered world 
nonetheless united by its very interconnectedness.72  
Lastly, a recent volume edited by Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou further 
insisted on the use of the Mediterranean as a category of historical analysis. By providing an 
image of nineteenth-century Mediterranean Europe “much larger than its geographical 
boundaries”, “a malleable space of contact, encounter, entanglement and interaction among 
its diverse and heterogeneous people”, the two authors challenged traditional views 
portraying this region as a backward periphery of a more advanced and progressive European 
North.73 This thesis will make use of transnational historiographical approaches slotting the 
study of nineteenth-century Italy within the narrative of Europe’s alleged “peripheries”, as it 
will discuss, in chapter five, how, by engaging with a purely European dimension of 
philosophical life, Neapolitan Hegelians directly responded to idiosyncratic characterisations 
of Italy’s tradition of thought, on the one hand, and, more importantly, to its systematic 
marginalisation, on the other.  
These observations on centres and peripheries intuitively lead to another set of 
considerations. Because this thesis will chiefly concentrate on the intellectual history of 
Naples, it will inevitably engage with historiographical debates concerned with the analysis of 
that which has too often been seen as the most marginal region of Europe’s southernmost 
periphery: the Mezzogiorno. Since the late 1980s, historians have been questioning with ever-
increasing frequency the dualistic division between an advanced northern Italy and its 
perceived unruly, backward, southern counterpart, suggesting that, far from being just a 
“question” or a “problem”, the South was a “piece of the world” demanding analysis in its 
own terms.74 This rapidly led to the proliferation of new ways of writing the history of 
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Southern Italy.75 In his study Darkest Italy, for instance, John Dickie investigated “the role that 
representations of the South played in forming notions of an Italian national identity”, in 
order to explore the thematisation of the South as “an Other to Italy”.76 In a similar manner, 
Nelson Moe, in his book The View from Vesuvius, interrogated the progressive orientalisation 
of the Mezzogiorno in the Italian cultural context, plotting it against the broader dichotomy 
between a European centre and its Mediterranean periphery. According to Moe, Eurocentric 
Northern Italian élites attempted to rethink the indiscriminate characterisation of Italy as 
Europe’s South, insisting that the Mezzogiorno was, in many ways, more prominently 
“southern” than the rest of the peninsula.77  
These studies will provide, in chapter five, the framework not only for a discussion of 
the perceived alterity of Italy’s intellectual tradition in the context of a European experience 
of modernity, but also its internalisation by those, such as the northern author Vincenzo 
Gioberti, who strongly rejected any form of engagement with foreign philosophical 
landscapes.78 Moreover, in Naples and Napoleon, John Davis contested the definition of the 
Mezzogiorno as “a recognisable metaphor of pre-modernity”, investigating how local 
experiences of political change would project the region “at the centre of the political storms 
that swept through Europe”.79 Deploying a similar line of argumentation, chapter four will 
show how the historical memory of Neapolitans’ revolutionary experiences was fully 
projected onto national debates on Italy’s emancipation and unification, while chapter five 
will discuss how intellectuals in the South saw themselves as fully engaged with a European 
dimension of cultural and philosophical life. 
A new history of the Mezzogiorno is by no means confined to the realms of intellectual 
and cultural history alone. In her seminal work Latifondo, for example, Marta Petrusewicz 
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challenged traditional Marxist and liberal views focusing on the economic backwardness and 
political disorganisation as the chief characteristics of the South during the nineteenth 
century. Her analysis concentrated on the Calabrian big landed estate, the latifundium, 
described as a hybrid of modern capitalist and non-capitalist models, which, by reflecting a 
distinctive modern economic mentality, would project local markets to a European dimension 
of economic life, while still retaining idiosyncratic, semi-feudal traits.80  
In a similar manner, Paolo Pezzino’s study Local Power in Southern Italy challenged 
traditional understandings of local élites, emphasising how historians generally neglected the 
issues connected with the emergence of new classes.81 Reflecting these studies’ attempts to 
draw attention to underrepresented power relations and socio-economic contexts, chapter 
three will discuss Hegel’s reception and amalgamation with Vico in the often-neglected 
context of Neapolitan private schools of philosophy. As this chapter will demonstrate, the 
study of private schools’ contribution to the intellectual history of the Mezzogiorno is crucial 
not only in articulating an understanding of the dynamics of education in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies, but also in unveiling how local authors encouraged intellectual innovation via a 
systematic engagement with European thought at large. This chapter will thus challenge 
historiographical verdicts suggesting that the allegedly peripheral status of the Mezzogiorno 
vis-à-vis a European dimension of cultural production could be explained on the basis of 
repressive educational policies promoted by the Bourbons, severely discouraging any form of 
engagement with foreign cultural landscapes.82 There is evidence that foreign philosophy was 
very much thriving in the Neapolitan cultural landscape and this thesis is also an attempt to 
interrogate its centrality in the region’s intellectual history. 
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iii. A Transnational Study in Intellectual History: Methodology 
 
Given the range of topics explored, the diversity of the contexts illustrated and the plurality 
of the cultural and political experiences discussed, this thesis will adopt a composite 
methodological approach, able to mediate among several, often competing, perspectives in 
the study of intellectual history, chiefly transnational history, the contextual methodology 
popularised by the Cambridge School, Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte, and 
Rezeptionstheorie. First of all, it must be noted that the actual notion of “Neapolitan 
Hegelianism” already hints at the dual nature of this school of thought, emerging as the result 
of an interplay between exogenous forces borrowed from the German idealist tradition and 
endogenous ones, namely the local, Neapolitan, tradition.  
A transnational approach, in this sense, able to account for Hegelianism’s 
“movement” towards the Mezzogiorno, as well as its local reception, constitutes the general 
framework for this research. In his discussion of transnational history, Akira Iriye described it 
as “the study of movements and forces that have cut across national boundaries”, a definition 
that conveniently lends itself to the discussion of the intellectual encounters and exchanges 
among Italian and European intellectuals presented in this work.83 A transnational approach 
is therefore distinct from a merely comparative one.84 As highlighted by several among its 
advocates, transnationalism is a means of avoiding the reification of ideas stemming from the 
oversimplified analysis of transnational encounters on the basis of comparative perspectives 
alone, which ultimately fail to “transcend the boundaries of nationalist historiography”.85 As 
such, it places greater attention on the the study of ideas’ movement, transfer and circulation 
in terms of “border-crossing”.86 The adoption of a transnational methodology, however, 
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comes with a caveat: historians often highlighted how placing ideas’ within supra- and 
transnational contexts might reify and relativise their significance. In consequence, they 
urged to reflect on how those exchanges and encounters, which transnational history 
engages with, are themselves generative of meaning.87  
Given historians’ exhortations to distance transnational history from national 
perspectives by examining dynamics of transmission and circulation occurring across national 
borders, the image of transnational history emerging from their observations is one 
characterised by remarkable conceptual flexibility. At the same time, scholars repeatedly 
warned that transnationalism’s openness as a historical concept could be seen as a lack of 
methodological rigour or conceptual looseness.88 Rather than being a limitation, however, 
this represents an important resource, able to avoid the risk of teleological explanations and 
ensure pluralism.89 Transnationalism’s plasticity opens up a range of possibilities, most 
notably that of relying on Histoire Croisée’s focus on the historical interconnectedness of 
different communicative spaces, such as cultures, nation-states, linguistic communities and 
political languages. In particular, being able to illuminate the ways in which the intersection 
of historically constituted formations is generative of meaning in different contexts, Histoire 
Croisée can conveniently direct historians’ analysis of circulation and transmission dynamics 
that transnational history must engage with.90  
These considerations will significantly inform the characterisation of Neapolitan 
Hegelianism proposed in this thesis. In particular, this philosophy’s emergence will be 
discussed, in chapter one, in relation to a polycentric understanding of idealist philosophy, 
whose dissemination in Europe will be said to have stemmed not only from mechanisms of 
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exchange and transmission, but also by distinct layers of often competing interpretations and 
revisions. Southern thinkers’ reflections on Victor Cousin’s use of Hegelian categories, in this 
sense, will be adopted as evidence of the many ramifications of Hegel’s ideas, on the one 
hand, and of the inherently pluralistic nature of their receptions, on the other. Moreover, the 
amalgamation of Hegelian and Vichian concepts explored in chapters two and three will 
further contribute to a transnational characterisation of Neapolitan Hegelianism, whose 
emergence and development will thus be rescued from the restrictive framework of a 
national narrative only, on the one hand, and from a merely comparative perspective, on the 
other. 
As a result, because the idiosyncratic character of Hegelianism in the southern capital 
will be defined as the outcome of the encounter between an idealist account of historical 
development and historicist motives borrowed from Giambattista Vico’s Scienza nuova, it will 
be necessary for this thesis to pay close attention to local contexts and debates, for the 
purpose of interrogating the emergence of the historicist intellectual fabric within which the 
Hegelian Weltgeschichte was woven. A transnational approach, in short, ought to be 
complemented with the detailed analysis of how Neapolitan Hegelians’ ways of engaging with 
the German thinker’s ideas – as well as their own written output – can also be redescribed as 
responses to local intellectual and political contexts.   
The contextual methodology of analysis perfected by what is often referred to as “the 
Cambridge school” will be an important tool in interrogating authors’ philosophical 
inclinations and intentions in relation to their historical contexts.91 This will not be limited to 
the examination of Hegelian philosophy of history’s amalgamation with Vichian historicism. 
Chapter four, for example, will investigate Neapolitan Hegelians’ political language on the 
basis of their ideological standpoint, ultimately providing a characterisation of their use – and 
revision – of the Hegelian concepts of freedom and State informed by the historical memory 
of the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution, the experience of the 1848 Revolution, and debates on 
Italian Unification. In a similar manner, an attempt to read Bertrando Spaventa’s theory of 
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European thought’s circularity in the context of ongoing debates on Italy’s cultural 
emancipation will enable chapter five to provide a clearer definition of the author’s intention: 
this entailed not only defending Italian philosophy’s authority vis-à-vis foreign forms of 
thought, but also championing its centrality in the making of a distinctly modern and 
European intellectual tradition. 
 The way in which contextual analysis has traditionally been carried out, however, will 
often be at odds with the themes and the scope of the present research, mainly for two 
reasons: first, the adoption of a transnational framework of analysis inevitably complicates 
the definition of the intellectual contexts that the Cambridge school would concentrate on; 
second, the debates on Hegel and Vico’s philosophies of history illustrated in this thesis, when 
understood as attempts to negotiate perceptions of change in historical time, signal 
conceptual shifts going beyond the linguistic contextualism chiefly proposed by Quentin 
Skinner and John Pocock. The latter problem, in particular, is effectively addressed by 
Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte, which understands itself as a form of social history, 
and believes it impossible to comprehend a given society’s politics without examining the 
concepts through which this is conceived and practiced: simply put, in order to make sense 
of societies’ political life, one must understand the Begriffe with which they they think and 
speak about themselves.  
Begriffsgeschichte is useful to overcome some of the limitations characterising works 
by Cambridge-trained intellectual historians. These scholars, in fact, have rarely ventured 
beyond the early modern period. In contrast, according to Koselleck, the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, a period labelled “Sattelzeit” (“saddle-time”), brought about the 
emergence of distinctly modern Begriffe, giving socio-political languages a new meaning on 
the basis of conceptual shifts occurring at an increasingly accelerated pace.92 An approach 
explaining conceptual changes, as well as the consequent modifications in political, social and 
philosophical languages on the basis of shifting experiences of historical time easily lends 
itself to the examination, in chapters four and five, of the ways in which the characteristically 
modern, Hegelian and Vichian, Begriffe of time and history were consistently used by 
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Neapolitan Hegelians as the philosophical backbone of their intellectual and political agendas, 
ultimately informing the political language and argumentation that Cambridge-trained 
historians of ideas would focus on. For example, it was on the basis of their reflections on – 
and experience of – a modern understanding of temporality that southern thinkers upheld 
democratic constitutionalism against the Bourbon monarchy in 1848, as illustrated in the 
articles appearing in the periodical Il Nazionale. 
 These observations point at another limitation of Cambridge contextualism, which 
seldom went beyond the analysis of political languages. Yet, chapters one, two and three of 
this thesis, by investigating the reception of Hegel’s philosophy of history and its 
amalgamation with Vichian historicism, will concentrate, consistent with the aims of 
Begriffsgeschichte, on broader shifts occurring beyond political vocabularies. For example, 
the definition of historical time in Neapolitan Hegelians’ imagination will be illustrated on the 
basis of changing conceptualisations of historical development, following a diachronic, 
transnational pattern connecting Victor Cousin’s use of rational psychology alongside a 
Hegelian notion of development with Francesco De Sanctis’ definition of a “dual”, bi-
directional, historiographical method, via Vincenzo Cuoco’s problematisation of the two kinds 
of history presented in Vico’s Scienza nuova. In a similar manner, chapter five will argue that 
a compelling understanding of Bertrando Spaventa’s theory of European thought’s circularity 
can be obtained not only by assessing the author’s intention via contextual analysis, but also, 
and much more prominently, by viewing its formulation in connection with competing 
experiences of temporality and concepts of modernity emerging in a broader, European, 
intellectual space.  
 These examples highlight the need to take into account the temporal dimension of 
ideas and their use, hence going beyond the perspective of linguistic action and the 
synchronic analysis of languages, authorial intention and contexts. The Cambridge school 
would undoubtedly disagree with this agenda: already in 1985, for instance, Quentin Skinner 
took issue with the analysis of ideas beyond their “uses in arguments”.93 This objection 
appeared with even greater force in a 1988 work, stating that “in spite of the long continuities 
that have undoubtedly marked our inherent patterns of thought, […] there can be no histories 
of concepts; there can only be histories of their uses in argument”.94 John Pocock would not 
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be sympathetic to the exploration of the temporal dimension of ideas, either, as he found 
himself in agreement with Skinner in conceiving intellectual history as “a history of things 
done with language”.95  
 In this thesis, therefore, Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte will represent a formidable 
means of addressing how the dynamics of Hegel’s reception, as well as his philosophy of 
history’s merging with Vichian historicism, reflected deeper diachronic shifts in the 
conceptual morphology of notions of “time”, “history”, “progress” and “historical 
development”, going beyond their mere use in language. This is by no means a subtlety, as it 
demands, as highlighted by Koselleck himself, the inclusion of a broader array of sources in 
the definition of intellectual context.96 Nowhere will this intuition be as evident as in chapter 
two: this, in fact, will point at the difficulties in identifying a continuity between Vichian 
historicism and Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie on the basis of a stringent contextual analysis 
alone. Rather, it will view their amalgamation in Naples in light of broader debates, taking 
place in Italy with Vincenzo Cuoco, Giandomenico Romagnosi and Carlo Cattaneo, and in 
France with Jules Michelet. These authors, by signalling diachronic conceptual shifts 
connected with notions of progress and historical development, paved the way for an 
increasingly idealist interpretation of La scienza nuova, ultimately enabling Neapolitan 
intellectuals to regard Vico’s masterpiece as fully complementary to Hegel’s idea of 
Weltgeschichte. As a result, the characterisation of Neapolitan Hegelianism provided in this 
thesis will be informed not only by the deployment of Hegel and Vico’s ideas in southern 
thinkers’ language and argumentation, but also by broader conceptual changes in the 
Koselleckian Temporalgestalten, namely the temporal categories adopted to interpret their 
ideas in the first place.97 
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iv. Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis will discuss Hegelianism’s reception, circulation and revision among Neapolitan 
authors, as well as their contributions to the political thought of the Risorgimento and the 
definition of Italy’s position in the cultural and political geography of modern Europe, over 
the course of five chapters. It will provide, in chapter one, an analysis of the intellectual 
exchanges that enabled Hegel’s philosophy of history to access the Neapolitan intellectual 
context. More specifically, this section will begin by problematising and ultimately refuting 
the notion of a direct encounter between southern Italian and German thinkers during the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, consequently suggesting that idealist philosophy’s 
dissemination in the Mezzogiorno took place via indirect avenues. It will then move on to 
illustrate the mediation of French intellectuals, particularly visible in Victor Cousin’s 
Fragments philosophiques, in which the Frenchman’s so-called “eclectic” method consisted 
of the use of a Hegelian notion of historical development alongside rational psychology. 
Lastly, drawing extensively on essays by Ottavio Colecchi and Pasquale Galluppi, as well as 
articles appearing in Neapolitan periodicals during the 1830s, penned by Stefano Cusani, 
Stanislao Gatti and Luigi Blanch, this chapter will examine how southern intellectuals matured 
a substantial knowledge of Hegelian philosophy of history, particularly an absolute 
understanding of historical development, by reflecting on Cousin’s Fragments, dissecting his 
eclectic method and ultimately isolating its constitutive elements.  
 Chapter two, instead, will focus on the ongoing re-discovery of Giambattista Vico’s 
philosophy of history during the early decades of the 1800s, as well as its systematic re-
imagining in increasingly idealist terms. It will begin by problematising the presence of Vico’s 
thought in the German intellectual landscape, claiming that a direct continuity between these 
two traditions of thought cannot be inferred on the basis of textual or contextual analysis 
alone. As a result, it will be necessary to view the idealist revision of Vichian history in light of 
broader debates, taking place both in Italy and abroad. Drawing extensively upon 
contributions by Jules Michelet in France, and Vincenzo Cuoco, Giandomenico Romangosi and 
Carlo Cattaneo in Italy, this chapter will examine a growing interest in concepts of progress, 
perfectibility and historical development, contributing to the emergence of an increasingly 
linear and teleological understanding of historical time, ultimately paving the way for a new 
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understanding of Vico’s Scienza nuova that resonated well with the emerging European 
idealist sensitivities.  
Chapter three will focus more closely on the phenomenon of Neapolitan private 
schools, seen as the context in which the amalgamation of Vico and Hegel’s philosophies of 
history finally took place. It will begin with an account of these institutions’ dissemination 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, and will posit, contrary to historiographical 
verdicts emphasising the Bourbons’ allegedly repressive and illiberal attitude in educational 
matters, that their popularity was indeed the result of the crown’s rather liberal approach to 
education in the Kingdom. This was revealed by their promotion of private initiatives, 
denoting an outlook that was indeed remarkably progressive, if plotted against other Italian 
states and European nations’ reactions to the revolutionary events of 1820-23. The chapter 
will then discuss the presence of foreign, particularly German, philosophy in Neapolitan 
private schools: in their institutes, in fact, Pasquale Galluppi and Ottavio Colecchi engaged 
with Kantianism. Their use of Kantian categories, however, did not stem from a mere process 
of absorption. Rather, it was indebted to the systematic amalgamation of the German 
thinker’s ideas with, unsurprisingly, Giambattista Vico’s, enabling them to articulate a 
markedly anti-metaphysical reading of Kant’s ideas, on the one hand, and further 
corroborating southern intellectuals’ theorisation of thematic and methodological 
continuities between present-day German thought and the Neapolitan Enlightenment 
tradition, on the other.  
Lastly, this chapter will move on to examine how Galluppi and Colecchi’s attempts to 
merge local and foreign thought were perpetuated by members of the Hegelian Neapolitan 
generation in their private schools: while Stefano Cusani and Stanislao Gatti encouraged an 
encounter of Hegelianism and Vichianism along the anti-metaphysical lines theorised by their 
mentors, it was in Francesco De Sanctis’ private school that the full merging of these two 
traditions ultimately took place. In an attempt to craft “an intimate union of philosophy and 
history, of the idea and the fact”, by empowering Vichian historicism with a distinctly modern 
account of progress and liberating Hegel’s Weltgeschichte from “pure abstraction”, De Sanctis 
elaborated a bi-directional historiographical model, revolving around the dialectics of a 
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“historical method” (“metodo storico”) and a “logical method” (“metodo logico”), borrowed 
from Vico and Hegel, respectively.98  
Following this characterisation of Neapolitan Hegelianism, chapter four will discuss 
how these ideas were deployed in the context of the Italian Risorgimento, focusing, in 
particular, on the experience of the 1848 Revolution and debates on the Italian Unification. 
This section of the thesis will begin by examining the ways in which the historical memory of 
the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution permeated the definition and characterisation of an Italian 
national character in 1848. More importantly, the events of 1799 were slotted in a markedly 
Hegelian historical teleology, viewing revolutionary experiences as necessary steps in the 
progressive realisation of liberty in history. Neapolitan Hegelians’ contributions, appearing in 
the pages of the short-lived periodical Il Nazionale, aptly reflected the encounter of Hegelian 
and Vichian themes, as they viewed the movement of Hegel’s Weltgeist to depend on the 
realisation of tangible pre-conditions for political emancipation. This is why the writers of Il 
Nazionale believed it necessary for absolute freedom to latch onto man-made (in a Vichian 
sense) institutions and forms of social organisation. These were promptly identified, contrary 
to the prevailing political agends of other 1848 revolutionaries, with the consolidation of an 
Italian nation-state and the strengthening of the Italian national character.  
Having Neapolitan Hegelians thus established a direct ideological and philosophical 
link between the local experience of the Revolution and the broader issue of Italian 
emancipation and Unification, this chapter will then move on to discuss their reflections on 
these topics after 1848, focusing, in particular, on Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa’s historicised 
understanding of Hegelian freedom. Drawing attention to the emergence of profound 
discrepancies between Silvio and Bertrando’s use of Hegelian categories after the defeat of 
the 1848 Revolution, the aim of this chapter is to take issue with historiographical verdicts 
hinting at the use of Hegel’s ideas in support of liberal politics during the Risorgimento, 
concluding, instead, that they represented the philosophical backbone of a form of 
democratic constitutionalism initially embraced by Neapolitan revolutionaries in 1848. 
Lastly, chapter five will investigate Neapolitan Hegelians’ engagement with competing 
narratives of European modernity and the mental geographies of the continent embedded 
therein. It will begin with an overview of European debates on the semantics of modern 
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historical time, leading to the progressive marginalisation and orientalisation of the Italian 
peninsula, following an intellectual tradition ranging from the French Enlightenment, 
Sismondi and Guizot, to De Stäel and Hegel. Italian reactions to these images of modernity 
varied: while intellectuals like Cesare Balbo, Giuseppe Ferrari and Giacomo Leopardi endorsed 
an orientalising reading of Italian history, Vincenzo Cuoco and Vincenzo Gioberti attempted 
to challenge the asymmetrical encounter of Italy and Europe, by invoking the notion of Italy’s 
“historical primacy”: the one associating it with the “ancient genius” of Italic populations, the 
other with the historical pre-eminence of the church in the country’s history.  
Neapolitan Hegelians’ response to these debates was forceful: already in the 1830s, 
Stefano Cusani, Stanislao Gatti and Francesco De Sanctis had begun developing a 
transnational understanding of Europe’s intellectual history, devising thematic and 
methodological continuities between local and foreign traditions of thought, in an attempt to 
negotiate a vantage point for Italy in the definition of a European philosophical modernity, 
and challenge the former’s perceived peripheral status. Yet, it was in Bertrando Spaventa’s 
theory of European thought’s circularity, initially formulated in his 1860-61 lectures and later 
published with the title La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea, that the 
implications of this approach were most consistently drawn out. In La filosofia italiana, a 
formidable response to Gioberti’s 1843 essay Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, 
Spaventa offered a historicised narrative of modern European philosophy: this, he believed, 
originated in Italy with Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella; primarily thanks to the 
European dissemination of Giambattista Vico’s ideas, then, Italian philosophy “went on to 
develop in freer lands and among freer intellects”.99 Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and, more 
importantly, Hegel, were thus seen as the “disciples” of sixteenth- and eighteenth-century 
Italian philosophers. Crucially, Spaventa’s characterisation of modern thought as inherently 
“circular” entailed that the “return” of European philosophy to the Italian peninsula was 
already well underway: evidence of this, for Spaventa, was contemporary Italian thinkers’ 
growing interest in Kantianism and Hegelianism.  
 By means of his powerful argument, Bertrando Spaventa succeeded not only in de-
provincialising debates on the status of Italian philosophy vis-à-vis a European vision of 
modern thought, but also in re-imagining the encounter of Italian and European traditions in 
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ways that did not invoke historically debatable notions of intellectual primacy, on the one 
hand, or viewed the relationship between the peninsula and the continent as an asymmetrical 
one, on the other. According to Bertrando, European philosophy was a constellation of 
traditions nonetheless brought together by their interdependence. Thanks to these ground-
breaking reflections, that modern philosophy became, in Spaventa’s Hegelian imagination, 
fully transnational and Naples a modern, European centre.  
 
 
 
v. Reimagining Naples’ Past to Rethink its Present 
 
By the end of this thesis, it will hopefully be clear why Theodor Sträter spoke so 
enthusiastically of Neapolitan Hegelianism in 1864 and how this school of thought 
spearheaded a process of innovation in Italian, as well as in European intellectual history: 
thinkers in the southern capital saw themselves at the forefront of a philosophical movement 
hinging on ongoing transnational encounters and able to imbue the political history of the 
nineteenth century with a dramatic sense of historical necessity. Viewed from such a broad 
angle, this thesis is an attempt to disclose the historical, intellectual, philosophical and 
ideological forces that made Naples a centre of modernity during the Risorgimento, rather 
than a periphery in the moral geography of Europe and in response to an accelerated 
experience of historical time. 
 It is, however, impossible to discuss Neapolitan intellectual history without casting 
one’s gaze on the present, too. Even in the twenty-first century, the image of Naples is still 
too often reduced to misgovernment, corruption, unemployment and criminality; its 
inhabitants frequently seen as lazy and unfit for civic and political life. This thesis is by no 
means an attempt to deny the socio-political problems riddling Naples today. It is, however, 
an encouragement to reflect critically on how much Neapolitan intellectuals’ imagination has 
contributed to making sense of who we are, both as Italians and as Europeans. At a time when 
Naples and the South are too often cast off as a dead weight being carried around by the 
industrious, progressive, North, and when political language is still too frequently imbued by 
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a distinct anti-southern rhetoric, this is not only a desirable thing to do, but an urgent one, 
too.  
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1.  The Making of Neapolitan Hegelians: Polycentric Idealism between the 
Local and the Transnational 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Have you read Hegel? This question, amusing and intimidating philosophy enthusiasts in 
equal measure, bears an extraordinary significance if seen in the context of nineteenth-
century European intellectual history. As claimed by the French scholar Frederick Beiser, 
engaging with an author whose written output was nothing short of colossal, characterised 
by a dense language and a strikingly intricate argumentation, is “a trying and exhausting 
experience, the intellectual equivalent of chewing gravel”.1 Reading Hegel was clearly no easy 
task for the intellectuals of the 1800s and the variety of interpretations that emerged is 
evident proof of this. Italy was no exception to this logic. In the peninsula, several, often 
conflicting readings on aspects of the German philosopher’s works were proposed. The 
Neapolitan philosopher Stefano Cusani, for example, who had engaged with his ideas via the 
French philosopher Victor Cousin’s writings, published, in 1839, an article entitled Del metodo 
filosofico e d’una sua storia, in which, reflecting on Hegel’s identification “of Idea and being, 
of thought and reality”, he understood his logic to consist of a “subjective” and an “objective” 
element.2 By consequence, he argued, it was only via a composite account of empirically 
observable circumstances and ontological principles that Hegel came to set forth the 
blueprint of a new “general method”, aiming at “investigating the only universal truth”.3 
Indeed, he reported that many of his contemporaries believed that the new philosophical 
method ought to be based on “psychological analysis”, seen as “the only base of the immense 
structure of philosophy, its only solid foundation”.4 
Another interpretation could be found in the works of Giambattista Passerini, who, 
one year later, during his exile in Zurich, was the first to translate Hegel’s Vorlesungen über 
die Philosophie der Geschichte into Italian. He supplemented the text with a rich introduction, 
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aiming to illustrate the place of the German thinker’s philosophy of history within his broader 
idealist system of thought. In this introduction, Passerini highlighted how Hegel’s logic 
underpinned virtually every single aspect of his thought, merging “with his metaphysics and 
ontology” and ultimately suggesting that “the logical motion of the Idea” could become “the 
reality itself of things” thanks to dialectical development.5 
In 1845, then, the Italian philosopher Augusto Vera, who, at the time, was completing 
his doctoral dissertation in Paris, published an essay entitled Problème de la certitude, in 
which he provided a comprehensive illustration of how Hegel’s logic and epistemology owed 
much to philosophical concerns originating among ancient Greek thinkers. His interpretation 
of Hegelianism, however, was largely tainted with elements of Platonism: positing a 
fundamental difference between the “idea-nature” (“Idée-nature”) and the “idea-logic” 
(“Idée-logique”), Vera concluded that Hegel had indeed proposed the subordination of the 
“real nature” (“nature réelle”) to the “ideal nature” (“nature idéale”), reflecting the tension 
between an “ideal spirit” (“esprit idéale”) and a “real and personal spirit” (“esprit réelle et 
personnel”).6 
These three examples, which appear to bear little relation to one another, illustrate 
how, within the short span of six years, one could identify a striking variety of readings of 
Hegel among Italian authors. Cusani’s interpretation bore traces of the French eclecticism of 
the 1820s and ‘30s, drawing Hegelian logic close – perhaps too close – to Kantian psychology. 
Passerini’s example, instead, portrayed Hegel’s logic as essentially based on the absolute 
identity of the ideal and the real, while Vera’s interpretation went in the opposite direction, 
highlighting the fundamental dichotomy between the sphere of the ideal and the objective, 
on the one hand, and that of the real and the subjective, on the other.  
A purely philosophical reading of these three interpretations would immediately 
identify their pitfalls, drawing attention to the misunderstanding of the German philosopher’s 
dialectics they shared. Such an answer, however, would not be satisfactory for intellectual 
historians, whose work is concerned with decoding how local contexts, debates and forms of 
thought inform how ideas enter the public sphere, circulate, and come to be debated. Hegel’s 
philosophy was illustrated, from the 1830s onwards, in so many different and often conflicting 
ways primarily because of the inhomogeneity of its local receptions. Yet, there is a significant 
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risk connected to the notion of “local reception” itself, namely that this might be uncritically 
adopted and act as a very limiting framework of enquiry, forcing historians to view intellectual 
exchanges through the lens of a regional or a national narrative only.7 This is particularly 
problematic when it comes to the study of Hegel, a philosopher whose impact and popularity 
in the nineteenth century clearly transcended any local or national boundary. 
A more comprehensive approach to the study of Hegel’s receptions is thus required: 
specifically, one able to establish a dialogue between its local and transnational dimensions. 
This, in turn, would be part of a broader effort, aiming at encouraging a closer integration of 
transnational paradigms in intellectual history. Returning for a moment to the example of 
Cusani may be helpful to better illustrate this intuition: his was not merely a misreading of 
Hegelian dialectics, as it clearly reflected precise dynamics of intellectual exchange between 
Naples, Germany and the rest of Europe, particularly France, where Victor Cousin’s works 
represented, for many years, the main source of information on Hegel. Tracing the intellectual 
history of Italian and, in particular, Neapolitan, Hegelianism requires an approach that, while 
insisting on the relationship between ideas and contexts, may be equally sensitive to cultural 
encounters taking place across national boundaries. It ought, therefore, to account for the 
polycentric nature of nineteenth-century European idealism, interrogating dynamics of 
transnational intellectual exchange, wider patterns of circulation, as well as the 
amalgamation of the local and the foreign. 
Hegel’s Southern Italian reception can unquestionably provide the springboard for 
such methodological adjustments, given the growing interest in the German philosopher’s 
works throughout the 1840s and ‘50s in the capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, coupled 
with the variety of the ways in which these were interpreted. These ranged from Giambattista 
Ajello’s definition of idealism as an alternative to positivism, to Stanislao Gatti’s analysis of 
dialectics in connection with aesthetic theory; from Bertrando Spaventa’s use of Hegel’s 
philosophy of history in support of the unification of the country, to Silvio Spaventa’s 
reflections on the ethical state, to name only a few.   
Reflecting on the very notion of “Neapolitan Hegelians”, therefore, a definition 
consisting, in a self-explanatory manner, of a “Neapolitan” and a “Hegelian” element, 
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mirroring both the local and the transnational dimensions of this school of thought, ought to 
begin with the analysis of how Southern Italian idealism stood in relation to broader currents 
of European philosophy, showing the dynamics of encounter that enabled the penetration of 
German idealism in Naples. A direct exchange between Italian and German intellectuals is not 
sufficient to justify the emergence of a Southern idealist school, with debates taking place 
during the 1830s and ‘40s, especially in the southern capital, revealing a degree of hostility 
towards German philosophy and advocating the closure to foreign thought. These debates 
contributed to preventing the establishment of a direct channel of exchange between Naples 
and Germany. This chapter will therefore explain that, after an initial hesitation to discuss 
German philosophy, Neapolitans engaged with Hegel following the mediation of French 
authors, most notably Victor Cousin’s, whose reading of the German thinker informed an 
extensive number of works written in the southern capital in the 1840s and generally 
published in local periodicals.  
Another important feature of Hegel’s Neapolitan reception is its dependence on the 
progressive attempts to disentangle his ideas from Cousin’s interpretation, enabling local 
authors to come to see him as a theorist of historical time, on the one hand, and as the chief 
exponent of a modern and European philosophical sensitivity, on the other. Such an 
understanding of Hegelianism had important implications, with Neapolitan authors positing 
the need to complement the analysis of history’s absolute and general conditions proposed 
by Hegel with the observation of its particular embodiments. In other words: while, by 
disaggregating Hegel from Cousin, intellectuals in Naples had become acquainted with 
modern idealism, their reflections on this philosophy soon paved the way for its revision, 
encouraging its amalgamation with the local tradition of thought. 
Because Hegel’s Neapolitan reception hinged on complex dynamics of encounter, 
transmission and circulation across national borders, and because it was connected with a 
revision of pure idealism, this chapter will also provide some methodological considerations: 
the emergence of a Hegelian school of philosophy in the capital of the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies cannot be viewed only through the lens of local or national narratives. Rather, it must 
be slotted within the broader picture of a transnational history of ideas, accounting for a tri-
polar relationship among Germany, France and Naples, and further reinforcing a polycentric 
understanding of nineteenth-century European idealism’s nature.  
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Lastly, it is important to point out that this chapter, and this thesis in general, will not 
attempt to operate a systematic analysis of Hegel’s philosophy, nor will it try to advance 
verdicts on his ideas: rather, by concentrating on the reception of some elements of his 
system of thought, it will keep the present inquiry firmly anchored within the framework of 
intellectual history; in consequence, the present discussion will not be concerned with Hegel 
per se, but only with certain interpretations of the philosopher, emerging from the various 
dynamics of reception and the debates connected to the latter. 
 
 
 
1.2. From Germany to Italy: The Exchange that Did Not Happen 
 
Recent scholarship on the Italian Risorgimento has frequently overlooked the role played by 
Neapolitan Hegelians in the cultural regeneration of the country, especially in connection with 
political debates taking place on the eve and during the years immediately following 
Unification.8 Studies that reflectied more attentively on the presence of a fully-fledged 
Hegelian school in the Mezzogiorno, instead, especially the often-referenced monographs by 
Eugenio Garin, Guido Oldrini and Giuseppe Vacca, did not provide an adequate analysis of the 
intellectual exchanges determining its emergence.9 New developments in the study of Italian 
intellectual history, however, have drawn attention to the transnational dimension of 
cultural, philosophical and political debates taking place in the peninsula during the 
nineteenth century.10 Yet, an approach of this kind is yet to be adopted in connection with 
the study of Hegel’s presence in the peninsula, especially in the South. This should not come 
as a surprise: elaborating a compelling account of Hegelianism’s Italian reception is no simple 
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task, given not only its remarkably complex and occasionally obscure dynamics, but also the 
presence of several contextual factors significantly undermining the circulation of German 
philosophy by and large. 
 A first obstacle to the reception and dissemination of Hegel’s ideas in Italy was 
represented, it can be argued, by the different chronologies characterising the development 
and spread of idealism in Europe. In 1831, the year of Hegel’s death, while his philosophy was 
beginning to appear in different parts of Europe, Hegelians in Germany were beginning to 
split along political battle-lines.11 Proposing diverging readings of the philosopher’s politics 
and metaphysics, they questioned the extent to which conditions in present-day Prussia 
fulfilled Hegel’s ideals, with the Left maintaining that few, if any, did, and the Right believing 
that most, if not all, did.12 Simply put, while Hegelianism was transforming into post-Hegelian 
critique in Germany, it was still in its infancy elsewhere in Europe. In fact, beginning in the 
same year, one can also observe the flourishing, especially among French and Italian 
intellectuals, of a more pronounced interest in the German thinker’s writings.  
 A second issue was the fact that Italian intellectuals’ initial efforts to engage with 
German philosophy, especially with Hegel, were not homogeneous, despite the remarkable 
circulation of foreign texts, in various parts of the Italian peninsula. In the early- and mid-
nineteenth-century, for example, German authors were undoubtedly very present in 
Lombard cultural landscape. August Wilhelm Schlegel’s 1809 Vorlesungen über dramatische 
Kunst und Literatur, whose 1814 French edition had been read and admired by Alessandro 
Manzoni, were translated by Giovanni Gherardini in 1817 and studied by Giuseppe Verdi.13 
An Italian translation of Friedrich Schlegel’s Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur, penned 
by Francesco Ambrosoli, appeared in 1828.14 In Milan, Andrea Maffei, who frequently 
collaborated with Verdi, translated and published several plays by Friedrich von Schiller and 
contributed to the composer’s 1847 opera I masnadieri with a libretto based on Die Räuber.15 
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Naples, was based on Kabale und Liebe, on a libretto by Salvatore Cammarano; Don Carlos, premiered in Paris 
in 1867, was composed to a French-language libretto by Joseph Méry and Camille du Locle, based on Schiller’s 
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Giandomenico Romagnosi, whose articles and reviews appearing in Annali universali di 
statistica and Biblioteca italiana showed an interest in Kant’s philosophy, contributed, in 
1832, to the Italian translation of Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie.16 Additionally, in 
his 1830 Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee, Antonio Rosmini spoke very critically of 
Kantianism, but, in directing his readers’ attention to the perceived shortcomings of this 
philosophy, he nonetheless brought it into circulation.17 
 Despite these Germanophile attitudes, Hegelianism never took centre stage in the 
Lombard intellectual context of the early- and mid-nineteenth century, with the first 
systematic illustration of this school of thought appearing only in Rosmini’s posthumous 
Teosofia in 1859.18 Romagnosi’s observations on Hegel, for example, presented in the 1832 
essay Alcuni pensieri sopra un’altra metafisica filosofia della storia, remained limited to a few 
derogatory remarks on the 1820 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts and signalled, 
according to Martin Thom “only a second-hand knowledge” of this text.19 In a similar manner, 
Cattaneo’s observations on the German philosopher remained limited to the postulation of a 
direct continuity between Vichian historicism and Hegel’s philosophy of history, and, as 
chapter two of this thesis will show, they were more relevant to Vico’s nineteenth-century 
re-discovery than Hegel’s reception in Milan.  
 In Tuscany, the periodical Antologia was founded in 1821 by Gian Pietro Vieusseux 
and Gino Capponi on the model of the Parisian Revue encyclopédique.20 The journal 
championed a cosmopolitan orientation and, as Vieusseux’s correspondence with local and 
foreign intellectuals revealed, it directly aimed at giving special visibility to English, French, 
American and German literary and political debates.21 In addition, Giuseppe Montanelli, who 
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frequently collaborated with Antologia and was a great admirer of Friedrich Schiller and the 
Schlegels, taught civil and commercial law at the University of Pisa together with Giovanni 
Carmignani, adopting an approach derived from Kant and Savigny.22 As it was the case in 
Milan, however, German idealist philosophy was not quite central to Tuscan intellectuals’ 
preoccupations, with the only substantial attempt to bring this tradition into circulation being 
limited to Giovanni Battista Niccolini’s anonymously published translation of Schelling’s 1802 
Über Dante in philosophischer Beziehung in 1844.23 Commenting on the relative lack of 
interest in Hegel among Tuscan authors, Bertrando Spaventa reported that he could not find 
a single book discussing idealist philosophy in Florence, where he spent “ten months 
yawning” between 1848 and 1849. 24 
 In Piedmont, the periodical Il subalpino, on which numerous works by the Tuscan 
Montanelli appeared, published an anonymous translation of Schlegel’s 1808 essay Über die 
Sprache und Weisheit der Indier in 1838.25 Additionally, it featured several articles reflecting 
on Schlegel and Schiller’s contributions to contemporary European literature.26 In Turin, 
Vincenzo Gioberti frequently engaged with German philosophy. His 1838 Teorica del 
sovrannaturale, for example, applauded Kant’s proposition of synthetic, a priori judgments 
for mediating “with clarity and precision” between the sensible and the intelligible.27 
Furthermore, in Introduzione allo studio della filosofia, published between 1839 and 1840, 
Gioberti discussed his own “ontologism” as an alternative to the psychologist tendencies of 
Kantianism.28 Interestingly, in attempting to overcome this philosophy’s perceived limits, 
Gioberti also warned against a reliance on the “squandered and abstract metaphysics” 
invoked by German idealists to solve the problems posited by Kant.29 Lastly, Gioberti’s best-
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known work, the 1843 essay Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, sought to elaborate an 
almost deterministic philosophy of history that incorporated elements of Hegel’s dialectics.30 
The Turinese philosopher’s use of Hegel, however, remained quite problematic, for 
three reasons: first, references to the German thinker were not accompanied by a systematic 
discussion of his ideas, which significantly undermined their circulation in the northern Italian 
context. Second, Gioberti reduced Hegelianism to a form of “pantheism”, a position which 
Hegel himself had repeatedly rejected in his own works.31 Third, by positing that “Italy 
features within itself, mainly thanks to religion, all the necessary conditions for its national 
and political Risorgimento, without resorting to inner turmoil, or foreign imitation or 
intervention”, Gioberti’s Primato made it clear that preference ought to be given to internal 
rather than external forces in the promotion of Italy’s unification and cultural regeneration, 
de facto discouraging any form of openness toward foreign thought, including German 
idealism.32 
 By the late 1830s and early ‘40s, idealist philosophers, especially Hegel, were at the 
margins of debates taking place in many parts of the Italian peninsula and their ideas were 
not enjoying significant circulation. Naples, however, constituted a different scenario, where 
local intellectuals were already beginning, during the same years, to reflect much more 
consistently on German idealism, particularly on Fichte and Schelling.33 Hegel, however, was 
not yet receiving the attention he deserved, at least according to Bertrando Spaventa, who, 
in 1851, recounted that Neapolitan intellectuals’ interest in “Kant’s works, Fichte’s doctrine 
of science and Schelling’s transcendental idealism” during the late 1830s and early ‘40s did 
not correspond to an equal fascination for “Hegel’s most fundamental works”.34 This naturally 
raises the questions of how the ideas of the best-known exponent of German idealism 
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managed to enter the philosophical landscape of nineteenth-century Naples and, more 
specifically, what the channels of this transnational intellectual encounter were. 
 The most obvious challenge to nineteenth-century Italian authors’ engagement with 
Hegel was language. Regardless of the sheer complexity and occasional obscurity of the 
philosopher’s vocabulary, very few Italian intellectuals could read his works in German. 
Moreover, these thinkers usually approached various aspects of Hegel’s thought using 
concepts borrowed from their own pre-existing philosophical beliefs. In consequence, they 
artificially forced their own intellectual preoccupations onto Hegel’s ideas, in ways that led to 
frequent mis-representations of the latter. Examining Hegel’s reception in connection with 
the mentalities that initially informed it can counter certain scholarly verdicts, which adopt a 
‘history of philosophy’ approach and are relatively insensitive to how the emergence of 
Neapolitan Hegelianism was directly shaped by local contexts and debates. For example: 
historians of philosophy have often argued that the Calabrian philosopher Pasquale Galluppi 
played a central role in the development of Neapolitan Hegelianism, given that he repeatedly 
referred to the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in his works.35 However, as 
will be explained shortly, Galluppi approached Hegel’s philosophy from the perspective of 
Kantianism and, as a result, he did not substantially contribute to debates on idealist 
Geschichtsphilosophie that would later become Neapolitan Hegelians’ main concern. 
Galluppi, who was the first southern author to engage with Hegel’s ideas in their 
original language, was born in the Calabrian town of Tropea, and was appointed professor of 
Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Naples in 1831. His appointment was, in itself, a 
rather ground-breaking event: his chair had been left vacant since 1826. The minister of 
Internal Affairs in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Nicola Santangelo, believed that public 
education ought to contemplate the latest developments in European modern thought, and 
suggested that Galluppi, whose interest in Kant’s philosophy was well-known in academic 
circles, would indeed be the most apposite candidate.36 This choice marked a significant shift 
in the intellectual orientation of the university, clearly willing to engage with present-day 
Italian, as well as foreign, philosophical debates. However, Galluppi’s appointment, formally 
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made by the university council and endorsed by the king was greeted with hostility by 
Francesco Colangelo, the president of the Public Education Council of the Kingdom. In a letter 
to the French philosopher Victor Cousin written in June 1839, Galluppi described Colangelo 
as his “gratuitous persecutor”, having labelled his philosophy and his teaching “pantheistic 
and enemies of the Revelation”.37 Colangelo’s opposition greatly limited the dissemination of 
Galluppi’s views on European thought and, in consequence, it partly undermined local 
intellectuals’ discovery of German philosophy: the Calabrian philosopher’s professorship was 
indefinitely suspended in 1833 and his lectures were subject to tight censorship, being only 
published in 1845 with the title Lezioni di logica e metafisica. 
 These lectures revealed a first genuine, yet rather timid, attempt to engage with the 
problem sitting at the core of German idealism. When reflecting on Kant, for instance, 
Galluppi suggested that the latter, due to the very nature of his own system of thought, had 
failed to recognise the existence of a “primitive truth” independent from the logic of his 
rational psychology and from a priori cognition.38 What Galluppi called for, was a new 
“experimental philosophy” of “exterior causes”, an attempt to amend the shortcomings of 
Kantianism, by selectively appropriating notions borrowed from idealist philosophy.39 Despite 
the difficulties encountered by Galluppi in engaging with Hegelianism in his university 
lectures, local periodicals, whose activities fell beyond Colangelo’s jurisdiction, offered him a 
platform to reflect on this philosophical system.  
The 1842 article Considerazioni filosofiche su l’idealismo transcendentale e sul 
razionalismo assoluto and two Lettere on Fichte, Schelling ed Hegel, published in the 
periodical Museo di letteratura e filosofia, revealed a certain degree of acquaintance with the 
idealist doctrine, albeit one that portrayed Hegelianism as a revised form of Kantianism.40 In 
the second Lettera, Galluppi wrote: 
 
The starting point, for Hegel, is the Idea. The Idea, according to him, encompasses Being and, at 
the same time, identifies itself with Being. In other words: that which is rational is real. This is how 
Hegel expresses himself […]. Logic – as generally adopted – teaches that judgment is a combination 
of ideas and that Reason a combination of judgments. Human thought at large, therefore, is a 
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combination of ideas. Judgment, Reason and ideas are to be regarded as various modifications of 
the thinking subject. Abstract from the thinking subject: you will be left with ideas. Grant unity to 
this constellation of ideas: you will be left with the One Idea. Call, then, the different combinations 
of ideas movements or movements of the One Idea. Grant this Idea absolute existence. Consider 
this Idea in its objective value, just like vulgar Idealism considers the agglomeration of all ideas. 
Thus you will come to Hegel’s idealist pantheism.41  
 
Galluppi clearly did not reflect on the 1817 Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften in greath depth, and remained anchored to a rather nebulous definition of 
idealism, unsupported by a concrete effort to disaggregate Fichte and Schelling’s philosophies 
from Hegel’s. Something even more problematic, however, was that Galluppi’s interpretation 
appears to have been greatly informed by his notorious interest in Kant, revealed by the 
definition of ideas as “abstraction” stemming from the “thinking subject”, hinting not only at 
the alterity of the ideal and the real, but also at the subordination of the former to the latter. 
This, therefore, reflected a reading of the Enzyklopädie largely informed by the critic’s Kantian 
inclination. In short, while Galluppi was undoubtedly one of the first Italian intellectuals to 
engage with Hegel’s works and, even more remarkably, was able to do so without resorting 
to translations, he ultimately offered little more than a misrepresentation of the 
philosopher’s ideas, due to an uncritical equation of Hegelianism and Kantianism. 
Galluppi was not, however, the only intellectual able to engage with German idealism 
in its original language: his contemporary Ottavio Colecchi, whose private school of 
philosophy, as chapter three of this thesis will show, forged the bulk of the Neapolitan 
Hegelian generation, must also be mentioned. The most notable among Colecchi’s students, 
Bertrando Spaventa, remembered his teacher in Turin in 1851, three years after the latter’s 
death, highlighting that: 
 
In the last years of his life, [Colecchi] had already started examining some aspects of Hegel’s 
philosophy, and he held them very dearly, despite the fact that, in some earlier writings, he had 
labelled the entire philosophical movement taking place in Germany after Kant ephemeral and 
inconsistent.42 
 
Spaventa’s testimony already identified Kant’s philosophy, rather than Hegel’s, as Colecchi’s 
chief concern and so it is possible to draw an interesting parallel between the two earliest 
interpreters of the German idealist thinker in Naples. In the same way as Galluppi lamented 
the need to move beyond Kant by overcoming the limitations of a priori cognition, Colecchi 
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believed that philosophy ought to depart from “reflections on the phenomena of 
consciousness”, investigating analytic truths before accounting for synthetic judgments.43 In 
Hegel, Colecchi argued, one could find a compelling amalgamation of the two natures of 
knowledge, accounting for both its synthetic and its analytic nature.44 It is possible, at this 
point, to notice how Colecchi’s discussion relied on characteristically Kantian concepts. It is 
therefore clear that, far from being motivated by a genuine interest in German idealism, let 
alone in Hegel’s philosophy of history, Colecchi’s approach to Hegelianism was entirely 
functional to his own revision of Kant. It is no surprise, in this sense, that Giovanni Gentile, in 
1912, argued that, despite attempting to overcome Kantian dualism by means of Hegel’s logic, 
Colecchi did not manage to move beyond the problems that had riddled the philosopher from 
Königsberg: 
 
The epistemological problem – relating to that particular kind of epistemology that, if 
appropriately explored in its historical development, had already emerged as a problem in 
Germany and, emerging as a new metaphysics, in Italy, too – remained, in Galluppi’s thought, 
the fundamental philosophical problem.45 
 
 At any rate, problematising the extent to which Galluppi and Colecchi assisted Hegel’s 
Napolitan reception does not mean that these two thinkers should be relegated to the 
margins of the local intellectual landscape. Rather, as chapter three of this thesis will explain, 
their anti-metaphysical reading of Kantianism established links between German philosophy 
and the local tradition. This perspective, which emphasised continuities between Kant and 
Vico’s ideas, would later serve as a model for a number of authors, such as Stefano Cusani, 
Stanislao Gatti and Bertrando Spaventa, who sought to merge Vichian historicism and 
Hegelian Geschichtsphilosophie. 
Kant’s philosophy was not the only framework within which Italian authors initially 
engaged with Hegel’s thought. Domenico Mazzoni travelled from his hometown of Prato to 
Berlin in 1835, where he acquainted himself with the local debates on idealism and met some 
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of Hegel’s own students, most notably exponents of the growing Hegelian Right. Upon 
returning to Italy in 1837, he began working on the translation of the Wissenschaft der Logik, 
but the volume remained unfinished. Yet, some of his manuscripts also featured some 
references to Hegel’s Enzyklopädie and the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte.46 It is interesting to note how a close friend and biographer of Mazzoni’s, Carlo 
Gatti, pointed out that the former, “upon departing from Germany, began adopting a 
historical method of inquiry much more consistently”.47 Mazzoni’s reading of Hegel, it can be 
argued, had a significant impact on his understanding of knowledge as the result of an 
unchangeable historical process, based on the very Hegelian identity of philosophy and its 
history. In an 1841 letter to the founder of Antologia Gian Pietro Vieusseux, in fact, Mazzoni 
wrote that “philosophical science is a process and is a form of development”.48  
This intuition lay at the core of his most ambitious project: writing a history of modern 
philosophy that would also include the most recent debates taking place in Germany. He 
clarified his intention in an 1843 letter to Marquis Gino Capponi, claiming that his observation 
of “various philosophical systems from a purely scientific point of view” had urged him to 
attempt to put together “a critical history of modern philosophy, in which systems would be 
regarded as intimately connected, so as to form a proper treatise of the science itself”.49 This 
would enable him to “demonstrate how, across these various systems, thought develops itself 
and runs through its various stages”, ultimately showing that “one philosophical system 
relates to another, and that the history of philosophy features, within itself, an account of its 
own development”.50 
 It is possible to notice how Mazzoni appears to have engaged with Hegel’s thought 
much more extensively than Galluppi and Colecchi had, given his interest in the convergence 
of history and philosophy. Mazzoni’s philosophical understanding of history therefore 
signalled a certain awareness of the German thinker’s Vorlesungen. In spite of that, a brief 
analysis of his intellectual agenda would inevitably reveal a fundamental flaw in his 
interpretation. Mazzoni, in fact, consistently misrepresented Hegel, as he tried to describe 
medieval Italian scholastic philosophers as forerunners of the great German thinker. His 
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overall intellectual project admittedly aimed at drawing idealism closer to Italian thought, by 
“resuscitating the ancient Italian science of St Anselm, St Thomas and the Divine Poet 
Alighieri, as they all held Hegel’s thought in its full force”. In Anselm’s Monologium and 
Proslogium, Mazzoni believed to have found a very Hegelian proposition, namely that “faith 
is Reason presenting itself as instinct, albeit not yet unfolded; and even at this stage it knows 
it holds the truth and it is not mistaken in believing so; however, after this initial step, it wants 
to fully and clearly contemplate that truth which constitutes its postulated content; in doing 
so, it deifies itself: it elevates and conjoins itself to God”.51  
In Mazzoni’s analysis, Anselm’s discussion of Reason mirrored Hegel’s idea that, in 
order to create knowledge, “it is imperative to begin with an immediately perceivable 
element, since one can only begin this way and then, via a logical and rationally unfolding 
reasoning, it is necessary to demonstrate and explain this element, hence returning to the 
starting point”.52 It can be said, therefore, that, despite Mazzoni’s evident recognition of the 
self-reflective character of Hegelian Reason, his reading of the German philosopher forced 
notions borrowed from scholastic philosophy onto contemporary idealism, as noticeable in 
the analysis of the intellect’s relationship with faith. His attempt to establish a direct 
connection between the Italian scholastic tradition and nineteenth-century idealism was 
arbitrary and problematic, as it led to the systematic distortion and misrepresentation of 
many important Hegelian concepts. Moreover, his ideas cannot be said to have significantly 
enabled the circulation of Hegel’s ideas: just as his translation of the Wissenschaft der Logik 
remained unfinished, the history of philosophy he had planned to write never saw the light 
of day. As Giovanni Gentile observed, Mazzoni’s understanding of idealism can only be 
inferred from his correspondence with Gino Capponi, with his general intellectual profile 
being labelled “of no interest for the history of philosophy”.53 
 A last Italian intellectual who engaged with Hegel’s works in German was Giambattista 
Passerini. Even in his case, the author’s discussion of nineteenth-century idealist philosophy 
did not entail an accurate representation of this school of thought. Having travelled to 
Germany between 1824 and 1827, Passerini was able to meet Hegel himself, as well as well 
as Friedrich Schleiermacher and the group known as the “Young Hegelians”. Passerini’s 
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engagement with members of the Hegelian Left reverberated in his exegesis of Hegel’s works. 
His most notable initiative, in this sense, was the 1840 translation – the very first from German 
to Italian – of the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, which, thanks to the 
inclusion of an introduction, also published separately as Sulla filosofia della storia, can 
provide an accurate understanding of Passerini’s interpretation. This translation, as argued 
by Guido Oldrini, had an extremely limited circulation in the peninsula and was read only by 
Neapolitan Hegelians during the second half of the 1840s, at a time when Hegel’s ideas were 
already being widely discussed in the southern capital.54 It also reflected a particular reading 
of Hegelian historicism that signalled how the context of Berlin in the mid-1820s, especially 
the relationship with the Young Hegelians, had paved the way for a very specific reception of 
Hegel’s thought. By 1840, Passerini had not only matured a rather substantial knowledge of 
the Vorlesungen, but also attempted to overcome some of its perceived limitations. In the 
introduction, he stated: 
 
Philosophy of history is a part of philosophy that is not yet fully understood by many; it still finds 
many opponents among those who only hold some confused and indeterminate notions of it. 
According to some, philosophy of history is nothing but a series of political and moral reflections 
backed by historical accounts, while, according to others, it consists of the mere application of a 
psychological approach to the history of nations; these two positions do not quite capture that 
which is necessary and divine in history: the progressive manifestation of Spirit, and the invariable 
laws governing it, in its course, toward a determined goal. Individual nations’ history ought not to 
be part of philosophy of history, unless one considers how said nations have contributed to the 
overall progress and to the development of an Idea. Generally speaking, there are three ways to 
consider history: a theological one, considering humanity in its perceived perpetual decadence; a 
political one, viewing humanity as entangled in a neverending and constantly uniform cycle of 
progress and decadence […]; the third one, instead, is the sole true and philosophical way, as it 
considers humanity as progressive, and striving for an absolutely determined perfection and goal.55 
 
This introduction, however, also featured Passerini’s critique of Hegel’s notion of a 
philosophical history, reflecting, in turn, Young Hegelians’ influence on his formation: echoing 
August Cieszkowski’s objections of the philosopher, Passerini pointed out that, due to the 
actual nature of his views of history, Hegel “fails to see progress in the future”, and ultimately 
“regarded his own philosophy, as well as the Prussian monarchy, as the endpoint and 
realisation of everything”.56 More specifically, he reported that: 
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The main problem with Hegel, as highlighted by one of his disciples, Cieszkowski, is that he did not 
take the future into account. Humanity’s history is, however, ongoing, and our time is far from 
being the ultimate expression and endpoint we can reach. As a result, if one wants to provide a 
substantial partition of history, the future must be included in it.57 
 
Passerini would then further illustrate his positions and concomitantly depart from Hegel in 
later writings, but, already in his introduction to the 1840 translation of Hegel’s Vorlesungen, 
it is possible to obtain clear indications regarding the coordinates of his reception.58 This was 
evidently informed by the context of the Young Hegelians with whom he liaised in Berlin: their 
agenda, in fact, appears to have been at the very centre of Passerini’s intellectual concerns.  
Once again, it is difficult to see Passerini as a channel of direct exchange between 
Hegel and Italy, partly due to the very limited circulation of his 1840 book and partly due to 
the extent to which his representation of German idealism stemmed from a speculative 
inclination that did not disaggregate Hegel’s ideas from those of his critics in Berlin. Galluppi, 
Colecchi, Mazzoni and Passerini, at this point, seem to have shared some common traits, as 
their readings of Hegel were generally selective, being systematically filtered through the lens 
of various philosophical agendas: Kantianism, Scholasticism and the Young Hegelians’ 
critique. In addition, their written output, being very limited in size and circulation, cannot 
justify the pervasiveness of debates on Hegel that would take place during the Risorgimento, 
let alone their emphasis on his Geschichtsphilosophie, as well as the range of the latter’s 
interpretations. The direct engagement of some of the peninsula’s intellectuals with their 
German counterparts seems, in this sense, to be only marginal as regards Hegelianism’s 
fortune in the peninsula. This, in turn, entails the need to examine indirect patterns of 
                                                           
57 Ibid., p. xxvii-xxviii; Cieszkowski lamented, in his Prolegomena to Historiosophy, the inadequate consideration 
of the future in Hegel’s Vorlesungen. (Cieszkowski, F. (1838) Prolegomena to Historiosophy, p. 52). The critique 
of the Prussian State as the endpoint of history, instead, was notoriously common to the entire circle of the 
Young Hegelians. See, on this point: Russ, A. R. (2013) The Illusion of History: Time and the Radical Political 
Imagination, pp. 121-22; Stedman Jones, G. (2018) The Young Hegelians, Marx and Engels, pp. 556-66 
58 In the 1863 Pensieri filosofici, for example he re-stated: “The philosophical partition of history must be able to 
accommodate the future, too. […] Hegel’s mistake is not to take that into account. The Prussian government 
was, for him the non plus ultra of perfection, just like his system the coronation and completion of philosophy” 
(Passerini, G. (1863) Pensieri filosofici, p.138). He also supplemented this critique with a rejection of Hegelian 
dialectics: “Hegel’s trichotomous system of opposites and a medium is artificial, because one can pick two 
extremes in any series and find the middle point between them” (ibid., p. 68); Passerini’s departure from Hegel 
appeared now imminent, as his critique began targeting the most basic aspect of the German philosopher’s 
logic. Commenting on the Hegelian equation of the real and the rational, in fact, Passerini argued that “that 
which exists is rational; but there is nothing in his System that can be said to truly exist; moreover, the only 
rational thing is the process of becoming, namely that which develops and goes” (ibid., p. 193). This was strikingly 
similar to Engels’ critique on the same topic presented in his 1886 Feuerbach (see Engels, F. (1866) Ludwig 
Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, p. 5) 
  62 
circulation and dissect whatever process of mediation enabled the penetration of Hegel’s 
ideas in Italy. In consequence, in order to gain a more substantial understanding of this 
process of exchange, one ought to enlarge the scope of the inquiry and come to investigate 
indirect trajectories and avenues, too. One of these, in fact, holds the answers to these 
questions and it is a very precise one indeed, connecting Germany to Naples, via France. 
 
 
 
1.3. The Grand Tour of Idealism: From Germany to France 
 
It should be clear, at this point, that, in order to construct a convincing account of Hegel’s 
Italian – and in particular Neapolitan – reception, it is necessary to take into account the way 
in which French intellectuals of the nineteenth century engaged with his works, ultimately 
providing the particular specific representation of absolute idealism that was received in the 
peninsula. The dissemination of Hegel’s ideas in France, however, was far more complex than 
traditional historiographical accounts hold. Twentieth-century intellectual historians often 
argued, in fact, that a substantial knowledge of Hegel was not observable in France prior to 
the publication of Jean Hyppolite’s 1946 volume Genése et structure de la phenomenologie 
de Hegel, or Kojeve’s 1947 Introduction à la lecture de Hegel.59 The main problem with these 
verdicts, as pointed out by Andrea Bellantone in his book Hegel en France, is that they placed 
excessive emphasis on the immediate contexts of Hegel’s French reception, his 
“marginalisation” in academia and, in general, the negative responses to his ideas.60 As a 
result, Bellantone urged historians to re-examine the history of Hegelianism in France, 
adapting their enquiries in order to engage with broader definitions of contexts and 
contemplate a wider range of views. Researchers’ focus, in this sense, ought to be particularly 
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directed towards not only Hegelianism’s local reception, but also its revision, informed by the 
intellectual agendas of the authors who took part in this transnational exchange of ideas.  
 Viewing this French-German exchange within the broader framework of a polycentric 
understanding of European idealism can clarify how it stood in relation to other examples of 
transnational intellectual encounters. Hegel’s French and Italian receptions exhibited an 
interesting array of similarities, as well as differences. A common feature was how local 
intellectual contexts represented a significant obstacle to the penetration of Hegel’s ideas 
and their interpretation. The reasons for this were already hinted at in 1868 by Karl 
Rosenkranz. In his introduction to Hegels Naturphilosophie, he argued that, before 1848, 
German idealism was entangled in a multitude of conflicting interpretations, and urged 
French intellectuals to commit to a process of systematic organisation and liberation from 
error.61  
These considerations were further amplified almost a hundred years later by 
Alexandre Koyré, who, in his 1961 series of Parisian lectures on the German thinker, 
connected the problematic nature of his reception to the wider context of nineteenth-century 
French philosophical life. Just as Hegel’s British reception was complicated by the 
overwhelming popularity of Locke and Hume’s empiricism, Koyré argued, France was, at the 
time, attempting to return to its Cartesian tradition, with the idéologues’ formulation of a 
science of ideas constituting a prime example of this inclination. Consequently, local debates 
encouraged reliance on scientific thought, rather than the appropriation of idealist 
argumentation, or Hegel’s notorious anti-mathematicism.62  
 Not only, then, did the re-discovery of Cartesian philosophy prevent French 
intellectuals from reflecting extensively on Hegel’s logic, but it also represented an obstacle 
to the penetration of the German philosopher’s theory of history. An idealist account of 
historical development, being fundamentally independent from empirically observable 
conditions, could not easily be picked up by the emerging école historique nouvelle. 
Nineteenth-century French philosophy of history, in fact, was characterised by the 
progressive association of history and science. Beginning with Condorcet’s idea of progress 
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outlined in his 1795 Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, via 
Guizot’s subordination of history to political philosophy, until Fustel de Colange’s definition 
of history as a science, French thinkers progressively conceptualised history as a very 
concrete, scientific discipline, in ways that radically differed from Hegel’s later account.63 
 A map of this context is important in order to obtain a precise understanding of 
Hegel’s French reception, as these debates converged in the formulation of a specific 
intellectual agenda, revolving around the assimilation of philosophical and scientific 
knowledge. In particular, it was precisely within this framework that the philosopher Victor 
Cousin, nineteenth-century France’s most notable interpreter of German idealism, engaged 
with Hegel’s writings. His philosophy, commonly referred to as “eclecticism” (“éclectisme”), 
was by definition concerned with the elaboration of a composite approach via the unorthodox 
juxtaposition of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century speculative positions, mainly 
sensualism, rational psychology, idealism, scepticism and mysticism.64 According to Cousin, 
each of these was able to interpret specific aspects of reality and man’s experience of them, 
and only when used in combination did they amount to what he regarded as the philosophical 
science par excellence.65 
The adoption of an “eclectic” approach reflected Cousin’s endeavour to imbue abstract 
philosophical reasoning with scientific depth and to amalgamate various forms of thought, 
including Hegelianism, in a coherent whole. Born in Paris in 1792, Cousin was also educated 
in the French Capital and his studies at the École Normale Supérieure brought him in contact 
with various philosophical approaches. In the introduction to the second edition of his most 
famous work, Fragments philosophiques, he recounted: 
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The day, - in which for the first time in 1811, a pupil of the Normal School, destined to teach in the 
department of Literature, I heard M. Laromiguière, - remains and will always remain in my 
memory, with grateful emotions. That day decided my whole life.66    
 
Laromiguière was here credited for having introduced young Cousin to “the philosophy of 
Locke and Condillac, happily modified on some points, with a clearness, and grace which 
removed every appearance of difficulty, and with the charm of an intellectual benevolence 
which won all hearts”.67  
Hovering between Locke and Condillac, Cousin’s thought was subject to further evolution 
upon his appointment, in 1815, as assistant to Pierre Paul Royer-Collard, professor of history 
of philosophy at the Sorbonne. Cousin extensively praised the colleague, highlighting how his 
influence brought him closer to a previously uncharted branch of philosophical speculation: 
 
M. Royer-Collard, by the severity of his logic, by to the gravity and severity of his discourse, 
gradually turned us away, and not without resistance, from the beaten way of Condillac, to the 
path which has since become so easy, but then rugged and solitary, of the Scottish philosophy.68 
 
Locke-via-Condillac’s psychologism and Scottish empiricism were not, however, the sole 
influences characterising Cousin’s intellectual formation. The “talent of internal 
observations” and the “refinement and depth in psychological research” of Maine de Biran 
were also described as crucial in the making of his system of ideas.69 Cousin’s philosophical 
interests, in the years preceding 1817, therefore, were much in agreement with the context 
of the growing post-Cartesian French intellectual landscape and revolved around a tri-partite 
inclination, contemplating the absolute, as well as the relative, conditions of knowledge. At 
the same time, they remained fundamentally anchored to a psychological framework of 
inquiry. He mentioned, in this sense, “the art of decomposing thought”, in order to “descend 
from the most abstract and general ideas” to “the most common sensations which are their 
primary origin”, providing an awareness of the “action of faculties, elementary or compound, 
that successively intervene in the formation of these ideas”. Secondly, he referred to the 
study of “certain inner conditions”, “certain laws” and “certain principles”, constituting the 
“natural patrimony of the human mind” and regulating these psychological processes. Lastly, 
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he mentioned an interest in investigating “the phenomena of the will” as a means to 
“disengage in all our knowledge, and even in the simplest facts of conscience, the element of 
voluntary activity, of that activity in which our personality is manifested”.70 
 Cousin moved on to engage with German idealism through the conceptual framework 
of this composite psychologism, constituting the true essence of his eclecticism. Having 
learned German between 1815 and 1817, he was immediately struck by how Kantian 
psychology resonated with his own views. He therefore decided to travel to Germany in order 
to deepen his acquaintance with local thought. One of his initial destinations, which would 
later turn out to be crucial to the development of his own ideas, was Heidelberg, where he 
met, among others, Hegel himself. Hegel and Cousin’s relationship was one of mutual 
admiration and respect, to such an extent that the Frenchman was one of the first to receive 
an early copy of Hegel’s Enzyklopädie. Shortly thereafter, Cousin moved to Munich, where he 
spent one month with Schelling and Jacobi, further expanding his knowledge of German 
idealism. A second trip to Germany, from 1824 onwards, featured a prolonged stay in Berlin, 
where he met again with Hegel and attended his lectures on philosophy of history, history of 
philosophy and aesthetics. 
 Cousin’s reading of idealism was ostensibly informed by the “triple discipline” 
characterising his intellectual formation. This was already very clear in the second edition of 
the Fragments philosophiques, where the author recounted how Hegelian ontology 
represented an alternative to the “subjective character of the inductions which proceed from 
an imperfect psychology”. Hegel, he believed, had succeeded in overcoming the pitfalls of 
“scepticism” and “conjectures” thanks to an extensive reliance on synthetic deductions 
deriving from “abstractions that are foundations and types of all reality”.71 This did not mean, 
however, that Cousin wholeheartedly embraced his absolute idealism.72 After all, his 
intellectual agenda admittedly revolved around the analysis of both the external and the 
inner conditions of knowledge, as well as the “phenomena of volition” regulating it. Rather, 
Cousin’s reading of Hegel as an alternative to his complex psychologism did not prevent the 
author from amalgamating the two, articulating a multi-faceted and unique understanding of 
                                                           
70 Ibid., p. xxxv 
71 Ibid., p. xlii 
72 He did, in fact, criticise Hegel on the lack of consideration given to the psychological processes informing the 
construction of knowledge; “he nowhere indicates or describes the process by which he obtains these 
abstractions”. (ibid., p. xlii) 
  67 
intellect. This was ultimately defined as “a fact of consciousness” that (i) revolved around its 
synthetic activity; (ii) “without being personal and subjective, intellectual intuition attains to 
the knowledge of being from the bosom of consciousness” and (iii) was “no less real than the 
notions of reflection, only more difficult to grasp, but still not beyond one’s reach”.73 
 The combination of Hegelianism and psychology had very important implications as 
regards the development of Cousin’s thought, leading to an even greater interest in Hegel’s 
ideas. His lectures on the history of philosophy held in Paris in 1828-29 revealed a growing 
fascination for Hegel’s account of history, revolving around the equation of the latter with the 
history of philosophy, the postulation of a historical teleology centred upon the progressive 
development of civilisation, as well as the historical realisation of absolute unity.74 At the 
same time, Cousin’s emphasis on rational psychology led to its merging with Hegelian history. 
He maintained, in fact, that the most common mistake characterising modern 
historiographical perspectives was the tendency to render the tension between the unity of 
history and the multiplicity of its manifestations exceedingly problematic.75 He therefore 
sought to identify a solution to this issue. It was precisely via the analysis of the facts of human 
consciousness, he argued, that inferences can be made with regards to the wider motion of 
history, due to fundamental identity of the two. In other words, Cousin aimed at establishing 
an equation between the facts of consciousness and the facts of history by claiming that: 
 
Variety in unity is the element of history. The power of variety in the hands of time, and upon the 
theatre of history, produces on a large scale that which happens on a small one in the limited 
theatre of individual consciousness. The human race sustains, in the course of its destiny, the same 
differences which the individual sustains relative to himself within the limits of his own. The human 
race, which has always in permanence the three fundamental elements of consciousness, admits 
also differences in the degree of clarity with which it recognises them, and in the degree of 
attention which it directs sometimes upon one and sometimes upon the other. The characteristic 
differences dividing the development of the individual’s consciousness are the different epochs of 
his life; the differences which the human race undergoes in its development are the epochs of the 
human race’s life, that is, the distinct epochs of history.76 
 
                                                           
73 Ibid., p. xliii 
74 Cousin, V. (1840) Introduction à l’histoire de la philosophie, pp. 23, 34; see also Cousin, V. (1828) Cours de 
l’histoire de la philosophie, pp. 31-32, 64, 108-11 
75 Cousin, V. (1840), p. 112 
76 Ibid., p. 146. Here Cousin was elaborating on a point already presented in his second lecture, where he argued 
that “The unity of civilisation is in the unity of human nature; its varieties, in the variety of the elements of 
humanity. […] In a word, history is the representation on a great scale of human nature, and that which is 
scarcely perceptible in consciousness shines forth in history in brilliant characters” (ibid., p. 32). 
  68 
Cousin’s reception of Hegel can therefore be said to have been informed by his intellectual 
formation, deepening its roots in the philosophies of Locke, Condillac and Kant. At the same 
time, he aimed to overcome the limitations of both rational psychology, on the one hand, 
deemed to be susceptible to scepticism, and absolute idealism, on the other, seen as unable 
to account for the intelligibility of historical development. This view ultimately led him to 
interpret Hegel’s metaphysics on the basis of psychology and rational ontology. More 
importantly, it was thanks to this approach that he came to view Hegelian history as the 
abstract reflection of a “collective psychology” directed by Reason, hence elaborating a 
precise methodology of the eclectic philosophical enquiry, which he aptly defined as “the 
identity of psychology and history”.77 
 This reading of Hegel, despite being limited to a select few works, was nonetheless of 
critical importance in the context of idealism’s dissemination in nineteenth-century Europe. 
Italy was no exception to this logic and, in this case, Victor Cousin’s mediation can be seen to 
have widely informed the way in which Italian authors engaged with Hegel’s texts. An 
example can clarify this idea: this chapter previously highlighted the variety of interpretive 
keys characterising Italian – particularly Neapolitan – intellectuals’ readings of Hegel. One of 
the most interesting ones, shared by Pasquale Galluppi, Ottavio Colecchi and Stefano Cusani, 
was Kantianism. All three thinkers had an extensive knowledge of Cousin, especially thanks 
to Galluppi’s 1831 translation of the Frenchman’s Fragments, published with the title 
Frammenti. This book enjoyed wide circulation among Neapolitan intellectuals, and the 
tendency initially to read Hegel in the context of Kantianism was evidence of this.  
 Initial approaches to Hegel from the perspective of Kant-via-Cousin can also help 
dispel a common misconception, namely the centrality of Augusto Vera’s contribution in the 
dynamics of Hegelianism’s transmission.78 Vera, who was born in Italy, but spent most of his 
life in France and England, translated Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften and Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion into French. Neither 
enjoyed a circulation comparable to that of Cousin’s Fragments. Additionally, Vera also 
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presented his own reflections on Hegelianism in two essays, Problème de la certitude (1840) 
and Platonis, Aristotelis et Hegelii: de medio termino doctrina (1845), as well as an article 
published in the Revue du Lyonnais in 1843, Philosophie allemande: doctrine de Hegel. These 
texts showed a very cursory and often erratic knowledge of the German philosopher’s views, 
certainly not as substantial as Cousin’s. Moreover, it was Vera’s own intention to view Hegel’s 
absolute idealism as a revised version of Platonism, as pointed out by Giovanni Gentile in 
1912.79 This was because Vera saw ideas as inherently external to the world and not as an 
internal and absolute principle.80 Furthermore, his translations were often criticised for being 
incompetent and hardly consistent with the original.81 
  With the Fragments philosophiques, then, German idealism had appeared in France. 
Later on, thanks to Galluppi’s translation, Hegelianism reached Naples. The inquiry on the 
local reception of Hegel, therefore, ought now now to develop in two directions. On the one 
hand, it must account for the ways in which Southern intellectuals reflected on Hegel-via-
Cousin, revealing their sensitivity for the Hegelian philosophy of history woven into the fabric 
of Cousin’s eclecticism. On the other, it must interrogate how Neapolitan thinkers 
endeavoured to disaggregate Hegel’s ideas from Cousin’s, and liberate his philosophy from 
the eclectics’ methodology. 
 
 
 
1.4. The Grand Tour of Idealism: …From France to Naples. A Problem of Method 
 
Thanks to Cousin, Hegel truly came to be known, read and debated in Italy, particularly in 
Naples. Already in 1898, the importance of Victor Cousin’s ideas in Italian intellectual history 
was recognised by Giovanni Gentile, who dedicated an entire section of his Albori della nuova 
Italia to Cousin’s presence in the peninsula. Gentile’s analysis, however, focused entirely on 
northern Italy, placing particular attention on Alessandro Manzoni’s friendship with Cousin, 
or the latter’s correspondence with Massimo d’Azeglio.82 In 1955, Salvo Mastellone published 
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a volume entitled V. Cousin e il Risorgimento italiano, in which he significantly enlarged the 
scope of Gentile’s inquiry by dissecting the exchange of letters between the Frenchman and 
other Italian intellectuals, including Giuseppe Ferrari, Cesare Balbo and, in Naples, Pasquale 
Galluppi.83  
Mastellone’s work pointed at the capillary dissemination of French eclecticism in the 
southern capital, suggesting that, within a mere few years, a large number of intellectuals 
declared their allegiance to this school of thought, such as Stanislao Gatti, Stefano Cusani, 
Luigi Blanch and Ottavio Colecchi.84 At any rate, Mastellone’s analysis remained somewhat 
limited with regard to how Cousin’s Neapolitan reception served as the gateway into Hegel’s 
philosophy, with this intuition being reduced to the simple idea that, by 1841, local 
sensitivities had abandoned their eclectic sympathies and consequently veered towards 
either Hegelianism or a revival of scholastic philosophy.85 This shortcoming in Mastellone’s 
analysis calls for a more substantial illustration of Hegel’s reception in Naples via local debates 
on Cousin’s eclecticism, poisiting the question of the extent to which intellectuals in the 
southern capital attempted to disaggregate the Frenchman’s own philosophical inquiries 
from Hegel’s. 
Neapolitans’ engagement with Cousin’s ideas was minimal in academic contexts: as 
pointed out earlier, Francesco Colangelo, the president of the Public Education Council of the 
Kingdom, was very critical of Pasquale Galluppi’s openness toward foreign forms of thought 
and greatly discouraged their inclusion in university programmes. Yet, even though the 
Calabrian philosopher’s 1831-32 university lectures, published for the first time in 1845, 
contained only a handful of references to Hegel, they drew attention, as part of their 
discussion of Cousin’s eclecticism, to themes that were central to German idealists’ 
preoccupations. One can mention, for example, the fact that the Frenchman’s methodology 
was often mentioned in connection with the quest for a “true method” of philosophical 
inquiry.86 Dissecting this “method”, Galluppi praised the Frenchman’s eclecticism for 
overcoming the limitations of Empiricism and rationalism, by making individual psychology 
fully subordinate to absolute Reason: 
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Cousin’s criterium of truth is neither man’s testimony, which cannot be accepted unless subject to 
close scrutiny, nor individual opinion, unable to account for any absolute thing: rather, this is 
Reason in its own essence and primitive purity. This criterium should not be sought outside 
ourselves and in others, nor should it be sought in a relative, variable and personal sentiment; it is 
neither here, not there; rather, it is in a superior, primitive principle.87 
 
This passage does not support a hypothetical claim that, by engaging with Cousin, Galluppi – 
and, consequently, the students in his course – directly reflected on Hegel and perhaps even 
his interpretation of French eclecticism may not be perfectly accurate. It can, at any rate, be 
certainly argued that the Southern professor had matured an awareness of the need, for 
modern philosophy, to define a new approach, able to go beyond empiricism and rational 
psychology and come to supplement them with a science of pure ideas. In other words, 
Galluppi may have not yet come to a Hegelian solution, but, by positing that “ontology is part 
of the science of man’s thought”, he underlined the urgency of questions that certainly moved 
philosophical inquiry a step further in the direction of pure idealism.88 
 At the same time, the concern for Cousin’s elaboration of a new philosophical 
methodology was consistent with debates taking place outside the university context. In 
particular, Neapolitan intellectuals’ reflections on the French philosopher were frequent in 
the pages of local periodicals. More specifically, Rivista napolitana (1839-48), Il progresso 
delle scienze, delle lettere e delle arti (1832-47) and Museo di letteratura e filosofia (1841-60), 
renamed Museo di scienza e letteratura in 1843, acted as the chief platforms for local thinkers 
to debate contemporary European philosophy. The first substantial illustration of Cousin’s 
thought, in this sense, appeared in 1835, when Giuseppe Devincenzi published an article in Il 
progresso entitled Dell’eclettismo in Francia, ovvero della nuova scuola filosofica del Royer-
Collard e del Cousin. In this article, the author commended the French eclectic method, 
deemed able to amalgamate various strands of contemporary European philosophy.89 In 
particular, Devincenzi noted how, thanks to his interest in German thought, particularly 
Schelling and Hegel, Cousin had managed to strike a balance between two competing strands 
of inquiry, namely “psychological observation” and “historical observation”.90 Devincenzi’s 
contribution was consistent with Galluppi’s interpretation of Cousin articulated in his 
university lectures during the early 1830s. At the same time, his analysis went one step 
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further, too, as it explained how the Frenchman’s interest in German idealism had paved the 
way for a sensible overhaul of his intellectual context’s psychologist tendencies. In other 
words, not only did Devincenzi’s article succeed in providing an extensive illustration of the 
eclectic method, but also constituted a first genuine attempt to disaggregate its theoretical 
foundations. In 1835, therefore, Neapolitan intellectuals were already beginning to reflect 
critically on Hegel’s presence in Cousin’s writings. 
 The mid-1830s can be considered a decisive turning point in Hegel’s Neapolitan 
reception, as local authors had matured, by that time, a significant awareness of an ongoing 
transnational exchange among Italy, Germany and France. An 1836 article by Luigi Blanch 
published in Il progresso, for instance, spoke of a new, modern, “philosophical movement”, 
deepening its roots in German idealism and arriving to Naples via “the study of that German 
philosophy which had been transported to France”.91 Similarly, an 1837 article penned by 
Ottavio Colecchi spoke of the need for Italian intellectuals to engage with “true philosophy”. 
This was described as a form of rationalism based on two kinds of abstraction: the one, 
particularly visible in Cousin’s works, “coming from experience”, the other, pertinent to 
German idealism, that “abstracts a general element from a single object” and “elevates itself 
to pure form”.92 Not only did Blanch and Colecchi’s articles serve as timely commentaries on 
the presence of French eclecticism in Naples, but they also correctly identified the role played 
by Hegel’s philosophy in it. Consequently, critical works on German thought began appearing 
at an increasingly frequent rate in the pages of Il progresso, as part of substantial attempts to 
deconstruct Cousin’s thought and proceed to investigate the individual tendencies of his 
eclecticism.93 
 At this stage, however, Neapolitans’ interest in Hegel was still functional to the 
solution of a problem posited by Cousin, namely the connection between a rational 
psychology and an absolute idea of history. This mentality was particularly prominent in the 
writings of Stefano Cusani, whose decisive contribution to the development of a Hegelian 
movement in Naples has generally been given little weight by later commentators.94 Born in 
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the village of Solopaca, some thirty miles north of Naples, Cusani met other soon-to-be 
Hegelians in Basilio Puoti’s private school, including Francesco De Sanctis and Stanislao Gatti, 
with whom he founded the periodical Museo di letteratura e filosofia in 1841. 
 Cusani’s 1838 work Gli arabi in Italia urged to investigate a notion of “human 
understanding” in order to understand the “immortal part of history”, since their relationship 
was deemed able to account for “the linkage of causes and effects, reasons, general facts, 
and ultimately the ideas in themselves, moving beyond their external nature”.95 In the 
following article, Del metodo filosofico e d’una sua storia, Cusani further expanded on this 
intuition, arguing that the articulation of a “general method, informing the investigation of 
the sole universal truth” ought to begin with “psychological analysis, which marks the starting 
point of our reasoning, and represents the sole basis of the great philosophical edifice, the 
only solid fundament, the atrium and vestibule of science”.96 In Del reale obbietto d’ogni 
filosofia, he also claimed that “the study of human nature’s facts, or – if you will – 
psychological phenomena, would turn out to be vacuous, if, rather than regarding it as the 
basis for further investigation, one considered it to be the actual end of science”.97 This was 
because “the subject’s science cannot be said to be complete, unless another goal of the 
human Spirit is accomplished, namely making one’s way towards the true origin of 
phenomena, ultimately investigating them – so to speak – at their starting point”.98  
 The most interesting aspect of Cusani’s articles was that they revealed a certain 
critique of Cousin’s eclectic method. The rather nebulous and, to some extent, uncritical 
amalgamation of empiricism, rational psychology and absolute idealism developed in the 
Fragments was criticised on the basis of a precise historiographic argument. The author 
believed, in fact, that the historical separation of the science of subjectivity and that of 
objectivity, namely psychology and ontology, deepening their roots in ancient Greek 
philosophy, had been dramatically problematized by Descartes, who paved the way for the 
unquestioned primacy of the subjective in philosophical speculation throughout the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. As a result, the nineteenth century ought to turn 
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its attention toward different strands of philosophical inquiry, namely the ones that had been 
neglected in the previous decades: 
 
What should the nineteenth century do, following all these works, and having witnessed the 
completion of all these questions pertinent to Psychology and Logic? It was left – above all – with 
two questions: first of all, examining the ontological problems left untouched during the previous 
century and, after examining beings and particular existences in themselves, reprising the question 
concerned with the issue of legitimacy, in order to understand the ways in which the Human Spirit 
comes to the understanding of those beings and existences.99  
 
Unsurprisingly, nineteenth-century German philosophy was hailed as the forerunner of this 
new philosophical inclination. A substantial departure from Cousin’s thought was, therefore, 
clearly visible. Based on the assumption that the goal of philosophy was to “declare how the 
Human Spirit legitimately comes to the cognition of the objective”, Cusani applauded French 
eclecticism’s understanding of psychological mechanisms, but criticised it in relation to its 
alleged failure to render it functional to the true goal of philosophy, namely the analysis of 
objective, absolute, truths.100 This was seen as a quintessentially modern research area for 
philosophy, an intuition that, as chapter five of this thesis will explain, was absolutely crucial 
in the definition of Neapolitan Hegelians’ philosophical agenda. Nineteenth-century 
speculation, by and large, ought therefore to follow the example of German idealism in 
exploring this largely uncharted field. As aptly put in another 1840 article, “it was necessary 
to start feeling the need for new problems, and for Ontology to reappear within the domain 
of speculative sciences”.101 
 The rupture with Cousin’s eclecticism, coupled with a greater emphasis on German – 
specifically Hegelian – ontology was, then, complete in 1842, when, in an article published in 
Rivista napolitana, Cusani pointed out that: 
 
We accept that it is not possible to proceed to the cognition of beings, unless our means of knowing 
them are examined first, or how human intelligence legitimately moves from the subjective to the 
objective. Yet, having declared that we are indeed able to hold absolute knowledge with regard to 
beings’ existence, and that, consequently, the science of Being is not an impossible point to reach, 
it is necessary to undertake its construction, and that we start from the Absolute in order to 
descend to the World and man. Should, therefore, psychological analysis come before, as the 
fundament of Ontology, it was first and foremost important to make clear that, once sufficient 
knowledge of this was matured, it was also necessary to reproduce this order in the broader order 
and generation of things. We accept the French eclectic school’s works with regards to psychology, 
but we must distance ourselves from it for what concerns Ontology, thus coming closer to 
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Germany. Indeed, we are not afraid to claim that this is precisely why we reject the theories by the 
French philosopher Cousin.102  
 
In this passage, the critique of Cousin’s eclectic method was visible in its most articulate form. 
Using a very Hegelian vocabulary, Cusani argued that, having investigated nature and 
particular phenomena, philosophical inquiry “returned upon itself” and proceeded to 
interrogate its own ontological status, namely the absolute conditions of the “Human 
Spirit”.103 This, in short, was the central intuition that Cusani borrowed from Hegel, 
constituting a crucial node in the German philosopher’s Neapolitan reception. Having 
highlighted the limitations of French eclecticism in accounting for the self-reflective character 
of knowledge, Hegelian ontology suddenly appeared as the most apposite means of coming 
to its understanding. 
 Such an intellectual trajectory, revolving around the extrapolation of Hegel’s ideas 
from the shell of Cousin’s philosophy, was also present in the writings of Stanislao Gatti. His 
hostility to the psychologist tendencies observable in Cousin and, to some extent, in Galluppi 
was clearly expressed: a philosophy that “condemns itself to remain within the sphere of 
purely psychological questions, should not deserve the magnificent name it strives for; rather, 
it should take on that of school logomachy”.104 This critique was already visible in an 1838 
article published in Il progresso, entitled Di una risposta di Vittore Cousin ad alcuni dubbi 
intorno alla sua filosofia, in which Gatti reflected on the French philosopher’s attempt to 
selectively appropriate diverse elements from various philosophies. In particular, while this 
approach was deemed laudable in principle, a cogent objection was raised in relation to the 
impossibility, for eclectic philosophers, of articulating a substantial ontological view against 
which to plot their analysis of individual psychology.105 Consequently, just like his close friend 
Cusani, Gatti declared his full allegiance to Hegelianism in a series of articles published in 
Museo, and suggested that the problems highlighted by Cousin were only part of a much 
wider issue: the identification of a historical law of universal Reason. This problem, Gatti 
argued, had been only cursorily touched upon by the eclectics, who saw its resolution as 
completely hinging upon debatable psychologist tendencies.106 Gatti’s speculation, at this 
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point, acquired a remarkably Hegelian overtone, as he pointed out that this law was 
observable in the progressive deployment of “the history of the philosophical Idea within 
mankind’s history”, a proposition fully consistent with Hegel’s notorious equation of history 
and the history of philosophy. Consequently, modern philosophy, as a “general science of 
existence”, ought to turn its attention to the study of absolute historical development, rather 
than restrict its analysis to the investigation of history’s particular embodiments107. 
 The dynamics of Hegel’s reception in Naples via Cousin’s philosophy ought, at this 
point, to be already quite clear: thanks to the Fragments philosophiques, local intellectuals 
rightly understood that the eclectic method consisted of an amalgamation of empirical 
observation and a broader account of historical development. Yet, Cousin’s understanding of 
Hegelian history as an abstract reflection of a “collective psychology” lay at the very core of 
Neapolitan commentators’ concerns, who endeavoured to partition the Frenchman’s 
philosophy and proceeded to dissect its individual inspirations, looking closely at its 
constitutive elements. Consequently, the process of disaggregating rational psychology from 
an idealist account of history took the form of a critique. This highlighted the need to 
reformulate the relationship between particular observations and the absolute conditions of 
history, placing greater emphasis on ontological notions borrowed from German idealism, as 
Cusani and Gatti’s contributions clearly showed. As a result, this critique allowed Neapolitan 
thinkers to move beyond Cousin’s eclecticism, on the one hand, and engage much more 
closely with Hegel’s own philosophy, on the other. 
 Limiting an account of Hegel’s immediate reception in Naples to such a brief account, 
however, would tell only part of the story, because the implications of this attempt to move 
beyond the initial Cousinian allegiances remain still unexplored. Chapter two of this thesis will 
illustrate how, having rescued Hegelianism from the shell of French eclecticism, Neapolitan 
intellectuals viewed it from the perspective of a newfound interest in Giambattista Vico’s 
historicism. By the early 1840s, the group of soon-to-be Neapolitan Hegelians had come to 
the articulation of a philosophical problem, which, by disentangling Hegelian ontology from 
Cousin’s psychologist tendencies, demanded the identification of absolute historical laws. 
These were to be viewed, as Cusani himself put it, as “constitutive elements of a specific 
faculty, which may be both subjective and objective, which, therefore, may proceed from the 
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object and manifest itself in the subject, stemming from an absolute and impersonal idea of 
Reason”.108 In consequence, a proliferation of works addressing this topic could be observed 
at the dawn of the new decade: in Della logica trascendentale, Cusani aimed at exploring the 
absolute and objective notion of Reason, borrowed from Hegel, and, as hinted two years 
prior, in order to demonstrate its centrality in organising and directing individual 
experiences.109 Similarly, in another article published in the same year, he argued that such 
an account of Reason, understood as an “impersonal and objective faculty, which does not 
belong to any man more than anyone else, which […] is identified with Absolute itself, being 
detached from the contingent”, was able to resist the threat of relativism and scepticism, 
despite being observable in virtually the totality of individual experiences.110 
 An inquiry into a notion of Absolute, highlighting its relational nature in connection 
with individual experiences was, therefore, exactly the road not taken by Cousin’s eclecticism 
and the entry point, for Neapolitan thinkers, to the study of Hegel’s philosophy:  
 
It is exactly in this sense, precisely from necessary and universal truths, that we aim at singling out 
that opinion held by Hegel, that the Idea is Being […] and discover the laws of Reason to be nothing 
more than the operations and manifestations of an absolute intelligence.111 
   
This allegiance to Hegel was symptomatic of a broader re-alignment of Cusani’s thought, 
which, as pointed out by Giovanni Gentile almost a hundred years later, revolved around an 
absolute ideal of history no longer understood as “the integration of psychology, but the 
actual configuration of philosophy itself”.112 Human experience, therefore, ought not to be 
seen in the light of its individual, rational and psychological character, but as a historical 
reflection of an absolute human Spirit. Stanislao Gatti argued in the very same direction when, 
in 1844, he claimed that history “is not situated in certain names, nor in certain facts devoid 
of movement and life; rather, it is situated in the most intimate representation of an Idea, 
which, in any given era, truly manifested itself and gave birth to an entire century, informing 
people and things with itself”.113 
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 This attempt to historicise the particular conditions of human experience and view 
them in the light of broader notions of historical development and historical time, however, 
automatically poses a question, connected with the actual method of inquiry. Because 
Cousinian, eclectic approach was fundamentally untenable, Neapolitan philosophers were 
confronted with the issue of how to connect the observation of history’s empirically 
observable conditions with their absolute counterparts. This problem was already illustrated 
by Stefano Cusani in 1839, when he lamented the need to adopt “convincing and safe 
methods” in order to demonstrate how “the universal history of Humanity […] features within 
itself the entire intellectual development of our species”.114 In other words, a methodology 
able to account for an absolute historical law informing all individual circumstances of man, 
the “historical subject par exellence”.115  
 In the tradition of Vico, and as illustrated in the following chapter, placing man at the 
centre of history was the key to understanding Neapolitan intellectuals’ complete departure 
from Cousin and, more broadly speaking, to illuminating the coordinates of Hegelianism’s 
local reception. Due to psychological observation’s inability to fuel an inquiry in an 
ontologically absolute notion of human experience, embedded in the idealist conception of 
history borrowed from Hegel, Neapolitan thinkers understood they ought to direct their gaze 
elsewhere. Yet, one of Cousin’s most significant intuitions, located at the core of the eclectic 
method articulated in the Fragments philosophiques, still echoed in their minds: that any 
metaphysics, in order to be intelligible, must be aided by the analysis of empirically 
observable circumstances. Consequently, as explained earlier, intellectuals in Naples 
discussed, in the pages of local periodicals, how the psychologist tendencies of the eclectic 
method had arguably failed to be functional to any metaphysics. The problem, in their view, 
lay in a certain imbalance characterising Cousin’s methodology, whose chief shortcoming was 
an alleged lack of ontological depth. A compelling account of history, however, was clearly 
present in Hegel, but intellectuals in Naples soon found themselves engaging with the same 
question that had puzzled Victor Cousin several years previously, namely how to mediate 
between the subjective and the objective, albeit from the exact opposite angle. The 
Frenchman striving for a metaphysics in order to validate his psychological observations, on 
                                                           
114 Cusani, S. (1839c) Elementi di fisica sperimentale e di meteorologia di M. Pouillet, terza edizione, p. 272 
115 Cusani, S. (1841) Della lirica considerata nel suo svolgimento storico e del suo predominio sugli altri generi di 
poesia nei tempi moderni, p. 33 
  79 
the one hand; Hegel, on the other, whose compelling account of history required empirical 
observation in order to be intelligible.  
What one could witness, at this point, was the complete reversal of the question that 
had foxed French eclectics twenty years earlier: if these were essentially asking “what can 
empirical observations reveal about history?”, Neapolitan Hegelians were now wondering 
“how does man’s absolute historical existence come to be realised in particular 
circumstances?”. The subject these two schools of thought were dealing with was indeed 
quite similar in nature, but the overall philosophical inclinations and approaches could not 
possibly be more different, as they perfectly embodied the chasm separating Kantian rational 
psychology from Hegel’s pure idealism. Modern philosophy should operate a fundamental re-
orientation of its aims. Rather than attempting to provide inferences on a notion of history 
seen as the product of man’s intellect, it was now crucial to study how history itself, in its 
totality and absolute force, was able to inform, shape and direct man’s existence. A new 
horizon of concerns was within the reach of Neapolitan Hegelians’ imagination. 
 What individual aspects of human history are able to reflect its universality? What 
particular aspects of man’s historical existence are particularly illustrative of its totality? What 
are the mechanisms connecting the universal and the particular? These seem to have been 
the questions at the forefront of Neapolitan intellectuals’ philosophical agenda in the early 
1840s. Instead of looking at individual psychology and reason, therefore, they felt they ought 
to interrogate different aspects of mankind’s historical life. While the formulation of such 
problems stemmed from a complex, multi-layered, transnational exchange, their answer 
revealed itself almost immediately. To solve these questions, the Hegelians of Naples had to 
look no further than their own backyard. Thanks to their sensitivity for Hegel’s philosophy of 
history, they had brought, perhaps inadvertently, the German philosopher exceptionally close 
to a Neapolitan thinker of the previous century, Giambattista Vico. Yet, if Hegel could easily 
be understood in Vichian terms, could Vico himself be re-discovered as Hegelian? 
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1.5. Neapolitan Hegelianism and a European History of Ideas 
 
While Hegel did not take centre stage in intellectual debates taking place in most parts of Italy 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, it was in Naples that aspects of his works were 
discussed and brought into circulation in a much more systematic manner. This chapter 
therefore has attempted to provide a substantial illustration of Hegel’s Neapolitan reception 
during the 1830s and ‘40s, drawing attention to several inter-related aspects, ranging from 
its inherently transnational nature to its implications in terms of local philosophical debates. 
As a subject of inquiry for intellectual historians, Hegelianism’s reception in the Southern 
capital can provide several insights, both from an empirical and a methodological point of 
view. These can be briefly summarised as having to do with: (i) the mechanisms of intellectual 
exchange across national borders, enabling the circulation of Hegel’s ideas from Germany to 
Naples via France, vs. historiographical accounts reflecting on an alleged direct encounter of 
German and Italian authors;116 (ii) the need to slot Neapolitan Hegelianism within the picture 
a transnational history of ideas, and (iii) the consequent implications for what concerns 
historians’ understanding of European idealism in its polycentric ramifications during the 
nineteenth century; (iv) the actual periodisation of Hegel’s Neapolitan reception; and (v) the 
need to consider Hegelianism’s reception in the southern capital in terms of revision and 
amalgamation with local forms of thought, in contrast to verdicts, primarily presented by 
Italian scholarship of the twentieth century, uncritically speaking of passive appropriation.117 
 The emergence of a Hegelian school of philosophy in Naples during the 1830s and ‘40s 
was an extremely complex affair, more complex than traditional accounts would hold. The 
proposition that this came about as a result of a direct, bi-lateral, exchange between 
Neapolitan and German intellectuals is hard to maintain. As explained in the first section of 
this chapter, local authors who were able to engage with Hegel’s works in their original 
language were very few and their interpretations, consistently filtered through the lens of 
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these thinker’s pre-existing philosophical beliefs, did not enjoy a wide circulation. In other 
words, Galluppi and Colecchi’s understanding of absolute Idealism as a form of post-Kantian 
thought was not sufficient to explain the fact that later authors reflected on Hegel as a 
theorist of historical time, let alone the range and variety of debates on his philosophy 
emerging from the early 1840s onwards. A compelling account of Hegel’s reception in the 
Southern capital ought therefore to consider indirect avenues of exchange and, in this sense, 
the mediation of French intellectuals, most notably Victor Cousin, appears to have played a 
crucial role. In consequence, it is hard to see how the study of Hegel’s reception may be 
slotted into any framework other than that of a transnational history of ideas. 
 Viewing Hegel-via-Cousin’s reception in Naples through the lens of transnationalism 
may provide meaningful insights with regard to the character of European idealism and its 
circulation across national boundaries. This chapter illustrated the presence of at least three 
different ways of engaging with the German philosopher during the nineteenth century: (i) in 
Germany, he was synonymous with pure idealism, while (ii) in France, mainly thanks to 
Cousin’s reading, his philosophy was understood as functional to the resolution of problems 
in rational psychology; (iii) in Italy, instead, one can notice a much greater emphasis on 
philosophy of history, coupled with a more extensive interest in absolute ontology. Within a 
timespan of little more than twenty years, then, different contexts produced various 
understandings of German idealism’s character, reflecting a plurality of philosophical 
concerns. These observations can be understood as evidence of the fact that, as a result of 
transnational exchanges, concepts may take on a life of their own and, from a methodological 
perspective, they suggest that a transnational approach to the study of European idealism 
ought to be sensitive to its ramifications and relationship with different contexts. As a result, 
it is ultimately necessary to challenge a reified definition of this philosophy that remains 
insensitive to the extent to which circulation across national borders is in itself generative of 
meaning. One ought, instead, to engage more closely with the polycentric nature of German 
idealism: Hegelianism in Germany, post-Kantianism in France and absolute philosophy of 
history in Italy stemmed from the very same idealist doctrine, but they reflected diverging 
intellectual agendas and, more importantly, they were informed by sensibly different 
contextual factors. 
 Investigating how local contexts intersected with broader dynamics of transnational 
exchange ultimately reveals that Hegel’s Neapolitan reception, far from representing a mere 
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process of passive absorption, constituted an opportunity not only to draw German idealism 
closer to the local tradition, but progressively to come to their amalgamation. This operation 
was carried along the lines of subsequent interpretations and revisions, which provide useful 
information in relation to the actual periodization of Hegel’s Neapolitan reception. One can 
identify a “first group” of authors, whose most notable members were Pasquale Galluppi and 
Ottavio Colecchi. The importance of their tentative contributions lies in the fact that, by 
reading Hegelianism as, to use Galluppi’s own words, an “experimental philosophy” of 
“exterior causes”, they provided the backbone of local thinkers’ later attempts to 
disaggregate Hegel from Cousin.118 This reading, which became a rather popular one mainly 
thanks to Colecchi’s teaching in his private philosophy school in the late 1830, whose 
centrality in forming the Hegelian generation of southern thinkers will be examined in chapter 
three, emphasises the need to move beyond the investigation of the facts of consciousness 
and direct one’s gaze toward a priori metaphysical truths.  
Galluppi and Colecchi’s reception of Hegel loudly reverberated in the intellectual 
agendas characterising the “second group” of the German philosopher’s southern 
interpreters. Cusani and Gatti, whose names are only seldom mentioned by traditional 
studies on Neapolitan Hegelianism, were the most prominent members of this group. Their 
readings of the German philosopher, while appearing prima facie as a critique of Victor 
Cousin’s eclecticism, reflected, during the early 1840s, a substantial and deliberate attempt 
to embrace pure idealism. This operation, however, by virtue of its own nature, entailed the 
need to replace Cousin’s emphasis on psychological observation with some other empirically 
observable phenomenon, hence paving the way for an understanding of Hegel as a theorist 
of historical time, on the one hand, and the amalgamation of his philosophy with Giambattista 
Vico’s, on the other. This goal, representing a recurring leitmotif in the next chapters of this 
thesis, can be seen as the prime concern of the “third group” of Neapolitan Hegelians, namely 
those authors, such as Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco De Sanctis, who, having developed 
a convincing acquaintance with Hegel’s philosophy, proceeded, from the mid-1840s onwards, 
to systematically project it onto notions borrowed from La scienza nuova.  
 Soon after its appearance in Naples, then, Hegelianism underwent critical 
examination, initially aimed at isolating it from the vessel that had transported it to Southern 
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Italy, namely Cousin’s eclectic method. The account of these complex dynamics, offered in 
the present chapter via a close examination of the German philosopher’s reception, may 
already begin, at this point, to render the actual definition of “Neapolitan Hegelianism” 
increasingly layered and complex. This, however, was only the beginning of the full story. The 
very same critical attitude shared by local thinkers during the mid- and late 1830s 
immediately signalled the need to revise Hegel’s ideas, too. This is where the next episode in 
Neapolitan Hegelianism’s history began. This is where the full amalgamation with 
Giambattista Vico’s philosophy took place, where Hegel became part of Naples’ tradition and 
where the southern capital itself finally emerged as a European centre of the nineteenth-
century intellectual landscape. 
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2. Un Incontro Mancato? Giambattista Vico and German Idealism in Context1 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
As hinted in the previous chapter, Hegel’s reception in Europe was a complex one, 
characterized by remarkable variety in different regions of the continent. This can be 
explained in terms of the different philosophical landscapes and intellectual contexts existing 
in various countries. It is no surprise, therefore, that, during the first half of the 1800s, in a 
region like Britain, where empiricism was on the rise, Hegel’s idealism could not enjoy 
significant popularity – at least until the advent of Marxism triggered its re-discovery. France, 
because of its ongoing efforts aiming at re-habilitating scientific thought and renovating the 
Cartesian tradition, was also not exceptionally sensitive to the impact of the German 
philosopher’s ideas. With a brief exception for the very early reception among the eclectics, 
France saw Hegel’s reception largely limited to his logic, partially leaving aside, among other 
things, his Geschichtsphilosophie, which remained a subject of enquiry for a small number of 
intellectuals only. 
 Italy, instead, represented a different scenario, with Hegel’s philosophy of history 
enjoying a particularly fortunate reception. This can be partly explained by the fact that, in 
the North of the peninsula, Giandomenico Romagnosi, Carlo Cattaneo and Vincenzo Gioberti 
frequently engaged in debates concerned with the historical nature of society and its 
institutions, the idea of progress and moral and civic improvement of the people, as well as 
the goals of history itself. These debates created a conceptual horizon bounding Italian 
intellectuals’ reading of Hegel, who was consequently welcomed as the leading exponent of 
a new historicism, able to inform numerous spheres of political and social life. Yet, equating 
the German philosopher’s Italian reception to a process of appropriation of his philosophy of 
history would be an oversimplification and would ultimately fail to provide a convincing 
account of Hegelianism’s appearance in the peninsula, particularly in the Mezzogiorno. 
                                                           
1 Sections of this chapter will be included in: De Arcangelis, A. (2018) “Towards a New Philosophy of History. 
European Vichianism and Neapolitan Hegelianism (1804-48)” Journal of Modern Italian Studies (forthcoming) 
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As suggested in the previous chapter, the dynamics of this encounter were more 
complex and hinged on the systematic amalgamation of Hegel with the local tradition of 
thought, informed by ongoing debates on history and the broader socio-political context. 
Some nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators who examined the popularity of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history, saw the latter as the most elaborate and extensive expression 
of a historicist tradition initiated by Vico’s famous book La scienza nuova, which was 
perceived as the manifesto of a philosophy of historical time and commonly seen as a 
forerunner of German idealism.2 
 At the same time, while this intuition already hints at a certain relationship between 
Hegelianism and Vichianism, the connection between these two schools of thought was not 
straightforward, due to conceptual and contextual factors. Hegel and Vico’s philosophies of 
history were characterised by fundamental differences in terms of their premises, focus, and 
definitions of historical development, among other things. Additionally, the lack of evidence 
suggesting that the German philosopher may have reflected on Vico when writing his 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte renders the intellectual continuity between 
the two authors even more uncertain and problematic. During the 1800s, however, Hegel’s 
philosophy of history was almost univocally treated as complementary to Vico’s: as a result, 
especially in the context of this thesis, the analysis of the German thinker’s reception ought 
to consistently engage with the often-problematic issue of Vico’s re-discovery in the early 
nineteenth century and only subsequently attempt to provide a full account of this 
connection. 
This chapter, therefore, will address the problem of Vico’s relation to Hegel, drawing 
attention to the re-discovery of Neapolitan philosopher in the context of nineteenth-century 
European and Italian debates on philosophy of history. In particular, it will be suggested that, 
while there is no significant textual evidence to identify Vico as a forerunner of German 
idealist philosophy of history, he was nonetheless being read as such in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, due to contextual factors, including dynamics of reception and intra- 
and transnational cultural transfers. This, in turn, may explain how Vico’s legacy made 
nineteenth-century readers more sensitive to the ideas proposed by Hegel, most notably to 
Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie. 
                                                           
2 Croce, B. (1913) Saggio sullo Hegel, p. 51; Gans, E. (1837) Vorrede, p. ix; Gentile, G. (1915) Studi vichiani, pp. 
103, 134; Spaventa, B. (1862) La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea, p. 31 
  87 
Viewing this chapter in the broader context of a study of Hegelianism’s presence in 
the Mezzogiorno, the need to supplement the analysis of this philosophy’s reception with the 
study of the local historicist tradition’s re-discovery appears critical: the previous chapter of 
this thesis maintained that Neapolitan thinkers’ attempts to disaggregate Hegel’s thought 
from Victor Cousin’s eclecticism ultimately confronted them with a convincing account of 
absolute historical development, devoid, however, of a compelling explanation of the ways 
in which this can be imagined as part of a direct, tangible experience of history. This issue, the 
previous chapter concluded, could conveniently be resolved by plotting a Hegelian account 
of Weltgeschichte against Vico’s views on history. In a nutshell, just as chapter one explained 
how Hegelian Neapolitan Hegelianism was, the present one will display what was Neapolitan 
about it. 
This chapter will therefore attempt to provide an explanation of how the encounter 
of Hegelianism and Vichianism took place. It will be suggested that: (i) the re-discovery of 
Vico’s ideas must be slotted into the context of European romanticism: as suggested by Isaiah 
Berlin in his book Vico and Herder, La scienza nuova deployed a number of “time-defying 
notions”, constituting a conceptual framework that made the text appeal to the emerging 
romantic imaginations, on the one hand, and to advocates of idealist conceptions of time and 
history, on the other;3 (ii) consistent with the illustration of French intellectuals’ contribution 
developed in chapter one, the dynamics of circulation of Vico’s ideas were affected by Jules 
Michelet, who, influenced by Victor Cousin, selectively borrowed notions from Vico and 
Hegel, systematically adapting them to his own conception of history; (iii) Vincenzo Cuoco 
and other Southern émigrés’ contribution to the popularization of La scienza nuova paved the 
way for the problematisation of the tension between two notions: “ideal eternal history” 
(“storia ideale eterna”) and the empirical conditions of history. This division, regarded by the 
Neapolitan exile to have been underdeveloped in Vico, entailed a dichotomy between a 
philosophical vision of historical time and the study of the most concrete and practical 
circumstances in which the latter comes to be embodied. In consequence, while expounding 
and praising Vico’s historiographical methods, Cuoco’s reading of the eighteenth-century 
Neapolitan philosopher highlighted the need to amalgamate the study of human knowledge 
and societies with the elaboration of a universal philosophy of historical time, which was 
                                                           
3 Berlin, I. (1976) Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas, p. xvi  
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reckoned to be only a peripheral concern of La scienza nuova, but later found in Hegel; (iv) 
nineteenth-century Italian debates on Vico, especially thanks to the contribution of Gian 
Domenico Romagnosi and Carlo Cattaneo, brought about a concern for a concept of progress, 
which Vico’s philosophy could not convincingly account for. Consequently, intellectuals 
turned to German idealists to resolve these questions, finding satisfactory propositions in 
some aspects of Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie. 
 
 
 
2.2. Giambattista Vico: der Unbekannte Philosoph 
 
Born roughly one century after Vico, Hegel never explicitly referred to him and no significant 
textual evidence can be provided to support a hypothetical claim that he reflected upon the 
Neapolitan philosopher’s ideas. There are, in fact, important differences between Vico’s 
philosophy of history, articulated in La scienza nuova, and the German idealist tradition, 
especially Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Vico wrote La scienza 
nuova on the basis of the equation of “verum” and “factum” elaborated in De antiquissima 
italorum sapientia of 1710. In plain opposition to eighteenth-century Cartesian rationalism 
and the reigning Galilean scientific worldview, he argued that, unlike nature, which is created 
by the omnipotent God, only that which is made by man (factum) is accessible to the human 
mind and can, therefore, be the subject of true knowledge (verum).4 By consequence, Vico 
aimed at rehabilitating all subjects dealing with man’s experience of reality, most notably 
history, which Descartes had notoriously labelled a pseudoscience.5 He then adopted this 
association as the basis for the creation of a new science, trying to reconcile the rational divine 
order with the sphere of human affairs. In La scienza nuova, therefore, the ways in which 
history could reflect – and be subject to – the divine laws of Providence were given special 
consideration.  
Vico’s theory stemmed from a basic assumption: that history moved from mankind’s 
desire to overcome man’s primitive state in order to participate in the divine order to which 
                                                           
4 Vico, G. (1710) De antiquissima italorum sapientia, pp. 14-37 
5 Descartes, R. (1637) Discours de la méthode, p. 7 
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it feels it belongs. 6 More specifically, the elaboration of a new science represented an attempt 
to investigate how mankind’s experience of history, reflecting the progressive articulation of 
its civic and intellectual life, coincided with the ongoing enactment of a divine order (“Ordine 
Eterno”).7 In particular: 
 
Our Science must therefore be a demonstration, so to speak, of the historical fact of 
Providence, for it must be a history of the forms of order which, without human discernment 
or intent, and often against the design of men, Providence has given to this great city of the 
human race. For though this world has been created in time and particular, the orders 
established therein by Providence are universal and eternal. In contemplation of this infinite 
and eternal Providence our Science finds certain divine proofs by which it is confirmed and 
demonstrated.8 
 
This was why Vico spoke of an “ideal eternal history” (“storia ideale eterna”), corresponding 
to the realisation “in time” of the “histories of all Nations” (“storie di tutte le Nazioni”).9 As 
this chapter shall explain, the juxtaposition of these two concepts was critical in the context 
of early nineteenth-century debates on La scienza nuova, as well as Neapolitan Hegelians’ 
later use of it. 
Crucially, for the Neapolitan philosopher, man’s agency was central to the experience 
and the development of history.10 Yet it was also constantly subject to the regulatory force of 
Providence, the “divine law-making mind” guiding people’s actions beyond the mere 
fulfilment of their “passions” and “private utility”, and towards the contemplation of “this 
world of Nations, in the totality of its places, times and varieties, within Divine Ideas”.11  For 
Vico, while being quite separate from the material world, Providence worked through the 
normal course of human affairs and was solely concerned with what happened in the world: 
as John Robertson put it, this was “what gives human affairs the degree of order they 
possess”.12 
                                                           
6 Vico, G. (1744) La scienza nuova, I, p. 29 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid., I, p. 184 
9 ibid., I, p. 21 
10 ibid., I, p. 145 
11 ibid., I, pp. 119, 185; According to Vico, man, if left alone, was profoundly threatened by his own selfishness 
and driven only by personal gain, to such an extent that the latter would end up destroying his social and 
historical life if left unregulated. Providence aimed at amending this and, by consequence, could be seen as an 
instrument for the civic happiness of man. Additionally, despite its divine origin, Vico’s Providence acted in such 
a natural way – and in concert with man’s free will – that it could be identified with the natural laws of historical 
process. Consequently, it did not have the transcendent and miraculous character characterizing, for example, 
Augustine’s idea of Providence. 
12 Robertson, J. (2005) The Case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760, pp. 320-21 
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Vico’s views on the character of history were supported by a number of key-concepts: 
alongside Providence, for instance, he frequently spoke of a tri-partite division of the 
“histories of all Nations”, reflecting, in a broader sense, three distinct moments in the 
development of the “ideal, eternal history”.13 In particular, he listed an “age of the Gods” 
(“età degli Dei”), during which people “believed they lived under divine governments, and 
everything was commanded them by auspices and oracles”; an “age of Heroes” (“età degli 
Eroi”), during which “they reigned everywhere in aristocratic commonwealths, on account of 
a certain superiority which they held themselves to have over the plebs”; an “age of Men” 
(“età degli Uomini”), in which “all men recognised themselves as equal in human nature, and 
therefore there were established first the popular commonwealths and then the monarchies, 
both of which are forms of human government”.14 
Accordingly, while Vico’s insistence on man’s agency in history, coupled with 
Providence’s regulatory force, allowed him to escape any form of determinism, his 
understanding of historical development was by no means linear. The three epochs of history 
were said to cyclically follow one another, according to the principle of “corsi e ricorsi” 
developed only in the second and third editions of La scienza nuova.15 Put simply, this theory 
suggested that the history of nations was characterised by periods of development, followed 
by periods of decadence and corruption, ultimately precipitating mankind into an early stage 
of barbarism.16 
 Some of the differences between Vico and Hegel’s philosophies of history should 
already be evident: first of all, while the Neapolitan philosopher’s analysis remained anchored 
to a concrete, empirical and historical, sphere, Hegel’s preference was for the meta-historical 
and that which he called “philosophical history”, concerned with theoretical concepts and 
entities, ultimately making his philosophy of history subordinate to his metaphysics of Spirit.17 
Additionally, while Vico and Hegel shared an interest in Reason, it is possible to see how 
different their accounts of this notion were: for Vico, Reason was synonymous with 
understanding, while, for Hegel, it had a much wider meaning, representing the true 
                                                           
13 Vico, G. (1744), I, p. 40 
14 ibid., I, pp. 40-41 
15 Ibid., V, pp. 974-1021 
16 ibid.; Robertson, J. (2005), pp. 254-55 
17 In La scienza nuova, even an apparently abstract theory, such as that of the tripartite division of history, 
reflected the three stages of development of the human mind (Vico, G. (1744), I, pp. 181-92); Hegel, G. W. F. 
(1837) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, pp. 3-75. 
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substance of history.18 By contrast, one can see a parallel between Vico’s idea of Providence 
and Hegel’s notion of Reason, as some later commentators postulated.19 After all, both 
concepts were seen as the engine propelling history, but here another significant difference 
between the two authors can be identified. This has to do with how the two come to occupy 
their respective spaces in history: dialectics, through which, according to Hegel, Reason is 
realized, was entirely absent in the writings of Vico, who saw God’s Providence as working 
alongside human agency. In this sense, it is difficult to disagree with Meinecke’s description 
of Vico’s philosophy of history as an attempt to “without weakening them, [pull] God’s hands 
a little further away from history”, giving “to this its natural freedom of movement”, and 
granting “the contingency of history and the freedom of its protagonist”.20 
Lastly, another fundamental difference lay in the trajectory followed by historical 
development: the Vichian theory of “corsi e ricorsi storici” described the cyclical succession 
of three distinct historical periods, following subsequent stages of acute social, political, 
cultural and intellectual crisis. This was the exact opposite of German idealist philosophy of 
history, whose exponents, instead, saw history as linear and directional. In particular, Hegel’s 
view was notoriously teleological and revolved around the progressive realization of freedom 
in it.21 
 Despite these evident conceptual differences, the dynamics of Hegel’s European 
reception, especially in the 1830s and ‘40s, were inextricably linked with those of Vico’s re-
discovery in many parts of the continent during the first decades of the 1800s, and it is 
possible to mention a significant number of commentaries arguing in favour of a certain 
continuity between the two authors. Eduard Gans, who attended Hegel’s lectures in 
Heidelberg and whose written output was imbued with the principles of Hegel’s philosophy 
of history, established, in his Introduction to the 1837 edition of the philosopher’s 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, a connection between La scienza nuova and 
the ideas of German idealists, arguing that the formulation of a philosophy of history akin to 
Hegel’s had previously been attempted by Herder, Friedrich von Schlegel, and by Giambattista 
                                                           
18 Hegel, G. W. F. (1837), pp. 13-14 
19 See, for example Croce, B. (1913), p. 51, or Croce, B. (1922a) La filosofia di Giambattista Vico, pp. 115-126 
20 Meinecke, F. (1936) Die Entstehung des Historismus, p. 42 
21 Beiser, F. (2002) Hegel, pp. 261-66 
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Vico, whose most notable achievement was to have elaborated a conception of history as 
ruled by “original laws and Reason” (“ursprünglicher Gesetze und Vernunft”).22  
 This view was further consolidated, in the Italian peninsula, by commentaries 
appearing during the second half of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century: Bertrando 
Spaventa, for example, in his 1862 essay La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia 
europea, described Vico as “the true precursor of all Germany”, positing that the eighteenth-
century Neapolitan philosopher should be recognized as the first – and most notable – 
theorist of a historical time informed by a new metaphysics of ideas and by a groundbreaking 
intuition, namely that of Spirit.23 In 1922, Benedetto Croce wrote La filosofia di Giambattista 
Vico, in which the Neapolitan philosopher was not only seen as a precursor of German 
historicism, but more broadly defined as “the seed of the nineteenth century”.24 This is 
particularly interesting if one considers that Croce knew that Hegel was not directly 
acquainted with any of Vico’s writings.25  
A parallel between the two authors was already developed in Croce’s 1900 essay Ciò 
che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel, where the Neapolitan philosopher was 
credited with being the first to formulate a dialectical view of history, and in which 
comparisons between Vico’s notion of Providence and Hegel’s “cunning of Reason”, were 
proposed.26 In his most mature reflection on Hegelianism, the often overlooked 1949 
imaginary dialogue Una pagina sconosciuta degli ultimi mesi della vita di Hegel, Croce 
recounted a fictitious encounter taking place in Berlin between the great German idealist and 
the young Neapolitan Francesco di Sanseverino, de facto a spokesperson for Croce himself, 
presenting Vico not only as a “precursor” of idealist philosophy, but also as a thinker deemed 
able to resolve some of the perceived shortcomings of Hegel’s own thought27. 
 Croce’s verdict on Vico, which acquired an increasingly Hegelian connotation over a 
time span of fifty years, was echoed by the words of another influential historian of 
nineteenth-century Italy, Giovanni Gentile. He authored, in 1915, the Studi vichiani, 
                                                           
22 Gans, E. (1837), p. ix 
23 Spaventa, B. (1862), p. 31 
24 Croce, B. (1922a) p. 257; Croce’s interest in Vico led him to compile the well-known Bibliografia vichiana, 
initially conceived in 1904 and published in 1911. Croce’s Bibliografia details all works written on Vico and his 
influence on others. A revised and updated edition was published by Fausto Nicolini in 1948.  
25 Croce, B. (1922b) La fortuna del Vico, p. 291 
26 Croce, B. (1900) Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel, pp. 42, 70, 72-74 
27 Croce, B. (1949) Una pagina sconosciuta degli ultimi mesi della vita di Hegel, p. 12 
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suggesting that Vico’s idea of Providence ought to be seen as a precursor of Hegel’s intuition 
of a rationality embedded in historical development. Gentile, in fact, highlighted how “the 
notion of reality discussed in La scienza nuova is not only mind, but mind understood as self-
consciousness”, later adding that the eighteenth-century Neapolitan philosopher had been 
the first to postulate, like Hegel a century later, “that concrete universality representing the 
subject positing itself, and realising itself via self-consciousness”.28 
In recent years, a historiographical tradition initiated by the volume Die Entstehung 
des Historismus by Friedrich Meinecke resulted in efforts to disaggregate Vico’s historicism 
from subsequent iteration of the same principle.29 Pietro Piovani, for example, in his book 
Vico senza Hegel, suggested that, while the two authors undoubtedly shared a common 
concern with the problem of history, they nonetheless diverged insofar as the Neapolitan 
philosopher’s elaboration of historical time exhibited some undeniable anti-metaphysical 
traits.30 A similar line of argumentation was adopted by Friedrich Jäger and Jörn Rüsen, who, 
while failing to regard historicism as a subject matter in itself for intellectual historians, 
believed that it nonetheless constituted an ubiquitous methodological approach in western 
philosophy. In their Geschichte des Historismus, in fact, they maintained that European 
historicisms stemmed from a common problem, but developed along different trajectories 
and ultimately differed quite substantially with regard to metaphysical assumptions, the 
subject of analysis and the conclusions reached.31 
The tension between early and late twentieth-century inquiries on Vico and German 
idealism may suggest that the truth with regards to their connection lay somewhere in the 
middle; it is therefore possible to argue that later commentaries on this topic seem to have 
defended a markedly philosophical reading of both Vico and German historicists, leaving little, 
if any, room for the analysis of the different authors’ receptions. This issue is one that 
intellectual historians can conveniently resolve: while there is little textual continuity 
between Vico and later authors, a contextual analysis can reveal how German philosophers 
of history were essentially deemed to have reflected on Vico’s historicism, due to ongoing 
debates on history and the overall orientation of the European intellectual landscape. In other 
                                                           
28 Gentile, G. (1915), pp. 103, 134 
29 A good overview of these scholarly interpretations is available in: Tessitore, F. (1968) Vico tra due storicismi, 
pp. 217-27; Tessitore, F. (1979) Vico nelle origini dello storicismo tedesco, pp. 5-34 
30 Piovani, P. (1968) Vico senza Hegel, pp. 553-86 
31 Jäger, F. & Rüsen, J. (1992) Geschichte des Historismus, pp. 144-48 
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words, it can show that a connection was perceived to exist even if there actually was none. 
Having rejected the possibility of a direct textual link, the possibility of a contextual 
connection still remains. Despite the significant differences between La scienza nuova and 
the Vorlesungen, one may legitimately wonder to what extent Vico’s historicism penetrated 
the German intellectual landscape, influencing, more or less indirectly, the group of authors 
who ultimately constituted the idealist school of philosophy. A contextual analysis of this kind, 
essentially concerned with Vico’s reception in nineteenth-century Germany, however, further 
consolidates the need to disaggregate Vico’s philosophy from Hegel’s. 
During the eighteenth century, Vico did not enjoy a favorable reception, either in Italy, 
or abroad. The first two editions of La scienza nuova, originally published in 1725 and 1730, 
initially had a very limited circulation in the peninsula, and they barely succeeded in crossing 
the Alps, hence providing little evidence in support of any direct continuity between Vichian 
and idealist historicism.32 The first German translation of La scienza nuova appeared only in 
1822, penned by Wilhelm Ernst Weber.33 This translation was generally regarded as a very 
accurate one; moreover, as indicated by Croce, later commentators also praised Weber’s 
efforts to render Vico’s language clearer to German speakers and his detailed reconstruction 
of the original text’s sources.34 Despite these facts, this work went almost completely 
unnoticed, being mentioned only in an 1851 article published in the periodical Deutsches 
Museum and in Karl Heinrich Müller’s 1854 translation of Vico’s 1720 De universi juris 
principio et fine uno.35 Prior to 1822, evidence of Vico’s presence in Germany was also limited. 
The periodical Acta eruditorum lipsiensia, appearing in Leipzig, which Vico himself knew well, 
produced a harsh review of La scienza nuova upon the initial publication of the 1725 edition, 
drawing attention to several alleged inconsistencies in its historiographical methodology.36  
Individual authors failed to engage systematically with Vico’s work, too: Hamann, for 
instance, confessed in a letter written in 1777, that he was eagerly waiting to receive a copy 
                                                           
32 Becchi, P. (1986) Vico e Filangieri in Germania, pp. 8-9; Tessitore, F. (1979) pp. 7-8 
33 Weber’s translation, made between 1817 and 1821, appeared with the title Grundzüge einer Neuen 
Wissenschaft über die gemeinschaftliche Natur der Völker, Aus dem Italienischen and was based on the third 
(1744) edition of La Scienza Nuova. 
34 Croce, B. (1911) Bibliografia vichiana, p. 6; Weber, W. E. (1822) Vorwort, I, pp. xxii-iii 
35 Cauer, E. (1851) G.B.V. und seine Stellung zur modernen Wissenschaft, p. 261; Müller, K. H. (1854) Einleitung, 
p. 31; Croce, B. (1911), pp. 6, 73; it is interesting to note that Müller’s translation was meant as the first entry in 
a series entitled Des Johann Baptista Vico kleine Schriften, discontinued after the first volume’s publication 
36 Anonymous (1727) Baptistae Vici notae; Croce, B. (1911), pp. 223-24 
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of La scienza nuova.37 In it, he explained, he was hoping to discover fresh insights into 
economics and history, but later admitted his disappointment in exclusively coming across 
notions of philology.38 This verdict proved to be quite puzzling for later commentators on 
Hamann, who found it peculiar – to say the least – that he had failed to see the evident 
similarities between Vico’s thought and his own.39  
 Johann Gottfried Herder was another author whose relationship with Vico was 
extensively dissected by later commentators. Isaiah Berlin, for example, examined the alleged 
convergence of their philosophical sensibilities, highlighting how Herder sought to articulate 
a philosophy of history able to “embrace the entire province of knowledge of his time”, and 
followed Vico in maintaining the need for historians to investigate the intersection of time, 
place and national character.40 Yet, despite Herder’s philosophical interest in Vichian 
historicism, which Berlin saw as a fundamental step in the definition of “human history” not 
as a “linear progression, but a succession of distinct and heterogeneous civilisations” that 
“could be seen to possess an inner unity”, the dynamics of the intellectual transfer from one 
author to the other make their affinity much more problematic.41  
When, in fact, Herder travelled to Italy in 1797 and gathered materials for his 
philosophy of history, the main source of information on Vico’s ideas was the latter’s 
autobiography and not La scienza nuova. 42 Additionally, it has also been suggested that 
Herder may have reflected on Vico without even being fully aware of his ideas. 43 Specifically, 
the German intellectual’s acquaintance with the Neapolitan thinker seems to have been 
‘filtered’ through the reading of Melchiorre Cesarotti’s footnotes to the German edition of 
                                                           
37 Hamann, J. G. (1777) Lettere: 1770-77, p. 413  
38 Ibid. 
39 Marienberg, S. (2006) Zeichenhandeln: Sprachdenken bei Giambattista Vico und Johann Georg Hamann, p. 8. 
The similarity between Vico and Hamann’s analysis of poetry is indeed quite striking: the former, on the one 
hand, argued that human life begins in the realm of the particular, characteristic of the poetic; the latter, on the 
other, defined poetry as “the mother tongue of the human race” (Hamann, J. G. (1949-57) Sämtliche Werke, p. 
197). Other similarities extend to wider discussions of the origins of language and writing. See also: Croce, B. 
(1911), pp. 364-71; Berlin, I. (1976) and Berlin, I. (2000) Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann and 
Herder 
40 Berlin, I. (1976), p. xxi; Herder’s ideas ought to be read as antithetical to those of the philosophers-historians 
of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire and Hume, insofar as he argued in favor of the historical nature of human 
consciousness, postulating fundamental differences among different historical periods. This intuition was 
presented relying upon Vichian categories, such as that of national character and the mental powers of a people, 
constituting important elements of historical laws. See: Herder, J. G. (1784-91) Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menschheit, p. 348 
41 Berlin, I. (1976), pp. xxv-xxvi 
42 Herder, J. G. (1797) Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität, X, pp. 67-69 
43 Clark, R. T. (1947) Herder, Cesarotti and Vico, pp. 645-71 
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Macpherson’s Ossian44. While, therefore, some similarities between Vico and Herder are 
undeniable, these considerations ultimately made their attribution to a direct acquaintance 
or, at least, clear dynamics of reception, difficult, if not unsustainable.  
 A similar trajectory can be drawn with regard to the intellectual development of 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: the connection between him and Vico was already questioned by 
Victor Cousin in 1827, when he pointed out how both Goethe and Jacobi’s knowledge of Vico 
was limited to the most superficial aspects of the latter’s system of ideas and generally 
inherent to political pronouncements only.45 Upon introducing Jacobi to the study of Vico in 
1787, Goethe had described him as a “Neapolitan man of politics”.46 Moreover, it is 
undeniable that Jacobi did not attempt to connect Vico with the German tradition of idealism. 
Rather, he saw him as a precursor of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental method. In this respect, 
he did not turn his attention to the philosophy of history elaborated in La scienza nuova, but 
to Vico’s emphasis on mathematical sciences and the idea of verum factum illustrated in De 
antiquissima italorum sapientia. This appears particularly evident by looking at the 1811 work 
Von den Göttlichen Dingen und Ihrer Offenbarung, where Kant’s ideas on sensibility and 
metaphysics were directly plotted against Vico’s De antiquissima.47 
While these considerations revealed traces of Vico’s ideas in the German cultural 
landscape of the time, they did not provide significant evidence regarding the reception of 
the Italian philosopher’s views on history, hence making the issue of the connection between 
La scienza nuova and idealist historicism all the more uncertain. In this sense, the notion of 
a “meeting that never happened” (“incontro mai avvenuto”) between Vico and Hegel, aptly 
coined by Silvia Caianiello, appears quite apposite: on the one hand, it draws attention to 
the lack of Vichian elements in Hegel’s works, while highlighting, on the other, how a 
connection between the two authors can nonetheless be postulated.48  
If, however, this link could not be clearly seen by looking at the works of German 
philosophers, nor could it be inferred via an analysis of their contexts, the presence of so 
                                                           
44 Macpherson, J. (1768) Die Gedichte Ossians, eines altern celtischen Dichter; Herder, J. G. (1789) Brief an 
Caroline Herder vom 12.1.1789, p. 308 
45 Cousin, V. (1828) Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie, p. 221 
46 “In dem kleinern Paquet findest du Vico den neapolitanischer Politiker, viele französische, einige italienische 
Schauspiele” (Goethe, J. W. (31.12.1792) Brief an Jacobi, p. 143) 
47 Jacobi, F. H. (1811) Von den Göttlichen Dingen und Ihrer Offenbarung, pp. 121-23; Jacobi directly quoted 
Vico, G. (1710), pp. 51-52 
48 Caianiello, S. (2011) Vico e lo storicismo tedesco, p. 73 
  97 
many later commentaries stretching their analysis so far as to describe Vico as a precursor 
of Hegel still remains puzzling. An effective explanation of this, however, can be obtained 
when considering these matters from a transnational point of view: with local contexts 
yielding meagre results in relation to the characterisation of the Vichian/Hegelian nexus 
discussed in this chapter, it becomes necessary to enlarge the scope of this inquiry, by 
slotting it within the broader picture of a European history of ideas.  In a nutshell, due to its 
transnational character, the relation between Vico and Hegel must be deemed a European 
phenomenon, not exclusively connected to the experience of local or national contexts and 
intellectual debates. 
 
 
 
2.3. Re-discovering Vico in Europe and France 
 
The reasons why Vico’s popularity rose only in the nineteenth century have often been 
addressed by historians.49 Generally speaking, the re-orientation of European culture marking 
the appearance of romanticism and idealism can be seen as a determining factor. A first, 
rather sophisticated, yet quite abstract, position was advocated by Isaiah Berlin, who posited 
that the presence of several elements in Vico’s philosophy that “defy time” made his ideas 
appealing in the context of European romanticism.50 Claiming that Vico’s greatest 
accomplishment was the proposition of the study of the past as a form of self-understanding, 
Berlin proceeded to list seven key-areas of his thought: (i) the intuition that human nature 
was not static, but continuously adapted to the environment; (ii) that historical facts were 
easier to grasp, and make sense of, than natural ones, since they were man-made; (iii) his 
preference for humanist versus natural studies; (iv) the assumption that all epochs and 
cultures seem to have been driven by a dominant idea; (v) that human creations were natural 
forms of expression; (vi) the proposition that works of art ought to be judged in relation to 
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the historical time to which they belong; and (vii) the idea that reproductive imagination 
supplemented deductive and empirical knowledge.51 
These seven points, while making Vico a peripheral figure in the Enlightenment culture 
in which he moved, resonated well with the new nineteenth-century sensibilities, hence 
corroborating, albeit in a generalist way, the intuition that his name was largely unknown 
prior to the 1800s. Point two, in particular, is especially relevant: Arnaldo Momigliano drew 
attention to Vico’s distinction between “sacred” and “profane” history, a tension stemming 
out of the dichotomy of “verum” and “factum”, arguing that all those romantics, anti-clericals 
and pantheists who were not concerned with such a division and accepted Vico’s view of 
profane history as the true history, were ready to turn his historicism into a pre-hegelian 
philosophy of history.52 Momigliano’s verdict also underlined how rapidly a dialogue between 
the Neapolitan philosopher’s ideas and those of the German idealist school was established. 
Once again, addressing the question of why this was the case is a very urgent goal if one is to 
acquire a more precise understanding of Hegelianism’s fortune and reception in nineteenth-
century southern Italy. 
The romantic orientation of much of early nineteenth-century European culture 
makes it easy to infer why Vico must have been an appealing thinker. France, in this respect, 
was no exception. Even though illustrating the full range of nineteenth-century French 
debates on the Neapolitan philosopher is definitely beyond the scope of this thesis, some 
authors and contexts nonetheless require closer examination. This is because these thinkers, 
such as Jules Michelet and his mentor Victor Cousin, consistently re-described Vichian 
historicism from the standpoint of an idealist concept of historical development. More 
importantly, they did so in a number of works, such as Michelet’s 1827 Principes de la 
philosophie de l’histoire, that were widely read both in northern and southern Italy and 
represented important sources of information on Vico for numerous thinkers, including 
Giandomenico Romagnosi and Carlo Cattaneo. The image of Vico’s philosophy of history 
developed in these French works, as this chapter will explain, significantly reverberated in 
Italian intellectuals’ idealist reading of La scienza nuova and their tendency to see the latter 
as complementary to Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie.  
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Together with other historians of the romantic generation, Michelet, who had become 
acquainted both with Vico and with Hegel via Cousin, sought to elaborate a conception of 
history different from the the one proposed by idealist philosophers: authors like Francois 
Guizot, Henri Martin and Prosper de Barante perfected an approach closely connected with 
notions of cultural history, in contrast to the German school, which focused, instead, on the 
link between history and political events. These French historians differed insofar as they 
proposed different interpretive keys accounting for the mechanisms through which man 
carved out his place in history.  
Michelet, in particular, committed to the elaboration of a new philosophy of history. 
This rested on the proposition of a single principle able to account for all forms of social life 
observable in a plurality of contemporary European nations, and in concert with a 
homogeneous process of civilization. In other words, unlike idealist philosophy that saw unity 
as the goal of the nations’ lives, Michelet, loyal to the Jacobin ideal of an undivided nation, 
searched for unity in their origin, namely in their mythical, spiritualized foundations.53 In the 
case of France, he argued, this ideal was embodied in the image of the “mère patrie”.54 More 
specifically, while fascinated by Hegel’s teleological idea that history was an objective and 
collective process, featuring a linear progression anchored to a solid dialectics, he disagreed 
with the German philosopher with regard to the idea that this proceeded towards a clear-cut 
goal, namely that universal history, to use Hegel’s own words, acted in such a way as to make 
possible that “all that is rational is real and all that is real is rational”.55 
This disagreement was quite significant, insofar as it mirrored the different cultural 
and philosophical orientations of the two authors: Hegel, the champion of a highly 
philosophical understanding of historical processes; Michelet, an exponent of a school of 
cultural historians trying to challenge the centrality of philosophical contemplation and 
aiming at explaining history in the context of a romantic worldview, according to which history 
originated from – and developed in accordance with – the mythic traditions of the nations 
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and their cultural production: “humanity”, for Michelet, “is its own creation”, an intuition 
resonating with Vico’s equation of verum and factum in his De antiquissima.56  
The clash of these views had significant methodological implications, too: arguing that 
historical laws ought to be found in the origin and development of nations naturally implied 
the rejection of the idealist assumption that history can only be investigated post-factually 
and retrospectively, namely from the vantage point of philosophical contemplation of the 
past. Yet, despite these significant differences with the champion of German idealism, 
Michelet’s reading of Vico forced typically idealist philosophical proeccupations onto La 
scienza nuova. The image of the Neapolitan philosopher proposed by the French author, then, 
was not particularly faithful to the original. 
 As Joseph Mali’s book The Legacy of Vico in Modern Cultural History showed, 
Michelet’s emphasis on the life of nations, as well as on the study of the cultural productions 
of the past, undoubtedly echoed elements of Vico’s Scienza nuova.57 After all, it was Michelet 
himself who recognized the impact of Vico’s ideas upon his own, highlighting how they had 
brought about a novel understanding that history ought to be seen as a spiritual process of 
self-creation of the people.58 Michelet’s relation to Vico, a “fury, an incredible intoxication 
with his great historical principle”, can then be understood by looking at the Frenchman’s 
1827 translation of La scienza nuova, for many years the most influential work on Vico.59 The 
author himself gave, in 1830, an account of the popularity of his book. In his candidature 
letter to the Collége de France, in fact, he wrote: 
 
Those who are familiar with the confusion and the obscurity of the original text know what such 
a work must have cost. The Italians themselves, in Turin, in Florence and in Rome, have 
repeatedly told me that they prefer to use the French translation; I have received the same 
testimonies in Germany.60 
 
This view was confirmed by Gian Domenico Romagnosi, who, in 1832, pointed out how 
Vico’s popularity in Italy was remarkably indebted to Michelet’s translation.61 Yet, Michelet’s 
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exegesis of Vico was far from being unproblematic. The 1827 translation was a largely edited 
one: the extent of the editing was so large that the title of the book was not La science 
nouvelle, as one would expect, but Principes de la philosophie de l’histoire de Vico. Clearly, 
Michelet’s intention was to render Vico’s theory more accessible and less obscure to 
contemporary readers, but, in doing so, he largely altered sections of it, making them much 
more consistent with his own pre-existing philosophical beliefs.62  
For example, the theory of “corsi e ricorsi storici”, Vico’s own interpretation of history 
as cyclical, was removed from the text.63 Other sections, especially those dealing with 
philological enquiries on the origin of modern languages, were heavily downsized and often 
relegated to footnotes. These considerations, in combination with the change of titles, seem 
to support the idea that Michelet engaged with Vico with the intention of ‘merely’ elaborating 
an account of the philosophical principles informing historical development and not with the 
goal, characterizing Vico’s enterprise, of articulating a wider new science, amalgamating 
similar speculations on the character of history with detailed notions of anthropology, 
philology and linguistics.  
 What stood out in Michelet’s Principes was therefore an undeniable interest for 
history, which clearly lay at the core of Vico’s book, but here ended up being separated from 
the framework of the Italian author’s wider cultural preoccupations, which were deemed by 
the Frenchman to be marginal and too obscure for his contemporaries. It is legitimate, at this 
point, to wonder: how consistent with Vico’s was Michelet’s philosophical history, once it was 
deprived of most of its empirical – and methodological – underpinnings? Only to some extent; 
and this was because of Michelet’s intellectual agenda of the years leading to the translation 
of 1827. First of all, one ought to keep in mind how, in 1824, Michelet had joined the circle of 
Victor Cousin, whose lectures on Hegel he had attended in Paris in the same year and had 
triggered a newfound interest in German idealist philosophers; second, despite being largely 
in disagreement with these authors, Michelet still retained some points of similarity with 
them, especially with Hegel, as illustrated earlier, most notably a general interest in history 
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as a collective process, as well as its linearity, an idea which Vico would have undoubtedly 
abhorred.  
This is not to say that Michelet proposed a reading of the Neapolitan philosopher 
along the lines of German idealism, but operated a selective one, clearly denoting intellectual 
concerns and a philosophical inclination that had much more in common with Hegel’s 
philosophy of history, rather than Vico’s. Michelet’s work was an attempt to slot La scienza 
nuova into his very “own treatise on the philosophy of history”, as he told Cousin in 1824, 
namely one that was driven by the quest for unity in history: unity that did not lie in the overall 
goal of world history, as Hegel would hold, but in the mythical foundations of nations.64 And 
this intuition represented a striking similarity with Hegel, insofar as Michelet reworked the 
German philosopher’s idea of Aufhebung, namely the notion of sublation stemming out of 
self-negotiation in history, suggesting that modern nations were the result of a continuous 
honing of a mythical image.  
Not surprisingly, in his most famous work, Histoire de la France, Michelet fully 
embraced this framework, suggesting that the tension between local and private interests 
and the voluntary bonds required for the well-being of society was resolved thanks to the 
idea of “a great homeland, by which he [man] imagines himself in the destinites of the world. 
The idea of this homeland, an abstract idea that owes very little to the senses, will lead him 
to a renewed effort to realise the idea of a universal fatherland, of the city of Providence”.65 
It was not the Hegelian Spirit at work here, via the “cunning of Reason”, but the mythical 
image of the French nation: in any case, these two mechanisms were not dissimilar and 
worked in comparable ways. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise to note that, in 
the 1831 Introduction à l’histoire universelle, Michelet posited France at the very forefront of 
history, attributing to it a centrality similar to that of Germany in Hegel’s Weltgeschichte.66  
Michelet, therefore, could be credited for having amalgamated the most basic and 
important Vichian assumption, namely that only that which is made is true, the famous verum 
= factum motto, with a philosophical interest for history, of a kind that was simply absent in 
La scienza nuova, but fully present in the intellectual landscape of nineteenth-century 
German historicism. As a result, the image of Vico presented in Michelet’s book embodied a 
                                                           
64 Michelet, J. (1994), I, p. 703 
65 Michelet, J. (1837) Histoire de la France, p. 129 
66 Michelet, J. (1840) Introduction à l’histoire universelle, pp. 9-28 
  103 
certain distortion of his thought: one that certainly contributed, given the widespread 
popularity enjoyed by Michelet’s book both within France and, more importantly, Italy, to the 
association of Vichian and Hegelian historicism. 
 
 
 
2.4. The Italian Context: Vincenzo Cuoco and the Southern Exiles 
 
The early nineteenth-century re-discovery of Giambattista Vico’s philosophy in France was, 
as identified earlier, virtually monopolized by Jules Michelet and, to some extent, Victor 
Cousin, thus remaining somewhat limited in scope, despite the exceptional popularity of 
Michelet’s book. Italy, instead, constituted a different scenario, where the presence of 
history and of debates connected with its character and functions were much more 
pervasive. In his 1995 study Republics, Nations and Tribes, Martin Thom viewed this tendency 
as symptomatic of a general re-orientation of European culture, whereby early romantic 
historical imaginations theorised “other tableaux of collective origin” in contrast to 
eighteenth-century historiography, in ways that “testify to the yielding of a world of cities to 
a world of nations”.67 Placing itself in opposition to the worldviews of the 1700s, the romantic 
understanding of history sought to decode the spiritual development of nations on the basis 
of a broader notion of historical progress.68 The works of Walter Scott are of special 
importance here, with his Ivanhoe being often seen as dismissive of the “stadial theory” of 
history characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment.69  
These books’ rapid proliferation in the Italian peninsula exemplified Italians’ growing 
interest in this new way of thinking about history and evaluating the past.70 Opera, in 
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particular, introduced large swathes of the Italian public to romantic history.71 Already in 
1819, for instance, Gioacchino Rossini performed his Donna del lago, based on Scott’s poem 
The Lady of the Lake, at the San Carlo theatre in Naples. Stendhal, who attended one of the 
first performances, described it as a “delight”.72 He also claimed that Trancredi made ample 
use of a stylistic device “invented by Walter Scott”, drawing a parallel between Rossini’s use 
of orchestral harmony to reinforce vocal music passages with Scott’s adoption of description 
as a means to enhance passages of dialogue.73 Subsequently, Donizetti produced Elisabetta 
al castello di Kenilworth in 1829 and Bellini crafted Lucia di Lammermoor in 1838. 
The fascination for this new romantic vision of history was so widespread that several 
librettisti, such as Andrea Leone Tottola and Gaetano Rossi, worked almost exclusively on 
the Scottish author’s works. One of these, Gaetano Barbieri, who, in 1829, wrote the libretti 
for Giovanni Pacini’s Il talismano, ovvero la terza crociata in Palestina after the 1825 book 
The Talisman, as well as Giovanna D’Arco in 1830, was famous for having translated Scott’s 
novels Kenilworth in 1821, Ivanhoe in 1822, and The Bride of Lammermoor in 1824. With 
Kenilworth, the Milanese publisher Vincenzo Ferrario, who was well aware of the rising 
popularity of Scott and of his literary genre in a wider sense, initiated the publication of a 
long series of historical novels.74  
 Between 1821 and 1840, 318 editions of various works by Walter Scott appeared in 
Italy, most notably in Milan, Florence and Naples.75 Francesco De Sanctis recounted, in his 
posthumously published autobiography, how extraordinary the impact of Scott’s novels had 
been upon his generation: 
 
As we were being infected by that early reading fever, we stumbled upon Walter Scott’s novels. 
We read them in secret, as if that were a crime. Giovannino read Leicester to us: to me, some 
friends and other students who lived with us, such as Carlo Bosco, Amadauri. To us, that felt like 
the revelation of a whole new world! Oh, how much did I cry for that poor Tressilian!76 
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In a context marked by the emergence of new ways of reflecting on history, 
Giambattista Vico’s works capitured Italian intellectuals’ attention. As explained by 
Benedetto Croce, the romantics unexpectedly found in the eighteent-century philosopher a 
“very rich and organic anticipation” of their own thought. This was because: 
 
Vico opposed to the superficial contempt for the past in the name of abstract Reason the 
unfolding of the human mind in history, as sense, imagination, and intellect, as the divine or 
animal age, the heroic age, and the human age. He held further that no human age was in the 
wrong, for each had its own strength and beauty, and each was the effect of its predecessor 
and the necessary preparation for the one to follow, aristocracy for democracy, democracy 
for monarchy, each one appearing at the right moment, or as the justice of that moment.77 
 
The extent to which Vico’s ideas on history reverberated in the poetics of the Italian romantic 
generation should therefore not come as a surprise: Ugo Foscolo, for example, in his 1825 
Discorso sul testo della commedia di Dante, as well as his later Lezioni di eloquenza (1834), 
proposed an interpretation of literature as deeply rooted in the historical process, in a 
manner akin to Vico’s reflections on the historical character of language and cultural 
production.78 Furthermore, Alessandro Manzoni, whose Promessi sposi is the best-known 
historical novel ever written in Italy, repeatedly referred to Vico’s centrality in the 
development of a new historiographical approach. In his 1830 essay Del romanzo storico e in 
genere de’ componimenti misti di storia e di invenzione, he famously defined the emerging 
genre as a “mixed composition of history and invention”, highlighting how the writer’s duty 
was to report “history, […] history according to people’s opinions”: in other words, history as 
a Vichian man-made factum.79 
Vico’s re-discovery in the context of nineteenth-century Italian intellectuals’ growing 
attention to new ways of interpreting history did not, however, occur in a vacuum. A very 
important catalyst for this process was represented by the contributions of southern exiles 
who travelled to various regions of the peninsula, most notably Milan and Florence, following 
the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution. Manzoni recounted that Vico’s name was “hardly” known 
in Lombardy prior to 1799 and that commentators’ attention came to be directed towards 
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his philosophy of history only after that date.80 What struck Lombard observers, and Manzoni 
in particular, was how Vico “sought to find very general principles regarding the common 
nature of nations. He did not aim at illustrating any specific epoch of history, but attempted 
to devise a universal pattern for societies across their darkest epochs”.81 
Neapolitan exiles played an important role in the re-discovery of Vico’s philosophy 
outside the boundaries of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Francesco Lomonaco, for 
example, who had actively taken part in the Revolution and subsequently moved to France 
and then Milan, published, in 1802, Vite degli eccellenti italiani in Milan, in which Vico, one 
of the central characters of the book, was described as “the most philosophical among all 
philosophers. This is because this character, who shines in all his fame, rather than limiting 
the scope of his thought to the one or the other science, hovered, with his great and divine 
mind, above all of human knowledge”.82 Having been appointed professor of history in Pavia, 
Lomonaco produced a passionate praise of La scienza nuova in the inaugural address of 1806, 
emphasizing how Vico’s methodology ought to be adopted as a means to disentangle the 
study of history from Cartesianism and the emerging clericalism.83 
Francesco Saverio Salfi then reflected extensively on history in his 1807 volume 
Dell’uso dell’istoria, in which, frequently referencing La scienza nuova, he engaged with the 
problem of progress, drawing attention to how the correct application of a scientific method 
to the study of political and moral subjects could not be separated from the adoption of 
history as platform of observation and verification of the said analysis.84 In other words, 
adopting a methodology that had much in common with Vico’s, Salfi firmly believed in the 
possibility of tracing human progress by looking at past and present events. 
The importance of history as a discipline was further emphasized in Salfi’s 1815 essay 
Dell’influenza della storia, targeting all those, such as Melchiorre Delfico, who had defined 
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history as a “useless” and “potentially dangerous”.85 Salfi’s diatribe, including several of the 
arguments adopted, with natural law theorists bore a striking resemblance to Vico’s 
vehement attacks against Cartesian philosophy, deemed guilty of having likewise defined 
history as a useless pseudoscience. In particular, Salfi applauded how, despite the efforts of 
all those “who consider history a repository of lies or illusions” and consequently “regard it 
as a despicable thing”, history “had re-acquired its reputation and authority” thanks to his 
generation’s efforts, being not only “elevated to the status of science”, but also – and more 
importantly – “considered the purest source of human knowledge”.86  
In Florence, instead, the patriot Gabriele Pepe, who had famously fought in defence 
of the Neapolitan Republic in 1799, frequently collaborated with the local periodical 
Antologia, and his articles offered an elaborate exposition of Vico’s methodology. He 
repeatedly suggested that the greatest accomplishment of “the most original maker of a 
novel and sublime historical critique” was to have provided guidelines to regulate historical 
inquiry, making it able to illuminate the present and offer a blueprint for the future, namely 
the idea of an “eternal history” (“un’istoria eterna”), able to explain that of both past and 
future peoples”.87 It is quite interesting, in this context, to note how Pepe’s contribution was 
consistent with Manzoni and Salfi’s testimonies, insofar as they all applauded Vico for 
articulating an idea of universal history, rather than acknowledging his broader effort to slot 
in the latter as part of a new science. Almost certainly due to a rather superficial knowledge 
of the Neapolitan thinker’s text, these intellectuals’ (mis-)reading of La scienza nuova 
excluded the Vichian focus on the history’s most tangible and concrete dynamics, which Vico 
himself had labelled “storie di tutte le Nazioni”, consequently proposing an understanding 
of the author as a theorist of historical time, rather than as the proponent of a more complex 
and layered historiographical approach, namely his new science.  
Another illustrious Neapolitan émigré, however, was much more sensitive to Vico’s 
notion of “storie di tutte le Nazioni”, to such an extent that the perceived tension between 
the latter and a notion of “ideal, eternal History” lay at the very core of his reading of La 
scienza nuova. The most compelling contribution to the popularization of Vico’s ideas, in fact, 
was made by Vincenzo Cuoco, who, during the early years of the nineteenth century, 
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presented the Neapolitan philosopher as being representative of a cohesive national 
philosophical tradition. According to Cuoco, only by “shaping the public spirit of the nation” 
and “beginning to engage, at least with the power of thought, with other nations, hence 
getting accustomed to regard the glory of all corners of Italy as a shared one”, Italy may stand 
tall in the contemporary philosophical landscape of Europe.88 After the Revolution of 1799, 
Cuoco had initially moved to Paris and subsequently settled in Milan in 1800.89 His best-
known work, Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana, published in 1801, played a double 
role in the re-discovery of Vico, prompting, on the one hand, a renewed interest in the 
latter’s philosophy, as well as its civic and political functions, and paving the way, on the 
other, for a reading of the philosopher that drew him closer to German idealism.90  
Cuoco’s writings played an important role in the cultural and political debates of the 
Risorgimento and were widely read even after his death in 1823. His often-neglected essay 
Platone in Italia went through six editions between that year and 1860, and, as chapter five 
of this thesis will explain, it was particularly well-received in Piedmont, informing Vincenzo 
Gioberti’s political thought.91 The Saggio storico was quickly translated into German and 
French.92 A second edition of the book was published in Milan in 1806 and was widely read 
both in northern and southern Italy, where counterfeit versions appeared in 1820 and 1832. 
As chapter four of this thesis will explain, Neapolitan readers were especially interested in 
Cuoco’s account of the 1799 Revolution and read it as a source of inspiration for their own 
participation in the events of 1848.93  
Cuoco’s Saggio reconstructed the events of the Neapolitan Revolution within the 
framework of Vico’s new science, bearing the trace of a very philosophical interest for 
history. This interest was then carefully discussed and illustrated in the 1804 essays Gli 
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scrittori politici italiani and Giambattista Vico e lo studio delle lingue come documento 
storico, two texts that distinguished themselves both for empirical brilliance and 
methodological clarity, in which every aspect of human knowledge was framed within a 
historicist perspective, losing its isolated character and perceived as part of a greater whole: 
 
He [Vico] was the first to realise that all laws had to be imbued with a Reason, and that this 
Reason ought to be situated in the general order of things: he realised that even civic institutions 
must to be subject to this order and consequently traced the orbit around along all societies 
gravitated at all times. Laws, governments, customs, religions: everything became a consequence 
of the general proposition expressing this eternal order; concepts, uses, the laws of all epochs 
became many distinct anomalies, which, however, could be accounted for thanks to the force of 
the principles he kept on asserting.94 
 
Echoing La scienza nuova, Cuoco proceeded to discuss how notions of anthropology, 
philosophy and history were characterized by the presence of a historical rationale, labelled 
“Reason posited in the order of things”.95 The intuitions advanced by Vico, “the first maker 
of this new science”, were therefore seen as fundamental interpretive tools to make sense 
of man’s life as a “historical document” (“documento storico”).96 The Southern émigré 
appropriated in particular those elements of Vico’s philosophy that appeared to be generally 
concerned with late eighteenth-century debates on the nexus of language, history and 
anthropology: 
 
At the time when Locke was discovering via reason the relationships between ideas and 
words, those relationships that, being developed by Condillac, du Marsais and Beccaria, 
should have provided us with a new grammar and a new rhetoric […]. During the same period, 
Vico, via the examination of facts, projected the study of languages onto the study of nations 
and the analysis of mankind’s mind. Vico was the first in Europe able to discover, starting with 
the words of a people, the latter’s ideas and, starting with its language, its philosophy. Vico, 
through words, came to know customs, governments, affairs, history. Vico is the first author 
of this new science.97  
 
 When arguing that “the principles and the method of his philosophy are platonic, 
[which means that] that which is true is always ideal, and analogous to the nature of our own 
mind, which he believes to be unchangeable”, Cuoco asserted that “his notion of truth refers 
exclusively to that which is ideal. Those things theorised by the German school in the last few 
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years, have already been thought of – and executed – by Vico roughly one century earlier”.98 
Vico’s methodology, in fact, “the idea of a man preceding his contemporaries by a century”, 
“ended up flourishing in Germany more than in Italy”.99  
This statement, thanks to the emphasis on the universal rationale of history, already 
hinted, on the one hand, at an image of Vico as a theorist of historical time and, on the other, 
at his link with German philosophy. Later on, this connection was rendered much more 
explicit. Cuoco’s reading of Vico was, in fact, largely concerned with the distinction between 
two types of history: an ideal, philosophical and universal one, labelled “ideal eternal history” 
(“storia ideale eterna”) and the concrete circumstances reflecting the trajectory of the 
former, which the southern exile termed “nations’ historical-empirical course” (“corso 
storico-empirico delle nazioni”).100 This division was indeed present in the pages of La scienza 
nuova, but was not particularly accentuated, certainly not as much as in Cuoco’s work. 
The importance of the Neapolitan émigré’s problematisation of this tension is crucial 
in understanding how his reading greatly contributed to the association of Vico and 
Hegelianism. The fundamental traits of nineteenth-century historical critique were fully 
present in Cuoco’s reading of Vico. This entailed the need to rethink the relationship 
between the unity of universal history and the multiplicity of the forms in which it was 
realized. In La scienza nuova, Vico avoided this tension by simply positing that the study of 
cultural productions of nations in history was the key to reconstruct their mythical 
foundations.101 Cuoco, instead, faithful to nineteenth-century speculation, found himself 
unwilling to accept the subordination of the “ideal eternal history” to its material conditions, 
of ideas to actions. Unity should not be present only in the foundation of nations, but in the 
historical process as a whole. He was, therefore, forced to accommodate the Vichian focus 
on facts, particulars and individual circumstances within a unifying principle of universality. 
This, in short, was the issue at the root of his problematisation of the two forms of history. 
Cuoco wrote: “There exists, according to Vico, an eternal ideal of truth independent 
from the opinions of men. This truth is in the hands (allow me to use this expression) of 
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Providence, and it comprises the entire range of possibilities”.102 And this fundamental truth 
was said not to belong to the sphere of individual circumstances or the specific life of a given 
people, but to the broader realm of ideas alone. The fundamental principle of Vico’s 
philosophy, Cuoco asserted, was that “that which is true is always ideal”, or, conversely, that 
ideas are the only true reality.103 These ideas were thus seen as the driving forces behind 
human actions.  
Therefore, with human circumstances fully subject to this universal unifying truth, it 
was necessary for them “despite their extraordinary variety”, to accept “the guidance of 
Providence, the true conductor of the Universe”, which ensured that all human actions 
remained “within the limits of the absolute truth, that eternal universal truth, that is 
positioned in the mind of Providence”.104 This was where, by completely turning Vico’s 
statement that “the order of ideas must proceed according the order of things” on its head, 
Cuoco transformed the ideal of history presented in La scienza nuova into a process directed 
by a universal force.105 Consequently, by investigating the “only absolute and universal truth, 
which exists before things come into existence”, Cuoco believed it possible to understand 
things at an individual, empirically observable level. 106 
The consequences of Cuoco’s problematisation of the tension between universal and 
particular history, as well as his undeniable preference for the former, were very important. 
Just like Michelet, the southern exile proposed an image of Vico as a theorist of historical 
time, fully concerned with the problem of unity in history. However, while the French author 
did so via a selective reading of La scienza nuova, voluntarily removing and altering certain 
sections in order to better match his own ideas, Cuoco remained comparatively more faithful 
to the original, nonetheless opting for a striking distortion of his views. Establishing the 
dichotomy between the “ideal eternal history” and the conditions in which this would 
concretely be embodied, the southern exile ultimately depicted Vico not only as a 
philosopher of history, but also as the proponent of a universal conception of it, to which 
individual circumstances, contexts and events, namely the true focus of La scienza nuova 
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were entirely subordinated. This was not an especially Vichian view of history, but was 
certainly a very Hegelian one. 
 
 
 
2.5. From Vico to Hegel: Debates after Cuoco 
 
Following the analysis of Vico’s reception and re-discovery, as well as the contribution of 
French and, more notably, Italian intellectuals, it is now possible to obtain a clearer 
characterisation of the encounter between Vico and Hegel’s philosophies. Despite striking 
textual differences, the two thinkers were seen, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, as exponents of the same historicist tradition and, even more importantly, the latter 
was deemed to have reflected on the former’s ideas. This can be partly explained by looking 
at the circulation of Vico’s ideas and their reception in a context that witnessed the rapid 
proliferation of German idealist philosophy of history: proceeding chronologically, a first, 
significant, contribution was that of Vincenzo Cuoco, who problematized the tension 
between an ideal universal history and the empirical set of circumstances in which this would 
come to be embodied, greatly magnifying the former, hence bringing Vico much closer to 
the idealist intellectual agenda. Secondly, the role of Jules Michelet in France can be deemed 
to have triggered a similar effect, given the latter’s reading of Vico not only as a theorist of 
historical time, but also as the proponent of a linear, progressive account of history in which 
the notion of mythical foundations of a nation was deployed in a very Hegelian fashion.  
 As illustrated earlier in this chapter, and as chapter three of this thesis will further 
clarify with regard to the Neapolitan context of the 1830s and ‘40s, the presence of history in 
Italian cultural life became much more pervasive and increasingly characterized by greater 
attention to the illustrious Neapolitan thinker’s ideas, following Cuoco’s contribution: 
monographs on Vico, for instance, began appearing and circulating widely.107 Yet, there was 
more to this: debates taking place during the first half of the 1800s in the north of Italy paid 
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special attention to contemporary critiques of the eighteenth-century philosopher. They 
focused, among other things, on the idea of progress and ultimately posited the need to 
elaborate a philosophy of history able to account for concrete historical instances according 
to a Vichian methodology, but still remaining anchored, to a linear, progressive trajectory. In 
other words, it is now essential to recognize how these debates highlighted the existence of 
a vacuum in Vico’s philosophy: a vacuum that, arguably, only certain elements of Hegel’s 
Geschichtsphilosopie could fill.  
The origin of these debates is easy to trace: together with the contribution of Cuoco, 
who had already stressed in 1806 the need to investigate “the idea of mankind’s 
perfectibility”, the 1830s witnessed the rapid proliferation of works dealing with a concept of 
progress, often re-described from the standpoint of Vico’s new science.108 While Antonio 
Rosmini’s 1830 Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee explained how urgent the regeneration of 
Italy’s cultural and philosophical landscape vis-à-vis its European counterparts, Gian 
Domenico Romagnosi’s 1832 book Dell’indole e dei fattori dell’incivilimento con esempio del 
suo Risorgimento in Italia, coupled with several articles published in periodicals, reflected on 
notions of civic and political development from a markedly Vichian perspective. In his book 
on Italy’s Incivilimento, Romagnosi, drawing extensively upon the concepts of moral and civic 
perfectibility theorized by Guizot and Cousin, firmly stated the need to “historicise” the notion 
of progress, analysing it, on the one hand, in connection with the changing nature of society, 
and framing it, on the other, within a certain ideal of historical development.109 Romagnosi’s 
book de facto made Vico part of Risorgimento political thought and, in doing so, it highlighted 
the need, for contemporary debates on civic and political progress, to engage with the 
Neapolitan philosopher’s ideas.  
 Carlo Cattaneo’s views on Vico are particularly relevant, too: he read him in the early 
1830s, following his mentor Gian Domenico Romagnosi’s recommendation.110 His use of Vico 
was initially functional to the defense of his maître à penser against the criticisms levelled by 
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Antonio Rosmini. In fact in 1832, following the publication of Romagnosi’s Dell’indole e dei 
fattori dell’incivilimento, Rosmini accused him of a dramatic lack of intellectual rigour and 
transparency: in particular, he attacked the notions of Providence and “incivilimento”, 
deemed, due to their interdisciplinary nature, to be extremely vague and systematically at 
odds with Christian ontology.111 Cattaneo, in 1833, used Vico’s authority to defend his mentor 
from these attacks, suggesting that Romagnosi’s work was indeed visibly consistent with the 
views of the great Neapolitan thinker, who, at the time, was particularly popular: 
 
We recommend to the contemporary studious youth, so excellent and large among us, 
Romagnosi’s essay on the idea of Incivilimento, recently published here. It is a splendid expansion 
of the Science promoted by Vico, by Stellini, by Mario Pagano and Jannelli.112 
 
Cattaneo further praised Romagnosi for maintaining that Vico’s philosophy of history easily 
lent itself to the formulation of a civic ideology. While Vico, in fact, had proposed “a science 
of all histories, a universal law leading all peoples, an ideal, eternal history common to all 
nations […], an ideal history which almost becomes a comparative physiology, by means of 
which the history of individual peoples’ civilisation can be reconstructed”, he noted how “the 
study of individuals at the core of mankind” paves the way for a “social and civic ideology”.113 
 This quotation is particularly interesting for two reasons: first of all, because it further 
consolidated the political implications of Vichian historicism and its relevance in the context 
of the Risorgimento; secondly, because it reflected an idealist reading of Vico, strongly 
reminiscent of Cuoco’s emphasis on the notion of “ideal eternal history”. Cuoco’s influence 
was particularly visible when Cattaneo described both Vico and idealist philosophers as 
concerned with the tension between “the progressive manifestation of the Absolute in 
history” and the “temporary necessity and transitory sanctity” of its deployment.114 This 
reading, according to Cattaneo, would ultimately draw attention on a process of self-
negotiation informed by a necessary, universal principle, “the progressive triumph of morals 
and Right, via the ongoing contrast of human freedom and the necessity of things”.115  
This interpretation was further fuelled by Cattaneo’s considerations on idealism: he 
believed, in fact, that it should not come as a surprise that Vico did not enjoy significant 
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popularity before the nineteenth century, since it was first of all necessary for other authors 
to create an intellectual context that may be receptive to the Neapolitan thinker’s theories.116 
Moreover, Cattaneo identified the presence of a dialectical understanding of historical time 
in La scienza nuova, based on the continuous tension between human freedom and the 
constraints imposed by history’s material conditions. Put simply, he further exasperated 
Cuoco’s problematisation of the dichotomy of the “ideal eternal history” and its concrete, 
epoch- and context-bound, historical circumstances. Cuoco’s idealist reading of Vico was 
brought to an extreme when Cattaneo explicitly referred to Hegel as following the trail 
previously laid by the Neapolitan philosopher:  
 
With other, very abstract, pronouncements, Hegel developed a variation on the same motive. He 
too says that history is the progressive development of ideal justice and, to use his own formula, 
history is the objectivation of the Idea, that is, of the mind, which, being realised, becomes an 
external fact, an object.117 
 
This reading of Hegel was perhaps not entirely accurate, insofar as it proposed a rather 
courageous identification of the Hegelian notions of Idea and Mind. Cattaneo, however, who 
was not particularly fond of the philosopher from Stuttgart, certainly captured the 
importance of his dialectics, by which the Idea would move out of itself and return to itself as 
part of a process of self-realisation.118 It is therefore now possible to see how, just like 
Michelet had described Vico’s account of the tension between local interests and voluntary 
social bonds as a form of dialectics, resolvable in the unity of a nation’s mythical image, 
Cattaneo understood Vico’s philosophy of history as centred upon the notions of justice and 
morality, continuously perfected via a dialectic of the mind.  
  Vico, however, was not immune from Cattaneo’s criticism and understanding this 
critique is fundamental in order to gain an even more compelling understanding of why Hegel 
was said to have reflected upon Vico. The theory of corsi e ricorsi storici, for example, 
famously labelled “dreary returns of decadence” (“tristi ritorni di decadimento”), was 
deemed to be too mechanistic, but Cattaneo also provided an explanation for this problem.119 
This was because, according to the author, Vico “had studied Plato and therefore regarded 
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man as a being in decadence, ultimately failing to grasp the idea of perpetual progress”.120 In 
other words, Cattaneo came to propose a double-faced verdict on Vico. On the one hand, he 
praised him for laying down the coordinates of a universal history, revolving around the 
progressive refinement of justice, highlighting how his contemporary philosophical systems 
had drawn extensively from this idea: 
 
Once we make an exception of the two principles of Progress and Variety, we are confronted 
with a truly admirable similarity between recent human systems and Vico’s fundamental idea, 
namely that Providence, by working through people’s interests succeeds in extrapolating justice 
from iniquitous passions, later coming to progressively realise it within the world of nations; this 
sublime doctrine is, for us, a foreboding and a prediction of the future.121 
 
This quotation, on the other hand – and this is where the influence of Cuoco and Romagnosi 
revealed itself in its full force – detailed Cattaneo’s hostility towards Vico’s cyclical theory of 
history, which was deemed to be at odds with the theorisation of a progressive form of civic 
and intellectual development. Put simply, for Cattaneo, only a linear notion of progress, 
rather than a cyclical one, could accommodate Vico’s notion of Providence. This, in Cattaneo’s 
view, was partly due to the Neapolitan philosopher’s own intellectual formation and partly to 
his having lived in a context that had not yet witnessed the emergence of strong, linear ideals 
of progress, such as Condorcet’s. 
 The concept of progress was the pivotal point of Cattaneo’s critique. An account of 
this notion able to direct the development of Vico’s “world of nations”, however, could be 
found, according to northern Italian commentators, in the constellation of ideas 
characterizing German idealism:  
 
While Vico’s synthesis had devised a general law of nations, Fichte’s analysis, by entering deeper 
into the realm of experience, managed to understand every nation’s particular law […] Moreover, 
Fichte relied on the idea of Progress, which Condorcet, only a few years earlier, had discussed in 
the midst of the Revolution, and which Romagnosi, during the very same period, was adopting 
as the basis for a new Right of nations.122 
 
Just like Michelet’s Vico reflected his mentor Victor Cousin’s interest in idealism, Cattaneo’s 
Vico bore a strong trace of Romagnosi’s intellectual sensibility, applauded here for having 
finally managed to overcome the main limit of Vichian historicism and amalgamated his 
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universal principle of history with a convincing account of progress. What remained of Vico, 
therefore, was the image of a theorist of historical time whose intellectual agenda was 
different from that of the one who had initially authored La scienza nuova in 1725. Just like 
Michelet, Cattaneo seems to have deliberately mis-read the eighteenth-century Neapolitan 
philosopher, perceiving him as a proponent of a universal history, casting aside all the 
philological and anthropological considerations appearing in the original book.  
Yet Cattaneo went one step further, explicitly pointing out how Vico had failed to account 
for progress, but strongly maintained that his philosophy of history could nonetheless be 
rescued, albeit in an amended form. In consequence, it suddenly appeared necessary to 
abandon his cyclical conception of history, while retaining his methodological apparatus and 
the scope of his inquiry, and supplementing his ideas with a more convincing and systematic 
account of progress.123 This operation, according to Cattaneo, had been successfully 
accomplished by Romagnosi, in Italy and, more importantly, by the German idealists, most 
notably Fichte and Hegel. By the mid-1830s, therefore, the trajectory of Vico’s re-discovery 
had reached a critical turning point. Following decades of often conflicting interpretations, 
his philosophy of history was still perceived as methodologically sound, but dramatically 
deficient in one major aspect: being unable to explain how societies develop, flourish and 
perfect themselves. Yet, for Italian intellectuals, this was not enough to abandon Vico’s ideas 
altogether: after all, he was still seen as an exceptional theorist of historical time and the 
proponent of a universal history that resonated well with nineteenth-century philosophical 
imaginations, especially German idealists’. What was needed, therefore, was someone who 
could fill the gap left open by Vico. Neapolitan Hegelians, as the next chapter will discuss, 
were prompt in rising to the occasion. 
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2.6. Giambattista Vico in a Transnational Intellectual History of Europe 
 
The study of Vico’s relation to Hegel, as presented in this chapter, has significant 
methodological implications. This part of the thesis, in particular, has sought to reconstruct 
the dynamics of intellectual transfer, reception and circulation ultimately converging in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentaries’ positing that Hegel reflected on the 
philosophy of La scienza nuova. In doing so, however, it resorted to a methodology extending 
well beyond a textual/philosophical reading of Vico and the German idealists’ texts. As 
explained in section two of the present chapter, the textual differences between Vico and 
Hegel were simply too great to support the inference of a direct intellectual continuity 
between the two authors. The presence of the great Neapolitan philosopher in the context 
of nineteenth-century German idealism, therefore, may be decoded as a topic in the history 
of ideas and, as a result, methodological approaches ought to be adjusted accordingly. 
 A canonical, strictly contextual approach produced similar results, as the section on 
Vico’s reception in Germany evidently showed: in that country, the Southern thinker was 
hardly read and references to La scienza nuova present in the works of the idealist school 
were very limited in number. Moreover, Hegel himself never explicitly referred to Vico. 
Complicating things even further, the analysis of the latter’s reception in Germany paved the 
way for a number of inter-connected problems, most notably with regard to the process of 
circulation of his ideas. In other words, a reconstruction of the relevant aspects of the 
intellectual context of early nineteenth-century Germany is ultimately unable to answer the 
question of why Vico and Hegel were seen as representative of the same philosophy of 
history. 
 This chapter, therefore, attempted to provide an explanation by viewing debates on 
Vico as part of a transnational, European history of ideas. In particular, it sought to articulate 
a more inclusive characterisation of intellectual contexts, granting the overall analysis a much 
wider scope. Contexts ought to stretch both geographically and chronologically. In the first 
instance, it can be intuitively seen how the inherently transnational nature of the connection 
between Vico and Hegel posited a significant problem for intellectual historians relying too 
heavily on rigid definitions of context. The simple assumption that ideas may travel across 
borders naturally implies dynamics of circulation and cultural mediation acting as ‘filters’: the 
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study of the context in which ideas are received, therefore, does not sufficiently account for 
the alterations, modifications and often conflicting readings that marked their journey. As an 
example of this intuition, this chapter drew attention to the role played by French historians, 
most notably Jules Michelet and Victor Cousin, whose mediation between Vico and Hegel 
appears to have taken the form of a selective appropriation of Vichian and Hegelian elements. 
Michelet’s Principes de la philosophie de l’histoire de Vico, then, played a very important role 
in subsequent Italian debates and, as explained by Romagnosi, was very popular among those 
intellectuals, such as himself and Carlo Cattaneo, who went on to equate Vico’s historicism 
with Hegel’s.  
 At the same time, a more inclusive definition of context ought to take into account 
debates and topics that may not be strictly connected to the reception of a given author, but 
nonetheless reflect significant inclinations and concerns of a specific historical domain. Lucien 
Febvre’s analytical category of “mental tools” (“outillage mental”), in this sense, seems to be 
especially apposite in capturing the mechanics of the ‘collective psychology’ informing 
cultural landscapes.124 This perspective invites intellectual historians to include a broader 
array of sources in their inquiries, in ways that venture beyond the traditional emphasis on 
linguistic structures and authorial intention. The purpose of this approach is to show how the 
emergence and negotiation of new concepts may shift researchers’ understanding of the 
relationship between authors and their contexts and lead to a novel conceptualisation of the 
intellectual production of a particular time. As shown in this chapter, for example, an 
understanding of the debates concerned with the concepts of progress and society’s 
perfectibility in 1830s Italy is crucial in making sense of subsequent verdicts on Vico, especially 
those that aim at drawing him closer to Hegel.  
 Contexts, however, ought to stretch chronologically, too: this chapter, in particular, 
showed how reducing the analysis of Vico’s relation to Hegel to the study of La scienza 
nuova’s presence in the context of nineteenth-century German culture is an unsustainable 
solution. The genealogy of Vico’s re-discovery in the 1800s, despite being strongly anchored 
to the views on history presented in his masterpiece, was also profoundly affected by ideas 
and topics presented in earlier works, most notably De antiquissima italorum sapientia. The 
                                                           
124 Febvre, L. (1942) La problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle: la religion de Rabelais, pp. 355-69 
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Vichian equation of verum and factum was at the very core of any idealist reading of La 
scienza nuova, both in France and in Italy.  
In a similar manner, contexts should not be bound to chronologically static definitions, 
but ought to be more sensitive to the progressive layering of various interpretations: the 
relevance of Cuoco’s analysis, for instance, was enormous for virtually every subsequent 
reading of Vico. It is precisely thanks to his problematisation of the tension between the “ideal 
eternal history” and its concrete, material and empirically observable conditions, that the 
association of Vichian and Hegelian historicism was so evident in the 1830s, more than 30 
years after the Neapolitan exile had expressed his verdict. This is because Cuoco’s revision of 
Vichian history marked an important shift in the conceptual lexicon of Risorgimento Italy, 
popularising a notion of history understood as linear and directed by ideal principles.  A 
contextual analysis, therefore, should not only be enriched by the study of the outillage 
mental of a given time, but also come to contemplate the analysis of the Koselleckian category 
of “space of experience”, prompting an understanding of a history of ideas as the 
amalgamation of several layers of interpretation put together in the present, as the past made 
present.125 This approach, which encourages a closer integration of intellectual history and 
Begriffsgeschichte, explains how the diachronic evolution of conceptual vocabularies may 
“sharpen the appreciation” of the ways in which the forms of linguistic action commonly 
examined by intellectual historians “depends upon the concepts with which it works”.126 
  The dynamics of Vico’s re-discovery during the nineteenth century, as illustrated in 
this chapter, reflected those of Hegel’s reception described in the previous one, both from a 
methodological and a thematic point of view: methodologically, because of the need for 
historians of ideas to slot in their study as part of a transnational understanding of their 
philosophies’ encounter; thematically, because of European thinkers’ insistence on their 
philosophies of history. And it was precisely thanks to their fundamentally European 
sensitivity and fascination with history, deepening its roots in the local tradition of thought, 
that Neapolitan Hegelians ultimately proceeded to fully synthesise them in one cohesive 
idealist historicism. This, as the next chapter will explain, took place in a context often 
overlooked by historians: Neapolitan private schools of philosophy. 
  
                                                           
125 Koselleck, R. (1985) Futures Past: on the Semantics of Historical Time, pp. 255-75 
126 Tribe, K. (2016) Intellectual History as Begriffsgeschichte, p. 67 
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3. European Thinkers and Maestri Privati: German Philosophy in Neapolitan 
Private Schools 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In 1835, the Tuscan writer Giuseppe Montanelli, who would later become one of the most 
vocal proponents of an Italian federalist project and fight against the Austrians in 1848, 
published an open letter in the Neapolitan periodical Il progresso. The letter was both a 
commentary on the mentalities shaping the cultural and institutional discourse in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and a dart of criticism directed against its perceived parochialism. 
Montanelli spoke very critically of a “national mission” that local education systems had 
embarked on. Their mentality, revolving around the exaltation of local traditions of thought 
and the complete closure to foreign ideas, was plotted against a “human mission”, namely 
the free and unconstrained development of culture and philosophy, based on ongoing 
exchanges with other countries’ thinkers. The premises of Montanelli’s argument were 
simple: that while “every individual of the human species features a set of characters that 
distinguish him from others, every people has a character that sets it apart from other 
peoples”, and that every national community “stems from the union of beings belonging to 
the great family of mankind, and consequently featuring those general qualities that are 
common to all people, regardless of their country’s climate or the diversity of their habits”.1 
 As a result, Montanelli strongly encouraged the institutions of the Kingdom, mainly 
education systems, to merge their “national mission” with the broader “human mission”, and 
engage much more extensively with foreign ideas, suggesting that these were – by their own 
nature – not only compatible with any particular local tradition of thought, but also 
fundamentally complementary to them. An optimal strategy, he continued, was represented 
not only by the absorption of contemporary European, particularly German, philosophical 
landscapes, but also by their merging with the local tradition.2 
                                                           
1 Montanelli, G. (1835) Biblioteca dell’intelletto, p. 65 
2 ibid., pp. 71-72 
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Montanelli’s contribution, appearing in Naples in a very timely manner, when Italian 
intellectuals were beginning to engage not only in a transnational exchange ultimately 
facilitating Hegelianism’s penetration in the peninsula, as described in the previous chapter 
of this thesis, but also with a process of revision enabling the amalgamation of Hegel’s 
philosophy of history with Vico’s. It highlighted the perceived parochialism and intellectual 
isolationism characterising public debates, drawing particular attention to the extent to which 
education channels were chiefly responsible for this bleak scenario.  
More than thirty years later, Francesco De Sanctis, who greatly contributed to the 
dissemination and revision of Hegel’s ideas in Naples, remembered how the form of 
engagement with German philosophy hoped for by Montanelli had indeed taken place within 
the context of Neapolitan private schools and had been accompanied by a newfound interest 
for Giambattista Vico’s thought. The private schools that De Sanctis drew attention to were 
an important element in Naples’ intellectual life during the late eighteenth century and the 
first half of the nineteenth. Roughly speaking, any school whose activity took place parallel 
to, and independently from, that of the institutes directly regulated by the government, 
would qualify as private. Private schools usually enjoyed unrestricted freedom with regard to 
the adoption of their teaching methods, the definition of the programmes and the actual 
length of teaching. Moreover, their students would pay a fee directly to their teacher, but, in 
some cases, wealthier families would directly fund private instructors, especially when the 
quality of their public counterparts was particularly low.  
Didactic freedom was the central characteristic of the private schools of the 
Mezzogiorno and the extent to which these encouraged an engagement with foreign culture 
aptly reflected it: in private schools, De Sanctis recounted, “Cousin arrived, and then Hegel: 
what a revolution within a mere few years! Its symbol was Vico, who was read, admired and 
cited everywhere”.3 He then illustrated the reasons for private schools’ popularity: 
 
At the time, private schools were uncontested masters in their field, since all that was alive 
and new in national culture had found shelter there: the youth were attracted by the fact that 
the quality of studies was higher and the principles broader… teachers were not allowed to 
indulge in the past and repeat themselves, as they were constantly spurred by a neverending 
wave of imitators and by a very enthusiastic youth, that financed them, on the one hand, and 
was very hard to please, on the other.4 
 
                                                           
3 De Sanctis, F. (1868) L’ultimo dei puristi, p. 534 
4 ibid., p. 514 
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Both Montanelli and De Sanctis’ testimonies drew attention to the peculiar dynamics 
of education in the Kingdom, underlining public channels’ reticence to enable transnational 
exchanges of ideas, and the propensity, characterising their private counterparts, to do so. If 
slotted within the broader picture of a transnational history of ideas, these two contributions 
acquire an even deeper significance. While they urge contemporary historians to interrogate 
the encounter of local and foreign traditions of philosophy, they problematise the definition 
of the contexts in which this took place. As such, they posit a tension between public and 
private education, whose implications for the Neapolitan intellectual landscape’s openness 
toward foreign ideas demand clarification. 
 From a historiographical point of view, an attempt to view private schools as the 
theatre of transnational intellectual exchanges entails the need to articulate a more 
substantive understanding of the dynamics of education in the Kingdom, focusing particular 
attention on the interplay of public and private initiatives. This, in turn, may provide a new 
perspective on the intellectual history of the Mezzogiorno, calling into question those verdicts 
univocally emphasising the link between the alleged failure of the reforms operated by the 
Bourbon monarchy in matters of public education and the perceived backwardness of the 
region, commonly thematised as part of the emergence of the Southern Question.5 More 
specifically, while these studies rightly drew attention to the problems of public education 
channels and their implications with regard to the economic modernisation of the 
Mezzogiorno, they did not place adequate attention on the competitive relationship between 
public and private schools, which, as this chapter will argue, constituted an extraordinary 
force driving intellectual innovation. Put simply, while a great portion of twentieth-century 
scholarship focused on the perceived failure of reforms and initiatives directed from above, 
this chapter will instead focus on the success and importance of those coming from below.  
The lack of attention generally placed on private teaching is partially understandable 
on the basis of the interplay of three reasons: first and foremost, the significant scarcity of 
sources available, hindering the reconstruction of private schools’ operations; second, the 
                                                           
5 see, for example: Broccoli, A. (1968) Educazione e politica nel mezzogiorno d’Italia, pp. 176-77; Coppola, D. 
(2004) Scuola e istituzioni pubbliche in età borbonica; Croce, B. (1925) Storia del Regno di Napoli, p. 276; Davis, 
J. (2006) Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1760-1860, pp. 184-85; Gramsci, 
A. (1977) Quaderni dal carcere, I, §43-46, pp. 30-56; Lupo, M. (1998) Istruzione, economia e società nel 
mezzogiorno preunitario: note per una ricerca; Pappalardo, F. (1989) La coscienza e il lavoro: l’istruzione 
pubblica, p. 561; Petrusewicz, M. (1998) Come il meridione divenne una questione. Rappresentazioni del sud 
prima e dopo il quarantotto, p. 78 
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presence of a discrete number of private teachers operating without an official licence, able 
therefore to escape the mechanisms of control imposed by the crown; and third, the lack of 
attention generally paid by historians to the Bourbon’s initiatives to regulate and, in many 
cases, encourage private schools’ operations. 
 A more critical discussion of private education in nineteenth-century Naples is 
necessary to address some of the limitations of contemporary scholarship on Neapolitan 
Hegelianism. A first problem, for example, has to do with the fact that a great number of 
studies rest on a purely philosophical approach to the study of Hegel’s reception in the 
Mezzogiorno and consequently do not to provide convincing answers as to how the German 
thinker’s reception was directly informed by local contexts and debates.6 A second problem, 
instead, pertains to the fact that, while some studies did indeed attempt to articulate a 
contextual understanding of Neapolitan Hegelianism’s emergence and development, they 
neglected or downplayed the importance of the Kingdom’s private schools.7 As a result, this 
chapter will attempt to fill these historiographical lacunae by not only adopting a contextual 
approach to the study of Hegel’s fortune in Naples, but also, given the emphasis on private 
schools and the debates among their protagonists, by calling for a substantial re-definition of 
the contexts in which Hegelianism initially came to be discussed.  
This will enable the present chapter to provide a much more precise characterisation 
of Neapolitan Hegelianism, viewed neither in its philosophical depth, nor in its speculative 
originality. Rather, given private teachers’ efforts consistently to draw German philosophy 
closer to the local tradition, and devise thematic and speculative continuities between the 
two, it will be considered in its purely transnational nature, stemming from the amalgamation 
of Hegel and Vico’s philosophies of history. This, in turn, will allow for another revision of 
certain historiographical verdicts: first, those that understand Hegel’s reception in 
nineteenth-century Naples as a process of mere absorption, as indicated in the first chapter 
of this thesis.8 Second, those that neglect the significance of Giambattista Vico’s historicism 
                                                           
6 Bortot, R. (1968) L’hegelismo di Bertrando Spaventa; Garin, E. (1983) Filosofia e politica in Bertrando Spaventa; 
Oldrini, G. (1989) Gli hegeliani di Napoli e la costruzione dello stato unitario; Rossi, M. (1957) Sviluppi dello 
hegelismo in Italia; Tessitore, F. (1995) Contributi alla storia e alla teoria dello storicismo; Vacca, G. (1967) 
Politica e filosofia in Bertrando Spaventa 
7 Cione, E. (1960) Francesco De Sanctis ed i suoi tempi; Gallo, F. (2015) Dalla patria allo stato. Bertrando 
Spaventa, una biografia intellettuale 
8 De Giovanni, P. (1996) Kant e Hegel in Italia; Losurdo, D. (1997) Dai fratelli Spaventa a Gramsci. Per una storia 
politico-sociale della fortuna di Hegel in Italia 
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within the context of the emerging Neapolitan idealist sensitivities, already introduced in 
chapter two.9 
With these considerations in mind, the present chapter will attempt to elucidate the 
role played by private schools in encouraging transnational intellectual exchanges and 
shaping Hegel’s reception. In particular, section two will examine the context in which private 
schools found their fortune, characterising their relationship with their public counterparts 
as an inherently competitive one, whereby the former essentially made up for the latter’s 
shortcomings, such as parochialism, government neglect, scarcity of resources and, more 
importantly, a lack of engagement with foreign ideas. Additionally, the analysis of legislation 
promoted by the crown and inquiries commissioned by the administration will also reveal the 
extent to which private initiatives were not only tolerated, but also, in many cases, concretely 
supported by the Bourbons, thus contributing to a broader rethinking of those 
historiographical verdicts describing the local administration as unquestionably repressive 
and judging its policies in matters of education as a complete failure.  
Arguing, as twentieth-century historians often did, that the status of education in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was, as a commonly-quoted monograph by Ferdinando 
Pappalardo maintained, “simply disastrous” due to the Bourbons’ failure to implement 
effective reforms of public channels, is, in itself, an oversimplification of the Kingdom’s 
education systems and an empirically incorrect one.10 This verdict ought to be reconsidered 
in light of the Bourbons’ promotion of private schools alongside public ones, hence viewing 
the dynamics of education in the Mezzogiorno as more progressive, and informed by a more 
liberal governmental attitude than historians were generally ready to admit.  
 Being a remedy for the ills riddling public schools was not, however, the sole function 
performed by private institutes. Section three will proceed to position their contribution 
within a transnational view of the Mezzogiorno’s intellectual history, illustrating how they 
attempted to promote a substantial engagement with foreign ideas. This could be observed 
both for what concerns the teaching methods adopted and also with regard to the subjects 
being taught. More importantly, looking at the study of German philosophy promoted by 
                                                           
9 Cospito, G. (2002) Il gran Vico: presenza, immagini e suggestioni vichiane nei testi della cultura italiana pre-
risorgimentale, 1799-1839; Mali, J. (2012) The Legacy of Vico in Modern Cultural History, pp. 12-70; Rubini, R. 
(2014) The Other Renaissance: Italian Humanism between Hegel and Heidegger 
10 Pappalardo, F. (1989), p. 569 
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private schools, it will be argued that foreign ideas were not simply absorbed, but were often 
amalgamated with the local tradition of thought. The examples set by Pasquale Galluppi and 
Ottavio Colecchi’s schools, commonly regarded as extremely influential in the making of a 
Neapolitan Hegelian generation, for example, can reveal how German philosophy was 
increasingly seen as conducive to the renewal of the local philosophical landscape, most 
notably the historicist tendencies of eighteenth-century Neapolitan Enlightenment.  
 Lastly, section four will discuss how the transnational sensibility and approaches 
developed in private schools can yield interesting results for what concerns the understanding 
of Neapolitan Hegelianism. This section will focus on some of the best-known students of 
Galluppi and Colecchi: Stefano Cusani, Stanislao Gatti and, more importantly, Francesco De 
Sanctis, who proposed a markedly anti-metaphysical revision of Hegel’s philosophy, via its 
encounter with Vico’s “metodo storico”. It will be argued that Cusani and Gatti, closely 
following their mentors’ approach to the study of German philosophy, encouraged the 
merging of Hegel and Vico’s philosophies of history in their own private schools, by closely 
reflecting on the perceived tension, as well as the continuities, between their historicisms. 
Finally, it will be contended that it was in Francesco De Sanctis’ private school that the full 
amalgamation of Hegel and Vico was finally carried out, via the elaboration of a composite 
historicism revolving around the dialectical interplay of a Hegelian “logical method” (“metodo 
logico”) and a Vichian “historical method” (“metodo storico”). 
 
 
 
3.2. Public and Private Education in the Kingdom 
 
In nineteenth-century Naples, private schools were far more inclined to engage with Hegel’s 
philosophy than their public counterparts. As it remains surprisingly under-represented in 
studies concentrating on Neapolitan Hegelianism, this perspective can be explained on the 
basis of traditional Risorgimento historiography’s ideological foundations. As indicated by 
David Laven, a feature of twentieth-century inquiries on this period was to interpret it in a 
teleological fashion, and view it as a pre-figuration of Italy’s unification. This mentality 
encouraged an “undue emphasis on political opposition and a negative judgment” on regional 
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and local idiosyncrasies, which were univocally treated as expressions of backwardness.11 In 
consequence, it fuelled derogatory viewpoints on the status of education under the 
Bourbons, in ways that completely neglected private schools’ achievements.  
Illustrating how private teaching contributed to Naples’ intellectual landscape during 
the Risorgimento is a very ambitious task, which extends well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As this chapter explains, however, examining how these initiatives encouraged the circulation 
of foreign ideas is necessary to understand some important aspects of Hegel’s Neapolitan 
reception. As a result, the discussion of private schools’ engagement with German idealism 
ought to be approached from a different perspective, namely one that rescues their 
contributions from uncritically derogatory verdicts on the status of education in the 
Mezzogiorno during the Risorgimento. 
During the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, private 
teaching in the Mezzogiorno engaged in an ongoing competition with its public counterpart, 
whereby the former systematically made up for the latter’s deficiencies. Testimonies of the 
agonal relationship between the two branches of education could be found in various parts 
of the Kingdom and featured very prominently in later historiography, too.12 It was commonly 
believed that private institues’ operations were a direct response to to a series of markedly 
conservative policies promoted by an increasingly repressive and authoritarian Bourbon 
administration.13 This verdict, initially formulated by Benedetto Croce, informed virtually all 
subsequent studies by historians investigating the dynamics of education in the Mezzogiorno 
during the pre-Unification years. While correctly acknowledging the agonal relationship 
between the two spheres of education, these works almost univocally argued that the 
flourishing of private initiatives ought to be understood as a direct response to reactionary 
and illiberal cultural policies promoted by the crown.14  
These verdicts relied on different sets of arguments: among these, the public sector’s 
bigotry caused by the tightening of censorship and the imposition of religious teaching was 
                                                           
11 Laven, D. (2002) Venice and Venetia under the Habsburgs: 1815-1835, pp. 1-14 
12 On the encounter of private and public schools in Sicily, see: Tosti, M. (1921) Felice Bisazza e il movimento 
intellettuale in Messina, pp. 72, 100; in Naples: Settembrini, L. (1879) Ricordanze della mia vita, p. 72 
13 Croce, B. (1925), pp. 9-11 
14 See, for example: Moe, N. (2002) The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and Southern Question; Pagano, A. 
(2004) Scuola e maestri nel sud: dal 1816 al 1860; Vigo, G. (1971) Istruzione e sviluppo economico in Italia nel 
secolo XIX 
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the most commonly invoked factor.15 Additionally, other studies have drawn attention to the 
extent to which hostility to foreign ideas played an important role in rendering the provision 
of a liberal education along the lines of models imported from abroad an exclusive 
prerogative of private schools.16 Lastly, some historians have examined how these attitudes 
were not observable in Naples only, but were present in the rest of the Kingdom, too.17 These 
views deserve closer scrutiny, because, by uncritically viewing the phenomenon of private 
teaching as a response to the Bourbons’ mechanisms of censorship and maintenance of public 
order, they encourage an ideologically charged characterisation of their politics of culture and 
education by and large as a complete failure, driven by a repressive and illiberal orientation. 
They can consequently be reviewed by pointing out that private schools did not acquire their 
popularity because of – and in response to – the Bourbons’ allegedly regressive and 
reactionary orientation. On the contrary, their actual existence, especially if considered in the 
context of Restoration Italy and Europe, can be seen as the sign of a rather permissive and 
liberal attitude on the part of the crown.  
The Bourbons’ stance towards private teaching, especially with regard to how a 
synergy of the public and private branches was actively promoted, should be understood as 
a response to the institutional, financial and intellectual problems that were a feature of 
public education, reflecting a mentality that one simply would not encounter elsewhere in 
the continent, let alone in the Italian peninsula, and that remained consistently 
unacknowledged by twentieth-century historiography. This argument, however, does not aim 
to be a full rehabilitation of the Bourbon administration. Rather, it represents a rather 
provocative encouragement to rethink some assumptions taken too often for granted by 
traditional Risorgimento historiography, univocally claiming, for instance, that, in 1861, the 
Kingdom of Italy “inherited” from the Bourbon experience a “disastrous” system of education, 
ultimately making Italy lag behind the rest of Europe.18 
                                                           
15 Agresta, S. (1992) L’istruzione nel mezzogiorno d’Italia: 1806-1860, pp. 27-29; Corbi, E. & Strollo, M. R. (1999) 
L’istruzione a Napoli dal 1806 al 1860. Politica scolastica e organizzazione didattica, pp. 11-40; Zazo, A. (1924) 
L’ultimo periodo borbonico, pp. 467-75; Zazo, A. (1927) L’istruzione pubblica e privata nel napoletano, pp. 103-
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16 Del Giudice, F. (1860) Le piaghe dell’istruzione pubblica napoletana, pp. 11-56; Gragnaniello, R. (2006) 
Didattica e istruzione nel mezzogiorno preunitario, pp. 41-42 
17 Bonetta, G. (1981) Istruzione e società nella Sicilia dell’ottocento; Iesu, F. (2007) Istruzione e salute pubblica in 
provincia di Terra di Lavoro del Regno di Napoli dai Borbone al Regno d’Italia; Omodeo, A. (1951) La cultura 
meridionale nel Risorgimento 
18 Pappalardo, F. (1989), p. 569; see also: Lupo, M. (2013), pp. 283-310 
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While most European powers were effectively encouraging mass public schooling via 
an increase expenditure, leading to higher enrolment rates in both schools and universities, 
the Bourbons devoted increasingly smaller shares of the Kingdom’s total spending to public 
education from 1820 onwards.19 Problems, however, were not limited to a financial and 
administrative sphere alone. A widespread hostility to foreign cultures, for example, played a 
crucial role in restricting the circulation of Hegel’s ideas to the sole context of private schools. 
Believing that present-day foreign ideas “had no other purpose than corrupting students’ 
minds”, professors of the Federico II university refused to approach the latest scientific and 
literary innovations produced in France, Germany and England.20 This lack of engagement 
with European ideas in public education channels was frequently reported by local and 
foreign observers alike.21 Hostility towards European, particularly French, ideas had been a 
characteristic of the Federico II university’s administration since the reaction to the 1799 
Neapolitan Revolution. The Cappellano Maggiore Agostino Gervasio, for instance, called for a 
reform of institution in 1800, being this “particularly infected” with political dissidence 
inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution.22  
This led to a series of initiatives on part of the public administration that contrasted 
the presence of revolutionary ideals in places of education, by suspending certain university 
chairs, closing schools, or imposing restrictions on students.23 After the French decade, the 
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Bourbons’ return to power was marked by a series of decrees aiming at reforming public 
schools, as well as the university’s organisation and cultural orientation. A royal document 
circulated in September 1815, for instance, marked the creation of a special commission, the 
Commissione per l’Istruzione Pubblica, whose efforts aimed at countering the legacy of the 
French principles that had characterised public education, as well as wider debates in the 
public sphere, during the previous decade.24 Among these, the reform of public education 
proposed in 1818 directly hoped to “dismantle dangerous foreign ideologies”.25 
The mentalities informing the Restoration government’s actions were illustrated in a 
statement by the Minister of Police in Naples. While criticising the “indulgent” policies of the 
earlier years, this document explained that a more effective system of censorship and tighter 
control over the press would be crucial for the government’s survival.26 Moreover, the 
inauguration speech of the 1816 academic year, held by the professor of sacred history 
Domenico Sarno, praised the Commissione’s efforts to erode the French “evil doctrines 
deriving from the looseness and delirium of unhappy times”.27 He then applauded how recent 
decrees had eroded “the plagues and the mortal ills riddling good customs and religion”.28  
This picture was further exacerbated in the wake of the events of 1820-21, leading to 
a new wave of decrees imposing even greater restrictions upon students in the Kingdom. 
Believing that “vice proliferates among the students”, the president of the commission 
banned the circulation of books coming from abroad at the university and forbade students 
from purchasing them anywhere in the capital, fearing that engaging with those ideas may 
lure the youth into revolutionary activities29. A royal document circulated in the spring of that 
year, in this sense, stated that: 
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Experience has shown that the gravest wounds to public morality were caused by the reading 
of dangerous books, and that these, when put in the inexperienced hands of superficially 
educated youngsters, became fatal to the well-being and honour of many cultured nations 
[…]. The prohibited and obscene ones, contrary to religion and morals, coming from abroad, 
will therefore be arrested in spite of any transit pretext.30 
 
It is certainly possible to ascribe some of the perceived shortcomings of public education to 
the Bourbon government’s intention to prevent the dissemination those foreign ideas that 
were deemed conducive to political dissidence and revolutionary activity and, in this respect, 
the dynamics of censorship and surveillance observable in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
were not dissimilar from those adopted elsewhere in Italy and in Europe, especially after 
1815.  John Davis, for example, illustrated the similarities between the mechanisms of control 
adopted during the Restoration in the Mezzogiorno and those present in Piedmont, Lombardy 
and Tuscany, maintaining that, in some cases, such as restrictions in the circulation of books 
under Austrian rule and censorship of the press in the Kingdom of Sardinia, these were even 
stricter than in southern Italy.31  
 Moreover, the Bourbons’ initiatives were consistent with other European powers’ 
response to the revolutionary turmoil of 1820-23 and, as such, they ought not to be seen as 
evidence supporting the idiosyncratic characterisation of their administration as illiberal and 
repressive, but in line with attitudes prevailing in the rest of Europe. Metternich, for instance, 
was particularly disturbed by how the early decades of the nineteenth century had been 
marked by the swift growth of nationalisms, liberalism and constitutionalism. He was 
especially distressed by the military nature of the Revolutions, which reminded him of the 
rise of Bonaparte, therefore demanding a swift and effective reaction.32 Additionally, he was 
greatly concerned with the republican character of the 1820 Revolution in the Mezzogiorno 
and directed his diplomatic efforts towards not only the characterisation of the 1820 
constitution as illegitimate, but also warning other European powers against the threat 
represented by the rapidly spreading democratic and liberal ideals.33  
 Just as Metternich readily applauded king Ferdinand’s counter-revolutionary 
initiatives on the basis of their effort to preserve the Kingdom’s internal security, Prussia and 
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Russia soon came to see restrictions of the freedom of the press and association as a means 
to thwart the democratic outlooks perpetuated by the Revolution.34 Britain followed suit in 
vehemently condemning the restrictions of royal power invoked by southern European 
constitutional movements, warning that these might cause discord and anarchy in southern 
Italy and the rest of the continent.35 Unsurprisingly, newspapers were identified as the prime 
platform for the propagation of political dissidence and, in the aftermath of the revolutions 
in Italy, Spain and Portugal, as the idea that freedom of the press would lead to increasing 
demands for political power began gaining traction, the British home secretary maintained 
that, for the sake of public order, the Bourbon king’s model ought to be followed and freedom 
of the press be limited.36 At the same time, academic freedom was restricted in most parts of 
Europe from the mid-1820s onwards.37 These observations make the Bourbons’ reaction to 
the revolutionary events of 1820 less suggestive of Ferdinand’s distinctively illiberal outlook, 
by revealing not only how they intersected, but also how consistent they were with broader 
Italian and European mentalities. Plotted against this context, the very existence of private 
schools in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies seems to be at odds with the prevailing attitudes 
of European Restoration governments: their examination may therefore be conducive to a 
general re-assessment of historiographical verdicts on the Bourbons’ education policies.  
Private teaching had already begun growing between 1800 and 1806: within a 
timespan of six years only, 72 new teaching licences were granted to private instructors by 
the government, leading to the opening of roughly one new school every month.38 Upon 
returning to power in 1816, the Bourbon king Ferdinand became convinced that the French 
had indeed significantly improved the status of education in the Kingdom, especially via the 
promotion of its private branch, consequently recognising that opposition to the latter would 
be not only fruitless, but also counterproductive. John Davis noted that, as it was the case 
elsewhere in Italy, the process of Restoration in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies relied on 
maintaining Napoleonic institutions: virtually all administrative and political changes 
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introduced by the French were kept in place.39 Education policies were no exception and, in 
this sense, the reforms undertaken by the head of the Direzione Generale per l’Istruzione 
Pubblica under the French rulers, Matteo Galdi, remained untouched by the Restoration 
government. Galdi’s initiatives, which aimed at eroding the “stubborn, haughty and resentful” 
orientation of public education, encouraged a closer partnership with private institutes, 
applauded for their openness towards cultural and pedagogical innovations produced in 
foreign European countries. In addition, they granted all university teachers the possibility of 
opening their own private schools and enjoy unrestricted didactic freedom.40 In 1816, the 
crown approved the Regolamento per le scuole private e i pensionati, extending the authority 
of the Commissione dell’Istruzione Pubblica on both private and public education, in an effort 
to further homogenise the two. This decision was particularly illustrative of king Ferdinand’s 
approach: aware of private institutes’ success under the French administration, he attempted 
to challenge a dichotomous separation between public and private, turning their agonal 
relationship into a public-private partnership.  
Particularly noteworthy were the Bourbons’ initiatives aiming at promoting women’s 
education in private schools, too. Attempting to combat the emphasis on the “womanly arts” 
characterising girls’ public education, an 1816 decree ruled that “it will not be permitted to 
open a private school for girls, if teachers are not proficient in reading, writing, practical 
arithmetics, religious catechism and social duties, because all these things must necessarily 
be taught”.41 More importantly, the king was constantly reminded of the problems affecting 
public education systems, which were particularly dramatic in the countryside and the least 
urbanised provinces. Reports and inquiries commissioned by the administration, in fact, 
clearly drew attention to several inter-connected problems, ranging from absentee or 
unprepared teachers to truancy, from the lack of resources to the complete absence of 
textbooks42.  
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In contrast to these, surveys on private initiatives commissioned by the crown in 
various regions of the Kingdom exhibited a very positive tone: the teachers in Calabria were 
said to make up for the deficiencies of the public sector, appearing “very well trained” and 
doing a “truly excellent” job in educating the local population;43 private schools in Salerno 
were “flourishing with such a degree of industry”, that they were able to mitigate “the misery 
threatening this province”;44 in Abruzzo, private teachers were said to be able to effectively 
counter the “decadence” of public education, causing “the whole Kingdom’s great 
admiration”;45 lastly, private schools in Puglia were deemed able to overcome the ills of a 
public education seen as “frail and uncertain”, rendering the population “strong and cohesive, 
and less prone to error”.46 These reports can be seen as evidence of the extent to which the 
government did not see private schools as a threat to their public counterparts or as a source 
of dangerous opposition. Instead, they suggest a genuine appreciation of their existence and 
operations. 
As a result, especially from the late 1830s onwards, teachers’ requests for a licence to 
open a private school were commonly granted very rapidly, due to the increasing awareness, 
among the ranks of the central administration, of their utility in compensating for the public 
sector’s inadequacies.47 The presence of an official licensing procedure for private instructors, 
coupled with the growing number of successful applications, further corroborates the 
hypothesis that the government would see private schools as a useful resource for the 
education of the Kingdom’s youth. Unsurprisingly – and this, once again, reflected the crown’s 
remarkably liberal stance towards the phenomenon of private education – a system of 
incentives would make it even easier for private teachers to open a school in the countryside, 
where fewer public institutes could be found, such as tax relief, exemption or monetary 
subsidies.48 
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Thus imagined, the Bourbons’ promotion of private initiatives makes it difficult to 
agree with historiographical verdicts condemning their education policies as a complete 
failure, informed by an illiberal and reactionary mentality alone. A more accurate 
interpretation may therefore suggest that the government, while largely neglecting the public 
branch of education and subjecting the Kingdom’s public life to mechanisms of censorship 
and control, as it was the case in other parts of Italy and Europe after the 1820-23 Revolutions, 
nonetheless allowed for a thriving intellectual life outside the public domain. This served as a 
crucial stimulus in fostering a climate of competition between the two education branches, 
ultimately enabling private schools to perform pedagogical and intellectual functions that 
remained simply inaccessible to their public counterparts. This agonal relationship had 
profound implications for what concerns the dynamics of transnational exchanges between 
Naples and the rest of Europe. Private channels served not only as progressive alternatives, 
but also as an engine propelling cultural innovation in the Mezzogiorno, via an unprecedented 
openness toward foreign ideas. Unsurprisingly, it was thanks to private schools that a strong 
interest for German thought came to imbue Naples’ philosophical landscape. 
 
 
 
3.3. From Reception to Revision: Neapolitan Private Schools in a Transnational History of 
Ideas 
 
Private schools did not simply “make up” for their public counterparts’ shortcomings. Rather, 
they also acted as a valid engine propelling cultural innovation in the Mezzogiorno. Plotted 
against the public sphere’s lack of engagement with foreign ideas, their most interesting 
contribution during the first four decades of the 1800s was the fact that they clearly aimed at 
encouraging transnational intellectual exchanges, as regards both the methods adopted and 
the actual topics being taught.  
The pedagogical innovations they brought about are easy to identify. The French 
decade had witnessed the introduction, in public education channels, of the normal method 
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(metodo normale), an approach proposing the standardisation of teaching and the provision 
of the same notions to all students. The years following the Restoration, instead, were 
characterized by a lack of experimentation, accentuated by a widespread regression to “a 
uniform teaching method, to be observed in all colleges and schools”, inspired by the 
principles of Catholic religion and mirroring that of the Jesuits, believing that “not only 
discipline, religious belief and students’ behaviour ought to be informed by uniform 
principles, but also that this actual uniformity may be extended to one’s literary or scientific 
career”.49 In an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by old-fashioned pedagogical 
methods, private schools aimed at engaging much more closely with foreign approaches. 
Already in the 1820s, local observers highlighted how, among private schools, “there was no 
known method that teachers would not attempt to try out”.50 This was promptly recognised 
by the authorities, too: the Rapporto for the year 1819-20, penned by the minister of Interior 
Zurlo, noted how the adoption of new methods, “to be used as a guideline for progressive 
improvements”, had come about as a result of transnational exchanges, having private 
teachers established “a fruitful correspondence with foreign scholars”.51 
The method known as mutual teaching, perfected by Andrew Bell and Joseph 
Lancaster in Britain, for example, would delegate part of the teaching to older, more 
experienced students. It rapidly became one of the most popular ones in Neapolitan private 
schools, having been introduced in Francesco Mastroti’s literature school, founded in 1828. 
This method was illustrated in his volume Manuale sul sistema di Bell e Lancaster, initially 
published in Naples in 1819, which was rapidly adopted in a multitude of private institutes, 
including Basilio Puoti’s grammar and literature school, perhaps the single most successful 
private institute of the 1820s.52 Moreover, the German educator Georg Franz Hoffmann, who 
had travelled to Naples in 1811, greatly contributed to the popularisation of the method 
elaborated by the Swiss pedagogue Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Born in Mannheim, Hoffmann 
received his education in Switzerland, before moving to Bergerac and Yverdon in France, and 
collaborated with the Prussian government before settling down in Naples, hence allowing 
for the penetration, in the Mezzogiorno, of a wide variety of European pedagogical ideas. 
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Foreign commentators promptly noticed the popularity of Hoffmann’s school, 
averaging approximately sixty students every year and praised it for its innovative approach.53 
The British periodical Literary Panorama, for example, applauded Hoffmann’s “ideas on the 
development of the human mind”, able to produce “such sound, such indestructible 
knowledge” and his intention to “teach a child to think and reason and by these means to 
become his own instructor”.54 Similar views also appeared in the pages of French press.55 
Private schools in Naples began rapidly adopting Pestalozzi’s method from 1812 onwards.56  
At the same time, Hoffmann’s correspondence would reveal attempts to innovate not 
only pedagogical methods, but also the topics covered in his courses. Worried about the 
allegedly static cultural landscape of the Southern capital and the lack of engagement with 
foreign ideas in public education channels, he believed that the intellectual regeneration of 
the region ought to begin by enriching the local tradition with notions borrowed from abroad. 
He endeavoured to provide “an introduction to learning German philosophy and Schelling” in 
his Neapolitan school, in order to supplement the study of “Bruno and other books of similar 
content”.57 
The transnational exchanges taking place in the context of Neapolitan private schools 
went well beyond the mere internationalisation of teaching methods, largely contributing to 
the characterisation of the local intellectual landscape as a melting pot of cultural and 
scientific innovations imported from various regions of Europe. Many teachers who had been 
exiled in the wake of the 1799 Revolution returned to the capital during and after the French 
decade, and rapidly proceeded to open their own private schools. These dealt with an 
impressive variety of subjects and encouraged the penetration of foreign ideas, as well as 
their amalgamation with local debates. Francesco Saverio Correra, for example, opened his 
private school of law in 1838.58 He taught French, Spanish, German and Dutch jurisprudence, 
and his views made a significant contribution to local debates on the modernization and 
internationalisation of the law.59 Within the field of medical sciences, Giovanni Semmola 
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opened a private school in 1831.60 He gave lectures on modern French physiology, pioneering 
pharmacological approaches that would later be widely adopted by the hospitals of the 
Kingdom from the late 1850s onwards. Similarly, Antonio De Martini began his private 
teaching in 1841 and taught, for the first time in Italy, ground-breaking medical techniques, 
which he had learned in Vienna and Paris.61 Lastly, Matteo Tondi, who had studied in Germany 
and France, opened a private school of geology in 1817, in which he illustrated new theories 
that shaped local debates on volcanology.62 
Within the context of literature schools, the appropriation of foreign ideas was even 
more explicit: Domenico Anzelmi opened a private school of literature in 1836 and taught 
foreign literature, focusing, in particular, on French and English novels, of which he 
highlighted the exquisitely modern character, in stark contrast to the parochialism of the 
programmes taught at the university.63 More importantly, Anzelmi believed in the common 
origin of all literary traditions: it was imperative for teachers, therefore, not to promote 
among students a static notion of literature, but one characterised by ongoing exchanges 
among the various national traditions.64 It was in philosophy schools, however, that 
intellectual innovation was pursued most consistently. This should not come as a surprise, 
given how this discipline occupied a place of absolute prominence in nineteenth-century 
Neapolitan culture. Its popularity, in turn, deepened its roots in the experience of the local 
Enlightenment. From the early eighteenth-century onwards, in fact, Neapolitans’ interest in 
history and law had been met by an even greater fascination for philosophical studies.65 
Philosophical reasoning was consistently deployed in support of other areas of knowledge, 
ranging from jurisprudence and economics to politics and natural sciences.66 Simply put, 
philosophy was assigned a practical significance that went well beyond its purely speculative 
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horizon and permeated, instead, virtually every other domain of Neapolitans’ intellectual and 
political life.  
Perpetuating the local tradition was therefore synonymous, in nineteenth-century 
Naples, with sustaining this characteristic commitment to philosophical studies. This 
inclination was common to an impressive number of students, who resorted to private tuition 
in great numbers. Lorenzo Fazzini’s school, for example, active between 1830 and 1848, was 
attended by more than four hundred pupils every year, including Francesco De Sanctis and 
Luigi Settembrini. In Fazzini’s institute, foreign ideas were widely discussed. De Sanctis, in 
particular, spoke very enthusiastically of how his teacher had stood out as a true innovator, 
at a time when public education was shrouded in “theological darkness”. 67 Fazzini’s school 
dealt very extensively with foreign philosophers, including Locke, Condillac, Tracy, Voltaire, 
Diderot and Rousseau. More importantly, it stimulated a rather unorthodox amalgamation of 
Locke and Hume’s sensualism with the ongoing re-discovery of scholastic philosophy 
operated by Italian thinkers and very popular at the local university.68 
Fazzini’s approach reflected an interesting attitude toward transnational exchanges, 
common to many Neapolitan private schools: put simply, teachers would engage with foreign 
philosophy for the purpose of regenerating the local tradition of thought, by not only 
absorbing notions coming from abroad, but also by fully merging them with local thinkers’ 
ideas. As indicated in chapter one, two private institutes were particularly illustrative of this 
tendency: those run by Pasquale Galluppi and Ottavio Colecchi, who spearheaded a process 
of intellectual exchange introducing, in their private schools, the study of German philosophy 
among the Neapolitan youth. 
Later commentators regarded the opening of Galluppi’s private school, taking place 
on November 7, 1831, as an event breathing new life in the Neapolitan philosophical 
landscape, inaugurating “a new speculative period”, thanks to the popularisation of German 
philosophy via Victor Cousin’s works, mainly his Fragments philosophiques.69 Bertrando 
Spaventa, who, from the mid-1840s onwards, would tower above his contemporaries as the 
leading exponent of the local Hegelian school, often emphasised Galluppi’s primacy in 
enhancing a sensitivity for foreign ideas, perfecting a composite, anti-metaphysical, 
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philosophical orientation that, by deploying Kant’s “transcendental psychologism”, ultimately 
provided answers to queries that could be traced back to Giambattista Vico’s Scienza nuova.70 
Additionally, in an 1868 letter to the philosopher and patriot Angelo Camillo De Meis, 
Bertrando recalled how his own approach to the study of Hegel had been greatly influenced 
by Galluppi’s postulation of a “certain relationship” between German and Italian philosophy, 
between Kant and Vico.71 The novelty of Galluppi’s approach lay in the fact that he had 
attempted to rethink the coordinates of Vico’s text from the perspective of Cousin’s 
eclecticism. He viewed, in fact, La scienza nuova as the proposition of “a new metaphysics: 
the metaphysics of the human mind, which moves from the history of human ideas […] that 
metaphysics that is not pure ontology, or the old metaphysics of being, but psychology: 
transcendental psychology”.72 Unsurprisingly, in articulating a vision of metaphysics firmly 
anchored to psychology, rather than pure ontology, Galluppi’s reading of Vico made the latter 
seemingly compatible with Kant’s ideas. 
Galluppi’s engagement with foreign thought also reflected the competitive interplay 
of public and private education in the Kingdom, further enforcing the idea that private 
teaching remained alien to the mechanisms of control imposed by the administration: while 
he held a chair at the university of Naples between 1831 and 1833, his lessons were subject, 
as mentioned in chapter one, to attentive scrutiny from the Giunta della Pubblica Istruzione. 
The president of this board, Francesco Colangelo, repeatedly accused Galluppi not only of 
disseminating atheism among the ranks of university students, but also of tainting the 
integrity of the local tradition of thought, via his revision of Vico’s Scienza nuova.73 This 
ultimately led to the suspension of Galluppi’s university appointment in 1833, following the 
first appearance of a text on Kant, later included in the Cousinian Frammenti di filosofia. As a 
result, Galluppi’s written output was at all times significantly affected by Colangelo’s 
opposition, with manuscripts remaining unpublished for several years, suffering from very 
limited circulation, or written for the sole purpose of shaking off Colangelo’s accusations.74 
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These considerations challenge historians’ understanding of Galluppi’s thought, 
rendering its reconstruction quite problematic, especially for what concerns the extent to 
which he fostered a genuine transnational sensitivity among his students and with regard to 
the possibility of disaggregating his university teaching from the lessons he held in his private 
institute. Their legacy, however, was later celebrated by one of his students, Luigi 
Settembrini, who, in his Ricordanze, recounted how his mentor had dealt, in his private study, 
with topics he would have not otherwise been able to address at the university. When 
reconstructing the events that led to Galluppi’s university appointment, Settembrini 
highlighted the difficulties he had encountered and the severe limitations imposed by the 
administration. At the same time, however, he highlighted how these restrictions did not 
deter the teacher from dealing with certain topics, most notably foreign philosophy, in his 
own private study.75 This, in turn, further reinforces the idea that the Bourbons’ attitude 
toward private schools was, contrary to many twentieth-century historiographical verdicts, 
rather liberal and permissive: while the public sphere remained neglected by the crown and 
subject to censorship and close control by the administration, independent institutions were 
nonetheless allowed to pursue their pedagogical and intellectual mission with a truly 
remarkable degree of freedom. 
In this sense, Settembrini drew particular attention to how this stood in direct contrast to 
the predominant institutional arrangements: “the government may well persecute me”, the 
author remembered his mentor saying, “as long as it allows me to teach, because by teaching 
I raise you, and you will one day be cultured, honest and generous”.76 Galluppi also presented 
these views in a small pamphlet, whose circulation remained, however, extremely limited, in 
which his opposition to the Bourbon’s system of control and censorship was clearly outlined. 
The goal of his philosophical and civic inclination, he pointed out, revolved around an intense 
intellectual resistance to the central power and its functionaries, with the purpose of “casting 
a light upon their conduct, unmasking their intrigues, warning society of the risks it is currently 
exposed to”.77 
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These brief indications regarding Galluppi’s school are particularly significant, for two 
reasons: first, they clearly framed it within the broader, competitive, interplay of public and 
private education illustrated in the previous section of this chapter, further corroborating the 
idea that the latter emerged in the Kingdom as a much more liberal and progressive 
alternative to the former; second, they drew attention, once again, on the very unorthodox 
dynamics of education in the Kingdom, characterised by tight control on public channels and 
a largely permissive attitude towards private ones.  
What is even more important about Galluppi’s contribution, however, has to do with 
the extent to which this stimulated a transnational exchange of ideas ultimately leading to 
the amalgamation of local and foreign philosophical landscapes. Reconstructing, in this sense, 
the contents of his private lessons is indeed a particularly hard task, given the scarcity of 
sources available. Settembrini, however, provided a valuable hint as he explained that most 
of the topics discussed by the teacher in his private study eventually came to be featured in 
a “critical essay on human knowledge”, later appearing in Messina with the title of Saggio 
filosofico sulla critica della conoscenza.78 This hypothesis was also confirmed by Bertrando 
Spaventa, who noted how this text fully revealed the extent of its author’s Kantian formation, 
adding that the rational psychologist approach elaborated by the philosopher from 
Königsberg had been deployed by Galluppi for the purpose of a significant revision of Vico’s 
thought.79  
 Galluppi’s new reading of La scienza nuova revolved around the projection of a 
Kantian transcendental subjectivity onto the Vichian equation of verum and factum, 
suggesting that only the analysis of a rational process of self-consciousness may lead to the 
understanding of a broader notion of “human spirit” in its progressive development:  
 
That which cannot be produced cannot be posited. Inner experience, upon which all 
philosophy must be based, teaches me that the human spirit is an agent, an active being; it 
therefore has the capacity to modify itself and produce something: modifications are the 
things which it produces; following this line of reasoning, one can correctly proceed towards 
truth.80 
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This position naturally led Galluppi to embrace a view on history that, while largely resonating 
with Victor Cousin’s psychologist eclecticism, entailed a vision of historical development 
understood as the concatenation of “the thoughts and the will of everyone”.81 In other words, 
via the deployment of what he labelled Kant’s “transcendental psychology”, Galluppi 
proposed a new form of historicism: one that, emphasising the centrality of man’s 
imagination and rational thinking in making sense of the experience of historical time, 
ultimately challenged the very idea of absolute historical laws, reduced, instead, to a 
“synthetic and empirical judgment”, a rational inference informed by the thinking subjects’ 
mental powers.82  
 If viewed from another perspective, namely that of the early nineteenth-century re-
discovery of Vico, examined in chapter two, the amalgamation of Kantianism and Vichian 
historicism operated by Galluppi becomes even clearer. The tension between an “ideal 
eternal history” and the latter’s concrete, empirically observable realisations, initially 
problematised by Vincenzo Cuoco and deepening its roots in the identification of verum and 
factum as the pivotal points of Vico’s historicism, was resolved by Galluppi via an 
uncompromising, anti-metaphysical, rejection of any kind of ideal history, or any notion of a 
priori historical mechanisms. The definition of historical laws, in fact, was said to depend 
entirely on the rational inferences made by the thinking subjects with regard to the 
relationship among “past, present and future”.83 As a result, historical laws were said to 
correspond to an “experimental truth, not a metaphysical one”, a “synthetic, rather than 
analytic truth”, a “contingent, rather than necessary truth”.84 Based on these premises, it 
should not be surprising that Galluppi sided with Vico in arguing that the succession of 
different historical epochs could be discerned via the examination of “language among the 
various peoples” and “the study of poets and orators”.85 Yet, by rescuing the ideas of progress 
and development from any metaphysical account of historical laws, Galluppi crafted a view 
on history as fully man-made and experimental and, more importantly, devoid of the 
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philosophical problems identified in Vico’s Scienza nuova by its early nineteenth-century 
commentators.  
  Galluppi, however, was not the only Southern thinker who actively endeavoured, in 
his private study, to establish a dialogue between the local and foreign traditions of thought. 
Ottavio Colecchi, for example, can be credited for further perfecting the blueprint for the 
amalgamation of Italian and German philosophy with equal accuracy and effectiveness, and 
according to the same anti-metaphysical tendencies exhibited by Galluppi. His school was 
fundamental for what concerns the development of a transnational sensitivity among those 
thinkers who later came to constitute the bulk of the Neapolitan Hegelian generation. Among 
Colecchi’s students, in fact, one can list Bertrando Spaventa and his brother Silvio, Francesco 
De Sanctis, Stanislao Gatti, Stefano Cusani and Luigi Settembrini. Many of these personalities 
offered significant testimonies of their mentor’s intellectual inclinations, as well as his 
school’s orientation: Bertrando Spaventa, for instance, openly credited it for disseminating a 
new philosophical consciousness among the Neapolitan youth, marking “the new principle of 
our age”.86 
 It is easy to situate Colecchi’s school within the broader competitive interplay of public 
and private education channels discussed earlier. Spaventa recounted how his mentor’s study 
was often targeted by the authorities, via “police’s suspicion”, or “threats and 
persecutions”.87 Moreover, just as Galluppi’s interest in Kant and his exploration of the 
perceived Kantian overtones of Vico’s Scienza nuova were met with hostility by public 
education authorities, Colecchi’s contribution too was severely limited by censorship. Several 
manuscripts, for example, engaging with Kant and, more importantly, with Hegel, whom 
Colecchi had begun exploring during the final months of his private school, were not 
published during the 1830s and ‘40s, due to Giuseppe Maria Mazzarella’s intervention.88 
Mazzarella, a professor of philosophy at the university and general inspector of Public 
Education, accused Colecchi, adopting a similar approach to that of Colangelo towards 
Galluppi, of disseminating atheism. He subsequently urged the philosopher to profoundly 
alter the contents of his magnum opus’ third volume, Sopra alcune quistioni le più importanti 
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della filosofia.89 The sections dealing with German idealism, particularly with the allegedly 
pernicious Hegelian philosophy then appeared only posthumously – and in a largely edited 
form – in the periodical Il Giambattista Vico.90 Once again, however, just like Galluppi’s 
written output, despite being censored or having its circulation limited in the public sphere, 
was nonetheless widely discussed in his private school, Colecchi’s Quistioni, despite 
remaining partially unpublished during the author’s life, were hugely indebted to the study 
of foreign philosophy taking place in his private institute, as reported by his students.91 
 Colecchi’s philosophical orientation closely followed Galluppi’s. Once again, his 
reading of Vico reflected contemporary debates on the eighteenth-century Neapolitan 
philosopher, particularly Cuoco’s identification of two kinds of history in La scienza nuova: 
commenting on the contents of this book, in fact, the author regarded it to be a “civic 
theology of Providence, according to Reason”, able to resolve the perceived tension between 
“divine” and “human things”.92 And, just like Galluppi had sided with Vico in encouraging the 
analysis of languages and cultural production in order to examine the “human spirit” (“spirito 
umano”), Colecchi exhibited a clear predilection for “the examination of facts above these 
absolute ideas”.93 While, however, Galluppi had deployed the ideas of Kant in order to solve 
problems which contemporaries were identifying in Vico, Colecchi used Vico to overcome the 
perceived limitations of Kant’s philosophy. 
 Colecchi, who had travelled to Königsberg in 1817 in order to be acquainted with 
Kant’s works and read them in their original language, promptly identified a significant 
problem with the German thinker’s system of thought: Kant’s method, in fact, was regarded 
by Colecchi as “absurd”, because “it situated itself beyond experience, in order to interrogate 
that which is offered by experience itself”.94 As a result, “there is a great difference between 
our way of doing philosophy and Kant’s, namely that Kant moves from the universal towards 
the particular, while we, via a completely antithetical procedure, move from the particular to 
the universal”.95 At the core of Colecchi’s philosophical speculation, therefore, was the search 
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for a logically tenable philosophical principle allowing to “move from concrete judgment in 
order to ascend toward the universal”.96 Solutions postulated by German idealist 
philosophers were said to be unsustainable. Notions of “transcendental idealism” and 
“absolute unity”, according to the author, “dishonour philosophy”, because, by attempting to 
bypass the sphere of experience, “they demand not only to know that which exists, but also 
to construct beings, too, illustrating how these are created and derived from absolute 
existence”.97 
 Vico’s new science, then, was identified as the optimal blueprint to address these 
problems.98 This was because it was able, via “philological and philosophical proof” to 
demonstrate the immanence of Providence in the world, hence rendering the knowledge of 
this universal principle accessible via the examination of the man-made “civic world of 
nations”.99 More specifically, Colecchi’s attempt to render Vico’s philosophy into the language 
of Kantian critical rationalism and ethical formalism revolved around a revision of Kant’s 
moral law: this, it must be granted, still remained an absolute and immutable concept, but – 
and here lay the novelty of Colecchi’s amalgamation of Kant and Vico – its factuality was said 
to hinge upon man’s rational judgment: 
 
For Vico, all this is the result of Providence’s actions. It is true, it comes from Providence. 
Providence’s blacksmith, however, is man’s Will, whose chief rule is popular knowledge, 
which, then, is constituted by the common sense of every people or nation, directing our 
actions in society, so that this may act in accordance with a nation’s belief. Nations have come 
to know one another via commerce, peace agreements and alliances and these are able to 
disclose what Vico regarded to be the knowledge of mankind. Now, the common sense of all 
peoples and all nations, which ought to realise our actions in societies, so that these many be 
consistent with what mankind, as a whole, believes: what can this be, if not the moral law?100 
 
 Thus imagined, Colecchi’s merging of Kant and Vico appears to have been carried out 
in order to bypass the perceived limitations of the German philosopher’s thought, namely his 
transcendental rationalism’s position fundamentally outside the realm of human experience, 
rendering the knowledge of anything beyond the latter logically impossible. Thanks to Vico’s 
idea of an immanent Providence, coupled with the definition of man’s judgment as its 
catalyst, Colecchi managed to weave a purely theoretical and immutable account of Reason 
                                                           
96 ibid. 
97 ibid., II, p. 46 
98 ibid., III, p. 127 
99 ibid., II, p. 235 
100 ibid., p. 298 
  147 
into the fabric of a lived experience of history. In a nutshell, the absolute normativity of 
Kantian Reason became finally accessible via the study of its historical individuation, namely 
the Vichian “natural right of the people”, stemming from “nations’ customs”101. 
 Private schools in nineteenth-century Naples, therefore, did not simply constitute a 
progressive alternative to the stale public education channels. Rather, they were evidently at 
the forefront of an intellectual movement popularising the study of foreign thought among 
the Neapolitan youth. More importantly, philosophy schools, particularly those run by 
Galluppi and Colecchi, ought to be credited for elaborating a new, markedly anti-
metaphysical, approach to the study of German philosophy: one that emphasised its thematic 
continuity with the tradition of Neapolitan Enlightenment and that actively attempted to 
deploy the one in order to address philosophical problems identified in the other, and vice 
versa. Such an inclination was noteworthy, especially if plotted against the closure to foreign 
ideas characterising the public sphere. This transnational sensitivity was rapidly picked up by 
Galluppi and Colecchi’s students. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before it was 
adopted not only to engage with Hegel’s ideas, but also to revise them. 
 
 
 
3.4. Verum esse Ipsum vernünftig: Vico, Hegel and a New Historicism 
 
The most immediate implication of the examples set by Pasquale Galluppi and Ottavio 
Colecchi in their private schools was the sudden dissemination of their approach to the study 
of German philosophy among their students. Just as they had themselves sought to 
investigate the continuities between Kant and Vico, their students endeavoured, as chapter 
five will illustrate in detail, to trace a new intellectual history of the Mezzogiorno, emphasising 
the transnational encounters the region had continuously engaged in. Unsurprisingly, Vico 
and Hegel emerged as the chief figureheads of this new view. 
 One of Colecchi’s students, for example, Stefano Cusani, whose importance this thesis 
introduced in chapter one, had a short-lived private school of philosophy operating between 
1845 and his premature death in 1846. In his teaching, as reported by his biographer Panfilo 
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Serafini, Cusani included the study of Hegel’s philosophy, having previously disaggregated it 
from Victor Cousin’s, “triggering local intellectuals’ praise”.102 Having correctly identified the 
German philosopher’s concern as the analysis of the “immortal part of history”, namely “the 
linkage among causes and effects, reasons, general facts, the ideas which they ultimately 
conceal under the cloak of their exteriority”, Cusani underlined the need not to restrict 
philosophical speculation to the investigation of history’s “premature generalities” alone, via 
an unconditional reliance upon “metaphysical formulae”.103 These reflections represented 
the entry point to Cusani’s exortation to craft a new philosophy of history able to 
accommodate both Hegel and Vico, albeit in a markedly anti-metaphysical vein. Central to 
this process was the identification of history’s dual nature: “the material and the spiritual 
parts of all visible events”.104 While Hegel appeared to have provided a convincing account of 
the latter, the analysis of the former was deemed by Cusani to be viable only within the 
coordinates of the new science forged by Giambattista Vico, namely via the examination of 
people’s languages and cultural production.105 
 At the forefront of Cusani’s philosophical speculation, therefore, lay an investigation 
into the intersection of history’s absolute mechanisms and its concrete, tangible, conditions. 
This, in turn, was informed by the need to amalgamate two competing traditions of thought: 
the one, which, due to its idealist emphasis on history’s absolute external principles, 
mistakenly rendered man’s experience of history “passive and fatal”;106 the other, which, as 
exemplified by Vico, “sought within man the principle and the law informing mankind’s 
development”, but failed to recognise “exterior nature’s influence” on man’s historical 
existence.107 In other words, Cusani’s proposition of a merging of Vichian historicism and a 
Hegelian account of absolute history was significantly informed by the need to mediate 
between two opposite understandings of man’s experience of history: the one, championed 
by Hegel and the other German idealist thinkers, portraying it as an effect, the other, 
articulated by the local tradition and most visible in La scienza nuova, viewing it as a cause.  
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 In Cusani, the merging of Vico and Hegel remained somewhat tentative, primarily due 
to his rather superficial knowledge of the latter’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte. Yet, his concerns were common to other Neapolitan Hegelian thinkers, 
significantly reverberating in the content of their private teaching, too. Stanislao Gatti, for 
example, who ran a private institute of philosophy between 1843 and 1848, published, in 
1861, a volume of Scritti vari, in which he collected notes, manuscripts and testimonies 
initially put together during the 1840s, positing particular attention on the lectures he had 
held in his private school. Gatti’s teaching ought to be credited for further encouraging the 
amalgamation of Vico and Hegel, by illustrating the continuities between their historicisms: 
as explained in a lesson on philosophy of history dating back to 1843, modern historicism was 
born “in Vico’s great mind”, but later took on different forms in other regions of Europe. 108  
In particular, the tripartite division of history imagined by the eighteenth-century 
Neapolitan author was said to have then been rethought by German philosophers. Schelling, 
for instance, described it as the dialectical interplay of “the age of the infinite” and “that of 
the finite”, resolving itself in “a third one, namely that of the one’s relationship to the 
other”;109 Fichte, too, forged his philosophy of history on the basis of the progress from three 
distinct epochs: “the first one is that of the not-I, the second one that of the I, the third one 
that of the fusion of the not-I and of the I”;110 finally, Hegel managed to fully abstract this 
tripartite structure, translating it into a dialectic of unmediated ideas. His account of history, 
postulating the resolution of “unity” and “variety” into “unity in variety”, was thus seen as an  
abstract reflection of the Vichian interplay among “the people, individuality, the individuality 
of a people”.111 In summary, Gatti’s composite Vichian Hegelianism revolved around the 
possibility of contemplating the progressive development of Spirit via the analysis of its 
“clearest manifestations”, such as language, in an attempt to replace Hegel’s logical-
metaphysical reasoning with a mechanism of philological validation borrowed from La scienza 
nuova.112 
 While the reconstruction of Gatti and Cusani’s contributions is rendered problematic 
by the scarcity of sources available, especially with regard to their engagement with Hegel 
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and Vico as part of their private teaching, it is nevertheless possible to paint a much clearer 
picture of how these two thinkers were discussed – and merged into one composite 
historicism – in Francesco De Sanctis’ private school of literature and philosophy. This 
institute, nicknamed “la scuola al Vicolo Bisi” and active between 1839 and 1848, exemplified 
the role played by private schools in enabling a transnational exchange of ideas, highlighting 
how this revolved around the establishment of an ongoing dialogue between the local 
tradition and contemporary German idealist philosophy. Reconstructing the content of De 
Sanctis’ lectures is no hard task, primarily thanks to Benedetto Croce, who, between 1912 
and 1917, collected and later published notes and autobiographical fragments dating back to 
the Vicolo Bisi school years, written by De Sanctis himself and his students Eduardo de 
Ruggiero and Felice Nisio.113 An even larger collection of the lessons held at the Vicolo Bisi 
was then published in 1975 by Attilio Marinari with the title of Purismo, illuminismo, 
storicismo: lezioni.  
Francesco De Sanctis’ intellectual orientation unquestionably emerged as a reaction 
to both the hostility towards foreign ideas prevailing in the public sphere of the Kingdom, as 
well as to the literary purism championed by his mentor Basilio Puoti in his private school. 
Literary purists aimed at rescuing the integrity of the Italian language from foreign, notably 
French, contaminations. This made Puoti’s school, in its students’ eyes, fundamentally stale 
and anti-modern. Commenting on his experience of Puoti’s school, De Sanctis pointed out 
that “this school’s basis was the orderly reading of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century authors 
[…]. Modern ones, then, were completely banned”.114  It was only a matter of time before De 
Sanctis departed from Puoti’s principles. Dissatisfied with his mentor’s excessive emphasis on 
the form over content, ultimately encouraging an understanding of literary production as a 
mere “imitation according to certain preconceptions and archetypes”, De Sanctis sought, in 
his own private school, to encourage a much more dynamic ideal of literature.115 This 
revolved around the acknowledgment of the fundamentally historical character of linguistic 
expression and cultural production. His 1840 class on historiography and the 1843-44 lectures 
Sui generi letterari, for instance, highlighted how literary criticism ought to be framed within 
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a purely historicist perspective, informed by its conceptual and formal identity with 
philosophy of history:116  
 
Criticism followed the same trajectory as history. This was initially nothing more than the mere 
narration of human actions; and criticism was equally nothing more than the aesthetic 
contemplation of works of arts. History then became an investigation of the proximal and 
remote causes of man’s actions; criticism, then, became the search for artistic masterpieces’ 
causes. And the eighteenth century, which created philosophy of history, also created, by the 
same token, the philosophy of criticism.117 
 
There is little doubt, at this point, that De Sanctis’s private teaching aimed at 
upholding a historicised understanding of literature against Puoti’s ideal of immutable, a-
historical, linguistic standards. The question was no longer limited to the context of literary 
criticism alone; rather, it came to include a speculative dimension pertaining to the sphere of 
philosophy of history. More specifically, as he tried to erode Puoti’s idea that “rules are 
invariable”, De Sanctis began complementing his lectures on Italian and foreign literature with 
the study of French and Neapolitan Enlightenment, as well as German Idealism, hoping to 
demonstrate, on the one hand, the fundamentally historical nature of cultural production, 
and add a markedly historico-philosophical dimension to his literary teaching, on the other.118 
The success of De Sanctis’ ambition consequently depended on the validity of the historicist 
model he would deploy in support of his revised understanding of aesthetics. 
Central to the thinker’s speculation was the examination of what he termed “historical 
school” (“scuola storica”), a strand of literary criticism proposing not only an increasingly 
historicised notion of cultural production, but also one stemming from transnational 
exchanges. Unsurprisingly, Giambattista Vico was identified as its founder. Vico, with whom 
De Sanctis had become acquainted thanks to his friendship with Enrico Amante in 1837, was 
credited for articulating an understanding of a people’s culture as a collective phenomenon 
dictated by unchangeable historical mechanisms: “Vico swapped the life of authors with the 
life of a people, biography with history”.119 Put simply, according to De Sanctis, by 
concentrating on the historical significance of cultural production, understood as a 
chronologically determined reflection of a people’s historical existence, Vico had introduced 
the need, for critics, to go beyond the contemplation and judgment of intellectual production 
                                                           
116 De Sanctis, F. (1926a) La storia e gli storici, II, pp. 12-13 
117 De Sanctis, F. (1926b) Vico e la scuola storica, p. 73 
118 ibid., De Sanctis, F. (1962) Memorie e scritti giovanili, p. 70 
119 ibid. 
  152 
and supplement it with an accurate analysis of the mechanisms able to translate man’s 
experience of history into specific aesthetic forms. This was how, according to the author, 
thanks to Vico’s contribution, “criticism” had become “fully historical”.120 
De Sanctis’ verdict on Vico, however, was not univocally positive. The eighteenth-
century philosopher, on the one hand, was praised for the elaboration of a markedly anti-
metaphysical speculative method, able to account for a “Providence able to regulate human 
events” on the basis of philological proof alone. Philology, “the science of the real and of 
languages’ historical facts […] enabled him to devise the laws informing nations’ 
development, as well as an awareness of the various conditions under which the human spirit 
has appeared”.121 Vico’s historicism, on the other hand, was deemed “stationary”, insofar as 
it was unable to provide a convincing account of progress: 
 
Vico speaks of mankind’s laws, but these are formal laws, according to which societies 
manifest themselves; yet, societies, as well as a humanity as a whole, manifest themselves, at 
all times and in all places, in accordance with the same forms, imagination, sentiment and 
Reason. And those who investigate the history of an individual do not limit themselves to the 
observation of the main moments in his or her life, but account for his or her intelligence and 
ideas’ development across several years; similarly, even when it comes to the study of 
societies, it is necessary to describe the progression of ideas across various epochs: an epoch 
of imagination, one of sentiment and one of reason. The forms are the same at all times, but 
ideas change and are inherently progressive […]. As a result, Vico is stationary, and while he 
sees societies following one another, he does not see the continuities among them, the 
heritage that one leaves behind, its influence on new societies, or the overall progress that 
takes place. Now, this idea that dead societies leave living ideas behind, which are then 
cultivated in a different form, is completely absent in Vico.122 
 
It was by looking at Euopean philosophy, De Sanctis believed, that one could identify 
solutions to Vico’s perceived shortcomings: in France, Voltaire had contributed to a first 
revision of his thought, by reflecting more closely on the relationship between developing 
social contexts and man’s experience of history, while Victor Cousin had begun to explore a 
notion of historical development understood as the progressive realisation of an absolute 
principle;123 yet, De Sanctis argued, an absolute, universal view on history was proposed only 
in Germany, with idealist philosophers subverting Vichian historicism, as they “cancel the 
individual out, and regard him as posited on Earth for the sole purpose of representing an 
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idea”.124 Viewed from another perspective, then, the development of the “scuola storica” 
presented by De Sanctis reflected an ongoing transition toward an idealised understanding of 
aesthetics: one that, by challenging a notion of cultural production as the mere work of an 
individual, suggested that art ought to be viewed historically, and imagined as the reflection 
of historical laws, rather than the product of the individual artist’s imagination. 
This, however, did not mean that De Sanctis wholeheartedly embraced Hegel’s views 
on history and aesthetics. Closely following the examples of Gatti and Cusani, who had 
attempted to provide an anti-metaphysical revision of Hegelianism, by encouraging its 
amalgamation with Vichian historicism, De Sanctis subjected Hegel’s ideas to close scrutiny, 
ultimately warning against the risks connected with a purely ideal notion of history, aided by 
logical, a priori reasoning alone. “Pure abstraction”, in this sense, “is not given to man”, but 
can only be contemplated “by descending within the realm of the real” and engaging with its 
most tangible realisations.125 From this, De Sanctis derived the need to revise Hegel’s 
philosophy, by – unsurprisingly – attempting its amalgamation with Vico’s, and elaborating a 
composite speculative method: one able to be both “logical” and “historical” at the same 
time.  
At the core of this lay the need to craft “an intimate union of philosophy and history, 
of the idea and the fact”.126 This is because “the Idea without the fact is a utopia; the fact 
without the Idea relegates civil life to a stationary and merely material existence”.127 In the 
final lessons of his school, then, dealing with Filosofia della storia hegeliana, De Sanctis 
further elucidated these observations, by adding that “every idea, before being manifested, 
is present in everyone’s consciousness; there can be no Idea without consciousness; and no 
fact without the Idea”.128 These observations conveniently reflected the problems which De 
Sanctis had found in both Hegel and Vico’s philosophies, identifying, at the same time, the 
elaboration of a new, composite, historicist method as the optimal means of overcoming 
them: “the path we will follow is going to be a dual one, historical or chronological and logical. 
By means of a historical method we will proceed from that which is concrete and come to 
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that which is abstract; by means of the logical method, instead, we will proceed in the 
opposite direction”.129  
 
 
 
A particularly interesting aspect of De Sanctis’ amalgamation of Hegelianism and 
Vichianism, then, was the proposition of a notion of history stemming out of the dialectical 
interplay of the two most fundamental intuitions advanced by the two philosophers: that 
“that which is rational is real; and that which is real is the rational” (“Was vernünftig ist, das 
ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig”) and that “that which is made is true” 
(“verum esse ipsum factum”).130  
Logical reasoning, according to De Sanctis, must allow for the individuation of the 
rational within man’s direct experience of history, with this consequently coming to be seen 
as the direct realisation of broader, necessary historical mechanisms; via historical 
observation, instead, the Hegelian “reality” (“Wirklich”) could be rescued from an exclusively 
metaphysical view and be conceived as the pure abstraction of a Vichian man-made “factum”. 
Crucially, by presenting the relationship of the real and the ideal as a dialectical one, De 
Sanctis could still embrace the Hegelian concept of “becoming” (“Werden”), regarding it as 
the force driving historical progress, and still uphold an ideal of “sublation” (“Aufhebung”) as 
a means to ensure the synthetic unity of reality.131 Thus imagined, the encounter of Vico and 
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Hegel operated by De Sanctis in his private school encapsulated a revision of the German 
philosopher’s dialectics of Spirit in history, re-imagined within the framework of the 
Neapolitan thinker’s historicism, and along the lines of the anti-metaphysical readings of 
German philosophy popularised both by his mentors Galluppi and Colecchi, as well as his 
contemporaries Gatti and Cusani. 
 As explained earlier, De Sanctis’ articulation of a Vichian-Hegelian historicism was 
functional to the elaboration of his views on aesthetics and literary criticism. Upholding a very 
Hegelian definition of art, understood as “the harmony of Idea and Form”, the historical 
dialectics of the real and the ideal were said to correspond to the interplay of the two.132 
Artistic production was thus understood as a bi-directional process: the synthetic unity of “the 
rational developed within the real, the Idea embodied in form” and the elevation of the real 
to the ideal, via its liberation from any “transitory external fact”.133  
In essence, De Sanctis’ final lectures on literary genres promulgated an ideal of cultural 
production able to reflect universal historical dynamics, on the one hand, but deeply 
anchored to concrete, observable contexts, on the other: “Literature”, he taught in the first 
lecture of the year 1845-46, “must be universal in the Idea, since this embraces the entirety 
of the universe, past and present altogether, but social or present in its form”.134 De Sanctis’ 
lessons, in open contrast to Puoti’s teaching and to the parochialism of public education 
channels, encouraged the study of literary forms’ interconnectedness, rather than their 
perceived idiosyncrasies, stimulating a dialogue among Italian and foreign cultures, informed 
by the recognition of their common, universal nature. National literatures, he believed, 
deepened their roots in the same shared principles.135 This was not mere conjecture on the 
part of De Sanctis. Rather, it was the logical implication of a complex philosophical 
speculation. As he put it at the end of his very last private lesson, it was impossible to conceive 
“a history of pleasant literary narrations separately from philosophy. It is impossible, 
nowadays, to separate these two things, which have come to be intrinsically connected”.136 
Vico and Hegel would certainly have agreed. 
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3.5. Neapolitan Hegelianism beyond National Exceptionalism 
 
Hegelianism’s fortune in Naples during the first half of the nineteenth century owed much to 
complex dynamics of transnational exchanges. As chapter one of this thesis illustrated, it was 
thanks to the mediation of Victor Cousin that Hegel’s ideas came to be discussed in the 
Southern capital. Additionally, endeavours to disaggregate Hegel’s philosophy from Cousin’s 
encouraged an understanding of the German thinker as a theorist of historical time and a 
proponent of an absolute ideal of history, which, according to his earliest commentators in 
Naples, demanded further clarification. At the same time, the ongoing re-discovery of 
Giambattista Vico’s philosophy, primarily thanks to the contribution of Southern exiles who 
had fled Naples in the wake of the 1799 Revolution, further fuelled debates on history, its 
nature, mechanisms and civic uses, as illustrated in chapter two. Vincenzo Cuoco’s 
problematisation of the tension between an “ideal eternal history” and the tangible, concrete 
experience of it, observed in the pages of La scienza nuova, provided early nineteenth-century 
critics with an image of Vico as the founder of a new historiographical method, yet unable to 
produce a convincing account of progress and of history’s broader mechanisms.  
 Based on these premises, the current chapter sought to illustrate how Hegel and 
Vico’s philosophies of history came to be amalgamated in Naples during the 1830s and ‘40s.  
Doing so required taking issue with some aspects of the current literature on Hegelianism’s 
fortune in the Mezzogiorno. A compelling understanding of Naples’ intellectual history during 
the nineteenth century cannot be separated from the examination of the often-neglected 
context of the capital’s private schools, where the encounter of Vico and Hegel occurred. 
Plotted against their public counterparts’ lack of engagement with foreign ideas, private 
initiatives were not only a more progressive and liberal alternative, but also the main bearers 
of a transnational sensibility ultimately enabling the dissemination of Hegel’s ideas in Naples. 
This, in turn, is a particularly useful intuition in order to address another, rather problematic, 
historiographical verdict on the intellectual history of the Kingdom, often univocally 
denouncing the alleged intellectual immobility of the region on the basis of the perceived 
failures of the Bourbon administration’s policies for what concerns public education.  
 Challenging such verdicts by underlining the centrality of private channels is not, 
however, important in an empirical sense only; rather, from a methodological point of view, 
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it helps avoiding what David Laven termed a “teleological trap”, namely the tendency to re-
describe the history of the Risorgimento from the perspective of the Kingdom of Italy’s 
creation.137 Such a stance encourages largely denigratory (mis)representations of the 
Bourbon monarchy, which a revisionist approach ought to examine instead “on its own terms, 
and for its own sake”.138 In consequence, it is important to detect and address the ideological 
bias common to much of twentieth-century Risorgimento historiography, writing in an 
intellectual climate that created patriotic myths by shaping a markedly anti-Bourbon 
propaganda.  
 With regard to the dynamics of education in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, one-
sided verdicts on the Neapolitan cultural landscape stemming from an overview of the 
problems within public education can therefore be perceived as myopic and methodologically 
inaccurate, as they do not place adequate emphasis on those initiatives developing 
independently from the crown’s administration and systematically neglect the extent to 
which the latter encouraged them. Looking at the Bourbons’ involvement in both public and 
private education, therefore, this chapter sought to partially challenge its often-invoked 
characterisation as repressive, suggesting that it was, instead, rather liberal and progressive, 
especially in light of the administration’s remarkably permissive attitude as regards to its 
efforts to promote private teaching. 
These considerations were particularly important in order better to illustrate the 
competitive interplay of public and private schools, focusing in particular on how the latter 
actively encouraged the engagement with foreign ideas. More specifically, apropos of 
German philosophy, the private institutes run by Pasquale Galluppi and Ottavio Colecchi were 
credited for the amalgamation of Kant and Vico: Galluppi, on the one hand, used notions 
borrowed from Kant’s philosophy to address problems identified by contemporary 
commentators in the pages of La scienza nuova; Colecchi, on the other, deployed Vico’s ideas 
to amend some perceived contradictions characterising the German philosopher’s thought. 
The blueprint for the study of German philosophy elaborated by the two thus stood out 
thanks to its exquisite sensitivity, attempting to dissect the continuities between the local and 
foreign traditions of thought, rather than their idiosyncrasies.  
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From a methodological point of view, Galluppi and Colecchi’s contributions are 
significant for what concerns historians’ approach to a transnational history of ideas: their 
Kantian tendencies, in fact, were not an end in themselves (pardon the pun), but were fully 
functional to both a revision of the German thinker’s ideas, as well as the regeneration of the 
local tradition. Given the difficulties, lamented by contemporary historians, to fully 
disaggregate a transnational approach from a merely comparative one, which may ultimately 
“end up reiterating” categories of national exceptionalism, it seems evident that the study of 
an author’s reception and, more importantly, revision – as it was the case for Galluppi and 
Colecchi’s Kant – may well be crucial in avoiding the “pitfalls of reification” associated with 
intercultural exchanges.139  
Based on these premises, the final section of this chapter finally turned its attention 
to Hegel’s amalgamation with Vico’s historicism, encouraging historians to place adequate 
attention on commonly-neglected authors. Championing an anti-metaphysical attitude that 
well resonated both with Galluppi and Colecchi’s approach to German philosophy and with 
early nineteenth-century perspectives on La scienza nuova, Stefano Cusani and Stanislao Gatti 
drew upon the ongoing debates on Vico and Hegel illustrated in the preceding chapters of 
this thesis, and ultimately concluded that Vichian historicism and Hegelian 
Geschichtsphilosophie ought to be merged. A historicist reduction of Hegel’s account of 
history, then, was fully operated by Francesco De Sanctis’ school, active between 1839 and 
1848, by establishing a dialectical interplay between a Hegelian Wirklich and a Vichian factum. 
Thus imagined, De Sanctis’ Vichian Hegelianism can, once again, draw attention, on the one 
hand, to the transnational sensibilities permeating Neapolitan intellectual history in the 
middle decades of the century, and rescue our understanding of it, on the other, from 
categories of national exceptionalism. Neapolitan Hegelianism was, indeed, a quintessentially 
European current of thought. 
  
                                                           
139 MacDonald, S. (2013) Transnational History: A Review of Past and Present Scholarship; Iriye, A. (1989) The 
Internationalisation of History, p. 5; Tyrrell, I. (2009) Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States 
History. Theory and Practice, p. 457; Bayly, C. et al. (2006) AHR Conversation: On Transnational History, p. 1452; 
Rusen, J. (1996) Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparative Historiography, pp. 7-11 
  159 
4. From Revolution to Unification: Neapolitan Hegelianism and Risorgimento 
Political Thought 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Hegel’s political philosophy, due to its “systematic ambitions and syncretic intentions”, easily 
lends itself to conflicting interpretations, which, by stressing “one aspect of his system at the 
expense of another”, regard his politics as either radical or reactionary.1 As introduced in 
chapter one of this thesis, Hegel’s death in 1831 marked the emergence of profound 
disagreements among his readers. Some of his students, known as “Right Hegelians” 
(“Rechtshegelianer”) saw his philosophy as a rationalisation of the Prussian Reform 
Movement and were sympathetic to the political tradition of the Prussian state. Believing 
that, thanks to its association of a people’s ethical life with the constitutions of modern states, 
Hegelianism represented a “via media” between reactionaries’ appeal to tradition and 
romantic revolutionaries’ sentimental patriotic ideals, they praised the virtues of 
constitutional monarchy and reform directed from above.2 In contrast to them, the “Left 
Hegelians” (“Linkshegelianer”), disagreed with the claim that Hegel’s dialectics of history had 
found its synthesis in contemporary Prussian society, pointing at the relative lack of political 
and religious freedoms in it.3  
  In 1840, the accession to the throne of Friederich Wilhelm IV, upon whom both Right 
and Left Hegelians, initially gathering around the journal Hallischer Jahrbücher, had placed 
their hopes of political reform, dealt a hard blow to the former’s position and greatly 
radicalised the latter’s. The new king thought of government from the standpoint of the old 
aristocratic estates, defended the divine right of kings and was very critical of contemporary 
debates on a new constitution. He also ostracised Hegel’s ideas: via censorship, he forced the 
Hallischer Jahrbücher to relocate outside Prussia, while the newly appointed Minister of 
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Culture summoned Schelling to Berlin in order to pursue a conservative intellectual agenda, 
and contrast “the dragon seed of Hegelianism, the flat arrogance of know-alls and the 
dissolution by law of domestic discipline”.4 These events, according to Left Hegelians, 
contradicted Hegel’s fundamental assumptions that Reason is inherent in history and that this 
teleologically realises freedom. His philosophical system therefore required a profound 
rethinking. 
The split between these diverging interpretations of Hegel’s views on history and 
politics reverberated in scholarly debates. Ever since the initial publication of the Grundlinien 
der Philosophie des Rechts in 1820, where the German thinker’s political vision was most 
clearly outlined, commentators have been passionately questioning the extent to which this 
work served as a philosophical backbone to the spread of European liberalism.5 Studies have 
been divided into two camps: in one camp were those who, following a tradition initiated by 
Rudolf Haym’s 1857 text Hegel und seine Zeit, read Hegel’s political philosophy placing 
particular emphasis on his defence of a strong Prussian state. This perspective would then be 
understood as anti-liberal.6 In the other were those identifying, in the pages of the 
Grundlinien, the presence of communitarian elements, such as participation and 
representation, consequently arguing that Hegel’s political thought ought to be understood 
as a theorisation of the modern, liberal constitutional state.7 
 There is little doubt that a conclusive verdict on the ideological continuity between 
Hegelianism and liberalism – or lack thereof –  is yet to be provided. The lack of such a 
framework of reference complicates the analysis of the political implications of Hegel’s 
reception by problematising the extent to which his ideas allegedly came to be deployed in 
support of certain emerging political sensitivities and in contexts marked by important 
political changes. Neapolitan Hegelians’ contribution to debates concerned with the 
Revolutions of 1848 and the broader narrative of the Italian Unification remains, even today, 
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largely uncharted territory for historians whose work concentrates on the political history of 
the Risorgimento.8  
 Imbalances in the discussion of Neapolitan Hegelians’ relationship to political debates 
taking place during the Risorgimento can frequently be encountered in studies focusing more 
closely on southern thinkers’ use of Hegelian ideas, systematically adopting their writings as 
a means to provide a philosophical justification – and a historical antecedent – to later 
political experiences and ideological beliefs.9 The two best-known commentators on the 
period, for instance, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, provided an analysis of 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ political views marked by a strongly teleological inclination and a visible 
ideological bias. Croce concentrated on Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa’s alleged use of 
Hegelianism as the philosophical backbone of Piedmontese liberalism, in direct connection 
with the experience of the moderate Right in the years following the Unification. His 
understanding of Hegel’s Italian reception was part of his broader verdict on the 
Risorgimento, seen as the process by which the “conception, development and perfecting of 
liberty” theorised by the German philosopher had come to be translated into active political 
life after 1861.10 
Gentile, too, exhibited a teleological approach similar to Croce’s, as he concentrated 
on the presence of an elements in Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa’s writings that stood 
opposite to a liberal dimension of politics. However, Gentile did more than merely contesting 
the relationship between Neapolitan Hegelianism and the Piedmontese liberal government: 
he drew a connection between nineteenth-century anti-liberal critiques and the experience 
of fascism during the twentieth.11 In contrast, the often-cited works by Sergio Landucci, 
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Domenico Losurdo and Giuseppe Vacca, concentrated on Bertrando Spaventa’s Hegelianism 
via the analysis of his relationship to Antonio Labriola and Antonio Gramsci’s Marxism, thus 
failing to place adequate attention on Spaventa’s involvement in political experiences taking 
place before the Unification.12  
 Little attention, therefore, has traditionally been paid to Neapolitan Hegelians’ 
contribution to political debates taking place during the Risorgimento. This chapter aims to 
fill this historiographical lacuna by investigating the progressive politicisation of Hegelianism 
in Naples, as well as its relationship to broader debates on the revolutionary experiences of 
1848 and the peninsula’s Unification, placing particular attention on its relationship with the 
moderate liberal politics of the Piedmontese government.  
 Section two of the chapter will explore how Hegel’s thought was deployed by 
Neapolitan intellectuals as a means of providing a philosophical rationale for their 
involvement in the Revolution of 1848, viewed as a historically necessary step in the 
realisation of a Hegelian notion of freedom.13 It will be argued that Southern thinkers’ 
contributions cannot be separated from the articulation of a historical memory teleologically 
connecting the failure of the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution to the events of 1848. Further, 
special attention will be placed on newspaper sources, particularly the short-lived periodical 
Il Nazionale. This paper represented Neapolitan Hegelians’ platform of choice to comment on 
current political issues. More importantly, their views relied on a conceptual lexicon 
stemming from the ongoing encounter between Hegel’s philosophy of history and historicist 
motifs borrowed from the Neapolitan Enlightenment, filtered through the lens of early 
nineteenth-century debates.  
Just as the previous chapters of this thesis described local Hegelianism as revolving 
around the amalgamation of an absolute notion of historical development, and the 
observation of history’s most concrete and tangible dynamics, this section will claim that, 
while the rationality and necessity of the Revolution were invoked from the standpoint of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history, it was thanks to Vincenzo Cuoco and Pietro Colletta’s verdicts 
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on 1799 that Southern intellectuals veered toward a position roughly identifiable with a 
democratic constitutionalism reminiscent of the Jacobin ideas of the Neapolitan Revolution.14 
Moreover, as a consequence of their reading of Cuoco and Colletta, the idea of nationality 
quickly imposed itself at the forefront of Southern Hegelians’ philosophical orientation and 
political allegiances. The implications of this were far-reaching, primarily because they already 
hinted at a certain ideological continuity between the local dimension of the Revolution and 
the broader cause of the peninsula’s emancipation. According to Il Nazionale’s anonymous 
and notoriously anti-Bourbon articles, the ultimate goal of the Revolution was the 
establishment of a fully-fledged national state, whose realisation was said inevitably to 
depend on the complete emancipation from foreign influences and Piedmontese leadership. 
This put the periodical’s politics at odds with mentalities prevailing elsewhere in the Kingdom, 
such as in Sicily, where revolutionaries were far more sympathetic to a federalist 
programme.15 Investigating Neapolitan Hegelians’ involvement in the events of 1848 in 
Naples, therefore, becomes synonymous with the analysis of the ways in which they imagined 
a unified Italy, the organisation of the Italian state and the functions of its institutions.  
 The defeat of 1848 revolutionary enthusiasms marked the formal dissolution of Il 
Nazionale and the diaspora of those intellectuals who had contributed to it: Silvio Spaventa 
was imprisoned in 1849 and his brother Bertrando fled to Florence and then to Turin. Yet, by 
the dawn of the new decade, not only was their support for the cause of the Unification still 
strong, but their belief in Piedmont’s role in spearheading this process would present itself 
with even greater force. Section three of this chapter will examine how Silvio and Bertrando, 
undoubtedly the most prolific representatives of the Neapolitan Hegelian school, imagined, 
following the defeat of the 1848 Revolution, the political configuration of a unified Italy.  
More specifically, section three will begin by focusing on Silvio Spaventa’s prison 
writings, regarded by later commentators as the earliest examples of the moderate liberal 
politics he embraced during his parliamentary activity between 1861 and 1889. It will address 
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a particularly intricate historiographical debate concerned with the identification of the 
philosophical and ideological continuity between Silvio’s Hegelianism and the liberal politics 
he began articulating during the 1850s. Carlo Ghisalberti’s proposition that, during Silvio’s 
prison years, “Hegel became liberal” served to support verdicts emphasising his use of the 
German thinker’s ideas in support of Piedmontese liberalism and, as a result, later historians 
contributed to piecing together an image of Silvio as a theorist of a liberal Hegelian 
Rechtsstaat.16 Furthermore, Silvio’s liberalism of the 1850s was undoubtedly consistent with 
the fundamental principles of Cavourian politics and Cesare Balbo’s reflections on liberty. Yet, 
contrary to these views, this chapter will argue that while the definition of Silvio as a liberal 
is accurate, his characterisation as a Hegelian thinker after 1848 is probably misleading. Doing 
so challenges the historiographical tradition initiated by Croce, who regarded the advocacy 
of liberal politics as an important aspect of Neapolitan Hegelians’ contribution. Reflecting on 
Silvio’s manuscripts from prison, as well as his correspondence, this section will argue that 
the notions of liberty, its political implications, as well as the very concept of State embraced 
by Silvio Spaventa in the 1850s, were fundamentally different not only from Hegel’s, but also 
the principles of democratic constitutionalism championed, in a very Hegelian fashion, by Il 
Nazionale in Naples in 1848.  
 Such a revision of Silvio Spaventa’s political thought, currently regarded by many as 
crucial in the identification of the liberal state’s character, and just as important for what 
concerns the fortune, in a philosophical sense, of Hegel’s ideas during the nineteenth century, 
inevitably complicates to a significant extent the identification of Neapolitan Hegelianism’s 
role in the context of Risorgimento political thought. If, however, Silvio’s contribution further 
problematises, rather than illuminates, the relationship between Hegelianism and 
Risorgimento political thought, the same cannot be said about his brother Bertrando’s, as 
identified in the last section of this chapter. Once settled in Turin, in fact, the older of the 
Spaventas began a prolific career as a journalist, which he adopted as a means to provide 
sharp commentaries on contemporary political events and debates. One of these, concerned 
with the problem of freedom of teaching, enabled him to launch a passionate critique of the 
liberal principles informing the Piedmontese moderates’ position. 
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 In fact, Bertrando’s writings on freedom of teaching published during 1850s revealed 
not only a significant degree of similarity with Il Nazionale’s advocacy of democratic 
constitutionalism in 1848, but were also supported by a philosophical reasoning whose 
overtones were unmistakably Hegelian. Plotting the notion of liberty outlined in the 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, as well as that illustrated in the 
Rechtssphilosophie, against the ideal of freedom invoked by Cavour and Balbo in 
parliamentary debates, Bertrando succeeded in advancing a particular vision of the State, 
along the line of the Hegelian ethical state: this, consistent with Il Nazionale’s orientation, 
was not only based on the principle of nationality, but was also an active catalyst in the 
political and social emancipation of Italy.  
 While these observations should contribute to a precise characterisation of 
Neapolitan Hegelianism’s political ramifications, they also allow for the re-definition of its 
relationship to moderate Piedmontese liberalism. Contrary to verdicts emphasising its 
ideological connection with the experience of Cavourian politics before 1861 and of the 
Destra storica after that year, this chapter will maintain that the Piedmontese government 
and Bertrando, a thinker whose orientation was unquestionably much more Hegelian than 
his brother’s, articulated two radically different conceptions of politics: the one claiming that 
the size of the State had to be limited in order for individual liberty to flourish; the other 
positing that the extent of state intervention had to be maximised in order for collective 
freedom to fully triumph.  
 
 
 
4.2. From 1799 to 1848: The Historical Memory of the Revolution and Il Nazionale 
 
In 1899, exactly one century after the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, Benedetto Croce 
published a volume entitled La rivoluzione napoletana del 1799, in which he aimed at 
rehabilitating the Southern patriots who had taken part in the revolutionary activities, and at 
denouncing the efforts by the Bourbon monarchy to suppress the historical memory of those 
events. Croce’s tone was undoubtedly sympathetic with the principles and the protagonists 
of the Revolution and very harsh as to the extent of the counter-revolutionary measures 
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undertaken by the crown, ultimately drawing attention to the widespread opinion that “the 
condemnation of the Bourbons’ reaction to the events of 1799 is one of the fiercest moral 
condemnations that history has ever advanced”.17 Croce’s verdict was later endorsed by 
Giovanni Gentile, who, in 1911, emphasised how the experience of the Neapolitan Republic, 
despite the repression of its historical memory by the Bourbons during the Risorigmento – 
and further promoted by the Savoy after 1861, played a central role in the earliest debates 
about the national unity of Italy.18  
Later historians agreed with these views, generally regarding the revolutionary 
turmoil of 1799 as conducive to the emergence of Italian nationalism: the “tragedy of 1799”, 
according to Antonino De Francesco, “made an indelible mark on the political experience of 
Italian patriotism”.19 John Davis claimed that, during the Risorgimento, “the events of 1799 
were brilliantly transformed into one of the great founding myths of the new Italian nation”.20 
Similarly, Rocco Rubini pointed out how the failure of the Neapolitan Republic “became a 
storehouse from which a significant number of Risorgimento thinkers drew as they attempted 
to articulate, relentlessly, the outlines of the Italian man and his nation”.21 While there is little 
doubt, then, as regards the importance of the experience of the 1799 Revolution for what 
concerns later instances of Italian patriotism and nationalism, the contribution of Neapolitan 
Hegelians in articulating a historical memory able to dialectically connect past revolutionary 
experiences and the future cultural and political configuration of a unified Italy remains 
largely underrepresented, especially in anglophone scholarship.22  
It must be conceded that for the Hegelian youth of Naples, whose cultural and political 
outlook was significantly affected by the Bourbon’s prevention and repression of 
revolutionary activities, engaging with the historical memory of 1799 was no easy task. In a 
cultural climate characterised by hostility towards foreign ideas in the public sphere, coupled 
with the downright condemnation of the experience of the Neapolitan Republic, the only 
reliable testimonies were those provided by two of the most notable protagonists of 1799, 
forced into exile by the Bourbon counter-revolutionary initiatives: Vincenzo Cuoco, whose 
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popularity among Neapolitan Hegelians was already introduced in chapters two and three, 
and Pietro Colletta. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, it was to the former’s Saggio storico 
sulla rivoluzione napoletana del 1799 and to the latter’s Storia del reame di Napoli that local 
intellectuals turned their attention.  
Cuoco and Colletta found themselves in agreement regarding several aspects of the 
perceived defeat of 1799. In particular, Cuoco’s Essay brought forward a view on 1799 as a 
passive revolution.23 A prominent Jacobin and greatly indebted to the tradition of Neapolitan 
Enlightenment, Cuoco was convinced that political revolutions could not possibly succeed 
unless backed by a systematic process of cultural and social regeneration of the contexts in 
which they occur. These views, to a large extent, gained traction in 1848 thanks to the actual 
aims of the Saggio storico: Cuoco’s intention, in fact, was to “write the history of a revolution 
which intended to bring about the happiness of a nation, but in fact caused its ruin”. This 
hinted at the possibility of reading his book both as a commentary on the events of 1799, and 
as a set of recommendations useful for the success of future revolutions.24 
Put simply, the failure of 1799, according to the Neapolitan émigré, had been caused 
not only by time constraints or the republican government’s failure to implement valid 
policies providing stability and cohesiveness, but also by the inability of the revolution itself 
to overcome factionalism and inner divisions among the local population, a concern that 
ought to be at the forefront of any future revolutionary agenda. In his analysis, Cuoco 
targeted two groups with particular force: the leaders of the Republic, and the self-
proclaimed “republican patriots”. While republicanism was generally associated with the 
distortion of patriotic ideals, the architects of the Neapolitan Republic were accused of failing 
to implement policies truly reflecting the will of the people, especially with regard to land 
reform, taxation and the abolition of feudal privileges.25 Despite the fact that “the abolition 
of feudalism reflected the nation’s general preference”, “widespread feudal practices still 
relied on a large number of advocates”, ultimately stalling the discussion of a new law marking 
                                                           
23 Antonio Gramsci famously adopted Cuoco’s notion of “passive revolution” as an analytical concept able to 
describe political change: in particular, he referred to the emergence of a bourgeois class in the Italian peninsula 
as a “passive” process, unaided by a revolutionary process, as opposed to the example of France, where the 
bourgeoisie came to the fore of the nation’s political life via direct revolutionary action. (Gramsci, A. (1977) 
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24 Haddock, B. & Sabetti, F. (2014) Introduction: Vincenzo Cuoco and the Nature of Revolution and 
Constitutionalism, pp. xxii-xxiii 
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their full eradication and greatly antagonising the population.26 As a result, “the fear of 
alienating ten thousand powerful individuals made the French and the Republic miss the 
occasion of capturing the favour of five million souls”.27 
Cuoco’s definition of the Neapolitan Revolution as a passive one, however, was not 
exclusively linked to a socio-economic discourse. Even harsher was his condemnation of those 
patriots who had blindly appropriated “foreign models”, championing a cultural inclination 
“different to that which the entire nation was in need of”, a topic that, as chapter five of this 
thesis will explain, would then become a major point of debate among nineteenth-century 
Italian intellectuals, especially Neapolitan Hegelians.28 Cuoco expressed his distaste for the 
unconditional application of French Jacobin ideas, which, instead, required being adapted to 
better suit the socio-economic and cultural conditions of Naples: 
 
The ideas of Naples’ revolution may have been very popular, if they had been derived from 
the actual spirit of the nation. As they were derived from a foreign constitution, however, they 
were exceptionally far from our own; they were based on very abstract principles, very far 
from our senses and, even more importantly, many more things came together with them and 
imposed themselves as laws: all sorts of customs, whims and often flaws belonging to another 
people, extremely far from our own faults, our whims and our traditions.29  
 
It was due to the combination of policy mismanagement and the unchecked adoption of 
foreign ideas that the Revolution had been a passive one, deemed to fail as not based on 
legitimate national sovereignty and the true will of the people: 
 
If the republic had ever been created by ourselves, if the constitution, informed and directed 
by eternal principles of justice, had been based on the needs and customs of the people; if the 
authorities, which the people regarded as legitimate and national, rather than speaking with 
them in an abstruse language that they would not understand, had provided real goods and 
freed the people from those ills they were suffering from […], we would not be mourning now, 
as we witness the wretched remains of a desolate homeland and worthy of a better fate […]. 
Our revolution, because it was a passive revolution, in order to be a successful one, should 
have aimed at obtaining the people’s general sympathy and opinion. Yet, patriots’ views were 
not aligned with those of the people: they had different ideas, different customs and even two 
different languages.30 
 
Similar views were expressed by Pietro Colletta, too, who had taken up arms under 
the Neapolitan Republic. Despite his support for the republican government and his 
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sympathies for the Jacobin ideals of liberty and equality characterising the spirit of 1799, his 
support for the revolutionary initiatives was much more moderate than Cuoco’s. Central to 
his position was the acknowledgment of the inherent ideological weakness of the local 
revolutionary movement, whose shortcomings appeared evident if plotted against the 
experience of the French Revolution, by which Neapolitan patriots were inspired. 
Commenting on the arrival of the general Jean Étienne Championnet in the Southern capital, 
Colletta recounted how the “political freedom” championed by the revolutionaries was 
transformed, in Naples, into a “ideal philosophy that remained unapplied to society”, being 
essentially incompatible with the socio-economic texture of the Mezzogiorno.31 As a result, 
he argued, “the greatest achievements of the French revolution, liberty and equality, were 
neither valuable for our people, nor contemplated by them”.32  
This inevitably resulted in an extremely unstable constitution: unable to find its 
legitimacy in popular sovereignty, this was overly concerned with “a balance of abstract 
powers that left little room for the balance of concrete forces, namely those elements 
representing the true strength of a free state: people’s customs, opinions and virtues”.33 
Colletta’s verdict, in this sense, closely resembled Cuoco’s. Unsurprisingly, just like the latter 
had defined the 1799 Revolution a passive one, Colletta famously stated that while French 
revolutionaries had “engineered and operated their upheaval”, Naples “had suffered it”.34 
Thus imagined, the historical memory of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, as seen through 
the eyes of some of its protagonists, had dramatically unveiled the need to tailor any 
revolutionary experience and constitutional effort on the basis of a precise characterisation 
of the socio-political context in which it took place, in order to ensure the popular legitimacy 
of political organisation, on the one hand, and the stability of the new government, on the 
other. For Neapolitan Hegelians, who reasoned from the standpoint of the composite, 
Hegelian and Vichian philosophical outlook illustrated in the preceding chapters of this thesis, 
these observations highlighted the need to view experiences of political change from a 
perspective able to amalgamate the absolute rationality of history theorised by Hegel with 
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the principle of popular sovereignty, seen as the main pre-condition for political emancipation 
and development. 
Cuoco and Colletta’s verdicts therefore provided arguments that resonated with 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ Vichian inclinations. Their legacy in Italian cultural and political debates 
during the first half of the nineteenth century was indeed remarkable, with their being views 
systematically reprised by commentators in various other parts of the peninsula.35 in 
Lombardy, for instance, Alessandro Manzoni incorporated Cuoco’s observations on popular 
sovereignty and national cohesion in the broader picture of his liberal revision of 
revolutionary democratism.36 Giandomenico Romagnosi, echoing Cuoco’s denunciation of 
the lack of popular participation in the Neapolitan Republic’s politics, embraced the ideal of 
a constitution understood as a covenant between the people and the sovereign, leading to 
the establishment of a fully-fledged national state in the 1815 volume Della costituzione di 
una monarchia nazionale rappresentativa.37 More importantly, Cuoco’s views were reprised 
by both by progressive and conservative voices: Giuseppe Mazzini, in his manuscript Sulla 
rivoluzione napoletana del 1799, fully endorsed the Southern thinker’s condemnation of the 
revolutionaries’ appropriation of French ideals and understood the struggle of the Neapolitan 
lazzaroni and the Calabrian sanfedisti as a popular, patriotic, insurrection informed by the 
hatred of foreigners, consequently suggesting that the events of 1799 could conveniently be 
interpreted as a national uprising.38 At the same time, the conservative Piedmontese Carlo 
Botta echoed Cuoco’s verdict on the failure of the Republic, coming to argue, in his Storia 
d’Italia, that any endeavour to introduce French ideals of liberty in Italy were inevitably 
destined to fail.39 In a similar manner, Botta encouraged local patriots not to look up to the 
the American Revolution, or political reforms undertaken overseas, as a model to import in 
order to further the cause of Italian emancipation.40 
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With the memory of 1799 – and of its failure – constituting the historical backbone of 
early nineteenth-century democratic sensibilities, and an important element in the emerging 
debates on the consolidation of Italy’s national character vis-à-vis its foreign counterparts, it 
is no surprise that, on the eve of the 1848 Revolutions, Neapolitan Hegelians were widely 
engaging with Cuoco and Colletta’s texts. The latter’s book, in particular, appeared in Naples 
in a very timely manner: originally published in the Swiss town of Capolago in 1834, it was 
printed again in the Southern capital in 1848 and served, according to Croce, “to instruct and 
ignite the new generations”, as it “presented the protagonists of 1848 the ideas and the 
examples of 1799 and 1821”.41 Neapolitan revolutionaries’ approach to their predecessors’ 
works, however, was not driven by general ideological or philosophical concerns. What the 
young Southern thinkers sought to derive from these volumes was, in fact, not only a set of 
principles able to inform their own revolutionary commitment; rather, they examined these 
verdicts on the Neapolitan Republic with the hope of also finding a precise analysis of the 
problems that had ultimately led to its failure, thus attempting not to replicate them in 1848. 
Connecting the historical memory of 1799 to the experience of 1848, in this sense, was 
extremely important in order to secure the latter’s success. 
Central to this operation, which also reflected the increasingly politicised tendencies 
of the Hegelian generation in the Southern capital, was the contribution of Bertrando and 
Silvio Spaventa. Born five years apart in the Abruzzo town of Bomba, the two moved to Naples 
in 1843, where they followed Ottavio Colecchi’s private lectures on European philosophy and 
became very close to Francesco De Sanctis, Luigi Settembrini, Stanislao Gatti, Stefano Cusani, 
Camillo De Meis, and the rest of Hegel’s local followers. The concession of a constitution in 
February 1848 by the king significantly fuelled their political sentiments and the Spaventas 
began voicing, in the pages of Il Nazionale, their anti-Bourbon, pro-unification sentiments.42  
Even though it dealt with a wide range of political and cultural issues, this paper mainly 
concentrated on the theme of revolution. This is because Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa 
admittedly founded Il Nazionale on March 1, 1848, to educate the public opinion to the 
revolutionary agenda.43 Unsuprisingly, the periodical frequently published articles written by 
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Naples’ most prominent anti-Bourbon patriots and intellectuals, who greatly contributed to 
advancing the cause of 1848, such as Luigi Settembrini, Angelo Camillo De Meis, and Luigi La 
Vista. As indicated by Giuseppe Vacca – and as confirmed by the correspondence between 
the Spaventas –, however, the vast majority of the content published was written by either 
Silvio or Bertrando.44 The two brothers’ centrality in leading the journal exemplified their 
prominence among Neapolitan Hegelians and consequently established them as the most 
prolific writers in their milieu.45 This was the case with regard to not only advancing their 
philosophical viewpoints, but also employing them in support of the revolutionary cause. It is 
for these reasons that the present chapter will almost exclusively concentrate on Silvio and 
Bertrando Spaventa’s ideas. 
The life of Il Nazionale was short and tumultuous. The publication of its articles, 
appearing, with no exception, anonymously, was repeatedly halted.46 This occurred in 1848 
between May 23 and June 21, except for a single issue published on June 5, and between July 
2 and 14, due to the “usual abuses by the police”, as reported in its last issue, the 66th, 
appearing on July 17.47 
At the core of Il Nazionale’s advocacy of the revolution lay a message that well 
resonated with Cuoco’s analysis of 1799. The very first article of the periodical clearly 
identified its ideological inclinations:  
 
Il Nazionale is created by us for the chief purpose of encouraging and promoting Italian 
nationality on the basis of independence, which ought to free all peoples of the peninsula 
from foreign influences, as well as a means to promote a representative system able to ensure 
their freedom and unite them in a political entity under the legal hegemony of the public 
opinion’s spiritual force.48 
 
And also: 
 
The people’s sovereignty is our most fundamental maxim, yet we believe, at the same time, 
that delegated powers ought to be freely executed in order for them to be strong, and that 
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their use ought not to be limited by any force other than the Law and public opinion, as 
formulated by its legitimate platforms: free press and free association.49  
 
The consolidation of a national identity via independence from foreign influences, coupled 
with a form of political organisation based on popular participation and direct representation: 
what, according to Cuoco, the revolutionaries of 1799 had failed to realise was evidently at 
the forefront of Il Nazionale’s concerns in 1848.  
 These observations are crucial in identifying the origin of the political language 
employed by the revolutionary periodical. The concept of “popular sovereignty”, as explained 
earlier, was directly shaped by the historical memory of 1799 conveyed by Cuoco and Colletta, 
who had warned that any form of political change should not be arbitrarily imposed from 
above, but be truly consistent with the people’s will and socio-economic conditions. Ongoing 
debates on the Kingdom’s constitution presented Il Nazionale with the possibility to plot 
these viewpoints against the context of 1848. It should not be a surprise, in this sense, that 
on May 2, less than two weeks before king Ferdinand was supposed to swear his allegiance 
to the constitution promulgated on February 11, the periodical spoke very harshly of the 
latter, accusing it of being at odds with Neapolitans’ true inclinations.50 Thus imagined, 
therefore, Il Nazionale’s advocacy of popular sovereignty had to do with unpholding a specific 
concept of constitution, understood not as a “concession” on part of the crown, but a genuine 
reflection of people’s will, aided by a system of direct representation. 
 At the same time, viewing the periodical’s contribution through the sole lens of 
nineteenth-century debates on revolution and constitutionalism is, in itself, an 
oversimplification of the philosophical agenda its writers advocated. More specifically, the 
ongoing reception of Hegel’s philosophy of history and its systematic amalgamation with 
Vichian historicism, as illustrated in the previous chapters of this thesis, had a profound 
impact on how Il Nazionale imagined not only the political value of 1848 in the context of 
Italy’s emancipation, but also – and more importantly – its historical significance. Croce’s 
famous statement that the Neapolitan journal succeeded in establishing a link between the 
local revolutionary activities and “the Italian question” via its observations on “the war of 
                                                           
49 ibid., p. 4 
50 Il Nazionale (2.5.1848) La necessità della rivoluzione, XLVIII, p. 5 
  174 
independence” reflected Southern intellectuals’ efforts to advocate the inseparability of the 
Italian question and the political emancipation of the Mezzogiorno.51  
Following the withdrawal of Neapolitan troops from Lombardy and the suppression of 
the revolts in the Southern capital, coupled with the dissolution of the local parliament, the 
journal’s writers, such as its founders Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa, and the patriots Angelo 
Camillo De Meis, Luigi Settembrini, Alessandro Poerio, Nicola Nisco and Diomede Marvasi, 
proceeded to rethink the coordinates and the goals of the revolution, by fully slotting it within 
the broader picture of the Italian national struggle. One can observe, in this sense, a number 
of shifts in the perceived political dimension of the Revolution. In the first article, in fact, the 
writers of Il Nazionale declared themselves “undefeated proponents of municipal liberties”.52 
Later on, instead, given “the actual impossibility of enacting our Revolution within the mere 
narrow limits of our Neapolitan land”, they acknowledged “the need for a broader State, 
which, however, is not represented by any of the currently existing governments”.53 
The reasons for this shift can be found in the context surrounding the journal’s 
activities, which urged its writers to translate their commitment to the local revolutionary 
cause into passionate advocacy of an Italian national state. This eventually took on the form 
of vocal support for the Piedmontese monarchy’s efforts in the independence war. In 
response to the battle of Goito on May 30, 1848, in which the Piedmontese troops defeated 
those of the Austrian Empire led by field marshal Radetzky, Il Nazionale proclaimed that Carlo 
Alberto’s operations were realising “the final and complete liberation of our peninsula from 
foreign forces”.54 This, if seen in the context of the history of the Risorgimento, was a rather 
striking position, since the support for Piedmontese hegemony in the process of Italian 
emancipation was not shared by the majority of Italian patriots, who were growing 
increasingly wary of Piedmont’s anti-liberal past and desire to dominate.55 Moreover, Il 
Nazionale’s position was also a rather unorthodox one in the Neapolitan context, where, in 
addition to Mazzinian republicanism and democratic constitutionalism, Gioberti’s federalism 
had been exceptionally well received, especially in the wake of the election of pope Pius IX, 
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who repeatedly encouraged the creation of a confederation of Italian states.56 Even more 
striking were the differences between the Neapolitan periodical’s politics and Sicilian 
revolutionaries’, who had sparked the Revolution in Palermo on January 12 and advanced 
separatist claims, with the hope of joining a federation of Italian states as an independent 
Sicily. 
This context made Ferdinand’s decision to withdraw his troops from Lombardy on May 
21, 1848, a particularly appalling one for Il Nazionale, which identified its consequences not 
only with the suspension of the constitution conceded on May 15, but also – and even more 
dramatically – the severance of the connection between the local revolutionary cause and 
the broader project of Italian unification. The tone of the periodical’s commentary on these 
events, however, was an optimistic one: “despite all its internal and external enemies, 
regardless of all the tenebrous machinations engineered by a decrepit diplomacy, 
notwithstanding the artifices and frauds operated by the existing factions, Italy will be made”, 
an article exclaimed in July 1848.57 Neapolitan patriots were encouraged, despite all 
adversities, to find solace in the idea that “Italy seeks to realise its nationality, independence 
and freedom”.58 This intuition stemmed from the acknowledgment of the profound socio-
economic and political divide existing between the North and the South of the peninsula, 
whose conditions were termed “an intolerable anachronism”: 
 
The dichotomy between northern and southern Italy is exceedingly evident: those who do not 
see it, must have no eyes to see, nor sufficient understanding to discern it. Now, is it possible 
that such a dichotomy may last for a long time, and that underneath the same sky, in the same 
land, two elements may exist and plotted against each other? Two elements that are so 
conflicting and so openly opposite to one another?59 
 
The resolution of this tension, according to Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa, hinged not 
only on the South’s participation in Italian emancipation, but also on the historical necessity 
of overcoming this fracture. This perspective, in particular, fully revealed the Spaventas’ 
attempts to re-describe experiences of political change from the standpoint of a Hegelian 
vision of dialectical historical development. “In the political world”, the article suggested, “as 
well as the physical one, forces in opposition to one another cannot exist within the same 
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sphere of action”.60 The overall tone of the argumentation, historicist and teleological in equal 
measure, reflected how the reasons for the journal’s association of the 1848 revolutionary 
cause in the Mezzogiorno and the broader Italian Unification project ought to be sought not 
only in the immediate context in which Il Nazionale was published, but also in the composite 
philosophical speculation, Hegelian and Vichian, underpinning its articles.   
 These observations also contribute to illuminating Benedetto Croce’s emphasis on the 
periodical’s philosophical, historicist, tendencies championing “the rational necessity of 
Revolution, which is not destined to succeed thanks to exogenous forces, but thanks to its 
inner power”.61 Commenting on “the ultimate goal of revolutions”, for instance, Bertrando 
and Silvio Spaventa believed that: 
 
Three things can be distinguished in any revolution: its Idea, its men and its form. The idea 
constitutes the revolution’s rationality: it is thanks to this that the Revolution sees the light of 
day and is alive, it acquires power and dignity, it overcomes any obstacle, it conquers people’s 
minds, it captures people’s hearts, it subverts existing states of affairs, it replaces them and is 
realised organically: this is because Reason alone governs the world and has an infinite right 
to existence. Reason is directed towards an end and this end is freedom. Hence the Idea of 
any Revolution is necessarily the idea of freedom.62 
 
This passage exemplified the Hegelian inclinations of Il Nazionale’s writers and revealed, at 
the same time, an attempt to historicise the revolutionary experience by viewing it as part of 
a necessary, teleological ideal of historical development, corresponding to the progressive 
realisation of liberty. Later commentators, in this sense, were absolutely correct in viewing Il 
Nazionale’s politics as part of the broader narrative of Hegel’s fortune in the Mezzogiorno.63 
What these studies appear to have overlooked, however, is the extent to which Neapolitan 
Hegelianism, thanks to its characteristically Vichian character, often re-imagined some of 
Hegel’s own ideas. For example, while Il Nazionale certainly embraced a notion of history 
understood as the progressive realisation of freedom, it did not consider political change 
exclusively as the reflection of an abstract Hegelian Weltgeist’s inner motion. Rather, 
consistent with Vico’s emphasis on a tangible, man-made notion of history, as well as Cuoco 
and Colletta’s verdicts on the 1799 Revolution, the periodical viewed it as anchored to 
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concrete pre-conditions for political emancipation. This position was clearly illustrated via a 
certain revision of Hegelian freedom: 
 
This idea constitutes a completely abstract representation, that requires a directly sensible 
element to latch onto, in order to acquire its concreteness. As long as this sensible element 
does not exist, freedom is merely a thought, which may well lead to generous and noble 
actions, on the one hand, yet incomplete ones, on the other, and this is the cause of much 
suffering, many sacrifices and martyrdoms, with little to no visible and long-lasting effect. 
Now, this directly sensible element is nationality, determined on the basis of independence, 
common origin, common language, religion and traditions… Where national independence is 
absent, there can be no true freedom.64 
 
These observations have great significance both for what concerns the precise 
characterisation of Il Nazionale’s politics and, more importantly, the revised nature of the 
Hegelianism the periodical relied upon. The latter’s emphasis on nationality, in fact, may 
appear puzzling, if one considers that this is entirely absent in Hegel’s writings.65 It is, 
however, fully consistent with Vico’s discussion of this concept, as re-interpreted in early 
nineteenth-century Italian debates. Il Nazionale’s politics therefore reflected the complex 
dynamics of Hegel’s reception in the Southern capital: Vico’s emphasis on a shared language 
and traditions as the basis of national unity, Cuoco’s problematisation of an “ideal eternal 
history” and the empirical conditions in which this is realised, coupled with the need to 
mediate between the two, as illustrated in chapter two of this thesis, the anti-metaphysical 
approach to the study of German philosophy, perfected in Neapolitan private schools of the 
1830s and early ‘40s, discussed in chapter three, as well as the definition of a composite, 
Vichian and Hegelian in equal measure, historicist approach, championed most notably by 
Francesco De Sanctis’ school in the mid-1840s. Political emancipation, in this sense, was both 
logically and historically necessary, as it depended not only on the realisation of a Hegelian 
ideal of freedom, but also, following the example of Cuoco’s Vico, on the consolidation of a 
strong national identity.  
These reflections prominently featured in many other articles published during the 
summer of 1848: the “philosophical movement” underpinning the revolution, aiming at “the 
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unity of the human spirit” was said inevitably to require a “public form and organisation”.66 
Similarly, the success of the revolution was seen as depending on the possibility of “the 
translation of this new life […] currently enclosed in thought alone […] into society’s universal 
consciousness”.67 Additionally, because “the indeclinable law of human nature is represented 
by perpetual progress” and “the course and development of ideas is irresistible”, “all ideas 
conceived and developed in the mind must inevitably be translated into facts”.68 
Thus imagined, at this point, Il Nazionale’s contribution to the revolutionary 
experience of 1848 appears to have incorporated Cuoco and Colletta’s analysis of 1799’s 
failure; yet, by closely engaging with the need for the Revolution to acquire a purely national 
character, Neapolitan Hegelians succeeded in moving beyond political particularisms, fully 
embracing the cause of Italy’s emancipation and unification. This naturally paves the way for 
the question of what kind of political organisation may be conducive to the strengthening of 
the peninsula’s national character. Put simply: if Italy’s political future is necessarily a national 
one, what institutions can contribute to its realisation? 
The answer to this question was a passionate advocacy of a democratic, Italian, 
nation-state. “Naples has discovered beneath the fallen Government an empty coffin, 
because the union of Neapolitan society with eternity does not and will not take place here 
[…]. The State that we were looking for does not exist within Neapolitans’ conscience, but in 
a broader and more substantial domain, namely Italian conscience”.69 Crucially, the State was 
regarded a condicio sine qua non for the complete flourishing of the principle of nationality: 
“nationality is not enough to bring a man glory”.70 This was because “it is the State that 
accomplishes and perfects nationality”.71 The implications of this premise are, at this point, 
easy to discern: consistent with Cuoco’s verdict on the political failure of the Neapolitan 
Republic, the authors of Il Nazionale believed that, in order to be a fully national one, the 
State must be based on the principle of popular sovereignty and participation. “The State”, in 
this sense, must not be “an arbitrary institution, depending on the will of a given individual, 
may that be the Prince, or someone else”: it ought to configure itself as “something higher 
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and more absolute, elevating itself above particular wills and able to reflect the will 
embedded in the citizens’ general will. As a result, should it ever be at odds with society’s 
inclinations, their opposition cannot last long and it suddenly appears necessary for the State 
to reconcile itself with society, in order not to be in disagreement with its own most 
fundamental principle”.72 
Il Nazionale’s focus on the creation of an Italian national state was, as explained earlier 
in this chapter, a preoccupation that other revolutionaries in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
simply did not share. Moreover, if seen in the broader Italian context, the periodical’s position 
further underlines the original and idiosyncratic character of its contribution to the political 
history of the Risorgimento. Despite the fact that the national idea had gained remarkable 
traction among 1848 revolutionaries, in fact, few viewed themselves as part of a fully-fledged 
national state beyond the idea of a confederate union under the existing rulers.73  
Additionally, Il Nazionale’s reflections articulated a vision of the State that was far more 
progressive and more deeply grounded in popular sovereignty than that advocated by other 
patriots who put their hopes into Piedmont. Cesare Balbo, for example, investigated the 
connection between representative institutions and the public spirit in his volume Della 
monarchia rappresentativa, written between 1849 and 1853.74 This text constituted a 
passionate advocacy of Piedmontese hegemony in the context of the Risorgimento: unlike 
other inhabitants of the peninsula, in fact, only the Piedmontese were said to be ready for 
the attainment of liberty.75 Balbo’s volume also featured a discussion of the ways in which 
the experience of 1848 had allegedly revealed a deficiency in Italians’ “political education”.76 
According to the author, this implied that the extension of political participation to all 
segments of the population was an undesirable solution. Rather, Balbo believed, it was only 
thanks to the contribution of the more progressive elements of the aristocracy, whose taxes 
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were crucial in the maintenance of political institutions in a financial sense, that the State 
could implement sustainable and effective liberal reforms.77 
Domenico Carutti, who worked closely with Cavour and served as Foreign Affairs 
Minister in the Kingdom of Sardinia from 1859 onwards, later retaining that position in the 
newly founded Kingdom of Italy, presented similar views in his 1852 treatise Dei principii del 
governo libero. In this text, he warned against the risks connected with an unchecked 
application of democratic ideals, maintaining that masses ought to be excluded from political 
participation, because they lacked civic virtues.78 Lastly, Terenzio Mamiani echoed Carutti’s 
arguments, further adding that the large majority of the population, being driven by 
ignorance in political matters and unchecked passions, was unable to interpret the moral law. 
As a result, the duty of government ought to be firmly in the hands of an enlightened élite.79 
The kind of State advocated by Il Nazionale, instead, must, by definition, be able to 
engage in a functional relationship with civil society, aiming at promoting the realisation of 
the principle of nationality via the establishment of institutions and policies firmly grounded 
in popular sovereignty and aiming at fostering mass democratic participation.80 This was 
deemed necessary both on logical and historical grounds: logically, because of the actual 
definition of the State adopted by Il Nazionale, understood as “the true image of the people” 
and, at the same time, “the perfection of its model”, in which every individual “finds himself, 
as a person and as a moral being” and “comes to acquire that which is located above its 
individuality”.81 Historically, because the principle of popular sovereignty championed by 
revolutionary experiences – both in France in 1789 and, more importantly, in Naples ten years 
later – had revealed the need to align political organisation with a people’s social 
emancipation: a State unable to reflect the absolute authority of the people, in this sense, 
was doomed to be demolished by the irresistible tide of history, being fundamentally 
disconnected “from ideas and from reality”.82 
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Especially in the light of the composite historicist approach embraced by Neapolitan 
Hegelians discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, these intuitions optimally embodied 
the two-fold understanding of the State articulated by Il Nazionale: the discussion of its ideal, 
universal substance, on the one hand, closely mirrored the position advanced by Hegel in the 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, where the State was defined as the chief 
means for the progressive self-realization of a people and the embodiment of freedom.83 Yet, 
it was from the direct experience of history, on the other hand, conveyed by the historical 
memory of 1799, that the formal character of political organisation ought to be derived, as 
indicated by Vico-via-Cuoco. And with the spectre of the dramatic divisions that had peppered 
the previous revolutionary experiments, coupled with the horrors perpetrated by the 
Neapolitan lazzaroni and the Calabrian sanfedisti, still haunting Neapolitan revolutionary 
sensitivities, it was evident that the elevation of people’s political conscience toward a 
cohesive national unity could only be operated within a fundamentally democratic dimension 
of political life. 
 
 
 
4.3. Freiheit contra Libertà: Hegelianism in the Political History of the Risorgimento 
 
4.3.1. Silvio Spaventa’s non-Hegelian Liberalism 
 
The defeat of 1848 marked the end of Il Nazionale’s publication, due to the involvement of 
its writers with revolutionary activities. One of its founders, Silvio Spaventa, was described as 
“the most enthusiastic” among the members of the Neapolitan parliament who had incited 
the construction of the barricades on May 15, having inflamed the crowds both from the 
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parliament balcony in and in the congested via Toledo.84 On March 19 of the following year, 
while strolling with his brother Bertrando and three other friends in the streets of Naples, 
Silvio was arrested and tried for “conspiring against the State’s internal security, for the 
purpose of destroying and altering the current form of government and exhorting the citizens 
and inhabitants of the Kingdom to take up arms against the royal authority, as well as 
concretely encouraging civil war among members of the population itself”.85 These 
accusation, whose validity was sometimes questioned by later historiography, were very 
grave and resulted into a death sentence, promptly turned, as it was customary in the 
Kingdom, into lifetime imprisonment on the island of S. Stefano.86 
 The experience of prison was crucial for Silvio’s intellectual development. According 
to later historians, it was in the Bourbons’ prisons that “Hegel became liberal”. This 
perspective suggests that German thinker’s ideas became increasingly projected on Italy’s 
political context and deployed in support of Piedmontese liberal politics.87 There is little doubt 
that Silvio, often regarded as one of the greatest theorists of liberal thought that would later 
inspire both Cavourian politics and the experience of the Destra storica, reiterated, during his 
imprisonment, several positions championed by the very Hegelian Il Nazionale in 1848.88 As 
explained earlier, however, the relationship between Neapolitan Hegelianism and 
Piedmontese politics was far more complicated than traditional historiographical accounts, 
which adopted a teleological view of the Risorgimento, would hold. Despite proclaiming its 
allegiance to Carlo Alberto and Piedmont, Il Nazionale believed in achieving the Italian 
emancipation and unification via the promotion of democratic constitutionalism, hence 
advocating policies that were much more progressive than those advocated by Piedmontese 
liberals and their supporters. On this basis, Silvio Spaventa’s alleged use of Hegel’s philosophy 
in support of a liberal ideology, as well as his original theorisation of the latter, require closer 
scrutiny. This operation is luckily aided by the range of sources available: Silvio’s 
correspondence from prison, especially the letters he exchanged with his brother Bertrando, 
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later collected and published by his nephew Benedetto Croce, represents a precious resource 
to clarify the nexus between Neapolitan Hegelianism and Risorgimento political thought. 
 The first feature of these letters that stands out is the postulation of a continuity 
between the experience of 1848 and the cause of Italian Unification, consistent with the 
propositions presented by Il Nazionale just a few years earlier. An 1854 manuscript entitled 
L’esercito napoletano e la riazione revealed how the defeat of revolutionary enthusiasms in 
the Southern capital would further encourage Neapolitan patriots to fight for Unification.89 
As this chapter shall demonstrate, similar views were also held by Bertrando himself, as well 
as Francesco De Sanctis: according to the latter, the chief effect of the crown’s anti-
revolutionary measures was an even greater consolidation of revolutionary ideals. 
Revolutions, even those labelled “failed ones”, he claimed, “find new blood, force and power 
in the experience of loss and martyrdom”.90 Moreover, just like Il Nazionale had argued in 
1848, Silvio Spaventa believed that the perpetuation of a revolutionary programme would 
still entail the endorsement of Piedmontese politics and support for the same form of 
constitutionalism that the Bourbons had violently suffocated.91 In response to the growth of 
the Muratist movement in Naples in the 1850s, he labelled Murat “completely unable to 
undertake any serious project” and vehemently stated that he would rather die in prison than 
compromise his support for Carlo Alberto: the “Northern Star” of the Risorgimento, he 
claimed was “the king of Piedmont”.92 
At the same time, while it revealed the permanence of pre-1848 political motives 
during his prison years, Silvio’s correspondence also featured the earliest articulations of a 
new concept of the political, which he would later retain throughout his entire parliamentary 
career after the Unification.93 Silvio’s position was unsurprisingly close to moderate 
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Piedmontese liberals’, being based on the same emphasis on individual liberty, strong 
constitutionalism, gradualism, political representation and separation of State and Church 
characterising Cavourian politics.94 This, especially if plotted against the backdrop of 
Spaventa’s experience with the Hegelian Il Nazionale, would clearly support the idea of a 
moderate liberal evolution of Neapolitan Hegelianism.  
 Benedetto Croce, however, in an introduction to an edited collection of Silvio’s Lettere 
politiche, emphasised how the conception of politics developed during the years of 
imprisonment was characterised by the absence of the speculative sensibility featured in his 
prior writings.95 Similarly, Antonio Labriola, who had attended Bertrando’s philosophy 
lectures in Naples in 1861, highlighted, in an 1898 letter to Croce, how Silvio’s politics were 
not supported by reliable philosophical insights.96 A closer look at the sources corroborates 
Croce and Labriola’s verdicts and reveals, on the one hand, several problems connected with 
Silvio’s characterisation as a Hegelian thinker after 1848, while greatly challenging, on the 
other, the notion of a certain degree of continuity between Neapolitan Hegelianism and 
moderate liberalism.  
It must be noted, first of all, that Silvio’s attempts to engage with Hegel’s texts 
remained largely unsuccessful. As is evident from his correspondence with his brother, 
Hegel’s philosophy presented itself as a system “dubious and formal” and every attempt to 
penetrate its perceived intricacies was consistently frustrated.97 Spaventa felt completely 
defeated by the complexity of the German thinker’s works: “I understand them one way, but 
then I realise I am mistaken: I understand them another way, but then I am once again 
mistaken. I am wrapped in a thousand difficulties, a thousand doubts and am ultimately lost 
in a maze with no way out”.98 In particular, Silvio had begun reading the Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften in 1856, but abandoned it after a mere few days, being 
admittedly unable to understand it: the more he attempted to access “the soul” of the text, 
the more this appeared “impenetrable”.99 Silvio had also hoped to translate the 
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Phenomenologie des Geistes into Italian, but he quickly gave up on this project, having only 
collected ninety-two pages of handwritten notes, mostly concerned with the Preface and 
Introduction to the original text, later published with the title Frammenti di studi by Benedetto 
Croce.100  
 Spaventa’s notes on the Phenomenologie can fully reveal the extent of his departure 
from Hegel, as well as the failure to adopt the German thinker’s ideas as the philosophical 
backbone of his own political views, hence challenging several twentieth-century 
historiographical verdicts. Most importantly, the notion of liberty discussed in these 
manuscripts was significantly different from Hegel’s. An obvious example of this would be the 
statement that: 
 
True freedom is objective and subjective at the same time: what I mean is that for this to be 
truly experienced, its content ought to be objective Reason and its form the subjectivity of 
Spirit. I am free if I want and do that which is reasonable, I must make the law, and I must will 
the law. The law must be my own will.101 
 
The intuition that individual freedom may acquire its objectivity in the law, a view which 
Spaventa reiterated in later writings and parliamentary speeches lay at the core of 
historiographical verdicts regarding him as an advocate of a Hegelian Rechtsstaat.102 Hegel, 
however, in his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, had warned precisely against such a 
conception of freedom, highlighting its logical inconsistency: 
 
When we hear it said that freedom in general consists in being able to do as one pleases, such 
an idea can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of intellectual culture; for it shows not 
the least awareness of what constitutes the will which is free in and for itself, of rights, ethics, 
etc.103 
 
Right (Recht), for Hegel, was by definition “the existence of the absolute concept, of self-
conscious freedom”.104 In order for freedom to acquire its absolute character, a process of 
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mediation among its individual determinations, through which objective freedom “develops 
out of itself”, was required: “Dialectics”.105 
 The notion of freedom that, according to Hegel, served as the foundation of right and 
political organization, by virtue of the dialectics it ceaselessly engaged in, was characterised 
by an inherently relational, reflective and self-generative nature. Such a conception was 
clearly missing in Spaventa’s political writings. When interrogating how liberty was to be 
embodied in the State, he claimed, consistent with Hegel, that “the State is freedom’s truth”, 
but adopted a concept of freedom corresponding to an unmediated “subjective freedom”.106 
And it was, in his view, only via a representative system that individual freedom could 
ultimately be part of the State’s political life.107  As a result, Silvio’s reflections on the goals of 
politics aptly reflected his complete departure from Hegel: by positing “subjective freedom”, 
corresponding to “individual will”, as the “origin of Right” and “principle of all public powers”, 
he ultimately embraced a precise ideal of the State, whose chief aim was the preservation of 
individual liberties via the authority of the law.108 
 Silvio Spaventa’s views on politics, commonly mistaken for an advocacy of the 
Hegelian Rechtsstaat, were not, therefore, as Hegelian as many historians suggested. They 
were, however, very much in agreement with the principles of Piedmontese moderate 
liberalism. Maurizio Isabella, for example, highlighted how, particularly in the writings of 
Cesare Balbo, these revolved around “a liberal commitment to the protection of individual 
rights under a constitution” and “political freedom based on individual capacity by virtue of 
representative institutions”.109 It is certainly hard not to see Silvio’s position as anything other 
than fully consistent with Balbo’s.  
While it is difficult to disagree with historiographical verdicts praising Silvio Spaventa’s 
contribution to moderate liberal thinking, it is just as hard to endorse those underlying the 
philosophical and ideological continuity between his alleged Hegelianism and liberal 
tendencies. Rather, it seems now evident that the proposition that “Hegel became liberal” via 
the experience of the Bourbon prisons, is simply untenable. At the same time, challenging the 
very characterisation of Silvio Spaventa as a Hegelian thinker after the defeat of the 1848 
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Revolutions only addresses part of the issue connected with a precise account of Neapolitan 
Hegelianism’s role in the political history of the Risorgimento. It is precisely for this reason 
that this chapter will attempt to clarify this problem by shifting the focus of its analysis: if 
Hegel’s ideas were not deployed in support of moderate liberalism, what kind of political life 
could they inform? The answer can only be found in the writings of someone who did not 
leave Hegel behind, as Silvio did, and ceaselessly engaged with his works: his brother 
Bertrando. 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Bertrando Spaventa’s non-liberal Hegelianism 
 
While Silvio Spaventa was gestating his political thought in prison, his brother Bertrando was 
understandably devastated by his brother’s predicament, further exacerbating the grief 
caused by the loss of his younger brother Tito, who had died of typhus only a few months 
earlier. Under the encouragement of a few close friends, and worried that the ongoing police 
inquiries might eventually result in his own arrest, Bertrando decided to flee Naples in 
October 1849, hoping to reach Genova.110 Having initially arrived in Livorno, however, he 
settled in Florence where he worked as a private mentor for the Pignatelli family. The Tuscan 
city was Bertrando’s home for ten months, during which he led “a solitary life, a very isolated 
one”.111 In “ten yawning months”, his philosophical and political commitment came to a 
sudden halt, due to the difficulty he encountered in getting hold of German philosophy texts, 
particularly Hegel and Kant’s.112 As a result, he decided to move to Turin, because, he believed 
“here can one find the Idea of our country, here is Italy, here is freedom”.113 
 Bertrando’s enthusiasm for the cultural and political environment he encountered in 
the Piedmontese city was often regarded by later historians as an endorsement of the liberal 
views generally invoked by, and associated with, the Piedmontese government. In an attempt 
to challenge Gentile’s discussion of the Southern thinker as part of his broader proposition of 
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an ideological continuity between the philosophy of the Risorgimento and the fascist political 
experience, researchers proceeded to view Bertrando’s political sensibility in line with 
Piedmontese liberalism, on the one hand, and the policies of the post-Unification Destra 
storica, on the other. Nicola Caputo’s 2006 Bertrando Spaventa e la sua scuola, for example, 
sought to identify the ideological connections between Spaventa’s works and Benedetto 
Croce’s defense of liberalism.114 Similarly, Renato Bortot, Giovanni Rota and Gaetano Origo 
provided an accurate analysis of Bertrando’s critical Hegelianism, proposing an image of the 
philosopher that resonated with the principles of Piedmontese liberal politics.115 Even more 
clearly, works by Teresa Serra and Eugenio Garin concentrated on Bertrando’s alleged 
revision of the Hegelian “ethical state”, drawing particular attention to the role played by the 
notion of liberty in it, consequently viewing the author’s reflection on the state and its 
functions as a hint at his liberal sympathies.116 
 Common to these works on Spaventa was the postulation of a rupture between his 
pre-1848 speculation and his political pronouncements articulated in the years spent in Turin, 
presented in the articles written for the local periodicals Il progresso, Il cimento and Rivista 
italiana. Plotting some of the arguments developed in the Turinese writings against those 
presented in the Neapolitan Il Nazionale, in fact, historians concluded that, by 1852, 
Bertrando had abandoned the democratic positions advocated before 1848 and allegedly 
embraced a conservative stance.117 
 A more careful look at Spaventa’s Piedmontese journalistic output, however, 
supplementing the revision of Il Nazionale’s political stance offered in the previous section of 
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this chapter, can challenge these verdicts, drawing attention to the thematic and speculative 
continuities characterising these two moments of Bertrando’s intellectual and political 
formation. It was earlier suggested that the theme of Italian Unification was systematically 
interwoven in the texture of Il Nazionale’s revolutionary inclinations: just as the periodical 
had believed in the need to commit to a revolutionary programme beyond “the mere narrow 
limits of our Neapolitan land” and embrace, via a very Hegelian reasoning, a purely national 
dimension of politics, an article penned by Spaventa in 1850, appearing in Rivista italiana and 
later published in a much expanded form with the title Studii sopra la filosofia di Hegel, 
underlined the possibility of achieving these goals under Piedmontese leadership.118 
Spaventa insisted on the same juxtaposition of cultural and political emancipation 
championed by the Neapolitan periodical two years earlier: “the Italian philosophical 
movement”, he claimed, “thwarted in Naples, where it initially began, must begin again, as a 
political movement, in Piedmont […]. While our homeland mourns its noble children, who are 
either in prison or exile, may Piedmont proceed to re-awaken Italy’s philosophical 
consciousness”.119 
 Thus conceived, Spaventa’s Turinese attitude not only was consistent with the 
ideological orientation of his Neapolitan periodical, but also underlined how any kind of 
political unification was linked to the consolidation of the peninsula’s national character, via 
the reinforcement of its cultural and philosophical tradition. Philosophy, he stated, “rather 
than being at odds with political history, as some may well believe, understands its results 
and achievements, and empowers them with a necessary and universal significance”.120 Even 
more clearly, in a compelling – yet often overlooked – article published in Il progresso, 
Spaventa further illustrated his ideal, speculative, sensibility underpinning support for Italian 
unification: the true unity of a nation and the freedom of its people, he argued “cannot be 
obtained without great ideas. And among these I do not regard philosophy as having a 
marginal role, especially in Italy, were, because every purely external connection is largely 
ineffective with regard to the immense endeavour of national unity, it is necessary, first of all, 
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to create an inner connection in order to resurrect the ancient genius of the nation, currently 
toned down by divisions and fragmentation”.121 
 These considerations represented an important stepping stone in the identification of 
the ideological continuity between the defeat of the 1848 Revolution in Naples and the 
struggle for Italian Unification. For Bertrando, the significance of 1848 went well beyond its 
perceived political failure. While it had been impossible to articulate a form of political 
organisation based on popular sovereignty, and able to reflect people’s acquired 
consciousness of their national identity, it was within the intellectual sphere that a major 
change had taken place.122 The dissemination of the principle of nationality, in fact, had 
effectively contrasted a “power that is an enemy of any sort of intellectual development”, 
namely that very same factionalism and set of inner divisions lamented by Cuoco and Colletta 
in their verdicts on the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution.123 As a result: 
 
Our Revolution of 1848 succeeded in severing the roots of this power. This is now nothing 
more than a dead weight, a corpse, and all that is left to do is burying it. It is now up to us 
Italians to accomplish what our revolution has started: it is necessary that the consciousness 
of man’s absolute right, Reason and thought become universal, i.e. national: it’s necessary for 
this consciousness to penetrate every single manifestation of our life; for it to be in our minds, 
in art, religious sentiment, in all and everyone.124 
 
It should be already evident, at this point, how Spaventa’s engagement with the topic 
of Italian unification was largely supported by his analysis of the historical significance of 
European revolutions: he envisioned, in fact, the initial emergence of principles of equality 
and popular sovereignty in the “marvellous drama” of the 1789 French Revolution.125 More 
importantly, it was against a teleological, Hegelian, account of historical development that 
revolutionary experiences were plotted, as Il Nazionale had already suggested in 1848 and as 
Bertrando repeatedly confirmed in his Turinese articles.126 So, if history moved toward the 
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embodiment of a Hegelian absolute freedom, realised, in a political sense, in the ideal of 
popular sovereignty, what kind of initiatives could lead to the latter’s concrete 
implementation?  
According to Spaventa, the answer was a straightforward one: the realisation of 
freedom, he argued, rested on two interconnected pillars: the political and the social 
emancipation of a people. In an attempt to link the history of Europe with the immediate 
context of the present, Bertrando suggested that the French Revolution had highlighted how 
any “revolution must first and foremost be a political one”.127 This was because, by combating 
a political organisation whose legitimacy stemmed from “a will believed to exist above and 
beyond the law and people’s will”, namely birth rights and privileges, French revolutionaries 
had initiated a process of democratisation establishing the people’s will as the sole “will of 
the State”.128  
This view was very significant for a number of reasons: first of all, it already hinted at 
a certain conception of the State, consistent with that championed by both Spaventas in the 
pages of Il Nazionale in 1848, underlining its role in reproducing and perpetuating the ideal 
preconditions on which it rested.129 Put simply, it was only via the establishment of a 
democratic state, corresponding to the political emancipation of society, that its social 
emancipation, namely the consolidation of a people’s national identity, could be achieved. 
Second, these observations also reflected another important influence on Spaventa’s 
intellectual formation during the years he spent in Turin: Lorenz von Stein’s 1842 book 
Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs, whose translation into Italian he 
had begun in 1850.130 Spaventa’s advocacy of a State able to mould its institutions on the 
basis of civil society’s inclinations, that is to say, a state whose authority, “does not stem any 
longer from the Government, but from the nation, because the Government is nothing more 
than the executor of public reason’s deliberations”, in this sense, reflected a specific 
understanding of history, whereby political change is intrinsically connected to the dialectical 
interplay of State and civil society, as postulated by von Stein.131  
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Central to Spaventa’s political vision was, once again, a very precise characterisation 
of historical development that deepened, unsurprisingly, its roots in the amalgamation of 
Vico and Hegel operated in the Neapolitan intellectual context, most notably private schools 
of philosophy, during the late 1830s and early ‘40s. More specifically, the composite method 
illustrated in chapter three of this thesis, according to which the Hegelian “rationality” 
(“Vernünftigkeit”) of history was disclosed via “logical” reasoning and the Vichian definition 
of history as a “factum” could acquire a universal character via “historical” observation, was 
deployed by Spaventa in order to support a largely historicised understanding of a nation’s 
political life. The author’s emphasis on past experiences of political change, in this sense, was 
connected to the need to correctly act in the present in order to tailor the future according 
to necessity. Put simply, while Spaventa had understood, via logical reasoning, the motion of 
history to be the progressive realisation of freedom, it was via an accurate understanding of 
past experiences of political change, namely the 1789 French Revolution, the Neapolitan 
Revolution of 1799 and the events of 1848, that the need for a democratic state had become 
evident.132  
Spaventa clarified these thoughts, as he explained how “the principle of human 
societies’ movement and progress” was represented by the dialectical interplay of the 
“reality” and the “ideal destination” of their historical life.133 A more speculative explanation 
was then provided by the argument that, while “philosophical speculation […] has posited the 
true determination of the idea of freedom”, “freedom and equality are absolute and have no 
limit or distinction other than those necessarily stemming from Reason itself” only “when 
man himself is posited as the principle and origin of any right and duty”.134 
These testimonies are important in various ways: first, they allow for a revision of 
Spaventa’s political outlook during the years he spent in Turin, in contrast to historiographical 
verdicts suggesting that he had moved toward a much more conservative position; second, 
they confirm the ideological continuity between Il Nazionale in 1848 and Bertrando’s views 
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in the early 1850s, challenging, once again, views emphasising the differences between these 
two moments; third, they further corroborate a transnational understanding of Spaventa’s 
Hegelianism, clearly indebted to the German philosopher’s notion of absolute history, as well 
as early nineteenth-century debates on Vico’s historicism, in equal measure. 
The most salient feature of Bertrando’s political thought in the 1850s, therefore, had 
to do with a democratic actualisation of the Hegelian concept of liberty. This, in turn, put his 
politicas at odds with Piedmontese liberal thinking. The trigger for Spaventa’s critique of his 
immediate political context was represented by the emergence of parliamentary discussions 
on the freedom of teaching in 1851. These debates, indebted to those that had taken place 
in France in the 1830s, were amply documented by Giovanni Gentile, who also emphasised 
how Bertrando’s position in relation to them revolved around the upholding of a notion of 
liberty different to that embraced by the government in Turin.135 During the parliamentary 
session of May 13, 1851, Domenico Berti proposed the closure of all those schools, both 
public ones and those run by the clergy, rejecting governmental appointment of teachers. 
This proposition was met with enthusiasm by the Education Minister Pietro Gioia, but, in 
response to it, Cavour, who, at the time, was serving as Minister for agriculture and 
commerce, strongly condemned the prospected extension of government influence on any 
education channel other than public ones. Cavour’s position was harshly criticised by an 
article published in Il progresso the following day, to such an extent that the Minister himself 
opted to clarify his position, claiming that the notion of liberty on which the state itself rested 
could be promoted only via the contraction of government interference.136  
Cavour’s views were enthusiastically endorsed by Cesare Balbo, who not only 
underlined that granting unrestricted freedom of teaching was the only viable solution, but 
also claimed that limiting state interference in educational matters represented a crucial step 
in the moral and cultural emancipation of Italy.137 A prima facie reading of this position may 
support a characterisation of Balbo’s politics as particularly liberal and progressive, in line 
with recent historiographical verdicts on Piedmontese moderates.138 Seen in the context of 
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his aristocratic definition of the state, however, Balbo’s views appear less forward-thinking. 
Rather than reflecting a genuine concern for the preparation of a wider public, his was an 
attempt to delegate the provision of education to third parties. For the Turinese statesman, 
the exercise of state functions depended on taxes paid by the élites. In consequence, he 
believed that the government should not be concerned with fostering mass education among 
those strata of the population that did not directly maintain it. His attitude went also against 
the trend of many other European countries, which, as mentioned in chapter three, were 
encouraging “mass public schooling” via a consistent increase in public education spending 
during the middle decades of the nineteenth-century.139 
The debate on freedom of teaching acquired an increasingly inflamed tone, ultimately 
leading to the Education Minister Gioia’s resignation, followed, shortly thereafter, by the 
appointment of Luigi Carlo Farini, who, as indicated by Gentile, had strongly opposed Gioia’s 
views on freedom of teaching.140 Farini’s designation marked a shift in the ministry’s policies, 
increasingly veering towards a Cavourian line. On November 21, 1851, Cavour himself 
detailed the guiding principles of the government’s new educational policies, disclosing an 
intention to gradually shift from a “monopoly regime” to one of “absolute freedom”, by 
introducing unrestricted freedom of teaching “in the sphere of higher education” and 
extending it, later on, “to that of middle and primary teaching”.141 
As hinted earlier, Turinese periodicals, most notably Il progresso, were extremely 
critical of Cavour’s advocacy of unrestricted liberty. From the pages of this paper, Bertrando 
Spaventa launched a devastating critique of the government’s new educational policies. This 
was ostensibly counter-intuitive: after all, was Spaventa not an advocate of an absolute ideal 
of freedom? In theory. Liberty, he believed, in order to have its emancipatory value fully 
realised, had to be subject to certain restrictions, dictated by the context in which it is to be 
implemented. As a result, Cavour, Balbo and Farini’s unconditional reliance on an unchecked 
notion of liberty was regarded a dangerous strategy. More specifically, Bertrando condemned 
the abstract nature of the policies promoted by the government, underlining the need for 
them to be driven by a principle other than individual liberty: 
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If it is upon a universal and abstract idea of individual right that one bases their reasoning, it 
will be necessary, since it is impossible to derive any positive or determinate element from 
such an abstraction, to posit as the foundation of sovereignty something other than individual 
right, in order not to end up with a chimerical state of affairs. This is precisely what those who 
rely on such an abstract and unstable principle end up with: while they discuss freedom as the 
basis of all authority, they actually build an entire edifice upon its ruins, as they elect individual 
will, interests, birth privileges or religious status as its foundation.142 
 
Bertrando was not against freedom of teaching, and repeatedly underlined that “all 
those who love liberty, and want its implementation to be a full one, cannot deny that 
teaching ought to be free”.143 He also underlined, however, that “if we approach this issue 
from a much more pragmatic perspective”, things ought to be somewhat different.144 
Religious belief in Italy, according to Spaventa’s analysis, still depended on the indications of 
the Church, which had historically adopted its spiritual authority in order to legitimise its 
political power. This, in turn, had resulted in the perpetuation of a system of privileges and a 
conception of political authority, which eighteenth-century speculation and revolutionary 
experiences had successfully eroded, in a philosophical and political sense, respectively. 
Bertrando therefore believed that, by unconditionally granting freedom of teaching, the 
government would essentially give the Church carte blanche to keep on enforcing privileges, 
divisions, and a political theory regarded not only unviable in a political sense, but also – and 
more importantly – anti-historical. 
Spaventa clarified these intuitions by disclosing the agenda allegedly hidden behind 
clergymen’s appeal for freedom of teaching: the Church, he argued, would invoke liberty “as 
a means to benefit from the limited set of advantages it is left with”, represented by its 
spiritual authority; central to this analysis was the intuition that “books, schools, newspapers: 
these are the weapons that the clergy wants to use in order to restore its kingdom”.145 He 
then concluded: 
 
Should teaching be free? It is the same as asking: does thought have a right to freely manifest 
itself in words? […] In a State, where no religious freedom exists and where the full separation 
of spiritual and secular power is yet to take place; in a state where the dynamics of belief are 
imposed by a single privileged authority; in a state that was actually governed for a long time 
by this authority, which also happened to be the supreme master of educational matters; […] 
in such a state, under such circumstances, would it be useful to implement the absolute 
principle of freedom of teaching? We frankly answer: no.146 
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 From these observations, Spaventa derived the need to rethink the coordinates of the 
fundamental question of politics, namely the relationship between freedom and authority, 
urging the creation of a system able to regulate the former, on the one hand, and grant 
legitimacy to the latter, on the other. In contrast to a moderate liberal understanding of 
freedom that relied on an atomistic conception of the individual, Spaventa therefore 
embraced a Hegelian definition of this concept, as detailed in the German philosopher’s 
Grundlinien. In this monumental work, Hegel had insisted on the distinction between an 
“abstract” and a “concrete” ideal of freedom, pointing out that the former could be resolved 
into the latter only via the process of mediation among all members of society.147 Being the 
State, then, the chief means for the compenetration (“Durchdringung”) of the substantial and 
the particular (“des Substantiellen und des Besonderen”), Hegel could conclude that “the 
State is the reality of concrete freedom”.148 In a similar vein, Bertrando deployed an ideal of 
freedom understood as the synthetic unity of individual freedoms, invested with an absolute 
character by virtue of its inherently relational, rather than discrete, character. In this sense, 
especially when compared to his brother Silvio’s misunderstanding of the Hegelian 
relationship between freedom and the State, Bertrando’s views suddenly appear much 
consistent with the German thinker’s ideas. 
 “The State”, Spaventa wrote on the basis of these observations, “constitutes 
individuals’ absolute ethical subjectivity. It is absolute, because it presents itself as substance; 
it is a subjectivity, because it is reasoned upon and willed for by individuals”.149 More 
importantly, this did not rely on “a simple, subjective notion of liberty”: rather, “this is 
objectified as universal and absolute rational will”; the State “is substance, i.e. necessary and 
absolute unity of individuals, of subjects, of people […]. It is free and freely self-aware 
substance […]. It is substance configuring itself as subject”.150 The stage, at this point, was 
fully set for the final thrust of Bertrando’s powerful argument. With an unregulated exercise 
of liberty threatening the synthetic unity of society, potentially leading to the political 
manifestation of fragmentation and the triumph of particular interests, “who can prevent 
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such dissolution?”.151 The answer, unsurprisingly, was disarmingly clear: “only that which, by 
virtue of not being the representative of any particular interest, but of the common one, 
makes everyone’s interests its own, when these are threatened by other interests’ 
opposition: the State”.152 
 Spaventa’s State, by virtue of its own nature and functions, closely resembled Hegel’s 
definition of “ethical state”: a form of political organisation actively enabling the rational 
mediation among particular interests present in society, in order to fully realise a substantive 
notion of freedom going beyond its discrete individuations.153 The modern State, for 
Bertrando, would constitute itself as absolute ethical substance vis-à-vis individual 
subjectivites, yet acquiring its rational, unconditional and unconditioned, character on the 
basis of the necessary sublation (“Aufhebung”) of its parts. This, in ultimate analysis, was the 
philosophical backbone of Bertrando’s argument against unregulated freedom of teaching, 
revealing, at the same time, the extent of his ideological distance from moderate liberal 
political theory: should the Piedmontese state restrict its influence on educational matters, it 
would cease to exercise its chief function, as it would enable private interests to triumph over 
their collective counterpart, hence undermining the ideal synthetic unity of society. In 
debates on freedom of teaching, Piedmontese liberals, such as Cavour, Balbo and Farini, had 
advocated a vision of politics that encouraged reducing the size of the state in order for 
individual freedom to be enhanced. For Spaventa, instead, it was necessary to maximise the 
extent of state action in order for concrete, collective freedom, to triumph. And on this basis, 
it is certainly quite difficult not only to imagine Bertrando as an advocate of moderate liberal 
politics, but also to regard him as anything other than a theorist, during the 1850s, of the very 
same democratic outlook that his generation had endorsed in 1848.  
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152 ibid. 
153 Bertrando’s pointed this out as he claimed that “The State must gather and concentrate in itself, in its 
universal substance, the splintered and various individualities, and unite in a single shared ambition the spirit 
and activities of all. And this does not mean that the State ought to act like a force pulling individuals to itself, 
while remaining extraneous to those who are being pulled. The State is substance, ethical substance. As such, it 
brings people together, because it is immanent in all individuals’ understanding and activities. A State different 
to this, or one that did not even configure itself, as they often say, as the full understanding and total inner 
activity of the people, would be a purely artificial and mechanical institution”. (ibid., p. 159)  
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4.4. Vico, Hegel and Historicised Freedom 
 
This chapter demonstrated how Neapolitan Hegelians’ contribution to the history of political 
thought of the Risorgimento, a topic often overlooked by historians whose work focuses on 
the events leading to the unification of the Italian peninsula, deserves more systematic 
illustration, in ways that may rectify some issues characterising current historiographical 
verdicts. Central to a more compelling account of Southern Hegelianism’s political 
ramifications was the postulation of a philosophical and ideological continuum able to 
connect the historical memory of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799, the events of 1848 and 
the broader cause of the Italian Unification. This perspective is further proof of southern 
intellectuals’ amalgamation of Hegel’s idealist historicism with Vico-via-Cuoco’s emphasis on 
a man-made, empirical history: while embracing a Hegelian account of historical development 
highlighting the rationality and logical necessity of the Revolution, Neapolitan Hegelians 
searched for the principles guiding their revolutionary agenda in Cuoco and Colletta’s 
commentaries on the failure of 1799. The upholding of popular sovereignty, the promotion 
of democratic participation and, more importantly, the definition of the nation as the 
fundamental unity of political life thus became central to their politics.  
 Identifying the extent to which Neapolitan Hegelians’ political attitude stemmed from 
their philosophical understanding of history is here very important from a methodological 
perspective, too. It demonstrates, in fact, the effectiveness of Reinhart Koselleck’s 
Begriffsgeschichte in explaining how political languages and practices are shaped by the 
concepts through which a culture understands itself. For Il Nazionale’s writers, participating 
in the 1848 Revolution was not just a matter of directing Italy’s political future. Rather, it 
represented a response to shifting perceptions of change in historical time. 
 Rehabilitating Neapolitan Hegelians’ contribution to Risorgimento political thought 
also goes hand-in-hand with an acknowledgment of how unique this was, if seen in context. 
Their interpretation of 1848 as a historically necessary step in the creation of an Italian nation-
state was markedly different from the political mentalities prevailing in Naples and other 
parts of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, on the one hand, and the rest of the Italian peninsula, 
on the other. First, in contrast to thinkers, both in northern and especially southern Italy, who 
believed in a rather loose notion of a league of Italian states under the existing rulers, they 
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deployed a dialectical understanding of political change to demonstrate the historical 
necessity of a unified national state. Second, in opposition to Tuscany, the Papal States and 
king Ferdinand’s decision to renounce their initial allegiances to Piedmont, Neapolitan 
Hegelians remained convinced that the destiny of the Italian Risorgimento lay in Carlo 
Alberto’s hands. Third, upholding an understanding of political life that resonated with 
principles of democratic constitutionalism borrowed from the experience of the 1799 
Neapolitan Revolution, they invoked an understanding of political life that was far more 
progressive than the anti-democratic tendencies of Piedmontese liberalism and its advocates.  
 This last point directly challenges traditional interpretations of Neapolitan 
Hegelianism’s relationship with the politics of Piedmont, too often uncritically reduced to the 
idea that, especially after the defeat of the 1848 Revolutions, Hegelian philosophy was 
consistently adopted as the philosophical backbone of liberal politics. This chapter took issue 
with these views and, in doing so, it attempted to offer a different perspective, suggesting 
that disentangling Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa’s political ideas is key to addressing this 
issue. While evidence suggested that Silvio’s thought was in line with the principles of 
Piedmontese liberalism, it must be conceded that Hegel’s presence in his post-1848 
manuscripts was exceptionally hard to identify. Moreover, his intuition that freedom ought 
to be realised in the law, informing later historiographical verdicts depicting him as an 
advocate of a Hegelian Rechtsstaat, was based on a definition of freedom profoundly 
antithetical to the one embraced by the German thinker in the Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts. So, while there is little doubt that, during his prison years, Silvio affirmed himself 
as one of the leading theoreticians of moderate liberalism, articulating a vision of politics that 
he would later champion in his parliamentary activity after 1861, one must be ready to admit 
that his political outlook developed hand-in-hand with his departure from the principles of 
Hegel’s philosophy.   
Bertrando Spaventa’s Hegelian tendencies, instead, remained untouched by the 
defeat of the 1848 Revolution. In fact, when in Turin, he deployed his idealist views in support 
of the cause of Italian unification by closely engaging with the topics of State formation and 
the definition of its institutions and its functions, thus further expanding on the project he 
had initiated with Il Nazionale in 1848. Historians’ work on Spaventa’s Turinese years, 
however, often drew attention to a perceived rupture with the agenda promoted by the 
revolutionary periodical, suggesting that Bertrando’s post-1848 political sensitivity veered 
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toward a much more conservative position, informing his alleged promotion of Piedmontese 
moderate liberalism. Once again, this chapter challenged such views, by focusing on one of 
the most contentious debates Spaventa engaged in: that on freedom of teaching. 
Bertrando’s writings on this topic perpetuated the historicist reading of political 
change underpinning Il Nazionale’s 1848 articles. The author’s insistence on the logical and 
historical necessity of creating a State able to promote the principle of nationality, on the one 
hand, and collective freedom, on the other, can be cited as evidence against those 
historiographical verdicts regarding, instead, 1848 and the 1850s as two separate moments 
in his intellectual and political formation. The same reasoning can be extended to the political 
implications of Bertrando’s philosophical sensitivity and, in this sense, his views on freedom 
of teaching can provide the necessary evidence: central to his writings on this topic was a 
discussion of freedom that closely reflected its Hegelian formulation. 
Unlike his brother Silvio, who had championed an ideal of unmediated freedom, 
Bertrando regarded it as stemming from the dialectical interplay of its particular 
individuations. In other words, consistent with Hegel’s Grundlinien, and on the basis of the 
historical observation of past political change, he did believe that a State’s activity had to 
necessarily revolve around the promotion of collective freedom, warning, at the same time, 
against an indiscriminate adoption of its individual counterpart, deemed to ultimately 
threaten the synthetic unity of society. Crucially, for Spaventa, the State, via the extension of 
its policies and institutions, had to take upon itself the duty of enabling the rational mediation 
among the particular interests present in society. 
 This vision of politics lay at the core of Spaventa’s contribution to the debate on 
freedom of teaching: while the Piedmontese government had opted to diminish the extent 
of its intervention, as a means to promote individual freedom, Bertrando believed that such 
a solution might be conducive to the fragmentation of state authority and to a conflict of 
interest which the State was supposed to prevent, let alone resolve. As a result, far from being 
compatible with the conservative stance associated to it by later commentators, Spaventa’s 
political thought positioned itself in antithesis to moderate liberalism: for the Piedmontese 
government, the extent of State action had to be limited for the promotion of individual 
liberties; for Spaventa, instead, it was for the sake of collective freedom, that which Hegel 
had famously labelled “konkrete Freihet” in the Grundlinien, that it had to be maximised. 
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5. Italian Philosophy Returns Home: Italy as a Centre of European Modernity 
in Neapolitan Hegelians’ Imagination1 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Il Nazionale’s discussion of the 1848 political events, as explained in the previous chapter, 
acknowledged the Revolution’s historical necessity, seen through the lens of a composite 
Vichian-Hegelian philosophy of history. For the periodical’s founders, Bertrando and Silvio 
Spaventa, the Revolution’s “inner power”, as defined by Benedetto Croce, stemmed from the 
force of “the new ideas that direct Europe today”.2 This exemplified how, in Neapolitan 
Hegelians’ imagination, the consolidation of Italy’s national character was not only fuelled by 
endogenous forces and initiatives, but also determined on the basis of the country’s 
participation in a new, modern, European dimension of political and intellectual life. At a time 
when a federation of the existing states remained the preferred option for many thinkers in 
various parts of the peninsula and especially in the South, Hegelians in Naples not only saw 
the creation of a national state as historically necessary, but also gave the Italian question a 
broader, European resonance. Obtaining a vantage point for Italy in the life of modern 
European nations was, in their view, just as important as unifying it. 
The intersection of nationalist and cosmopolitan motives proposed by Neapolitan 
Hegelians was a response to European and Italian debates negotiating a definition of 
modernity on the basis of an asymmetrical relationship between the hegemony of a modern 
“light from the North” and its deviant, anti-modern opposite.3 In Europeans’ imagination, the 
dichotomy between a progressive, modern centre and a backward periphery led to the 
                                                           
1 Sections of this chapter will be included in: De Arcangelis, A. (2018) The Cosmopolitan Morphology of the 
National Discourse: Italy as a European Centre of Intellectual Modernity, to be featured in Hauswedell, T., Körner, 
A. & Tiedau, U. (eds.) Remapping Centre and Periphery: Asymmetrical Encounters in European and Global 
Contexts. London: UCL Press. Volume in preparation 
2 Il Nazionale (2.5.1848) La necessità della rivoluzione, XLVIII, p. 2; Croce, B. (1898) Silvio Spaventa. Dal 1848 al 
1861. Lettere, scritti, documenti, p. 24 
3 Hazard, P. (1953) The European Mind: the Critical Years, 1680-1715, pp. 53-59; see also: Dainotto, R. (2007) 
Europe (in Theory), p. 4 
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systematic association of Italy with the mental category of a “European south”.4 Seen in this 
context, southern Hegelians’ contribution has often been neglected by historians proposing 
an increasingly transnational understanding of Italian national character-building during the 
1800s, despite their successful efforts to highlight the South’s contribution to the 
Risorgimento and, more generally, to ideas of Italian modernity.5 Addressing this scholarly 
imbalance is the prime objective of the current chapter. It will begin, in section two, with an 
overview of the debates leading to a new articulation of modern Europe’s intellectual 
geography, placing particular attention on Italians’ responses, especially those deploying an 
orientalised image of the country to bolster a nationalist discourse, such as the works of 
Cesare Balbo, Giuseppe Ferrari and Giacomo Leopardi. The goal of this section is to illustrate 
how certain notions, such as the perceived decadence of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Italian political and cultural landscapes, or the lack of participation in the protestant 
Reformation, were adopted, both in the peninsula and abroad, to diagnose Italy’s alleged 
anti-modern character and its “otherness” in present-day Europe.  
Section three will focus on Italian thinkers’ attempts to respond to the indiscriminate 
characterisation of the country as peripheral. An analysis of these is particularly relevant to 
the study of Neapolitan Hegelianism, as they constituted the proximal context for Southern 
thinkers’ responses. Two authors will be considered in detail: Vincenzo Cuoco, whose 
relevance to southern Hegelians was already introduced in chapters two and four of this 
thesis, and Vincenzo Gioberti. The former’s Platone in Italia, published in 1806, and the 
latter’s Del primato morale e civile degli italiani, published in 1843, will be seen as attempts 
to subvert the notion of Italian alterity, by invoking the principle of Italy’s “historical primacy”, 
a notion that clearly did not sit well with southern intellectual’s sensibilities.  
Their reaction to these debates will be the central concern of section four. This will 
begin with a discussion of the intellectual outlook common among southern thinkers, who 
aimed at championing not only the centrality of Italian philosophy in the making of modern 
                                                           
4 Moe, N. (2002) The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and Southern Question, pp. 13-36; see also Chabod, F. 
(1961) Storia dell’idea d’Europa, pp. 45-46; Landes, D. (1996) Radici sociali e culturali dello sviluppo europeo, pp. 
117-44; Petraccone, C. (2000) Le due civiltà: settentrionali e meridionali, pp. 11-23; Salvatorelli, L. (1959) 
Pensiero e azione del Risorgimento, pp. 123-24 
5 see, for example: Davis, J. (2006) Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1760-
1860; Duggan, C. (2007) The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796; Isabella, M. (2009) Risorgimento in 
Exile. Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era; Patriarca, S. (2010) Italian Vices: 
Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic; Riall, L. (1994) The Italian Risorgimento: State, 
Society and National Unification 
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European thought, but also the interconnectedness of the various national traditions. Among 
southern authors’ contributions, particular attention will be focused on Stefano Cusani and 
Stanislao Gatti, whose articles written in Neapolitan periodicals during the late 1830s and 
early ‘40s focused on the perceived thematic and methodological continuities among the 
various national traditions of the continent. Their observations and attempted to challenge 
the idea that modern philosophy ought to be categorised along national lines. As it was the 
case in the previous chapters, the emphasis on Cusani and Gatti’s journalistic output 
represents an attempt to draw historians’ attention to generally overlooked authors and 
contexts: not only are their names completely absent in anglophone studies engaging with 
the intellectual history of the Risorgimento, but they are also too often ignored by Italian 
scholarship univocally singling out Bertrando Spaventa’s most famous text, La filosofia 
italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea, composed in 1860-61, as Neapolitan 
Hegelians’ only attempt to engage with the idea of Europe.6 
This does not mean, however, that the importance of Spaventa’s best-known 
contribution ought to be reconsidered. On the contrary, this chapter will maintain that an 
even more compelling understanding of La filosofia italiana can be obtained by viewing the 
genesis of this text in relation to commonly overlooked contexts. Among these, Bertrando’s 
Turinese years in the 1850s were no less important – and, unfortunately, no less neglected by 
historians – than the Neapolitan intellectual landscape of the 1830s and ‘40s. Spaventa built 
upon Gatti and Cusani’s views in articles published in Turin, further contributing to the 
identification of fifteenth-, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy as the birthplace of 
modern European philosophy.  
Plotted against Bertrando’s earlier writings, La filosofia italiana can then be 
appreciated in its originality: first, by perpetuating Neapolitan Hegelians’ broader outlook, 
this text further expanded on the author’s earlier identification of the Italian Renaissance as 
the cradle of modern thought. Second, it drew attention to how, thanks to thematic and 
methodological affinities between nineteenth-century Italian and European intellectuals, 
Italian philosophy could be said to be “returning” to its birthplace, albeit in a mature, more 
                                                           
6 Gallo, F. (2012) Philosophical Revolution and the Shaping of European Consciousness: Bertrando Spaventa’s ‘La 
Filosofia Italiana nelle Sue Relazioni colla Filosofia Europea’, pp. 213-22; Origo, G. (2011) Bertrando Spaventa 
interprete di Bruno, Vico ed Hegel, pp. 143-67; Rota, G. (2005) La circolazione del pensiero secondo Bertrando 
Spaventa, pp. 655-86 
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developed, form. Additionally, when seen as a response to Gioberti’s Primato, La filosofia 
italiana represented Spaventa’s most passionate effort to challenge an understanding of 
modernity that emphasised the hegemonic positions of certain nations over others, 
underlining, instead, how the making modern European thought rested on the ongoing 
dialogue and non-competitive encounter of the various national traditions. Simply put, 
according to Spaventa and the other Neapolitan Hegelians, the development of modern 
philosophy depended on what one may call, even if in a rather anachronistic manner, 
transnational intellectual exchanges.  
Lastly, by showing how the idea of Europe was at the forefront of southern Hegelians’ 
preoccupations, this chapter will reveal another use of the Vichian-Hegelian historicism 
developed in the context of Neapolitan private schools, initially discussed in chapter three of 
this thesis. While chapter four discussed how these ideas were used in connection with 
Risorgimento political thought, the present one will show how southern thinkers, by 
articulating a deeply historicised account of European thought, succeeded in reimagining the 
relationship among the national traditions that constituted it. Understanding European 
thought as inherently “circular” ultimately enabled Spaventa and his fellow Hegelians not only 
to make Italian philosophy an integral part of the intellectual space of experience of the 
continent, but also effectively to negotiate a vantage point for their country among modern 
European nations. 
 
 
 
5.2. Italy as a European “Other” 
 
Italy’s systematic marginalisation in the definition of modernity did not stem from a distinct 
anti-Italian bias, but from European intellectuals’ efforts to present their own countries as the 
epitome of the continent’s social, cultural and political achievements. Rather than signalling 
a denigratory attitude towards Italy, therefore, these views should be regarded as self-
referential attempts to construct an image of modernity that gradually minimised the 
contributions of other countries. Italy was perhaps the most illustrious victim of this logic and 
the range of arguments invoked was remarkably diversified: the peninsula’s climate, its 
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“southern character”, its having remained untouched by the Protestant Reformation, as well 
as the perceived lack of civil liberties were frequently referenced to support the idea that, 
despite the widely acknowledged achievements of Italian humanism and Renaissance, as well 
as early modern science, present-day Italy was distinctly “less modern” than other regions of 
the continent. These tendencies were already visible in the French Enlightenment tradition: 
in 1721, Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes described Italy as a periphery of the continent, a 
country “empty and depopulated”, presenting itself as the mere “debris of that ancient Italy 
that was so famous in the past”.7 Later on, the 1748 treatise De l’esprit des lois translated 
these considerations into a broader thematisation of a “northern” and a “southern” European 
character, marking southern populations as savage, backward and violent, as opposed to the 
civilised Northerners’ natural inclination towards the attainment of liberty.8 
 Contributions to Diderot’s Encyclopédie, then, often acted as an echo chamber to 
Montesquieu’s verdicts, ranging from Louis de Jaucourt’s explanation of Italy’s present 
backwardness on the basis of its historical decadence, to Voltaire’s proposition of a 
Francocentric vision of European modernity. These perspectives contributed to the 
progressive orientalisation of northern Europe’s perceived opposite, most prominently 
identified with the continent’s southern periphery.9 These debates provided the context for 
increasingly politicised arguments during the nineteenth century: Charles-Victor de 
Bonstetten’s 1824 text L’homme du midi et l’homme du nord, for example, traced a 
sociocultural history of the dichotomy between northern and southern characters, arguing 
against the latter’s capacity to sustain effective reforms and enjoy political and economic 
stability, due to its emphasis on passions and emotions, lack of organisation, culture and 
reason.10  
Between 1807 and 1818, the Genevan Jean-Charles-Léonard Simonde Sismondi 
published his monumental Histoire des républiques Italiennes du moyen-âge, one of the best-
known accounts of nineteenth-century Italy’s allegedly anti-modern character. Tracing the 
                                                           
7 Montesquieu, C. L. (1721) Lettres Persanes, pp. 149, 183 
8 Montesquieu, C. L. (1748) De l’Esprit des Lois, p. 355 
9 de Jaucourt, L. (1765) Italie, VIII, p. 932; Voltaire (1765) Histoire, VIII, pp. 222-23; already in his 1751 work Siècle 
de Louis XIV, then, Voltaire had discussed a process of cultural and political modernisation initially spearheaded 
by France, famously defined “legislator of Europe”, and later extended to Britain and Germany, while Italy, a 
“divided” country, was left to “languish”. (Voltaire (1751) Siècle de Louis XIV, pp. 14, 32-35) 
10 de Bonstetten, C. (1824) L’homme du midi et l’homme du nord, ou, l’influence du climat, pp. 34-41, 132-38, 
145-51 
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origin of modern European civic liberty back to fourteenth-century Italian city-states, 
Sismondi praised the “energy of liberty” (“énergie de liberté”) informing the political history 
of the peninsula’s comuni, viewing them as the birthplace of modern civic virtues.11 Yet, 
according to Sismondi, things changed from the fifteenth century onwards: tyrannical forms 
of government emerged in northern Italy and the absence of a Protestant Reformation 
granted Catholicism a hegemonic power. These factors ultimately eroded Italy’s “énergie”, 
corrupted the country’s national character and paved the way for its progressive 
marginalisation in the continental context.12 
In 1828, François Guizot’s Cours d’histoire moderne, placed special attention on the 
significance of the Protestant Reformation in European history, suggesting that this had 
produced “a prodigious advancement to the activity and liberty of thought” and “a grand 
tendency to the emancipation of government”, and marked a decisive turning point in the 
emergence of a distinctly European, modern conception of political and intellectual life.13 
Guizot’s verdict on the southern peripheries of the continent, particularly Italy and Spain, 
regarded as prime examples of “countries where the religious revolution did not penetrate, 
or was early stifled, or was unable to gain any development” was wholeheartedly negative: 
in these countries, he claimed, “the human mind was not enfranchised”, and would inevitably 
fall into “weakness and inertness”.14 
These views were not, in any case, exclusively featured in historiographical verdicts 
emphasising France’s importance in the definition of European modernity. Especially in the 
nineteenth century, these debates were frequently approached from a Germanocentric 
perspective. Even in these cases, however, Italy and the Southern regions by and large were 
ultimately relegated to a position of subordination. Mme de Staël was among the first 
proponents of this new imaginary geography of the continent.15 Having already rejected the 
notion of French hegemony in the making of modern Europe in her 1799 essay De la 
littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales, de Staël traced, in her 
                                                           
11 Ruehl, M. (2015) The Italian Renaissance in German Historical Imagination, 1860-1930, p. 63; see also 
Ferguson, W. K. (1948) The Renaissance in Historical Thought, pp. 127, 145-46 
12 Simonde de Sismondi, J. C. L. (1840) Histoire des républiques italiennes du moyen-âge, IV, pp. 70-73; VII, p. 
394; VIII, p. 2; see also: Patriarca, S. (2010) Italian Vices. Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the 
Republic, pp. 37-39, 69 
13 Guizot, F. (1828) Cours d’histoire moderne. Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de 
l’empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française, XII, pp. 205-06 
14 ibid., p. 206 
15 Dainotto, R. (2007), p. 143-46 
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1810 work De l’Allemagne, a socio-cultural anthropology of Germany functional to her 
notorious hostility to Napoleonic France.16 A product of De Staël’s years in exile, De 
l’Allemagne was initially conceived following Bonaparte’s victory over Prussian troops at Jena 
in October 1806.17 It erected a largely idealised and romanticised image of the German 
“spirit” (“esprit”) that served to challenge Napoleonic France’s hegemonic self-
understanding.18 The author’s cultural observations lent themselves to political implications: 
“Germany”, she wrote, “can be considered the heart of Europe, and the great continental 
association will never be able to recover its freedom if not through the freedom of this 
country”.19 
According to De Staël, thanks to the strength of its virtues, civic spirit and cultural 
heritage, Germany had imposed itself, particularly in the wake of the Protestant Reformation, 
as the leading force in the process of European modernisation.20 Unsurprisingly, Italy was 
described as fundamentally alien to this process. This argument was developed in both 
essays: in De la littérature, the peninsula, due to its political fragmentation, the presence of 
despotism and superstition, was regarded to be fated to emulate foreign models.21 In De 
l’Allemagne, the country’s intellectual parochialism was then deemed to have been the chief 
cause of Italy’s inability to engage in a “universal” dimension of cultural life.22 
In 1820, Hegel concluded his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts with an 
illustration of four “world-historical realms” (“welthistorischen Reiche”), corresponding to 
the stages of Spirit’s self-realisation in history.23 These realms, whose discussion would later 
constitute the bulk of his lectures on philosophy of history, established Spirit’s movement as 
proceeding from East to West: beginning in the “Oriental” realm, it then developed into the 
“Greek” and “Roman” ones, before fully realising itself in the “Germanic” world.24 Hegel’s 
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depiction of the “germanische Reich” as the result of history’s inner dialectics was an attempt 
to place protestant Europe at the centre of the modern world.25 
In a section of his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte entitled die Neue 
Zeit, he then insisted on Germany’s centrality in the development of world history. His focus 
was on the experience of the Protestant Reformation.26 This event was described as an “all-
enlightening sun” leading to the objective actualisation of “the subjective Spirit in truth” and 
the realisation of freedom.27 The philosopher then identified the Reformation’s “essence” 
with the emancipatory intuition that “man is destined to be free”.28 This event, however, 
despite its universal significance, was described as a product of German genius.29 Applauding 
the “pure inwardness of the German spirit” as “the proper soil for the emancipation of Spirit”, 
Hegel portrayed a vision of modern Europe whereby all the countries (such as Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) that had not experienced the emancipatory value of the Reformation 
maintained “in the very depth of their soul the principle of disharmony”, thereby suddenly 
acquiring a peripheral status.30 The Reformation, in this sense, had a dual significance in 
Hegel’s Vorlesungen: on the one hand, it enabled the full emancipation of the Weltgeist and 
the objective realisation of freedom in history; on the other, being a fundamentally German 
phenomenon, it granted Germany a hegemonic status in the latest stage of world history.31 
Countries excluded from this picture, most notably those belonging to the continent’s 
southern periphery, were not only regarded as backward, but also anti-historical. 
European intellectuals’ reflections on Italy’s alterity vis-à-vis other continental powers 
soon attracted Italians’ attention, triggering a wide variety of responses. Broadly speaking, 
these could be grouped into three categories: the first category comprised verdicts endorsing 
an orientalised image of Italy in the European context, often deploying this intuition as a 
means to encourage the proliferation of a nationalist discourse over a cosmopolitan one; the 
second encompassed verdicts attempting to rethink the general co-ordinates of the 
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continent’s imaginary geography; among these, the third category contained verdicts that 
operated a downright rejection of Italy’s perceived marginality, by attempting to illustrate the 
peninsula’s historical centrality in the political and cultural landscape of the continent.  
 Especially during the nineteenth century, the negotiation of a vantage point for Italy 
in the life of modern European nations often intersected with the narrative of the country’s 
unification, sometimes contributing to a problematic juxtaposition of cosmopolitan and 
nationalist tendencies, as underlined by several twentieth-century commentators.32 A clear 
example of these two motives’ confluence was represented by views advanced by Cesare 
Balbo, whose vocal support for the cause of the unification was informed, to a large extent, 
by the recognition of Italy’s inherent “otherness” and marginality in the European context. In 
the 1843 text Delle speranze d’Italia, he identified, championing a markedly iconoclastic 
stance, the cause of Italy’s perceived alterity vis-à-vis the other European power with the 
fragmentation of political liberties and the presence of foreign domination during the 
Renaissance.33 
According to Balbo, the sixteenth century, had been “nothing more than a splendid 
and happy-go-lucky free fall”. In his view, two symptoms were particularly concerning: first, 
Balbo mentioned divisions caused by the lack of a political culture encouraging national 
unification initiatives and emancipation from foreign powers; second, he reported an overall 
cultural decadence, explaining that this was due to repeated failures to organise cultural 
production along the lines of a genuine, national and autochthonous, heritage.34 Balbo was 
certainly aware that the Italian national character being shaped and negotiated during the 
Risorgimento rested on an extremely unstable basis and believed that the country’s 
idiosyncratic, difficult path towards a European dimension of political modernity in the 
nineteenth century ought to be attributed to its past, which was marked by political and 
cultural fragmentation.35 
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The republican Giuseppe Ferrari advanced similar views. In 1837, he defined the 
sixteenth century an “enigma”, marked by the experience of “a splendid crisis”, and 
characterised by fundamental political and cultural divisions.36 While other powers of the 
continent were embarking on their emancipatory enterprises by undertaking a series of 
“centralising” initiatives, Italy “remained motionless in its past”, and fundamentally alien to 
the experience of “the great European passions, ideas and struggles”.37 Crucially, for Ferrari, 
the definition of Italy as “a motionless nation, which, pulled along by Europe, witnessed the 
great spectacle of the modern era, albeit without understanding it” reflected the 
acknowledgment of other nations’ hegemonic position from the sixteenth century onwards: 
more specifically, France was believed to be destined, in the wake of the Napoleonic 
experience, to act as a guide to all other nations of the continent.38  
The poet Giacomo Leopardi, then, reprised, during the early 1820s, Winckelmann’s 
inquiries on the Mediterranean character of southern European cultural production, 
amalgamating them with de Staël’s geopolitical arguments, in his 1824 Discorso sopra lo stato 
presente dei costumi degl’Italiani. In this text, the “ancient” character of the Italian peninsula 
was contrasted with the “modern spirit” of northern European nations, concluding that one 
can find a genuine “image of modernity” only among the latter.39 As a result, Leopardi 
resolutely claimed that “the North’s time has come”.40 Similar views were expressed in the 
posthumously published Zibaldone di pensieri, in which he repeatedly referenced 
Montesquieu’s observations alongside de Staël’s, in order to support the notion of “modern 
northerners’ superiority”, or in one of his Operette morali, where the definition of “modern 
civil nations” went hand-in-hand with the illustration of northern European bourgeois 
society.41 
Italy’s perceived alterity in the context of European modernity, however, was often 
re-imagined by authors of the peninsula, in ways that questioned this imaginary geography, 
on the one hand, and sometimes restricted notions of “backwardness” and “ancient 
character” to the sole context of southern Italy, on the other. It is important to notice that 
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many of these contributions, by relying on the growing popularity of the press, succeeded in 
shaping the views of a wider public, both in southern and, even more noticeably, northern 
Italy.42 While Neapolitan periodicals such as Omnibus and, even more prominently, Poliorama 
pittoresco frequently drew comparisons between northern Europe’s technological and 
economic advancements and the Greco-Roman heritage of the Italian peninsula, northern 
periodicals, predominantly the Milan-based Cosmorama pittorico, adopted a noticeably 
different stance.43 Already in 1836, Cosmorama had begun adopting geopolitical and 
anthropological observations as the basis for derogatory judgments on the “barbarous” 
Mezzogiorno. This was especially evident in the way the asymmetry between northern and 
southern Italy was imagined in relation to the wider fracture between northern and southern 
Europe. Lombardy, in fact, was often described as a prime embodiment of the modern 
European spirit, inhabited by “the most cultured people in the world” and its socio-economic 
organisation and technological advancement usually equated to an inherently European 
notion of progress.44 This was often described using very emphatic language: the “great 
industry”, “excellent infrastructure”, “clean architecture” and “optimal economy” of Milan 
and the neighbouring regions were frequently compared to those of the “great” European 
capitals: London, Paris and Amsterdam; the Mezzogiorno, then, was systematically described 
as untouched by these signs of progress. An article, in particular, while highlighting the 
“European character” of northern cities, pointed at the impossibility to observe the same in 
those of the Mezzogiorno, characterised by a “primitive” degree of civilisation.45 
It was accordingly against an indiscriminate characterisation of Italy as the peripheral, 
Southern country par excellence that many Italian authors often directed their efforts. The 
most notable of these was by the Lombard economist Melchiorre Gioia. In 1825, his 
Reflections on Charles-Victor de Bonstetten’s The Man of the South and the Man of the North 
openly attempted to rethink the notion of European “southernness” by restricting it to the 
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sole context of the Mezzogiorno. He challenged several sections of the Swiss writer’s text, 
arguing that “the author attributes to all of Italy a custom which he observed in the noble 
houses of Rome and Naples”.46 He then claimed that northern Italy, thanks to the presence 
of successful economic institutions and progressive forms of social life similar to those 
observable in northern European capitals, exhibited a kind of behaviour and social 
organisation consistent with the idea of a northern, modern bourgeois society. Gioia 
consequently urged to rethink the conventional North-South dichotomy, conceding that 
southern Italy was, in many respects, more prominently “southern” than any other region of 
the continent.47 
 In spite of the variety of notions invoked to support it and of the numerous attempts 
made to rethink its coordinates, the idea of Italian alterity still remained present in many 
contributions to nineteenth-century cultural imagination, greatly contributing to the earliest 
thematisation of that which would later come to be labelled “Southern Question” 
(“Questione Meridionale”). Yet, what appears evident on the basis of the evidence presented 
above is the emphasis on the temporal dimension of these debates. Alongside notions of 
climate and geography, intellectuals in Italy and abroad began articulating a mental 
geography of the continent that resulted from an increasingly teleological understanding of 
its history: modernity was consistently imagined in connection with a “northern” space of 
experience. To borrow Reinhart Koselleck’s vocabulary, it was precisely within the chasm 
between their space of experience and horizon of expectations that the ideal of modernity 
embodied by other nations, such as Italy, came to be seen as defective, marking their alterity 
in a European context.48 
For Italians, challenging their country’s perceived peripheral status required an 
operation going well beyond its positive re-evaluation in the context of present-day Europe: 
for Italy to be seen as truly modern, in fact, it was first and foremost necessary to rethink the 
relationship between its past and its future, showing how the former, if “made present”, was 
able to disclose a future from which the present derived its expectations. Unsurprisingly, 
Italian reactions to the country’s characterisation as peripheral often took the form of re-
writings of the its history, aiming at demonstrating how its relationship to other European 
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powers was not one teleologically leading to its marginalisation. Among nineteenth-century 
contributors to these debates, two authors stood out due to the impact of their ideas: 
Vincenzo Cuoco and Vincenzo Gioberti. 
 
 
 
5.3. Challenging the Asymmetry, Re-imagining History: National Primacy and European 
Hegemony 
 
With European and Italian debates on national identity-building vis-à-vis transnational images 
of modernity, coupled with the systematic acknowledgment of certain nations’ hegemonic 
position in the nineteenth century, constituting the broader intellectual context for Italian 
intellectuals’ negotiation of their patria’s position within a new, modern, experience of 
temporality, the early decades of the 1800s witnessed the increasing juxtaposition of 
nationalist tendencies and cosmopolitan sensibilities. In a nutshell, intellectuals’ observations 
on the construction and consolidation of an Italian national character were plotted against 
broader considerations on how this ought to stand in relation to other European nations.49  
The earliest example of a re-writing of the Italian past able to illuminate the country’s 
relation to other European powers in the present and direct it in the future can be found in 
an often-overlooked text by Vincenzo Cuoco, published between 1804 and 1806: the 
epistolary novel Platone in Italia, with which, as this chapter shall explain in the next section, 
Neapolitan Hegelians would repeatedly take issue during the 1840s and ‘50s. Cuoco, who fled 
Naples following King Ferdinand IV’s retaliation against the supporters of the Neapolitan 
Republic briefly established in 1799 by the French, devoted this work to the pursuit of a clear 
goal: championing the need for Italy to acquire a unified national cultural and philosophical 
character in order to stand tall in the contemporary philosophical landscape of Europe. This 
intention was easily discernible in his intellectual preoccupations during those years. Already 
in 1804, for instance, Cuoco highlighted the need to shape “the public spirit of the nation”, 
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and “engage, at least with our thought, with other nations, growing accustomed to 
considering the glory of Italy as a shared one”.50  
Platone in Italia was presented as a translation of an imaginary ancient Greek 
manuscript, detailing Plato’s fictional trip to Southern Italy. In the book, the philosopher 
visited a number of small communities, displaying strikingly progressive customs, such as the 
complete emancipation of women among the Sannites, excellent organization skills, a very 
creative language, a peaceful behaviour and sheer brilliance in the scientific and intellectual 
domains. These talents were associated to an obscure “Pythagorean genius”, which Cuoco’s 
Plato, following Giambattista Vico’s notion of Antiquissima italorum sapientia, saw as central 
in the making of Italy’s national character: “I venture to say”, he pointed out, “that Pythagoras 
never existed; he is rather an idea conjured up by people to denote a system of cognitions 
whose origins are very ancient, and that has been conserved and handed down through a 
board of wise men who were born and raised in Italy”, whom Cuoco identified with the 
Etruscans, the true bearers of the Vichian “most ancient wisdom of the Italians”.51   
This intuition led Plato to acknowledge the Italians’ superiority over the Greeks, as 
“these nations that we deem barbaric have been cultured long before us”.52  Cuoco’s Platone 
in Italia can be read as a metaphor for the encounter, in the nineteenth century, of the Italian 
and the French nations: the Greeks’ boastfulness and overinflated sense of pride was 
dramatically challenged by the contemplation of Italians’ “Pythagorean genius”. Therefore, 
just as Cuoco’s Plato was forced to admit Italy’s cultural superiority over Greece, foreign 
observers in the present, especially the French, must acknowledge the uniqueness of the 
peninsula’s tradition and its historical intellectual primacy over Europe, informed by a notion 
of an “ancient Italian genius” borrowed from Vico. 
An investigation of the notion of primacy is, in this context, crucial in order to make 
sense of Italy’s relationship with the European intellectual landscape of the nineteenth 
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century, but any analysis of this concept is complicated by the fact that it served a dual 
purpose: on the one hand, it allowed Italian thinkers to appeal to their tradition to challenge 
their marginalisation in the continental context; on the other, it often erected a wall around 
the country’s cultural heritage, rendering it untouchable and fundamentally hostile to foreign 
influences. While the transnational implications of the concept of primacy remain an open 
question, the relevance of this concept to the discourse of the Unification cannot be in doubt: 
projecting this idea onto debates concerned with Italy’s cultural emancipation, Cuoco 
contributed to defining Italians as a cohesive and organic unit, thereby popularizing the belief, 
which he had borrowed from Vico, in unified nations as reflections of shared cultural 
heritages and traditions. 
Following Cuoco’s exhortation to embrace Italy’s great tradition, one could observe 
the proliferation of works adopting a similar line of argumentation: Ugo Foscolo’s 1807 poem 
I sepolcri praised the resilience of the Italian national character, positing that a newfound 
cultural cohesion ought to be established on the example of the men of genius of the past, 
whom the author referred to as “Itale glorie”, ultimately inciting Italians to action and urging 
them to take a stronger stance against French hegemony in the peninsula and the rest of the 
continent.53 Giuseppe Micali’s 1810 book L’Italia avanti il dominio de’romani went even 
further back, connecting the efforts of the present with the shared pre-Roman origin of the 
Italian people, and presented, in a manner similar to Cuoco’s, a deptiction of Etruscans’ 
superiority over the Romans as a metaphor for Italy’s primacy over other nineteenth-century 
European nations.54 Lastly, Angelo Mazzoldi’s 1840 Delle origini italiche e della diffusione 
dell’incivilimento italiano linked the historical origin of the Italian nation with Plato’s allegory 
of Atlantis, the fictitious embodiment of the ideal city-state detailed in the Republic, to 
symbolize the historical intellectual superiority of Italy over its continental counterparts.55  
In any case, while these works differed insofar as they tended to locate the origin of 
an Italian national culture in different areas and historical periods, their most striking shared 
features were a passionate cult of the past, on the one hand, and the tendency to positively 
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re-evaluate Italian history in order to gain a position of prominence within nineteenth-century 
Europe, on the other. It is difficult, however, to see how the primacy of Italy, which, according 
to Foscolo, was still observable with Machiavelli and Galileo, could be rescued from a sterile 
cult of the past and be fully projected onto the context of the nineteenth century, especially 
given the presence of debates, both in Italy and abroad, emphasising the fundamentally 
peripheral character of present-day Italy.56 New questions emerged: is Italy’s primacy still 
observable in the present? How would it inform the country’s relation to other European 
powers? 
An answer to these questions appeared in 1843, when Vincenzo Gioberti’s essay Del 
primato morale e civile degli italiani proposed a solution to the problem of the Unification 
that indicated, at the same time, how the country was to stand in relation to its European 
peers. Gioberti’s book invoked a reprise of Guelph federalism, arguing in favour of the full 
liberation from foreign influences and the transformation of Italy into a confederation of the 
existing states, with the Pope acting as a symbolic head of the union.57 As explained in chapter 
four of this thesis, Gioberti’s political programme was not well-received among Neapolitan 
Hegelians, whose theorisation of a unitary national state was fundamentally at odds with the 
neo-guelph views common in much of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the rest of Italy. 
At the same time, their opposition went beyond a strictly political domain and targeted, in 
particular, the book’s reading of Italian history within that of Europe. Gioberti’s project, in 
fact, stemmed from wider considerations on the historical character of the Italian nation, 
labelled “the religious nation par excellence” and the ways in which the Church had granted 
its historical primacy over its European counterparts. The Turinese philosopher saw the 
Church as an inherently national institution, and as the chief source of Italy’s cultural unity 
and prosperity in the past, as well as a guide to follow if the country was to carve out 
prominence for itself in contemporary European politics.58   
Ever since Roman times, Gioberti argued, the historical development of Italian culture 
was inextricably linked with Rome’s position at the core of Christian Europe, granting a 
favourable position over the rest of the continent. Even after the end of the Roman Empire, 
the Church managed to preserve unity and cohesion, at least in terms of shared tradition and 
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customs, among the people of the peninsula. Divisions emerged concomitantly with the 
Protestant Reformation, not only in terms of the immediate challenge posited to the unity of 
Christianity, but also, and, in Gioberti’s view, even more dramatically, because of the 
introduction of foreign “barbarian”, subjectivist and empiricist, ideas into the philosophical 
landscape of the peninsula.59   
For these reasons, Italy found itself in a position of subordination to the emerging 
European powers such as France, England and Prussia. France, in particular, was targeted with 
remarkable force: the actions of Charles VIII, Louis XIV and, later on, Napoleon, were accused 
of having challenged Italy’s aspirations to independence and contributed to spreading a 
tendency to “corrupt, maim and uproot” the principles of Revelation, by encouraging a blind 
obedience to the ideas of Renée Descartes.60  As a result, Italian culture, tainted with a servile 
imitation of foreign ideas, ideologies and institutions, engaged with the rest of Europe in a 
relationship of dependence, strongly hindering, on the one hand, the country’s unique 
spiritual status and, on the other, preventing the flourishing of the local, native culture. 
The acknowledgment of the asymmetrical nature characterizing Italy’s relationship 
with the rest of Europe from the Reformation onwards did not prevent Gioberti from offering 
a positive evaluation of the country’s historical primacy in the context of the Risorgimento. 
He boldly stated, in fact, that “Italy features within itself, mainly thanks to religion, all the 
necessary conditions for its national and political Risorgimento”, arguing against Mazzinian 
revolutionary ideals and the dependence on foreign intervention.61 Key to this goal, he 
suggested, was the consolidation of national culture, along the principles informing the 
historical pre-eminence of the Church in the intellectual life of Italy, as well as the 
perpetuation of its centrality in politics, a programme seen as unquestionably consistent with 
the country’s history.62  However, while both in its historical analysis and its propositions for 
the Risorgimento, the book revealed an interest for the cultural and political dynamics of the 
wider continent, it did not adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, but a nationalist one. More 
specifically, Gioberti’s argument rested on the idea that the relationship between Italian and 
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foreign culture must be radically altered, with preference given to native forces over external 
ones. 
This hostility towards foreign influences, already visible in Antonio Rosmini’s 1830 
essay Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee, achieved wide popularity thanks to the 
dissemination of Gioberti’s Primato, circulated in virtually all regions of Italy and especially 
well-received in Naples.63 Francesco De Sanctis recounted, in his autobiography La giovinezza, 
how, upon reading the book, he immediately identified it as the ideological forerunner of a 
new, rapidly growing, school of thought that championed the absolute primacy of the Italian 
language, rhetoric, style and culture at large, rejecting any engagement with its European 
counterparts.64  This was not an uncommon tendency in Neapolitan Hegelians’ immediate 
context: De Sanctis himself, for instance, had been a student of Basilio Puoti’s, whose private 
school of literature had emerged, from the 1820s onwards, as the most vocal proponent of 
literary purism, a current upholding the imitation of Italian language and literature of the 
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, in direct opposition to the French inflections perceivable 
in various other regions of the peninsula. 
 Similarly, Luigi Palmieri, appointed professor of philosophy and logic at the University 
of Naples in 1847, believed in the need to prevent the spread of the dangerous “German 
pantheism” in national culture. He encouraged, instead, the systematic re-discovery of the 
local tradition: “In declaring myself openly to be a loyal follower of our native thought”, he 
claimed in the introductory lecture of his course, “I cannot but reprove the repeated attempts 
to enable certain foreign doctrines to take root among us. Today we are infested with German 
encroachments because there are some teachers who would indoctrinate our youth with 
German pantheism, especially with that brand which is rigged out in the imposing and 
grandiose cloak of George Frederich Hegel”.65  
Gioberti and Palmieri’s examples of hostility towards foreign ideas taking root in Italy 
could hardly represent an encouraging background for what concerns the projection of the 
country toward a European dimension of modernity, let alone the attainment of a vantage 
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point in the intellectual landscape of the continent. Especially in Gioberti’s Primato, one can 
identify the same logic characterising Piedmontese debates during the 1830s and ‘40s: 
because Italy had been acquiring an increasingly peripheral status from the sixteenth century 
onwards, promoting a nationalist perspective was seen as fundamentally antithetical to 
encouraging a cosmopolitan one. As a result, while Gioberti and his peers’ arguments 
attempted to strengthen national identity and cultural unity via a positive re-evaluation of 
the country’s history, they remained ambiguous with regard to the relevance of its past 
primacy in the present, thus failing to articulate the progressive character of the country’s 
intellectual forces in the nineteenth-century European intellectual landscape. 
Even more importantly, their attempts to champion Italy’s cultural primacy, being 
grounded (to borrow, once again, Reinhart Koselleck’s vocabulary), on the positive re-
evaluation of a fundamentally idiosyncratic space of experience, ultimately resulted in the 
conceptualisation of a horizon of expectations characteristically disconnected from a 
European experience of modernity. In other words, Gioberti and, to a large extent, Cuoco’s 
nationalist attempts to “make the past present”, while genuinely animated by a desire to 
rehabilitate Italy’s national character in a European context, ultimately did little more than 
perpetuate the notion of Italian alterity. For this asymmetrical relationship to be truly 
challenged, then, a much more cosmopolitan intellectual sensitivity was required. Neapolitan 
Hegelians did not fail to live up to this challenge.   
 
 
 
5.4. Neapolitan Hegelians and the Transnational Making of European Philosophy 
 
The lack of attention placed on Neapolitan Hegelians by anglophone studies proposing an 
increasingly transnational understanding of the Risorgimento is problematised by the extent 
to which twentieth-century Italian commentators have drawn attention to their attempts to 
slot the study of the country’s philosophy within the broader picture of a European 
intellectual geography. The figure of Bertrando Spaventa was usually central to these studies. 
Commenting on his writings of the early 1860s, Benedetto Croce pointed out how, by carrying 
“the torch of idealist philosophy”, the Southern philosopher had fully managed to negotiate 
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Italy’s position in the European cultural landscape.66 Similarly, Giovanni Gentile, who edited 
and published several works by Spaventa, praised Bertrando’s idealist, Hegelian attempts to 
close the gap between Italian Renaissance tradition and modern European philosophy.67 
Lastly, Antonio Gramsci claimed, in his Prison notebooks, that Bertrando’s characteristically 
Europhile philosophical sensitivity, coupled with his direct participation in Risorgimento 
political history, had succeeded in teaching Italians how to think “globally” 
(“mondialmente”).68 
 For Bertrando, as well as the rest of the Hegelian youth, rehabilitating Italy’s national 
character in a European context was fundamentally linked with a primarily philosophical, 
historiographic and speculative, endeavour, rather than one grounded in direct political 
action. Neapolitan Hegelians’ passionate emphasis on consolidating Italy’s national character 
via the regeneration of its philosophical tradition, discussed in chapter four of the present 
thesis, was, in this sense, already clear in 1848. Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa’s involvement 
with the revolutionary periodical Il Nazionale had fully unveiled their determination to 
translate the emerging “philosophical movement” into an experience of social and political 
change, by “recuperating the lost ranks of our tradition and develop them into a doctrine able 
to cast a light upon our uncertain future”, and by embracing the consequences of this 
operation as “a social manifestation of the desired outcomes”.69 For Spaventa and the writers 
of Il Nazionale, the historical necessity of the Revolution was informed by the “irresistible” 
spread of “new ideas, ruling today over Europe” and demanding a political realisation.70 
Bertrando clarified these observation in an often-overlooked article penned in Turin in 1851, 
entitled False accuse contro l’hegelismo, in which he maintained that the genuine 
emancipation of a people depended on the cultural and philosophical regeneration of the 
local intellectual tradition: the unity and freedom of a nation, the author pointed out, could 
only be obtained thanks to “great ideas. And among these, I do not regard philosophy as 
having a marginal role, especially in Italy, were, being every purely external connection largely 
ineffective with regards to the immense endeavour of national unity, it is necessary, first of 
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all, to create an inner connection in order to resuscitate the ancient genius of the nation, 
currently toned down by present-day divisions”.71 
 The events of 1848 enabled Southern Italy not only to challenge the coordinates of an 
imaginary geography relegating Italy to a peripheral position, but also, and more importantly, 
to present itself as a European vanguard. Sicilians, for example, found pride in the fact that 
the continent’s Revolutions had started in Palermo and in the extent to which local 
revolutionaries had set an example for other Italians and Europeans.72 In the same year, Il 
Nazionale conveyed Neapolitan Hegelians’ ongoing attempts to place themselves at the 
centre of the continent’s intellectual geography, by showing that the relationship between 
the Italian and foreign traditions was one of systematic interdependence, rather than 
separation. Despite its political focus, therefore, the journal’s articles reflected Neapolitan 
Hegelians’ broader reflections on the history of modern philosophy. The development of this 
outlook was indebted to the writings of Stefano Cusani, Stanislao Gatti and Francesco De 
Sanctis, whose private schools’ contribution to the amalgamation of Vichianism and 
Hegelianism, as well as their attempts to de-provincialise present-day philosophical 
sensibilities by encouraging the study of German idealism among the local youth, were 
discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis.  
As illustrated in chapter one, for example, Cusani’s articles written in the 1830s for Il 
progresso and Museo had been extremely important in disentangling Hegel’s philosophy of 
history from Victor Cousin’s eclecticism. Yet, in attempting to show the thematic and 
methodological continuity between the emerging German idealist current and the French 
eclectic school, he hinted, already in the late 1830s, at an unmistakably transnational 
understanding of modern European thought. Furthermore, focusing especially on Cusani and 
Gatti’s reflections modern philosophy also serves another purpose: drawing historians’ 
attention to authors too often neglected by studies singling out Bertrando Spaventa’s theory 
of European thought’s circularity as Neapolitan Hegelians’ only attempt to engage with the 
idea of Europe.73 
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 Already in the late 1830s, Neapolitan Hegelians were beginning to think in increasingly 
European terms: an article by Cusani entitled Del reale obietto d’ogni filosofia e del solo 
procedimento a poterlo raggiungere, published in 1839 in Il progresso, for instance, identified 
speculative links among various national traditions, suggesting that, while these had provided 
diverging outcomes, they all shared the same preoccupation with Descartes’ theorisation of 
a tension between subjectivity and objectivity.74 For Cusani, this operation had marked the 
beginning of modernity, seen as a distinct epoch in the history of philosophy. In contrast to 
previous inquiries in the “external world”, namely nature and metaphysics, modern thought 
(“il pensiero moderno”) “folded itself inwards” to contemplate the “inner world” of man’s 
knowledge and consciousness.75 Cusani further developed these intuitions in a later article 
entitled Della scienza assoluta, in which he discussed the continuities among Locke, Condillac, 
Malebranche and Hume, claiming that their philosophies constituted different attempts to 
come to terms with the form of scepticism embedded in Descartes’ ideas.76  
Yet, it was in Del metodo filosofico e d’una sua storia that Cusani invited a much more 
detailed characterisation of the intellectual exchanges illustrated in his earlier articles, and 
hailed Immanuel Kant as the theorist of a new philosophical mentality able not only to 
mediate among competing national traditions, but to amalgamate them into a cohesive 
whole, too. Cusani’s engagement with Kantianism, despite being quite superficial, was 
nonetheless a genuine attempt to view the emergence and development of this school of 
thought as part of a broader movement of ideas, which, depending on exchanges occurring 
across national boundaries, ought to be deemed European, rather than tied to specific, 
nation-centered parameters. Cusani’s own language made this intuition very clear: his 
account of modern philosophy emphasised how “national philosophies” (“le filosofie 
nazionali”) “addressed”, “reprised”, “completed”, “reflected on”, or “responded to” one 
another. As a result, the author explained that the development of modern philosophy 
depended to not only national traditions, but also – and more importantly – their merging 
into “European schools” (“scuole europee”).77 
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The main novelty of Cusani’s contribution lay in the postulation of thematic and 
methodological links between modern German philosophy and its European predecessors: 
French sensualism, David Hume’s “universal scepticism” and the emerging idealist school in 
Germany had all been synthesised by Kant’s transcendental psychologism, which 
consequently imposed itself as the full amalgamation of “the leading principles of all 
philosophies”.78 
The vision of Europe’s philosophical modernity imagined by Cusani, however, while 
attempting to demonstrate the interdependence of various local traditions, systematically 
excluded Italians’ contributions: the Italian genius, he argued, had been severely thwarted, 
from the fifteenth century onwards, by the local “lack of erudition”, as well as the “external 
forces opposing freedom of thought”.79 Among these, special consideration was given to the 
Protestant Reformation, which, by “unsettling the political and the intellectual world”, 
marked the birthplace of “modern philosophy”.80 Italy, having remained fundamentally alien 
to this process, was relegated to a peripheral position in relation to other European powers, 
ultimately causing the philosophical sensibilities of the peninsula to remain dormant. As a 
result, particularly due to his passionate praise of Kantianism, Cusani’s vision of modern 
European thought remained a Germanocentric one, with Fichte, Schelling and, to an even 
greater extent, Hegel being praised for having rescued Kant’s ideas from their psychologist 
tendencies and translated them into a philosophy of absolute Spirit.81 
 If Cusani, then, succeeded in theorising links among various national philosophical 
traditions, but failed to rehabilitate Italy’s position in the context of modern European 
thought, his contemporary Stanislao Gatti took his reasoning to an extreme. His 1841 article 
Del progressivo svolgimento dell’idea filosofica nella storia attempted to reject the very 
categorisation of philosophy as “national”. While conceding that national distinctions were 
indeed valid as regards political organisation and social forms, Gatti claimed, adopting a very 
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Hegelian tone, that “the life of mankind lies in its ideas, unfolding and developing by 
themselves, being later embodied into facts, which are nothing more than ideas turned into 
action”.82 Tracing “the history of facts”, according to the author, was synonymous with 
interrogating “the sensible, external history of ideas”.83 Being the “principles guiding 
humanity’s speculative progress”, then, regarded as “universal”, and being “the absolute 
identity of human nature and abstract thought” independent “from any particular 
determination”, Gatti could conveniently conclude that the concept of “national philosophy” 
was logically and historically untenable.84  
 There is little doubt that Cusani and Gatti’s contributions aimed at deprovincialising 
Italian culture by encouraging the study of foreign, especially German philosophy, on the one 
hand, and at viewing its emergence and development as part of an account of European 
thought that seemed to escape national categorisations, on the other. The implications of this 
mentality went well beyond the realm of philosophy alone. Francesco De Sanctis, for example, 
who, as explained in chapter three of this thesis, contributed to the popularisation of Hegel’s 
thought in his private school and its amalgamation with Vichian historicism, applied, in his 
1845-46 lectures, Gatti and Cusani’s arguments to the sphere of literary criticism.  
 De Sanctis, adopting a clear Hegelian approach, identified three stages in the 
development of a new approach to aesthetics, realised in that which he labelled “scuola 
storica”. Initially, he argued, literary criticism had attempted to interrogate the remote causes 
informing works of art; subsequently, it proceeded to investigate “art’s immediate causes”, 
consequently focusing on individuals’ contribution to cultural production; lastly, he identified 
the third, final, moment with the dialectic synthesis of the previous two, namely the 
recognition that the source of artistic creation ought to be found in society, of which 
individuals are “an expression”.85 As a result, by contemplating both an individual and a 
collective aesthetic dimension, modern criticism had succeeded in theorising an “objective” 
understanding of artistic production.86 These observations reflected the extent to which De 
Sanctis was indebted to Gatti and Cusani, with whom he had been very well acquainted since 
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the early 1830s, as they understood that the central problem of modern philosophy had 
emerged with Descartes’ discussion of the tension between subjectivity and objectivity.87  
 Crucially, just like Cusani and Gatti, De Sanctis imagined the dialectics of various 
critical approaches as a matter of exchanges taking place beyond national contexts, leading, 
in a teleological manner, to a passionate advocacy of Hegelian aesthetics:  
 
The social or historical principle, representing a new principle added to the individual principle 
popular in French criticism, had been discovered by Vico, later embraced by Voltaire and 
ultimately perpetuated by the German historical school. Vico’s principle was: institutions 
constitute individuals. This was the exact opposite of France’s approach: individuals constitute 
institutions. Vico’s first principle, plotted against that of the French school, could not hold up 
[…], hence the need for modern German criticism.88 
 
De Sanctis’ ideal of modern aesthetics, therefore, evidently rested on a dialectic of nations, 
whereby the tension between Italian and French worldviews had been resolved by German 
intellectuals. In particular, his attention concentrated on August Wilhelm Schlegel’s 
Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur and his brother Friedrich’s Geschichte der 
alten und neueren Literatur, of which he had read Italian translations published in Milan in 
1817 and 1828, respectively.89 Consistent with the nineteenth-century Italian debates on 
Vichian historicism detailed in chapter two of this thesis, De Sanctis read the Schlegels’ 
tendency to consider literary production within the framework of a romantic conception of 
history as an attempt to plot a Vichian approach against the subjectivist tendencies of the 
French school, hence paving the way for “the greatest monument in art criticism available 
nowadays”: Hegel’s theorisation of a dialectical synthesis of a social and an individual 
principle.90 Thanks to Cusani, Gatti and De Sanctis, therefore, Neapolitan Hegelians theorised 
a definition of modern philosophy linked to exchanges among national traditions, with Gatti 
going so far as to challenge the very categorisation of philosophy along national lines. These 
perspectives, especially if seen in the context of nineteenth-century debates on the 
relationship between Italy and Europe, offered a valuable set of indications, which may be 
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able effectively to re-describe the country’s contribution to the continent’s intellectual 
history. Bertrando Spaventa promptly understood that and, especially from the 1850s 
onwards, he endeavoured to show how Italian and European philosophy were not only 
intrinsically connected, but also one and the same. 
Spaventa’s intellectual development was largely indebted to his close friendship with 
Cusani, Gatti and De Sanctis: they all attended Ottavio Colecchi’s private lectures on European 
philosophy in 1843 and frequently contributed to local periodicals. During the years spent in 
Turin, Bertrando could therefore rely on a plurality of views advanced by his fellow Hegelian 
thinkers, especially the image of European thought as characterised by exchanges across 
national borders. Evidence of this can conveniently be found in Spaventa’s preoccupation 
with the nature of modern ideas. Consistent with Gatti, in fact, he used the concept of 
“modernity” as a signifier for a profound re-orientation of philosophy’s aims and methods: 
while “ancient philosophy” had attempted to disclose “the principle of all things” within the 
realm of “absolute objectivity, may this be ideal or material”, its modern counterpart was 
concerned with “the absolute mind”. This intuition, for Spaventa, reverberated into a new, 
distinctly modern, intellectual agenda, which would investigate “the emergence, opposition 
and ultimately unity of the absolute mind’s two moments, namely infinite objectivity and 
subjectivity: the true reality of nature and the autonomy of man’s conscience”.91  
Spaventa was convinced that these speculative developments could only be decoded 
from a European point of view: “those that appear to be national philosophies […] are nothing 
other than stepping stones through which philosophical thought passes in its immortal 
course. Modern philosophy is therefore […] European”.92 At the same time, the southern 
philosopher was ready to acknowledge Germany’s centrality in the making of modern 
worldviews, thanks to not only the experience of the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth 
century, but also a “higher, wider and more vigorous philosophical sensibility” in the 
nineteenth.93 
The ongoing debates on Italy’s allegedly marginal position in Europe represented, for 
Spaventa, an opportunity to clarify the relationship between modern philosophy and the 
principle of nationality, in ways that may contribute to re-thinking Italy’s position in the 
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intellectual landscape of the continent.94 Drawing extensively on Cusani, Gatti and De Sanctis’ 
arguments, Spaventa quickly accepted how a more substantial engagement with German 
thought may be conducive to a series of inter-related achievements, most notably Italy’s 
intellectual regeneration and, consequently, the erosion of those verdicts relegating the 
peninsula to a peripheral position in the European cultural geography. A letter penned by his 
friend Pasquale Villari while Spaventa was in Turin, in this sense, stimulated the latter to 
encourage Italy’s philosophical reawakening via a closer study of Hegelianism: 
 
Making Italy understand Hegel would mean regenerating the country […]. Camillo [De Meis] 
will be able to tell you about the enthusiasm produced by De Sanctis’ words, when he was 
illustrating some pages of Hegel’s Aesthetics […]. That is a system, which, once properly 
understood, takes hold of all of man’s cognitions, his actions, his whole life! […] Italy must find 
a system able to represent its nationality and gather its lively elements; yet, first of all, it must 
re-discover the consciousness of itself, and no system is more apposite to this end than 
Hegelianism.95 
 
Rehabilitating Italy’s philosophical heritage by establishing a dialogue between the 
local tradition and Hegel’s philosophy: this was one of the leitmotifs of Spaventa’s speculation 
during the 1850s. While he initially attempted to do so via a translation of the 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, he soon understood the need to provide an image of Hegel that 
was consonant with the Italian intellectual tradition by making him “intelligible, but not 
superficial: popular, not vulgar”.96 This inclination was further elucidated in the introduction 
to his 1851 Studii sopra la filosofia di Hegel, where Italy’s cultural regeneration was said to 
beconnected with the identification of the continuities between sixteenth-century local 
tradition and present-day German thought: 
 
I openly declare that we must perpetuate our philosophical tradition beginning with the 
position it has come to acquire by developing in German intellectuals’ speculative movement; 
therefore, if we want to restore it in Italy as a more intimate part and as the supreme principle 
of our lives, it is mainly necessary to concentrate on two strands of study: that of sixteenth-
century Italian philosophy and that of modern philosophy within the great German systems.97 
 
 Spaventa’s focus on sixteenth-century Italian philosophy might appear, at this stage, 
almost paradoxical: after all, both his filo-Hegelian predecessors in Naples, as well as other 
Italian authors, most notably Cuoco and Gioberti, had diagnosed a decline in Italy’s 
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philosophical sensitivity occurring during that century, rather than its apex. To understand 
Bertrando’s arguments better, however, it is necessary to view them as a direct response to 
Vincenzo Cuoco’s exhortation to revitalise Italy’s philosophical tradition – and claim the 
intellectual primacy of Italians over other Europeans – on the basis of Vico’s “ancient Italian 
genius”, as argued in Platone in Italia. This, according to Spaventa, was not only a fruitless 
operation, but also a historically inaccurate one, according to his university lectures held in 
1860 and 1861, whose content was later published with the title La filosofia italiana nelle sue 
relazioni colla filosofia europea.98  
 In La filosofia italiana, the pre-Roman Italian philosophical heritage discussed by Vico-
via-Cuoco was regarded as little more than a fictitious construct: referencing Theodor 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte, the author pointed at the Greek origin of the philosophical 
language associated by his predecessors with the Etruscan and Sannite cultures: 
 
That which is commonly called “Italic philosophy of the antiquity” belongs to Greek 
philosophy, and constitutes little more than a rudiment of it. Renewing Pythagoreanism or 
Eleaticism today would be the same as returning to philosophy’s infancy.99 
 
Additionally, while conceding that pre-Roman Italic populations had indeed produced 
significant cultural innovations, Spaventa claimed that it was impossible to speak of a 
systematic philosophical organisation of indigenous ideas, before these were amalgamated 
with the Greco-Roman speculative tendencies.100  
 Bertrando’s confutation of Vico’s notion of an “ancient Italian genius”, as re-imagined 
through the lens of Cuoco’s nationalist programme, however, did not enable him to disprove 
the idea that “the latest results achieved by modern European speculation” were 
“fundamentally at odds with the latest results achieved by our own”.101 It was to a later stage 
of Italy and Europe’s philosophical life that his attention ought to turn: the making of 
modernity, explaining how fifteenth-, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italian thought, too 
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often regarded “an aberration of the Italian spirit” had actually contributed to “the greatest 
discoveries of the modern spirit”.102 
 The identification of thematic and methodological continuities between what 
Spaventa labelled “filosofia del Risorgimento” and its present-day European counterpart, 
then, represented an important preoccupation for the Southern thinker during the 1850s.103 
In an 1855 article, for example, entitled Del principio della riforma religiosa, politica e 
filosofica nel secolo XVI, Bertrando explained, adopting a markedly historicist tone, how his 
approach to the study of sixteenth-century philosophical ideas went well beyond a mere 
attempt to dissect their meaning or logical consistency. Rather, it was their historical 
significance that Spaventa was keen to interrogate, with the intention of imagining systems 
of ideas as “discrete moments” in “philosophical thought’s progressive realisation in 
history”.104 In other words, it appeared necessary to examine the ways in which Renaissance 
Italian philosophy had participated in the formulation of present-day attitudes and 
worldviews: “the essence of modern thought”.105 
 Convinced that “all modern philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel was nothing more than 
the logical and necessary development of sixteenth-century Italian philosophy”, Bertrando 
demonstrated his intuition in a diverse series of works.106 Already in the 1854 Lettera sulla 
dottrina di Bruno, for instance, the Southern thinker had reflected on the perceived 
continuities between Giordano Bruno and Hegel’s philosophies, believing that the former’s 
ideas “necessarily lead, as part of philosophy’s broader progress” to absolute idealism.107 
More specifically, while revealing a strongly Hegelian reading of Bruno, Spaventa’s 
contributions praised the latter’s postulation of an “absolute identity” of the human and the 
divine, via the intuition that, being man “the true image of God on Earth”, “God must be 
realised in man’s actions”.108 This, in turn, signalled how Spaventa had understood Hegel’s 
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notion of Spirit as analogous to Bruno’s image of God. Crucially, it was precisely the 
emergence of this concept that, for Bertrando, had marked the true beginning of modern 
philosophy:  
 
Bruno’s natural philosophy situates God in the world and the world in God; he is thus the 
precursor of eighteenth-century philosophy, the first modern philosopher after the 
Risorgimento. Modern philosophy’s goal is to understand God as absolute Spirit.109 
 
He then praised German idealist thinkers, particularly Hegel, for having re-worked Bruno’s 
identity of the absolute and the discrete into a much more dynamic relationship, which, in 
Bertrando’s analysis, was absent in the Italian thinker’s system of ideas, deemed unable to 
contemplate the “return of Spirit to itself from its external individuation”.110 In a word, 
dialectics.  
Giordano Bruno was not, however, seen as the sole precursor of modern philosophy: 
a similar connection was said to have existed between Tommaso Campanella and Hegel. 
Applauding the Calabrian philosopher for positing “the concept of unity and liberty of spirit 
as the chief principle of thought and as a pivotal point of man’s actions”, Spaventa believed 
that, in doing so, Campanella had correctly identified the coordinates of “the modern world’s 
essence”.111 While his verdict initially mirrored that advanced with regard to Bruno, by 
essentially revolving around the identification of thematic continuities between early modern 
Italian philosophy and its modern European counterpart, the author’s correspondence in the 
mid-1850s also revealed attempts to decode these connections from a methodological 
perspective.112 In particular, Spaventa referred to Campanella’s observations, included in his 
Metaphysica, on the identity of “thought” and “being”, suggesting that, by attempting “to 
unveil being in consciousness” and later “inferring consciousness and every other thing from 
being”, Campanella had theorised a relationship of absolute interdependence between 
metaphysics and logic that one could also find at the very core of Hegel’s philosophical 
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system.113 A letter to his brother Silvio written in March 1855, in fact, revealed Bertrando’s 
efforts to come to terms with the relationship between Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik and 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, explaining that it was precisely thanks to Campanella’s writings 
that he had come to understand how the latter represented the “foundation” of the 
former114. 
 In the 1850s, therefore, Bertrando Spaventa fully succeeded in perpetuating a 
philosophical inclination initiated by other exponents of the Neapolitan Hegelian youth in the 
late 1830s and early ‘40s, attempting to challenge verdicts on the marginality of Italy’s 
philosophical tradition in the context of modern European thought, and by proposing a novel 
account of the latter’s development. Drawing extensively on the examples put forth by his 
fellow intellectuals’ contributions, Bertrando detailed how present-day German idealism 
deepened its roots in the local tradition of thought, too often associated with a notion of 
Italian “moral and intellectual decadence” and regarded as “antithetical” to modern 
philosophical sensitivities.115 More specifically, from Stanislao Gatti, Spaventa borrowed the 
intuition that challenging the categorisation of present-day intellectual traditions along 
national lines was central to any attempt to negotiate a vantage point for the peninsula in the 
cultural landscape of nineteenth-century Europe; Stefano Cusani and Francesco De Sanctis 
inspired Bertrando to do so by devising a history of European philosophy that considered 
present-day philosophy a development of early modern Italian contributions. 
 As the decade was coming to a close, however, Spaventa’s views still featured that 
very same Germanocentric ideal of modernity featured in the Neapolitan context of the 
1840s. In order to fully rehabilitate Italy’s position as part of a European intellectual space of 
experience, therefore, it was necessary to demonstrate how the historical inter-dependence 
of the Italian and European philosophies was still observable in the present: in other words, 
challenging the assumption that the latter had teleologically developed along an imaginary 
trajectory connecting Italy and Germany, by showing, instead, its inherently circular nature; 
how, having reached its maturity under a different, idealist, guise, Italian thought was now 
ready to return to the peninsula.  
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 A lecture held at the University of Bologna on May 10, 1860, entitled Carattere e 
sviluppo della filosofia italiana dal secolo XVI sino al nostro tempo, perfectly summarised 
Bertrando’s goal. According to the author, it was necessary to: 
 
Recuperate the sacred thread of our philosophical tradition, revivify the consciousness of the 
freedom of our thought in the study of our greatest thinkers, seek in other nations’ 
philosophies the seeds spread by the early fathers of our own philosophy and how these then 
returned among us in a new and more developed, systematic, form; understand this 
circulation of Italian thought […] and be able to understand what we were, what we are and 
what we must be in modern philosophy’s ceaseless motion […], presenting ourselves as a free 
and equal nation in a community of nations.116 
 
With the idea of European philosophy returning to the Italian peninsula, the stage was set for 
Spaventa’s most significant intellectual contribution: the theory of “European thought’s 
circularity” developed in La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea. 
 
 
 
5.5. From Europe to Italy: La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea 
 
Seen in its own context, Spaventa’s best-known work represented a dart of criticism directed 
against Gioberti’s cultural nationalism, and an attempt to dismantle the widely popular view 
that Italian philosophy was fundamentally detached from modern European thought.117 In 
this sense, Gioberti’s exaltation of the country’s past tradition, via the definition of religion 
and the Church as inherently national institutions, informing a vague notion of the peninsula’s 
primacy over the rest of the continent, was condemned as a deplorable solution and little 
more than a means of shielding oneself from the cultural and philosophical ideals of present-
day Europe.118 
 Reprising his own verdicts of the 1850s, Spaventa suggested that Italian philosophy 
had not come to an end during the Renaissance; rather, it “went on to develop in freer lands 
and among freer intellects”.119 In consequence, engaging with contemporary European ideas 
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was synonymous with the discovery of a new chapter in the life of the local tradition, namely 
one that had taken place abroad: 
 
Seeking Italian philosophical thought in its new fatherland does not entail a servile imitation 
of German nationality. Rather, it constitutes a recovery of something that belonged to us, of 
something that, under different guises, has become part of a universal Spirit, the essential 
condition of our civilisation, as well as other people’s. It is not our philosophers of the last two 
centuries, but Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who are the true disciples of Bruno, 
of Vanini, of Campanella, of Vico and other illustrious authors.120 
 
Crucially, this passage did not only reiterate some of the views developed by Bertrando in 
Turin during the 1850s, deepening, in turn, their roots in Neapolitan Hegelians’ contributions 
of the 1830s and ‘40s: it also fully revealed a genuine attempt to erode the Germanocentric 
view of modernity emerging in the very same contexts.  
 This intuition becomes even clearer if one notices how, in La filosofia italiana, 
Spaventa proposed a very elastic definition of philosophy, which, following Stanislao Gatti’s 
indications, was not bound to specific national traditions, but emerged as an unquestionably 
European phenomenon, stemming from intergenerational exchanges among national 
traditions. His rejection of Cuoco’s emphasis on Vico’s definition of Antiquissima italorum 
sapientia, illustrated earlier in this chapter, can also be viewed from this perspective. 
Moreover, Bertrando believed that these exchanges had been even more evident from the 
Renaissance onwards, with their effects being clearly observable in the present: “modern 
philosophy”, the author claimed, “is not the work of a single nation, but of all”.121 Those that 
appeared to be “national philosophies”, as a result, “are nothing more than stations through 
which thought, in its immortal course, passes. Modern philosophy, therefore, is neither 
exclusively English, nor French, nor Italian, nor German, but European”.122 
 La filosofia italiana then illustrated, with newfound force and following the reasoning 
already developed in the writings of the 1850s, how the Italian Renaissance represented the 
birthplace of modern ideas: particular attention was posited on the ongoing rejection of 
Scholastic philosophy via the rehabilitation of inquiries on nature and subjectivity.123 Later on, 
it illustrated how these innovations ought to be seen as conducive to the encounter of local 
and foreign philosophies: Giordano Bruno’s definition of Nature as “Deus in rebus” was said 
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to have anticipated Baruch Spinoza’s “Deus sive Natura”, the manifesto of “modern 
immanentism”; Tommaso Campanella’s emphasis on sensitivity and experience as the basis 
of all knowledge were described as forerunners of empiricism and Cartesian rationalism.124 
As Spinoza and Descartes’ mature reflections were said to have revealed the magnitude of 
the dichotomy between the sensible and the intelligible, Spaventa’s argument continued, 
man was still perceived exclusively as an “effect”, namely a product of God’s creation. An 
attempt to articulate an account of man as “cause”, namely as the free maker of himself, was 
then identified with the critique of this mono-directional account of causation, emerging in 
England with Lockean empiricism and in Germany with Leibniz’s Monadology. 
 While these ideas originally appeared abroad, it was only in Italy, according to 
Bertrando, that the tension between man as an effect and man as a cause was resolved. 
Consistently with Neapolitan Hegelians’ fascination with his association of “verum” and 
“factum”, the philosopher credited for this innovation was Giambattista Vico, who blurred 
the definition of these two concepts by amalgamating them into a wider notion of progress, 
believed to have anticipated Hegel’s account of Spirit’s perpetual process of self-negotiation. 
“Vico denies any parallel”, Spaventa wrote: “nature is the phenomenon and the basis of Spirit, 
the premise that Spirit makes for itself, in order to be true unity. True unity, the true One, 
true development: development of itself, from itself, via itself, to itself: that is, completely 
itself”.125 
 In Spaventa’s reading, Vico’s principle had paved the way for the elaboration of a new 
metaphysics, introducing ideas of perpetual progress and self-negotiation, rather than 
immediate causation, in the European philosophical landscape. In a particularly poignant 
section of his text, Spaventa suggested that “Vico anticipates the problem of knowledge, 
demanding a new metaphysics anchored to human ideas; he is sensitive to the idea of Spirit, 
hence creating philosophy of history. Vico is the true precursor of Germany”.126 This was 
exactly where, according to the Southern thinker, the diaspora of Italian philosophy was most 
dramatically observable: after Vico, a meaningful intellectual and philosophical life was said 
to have taken place only elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Germany.  
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 As a result, following a logic similar to that championed by Stefano Cusani in 1839, 
Immanuel Kant was to be credited for the elevation of the themes problematised by Vico into 
a transcendental psychologism, resolving the quandaries of knowledge and its intelligibility 
with the intuition of the former’s synthetic unity.127 Later on, Spaventa continued, another 
version of the same issue could be found in Fichte’s idea of Selbstbewußtsein, the 
transcendental realism of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, and, more importantly, Hegel’s 
idealism, positing the ultimate question as to how Spirit realises itself in history and in man’s 
experience of it.128 For Bertrando, these debates represented solutions to the fundamental 
problems of modern tought, initially emerging in the context of Italian Renaissance 
philosophy: the nature of history, of progress and historical development, as well as man’s 
own experience of them. La filosofia italiana illustrated, in this sense, a well-defined 
trajectory linking Bruno and Campanella with present-day German thought, brought together 
by the persistent search for unity in history.  
 This intuition closely reflected the dynamics of Hegel’s reception in Naples. As 
illustrated in chapters one to three of this thesis, Neapolitan Hegelians elaborated a 
composite historicism as a means of mediating between an absolute notion of historical 
development and Vico’s philosophy of history, which emphasised man’s direct, tangible, 
experience of it. This operation was exemplified by Francesco De Sanctis’ “dual method”, 
itself primarily understood as a response to Vincenzo Cuoco’s problematisation, at the 
beginning of the 1800s, of the tension between an “ideal eternal history” and “nations’ 
historical-empirical course”. Once again, the extent to which Spaventa’s La filosofia italiana 
was indebted to the Neapolitan context of the 1820s, ‘30s and ‘40s is evident, but a discussion 
of this connection is largely absent in current historiographical works on this text, which is 
too often considered in isolation. 
 The novelty of Spaventa’s argument can now be disclosed on the basis of its 
relationship with the Neapolitan intellectual context. In order to restore its status of pre-
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eminence among the nations of Europe, Italy was urged, in the nineteenth century, to re-
discover its own philosophy in its mature, cosmopolitan form: with the country’s tradition 
having “developed in the motion of German intellects” it was necessary, for local thinkers, 
not to engage with foreign authors “in the same way as goods are imported”, but via the 
recognition of their shared intellectual genealogy.129 According to Bertrando, this process was 
already well underway. As evidence of this, Spaventa drew a parallel between Pasquale 
Galluppi and Immanuel Kant: both had reflected, “without necessarily being aware of this”, 
upon the problem of knowledge as initially appearing in Vico.130 Spaventa therefore saw 
Galluppi as “unknowingly Kantian”, thanks to his empiricist philosophical inclination.131 
Similarly, he believed that Antonio Rosmini, despite his well-known hostility towards foreign 
ideas, had theorised a notion of “primitive synthesis of Reason and perception”, able to mirror 
Kant’s notion of “transcendental imagination” and to mediate between sense and intellect: 
 
That application of the idea of Being to the matter of sense is, generally speaking, Rosmini’s 
concept of synthetic a priori judgment. This judgment is the unity of the original, pure, concept 
and of sensible intuition. Rosmini criticises Kant for grounding his verdict on the unity of two 
concepts: yet, he does not realise that he says the exact same things as Kant: unity of concept 
and intuition, which Kant had already postulated long before him. This is why Rosmini is 
Kantian. He regards himself as evern more Kantian than Kant himself.132 
 
Another interesting comparison was the one drawn between German idealists, 
particularly Hegel, and Gioberti: just as the German thinker had moved beyond his 
predecessors by positing the absolute self-awareness of Reason as a token of the infinite 
possibility of knowledge, Gioberti had overcome the limits of Galluppi and Rosmini by 
theorising an “Absolute Mind”, decreeing the infinite potentiality of knowledge via the 
dialectics of its creative force: 
 
Gioberti […] is Fichte, Schelling and Hegel altogether. When he speaks of mind, namely self-
consciousness, he is Fichte. When he speaks of ideas or Reason, he is Schelling. When he says: 
idea or self-conscious Reason as absolute universal principle, he is Hegel. Gioberti therefore 
represents the true Unity of Spirit, the true concept of Development, the true absolute Psyche: 
an activity, which, as dual activity, becomes One; a cycle, which, as dual cycle, becomes One. 
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This is the true absolute Spirit. Gioberti’s philosophy, then, is true contemplation of the 
absolute.133 
 
To paraphrase Spaventa’s verdict on Galluppi, then, Gioberti could be seen as 
“unknowingly Hegelian” and much closer to German idealism than he was ready to admit 
himself. Only thanks to the recognition not only of the similarities, but also of the continuities 
between nineteenth-century German and Italian philosophies, Bertrando concluded, the 
peninsula could achieve the cultural unity and cohesiveness observable in other European 
countries, and create “a historical Italy, having its worthy place in the common life of modern 
nations”.134 
 Spaventa’s theory of European thought’s circularity was not only an attempt to 
challenge notions of primacy, seeing the centrality of the Italian tradition as limited to the 
sole context of the Renaissance, but also a means to de-provincialise nineteenth-century 
debates taking place in the country, showing how they reflected a much more modern, 
European, experience of historical time. As a result, it is easy to see La filosofia italiana as an 
effective response to Gioberti’s Primato. Despite the fact that both texts stemmed from a 
shared recognition of Italian Renaissance’s historical significance, Spaventa re-imagined the 
relationship between Italian and European thought: as the Turinese philosopher had 
countered the perceived asymmetry between Italy and Europe by completely turning it on its 
head, Bertrando suggested, as an implication of Cusani, Gatti and De Sanctis’ views, that no 
imbalance had ever existed in the first place, considering that the history of European 
philosophy was one of constant and self-perpetuating exchanges; one of continuous dialogue 
among its parts and, more importantly, one of non-competitive encounters. This attempt to 
place Italy at the centre of the continent’s intellectual history came from the leading exponent 
of a group of Southern thinkers. This, in itself, is a very charming idea. 
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5.6. Philosophical Modernity between the National and the Transnational 
 
This chapter has illustrated the idea of Europe’s centrality in Neapolitan Hegelians’ 
imagination. This was by no means a mere epiphenomenon of their philosophical sensitivity: 
rather, their engagement with a transnational understanding of modernity occurred in 
response to specific debates and the thematisation of a distinctly European and 
characteristically modern dimension of temporality. Negotiating a vantage point for Italy vis-
à-vis the other nations was no easy task for southern thinkers, especially bearing in mind the 
tendency, common to Italian and foreign thinkers alike, to articulate a mental geography of 
the continent that systematically relegated Italy to a peripheral status. An intellectual 
tradition extending from Montesquieu to Hegel’s understanding of Europe as the “end of 
history” contributed to a definition of modernity that systematically portrayed the South as 
an “internal Other”.135 Italian intellectuals often accepted orientalised accounts of 
nineteenth-century Italy and the implications of this process were wide-ranging: from Cavour 
and Balbo’s rejection of supra-national co-operation, based on their suspicions of foreign 
nations’ hegemonic position, to Italian periodicals’ emphasis on the “ancient” character of 
the peninsula, able to shape the opinion of a broad public, nineteenth-century debates on 
Italy’s relation to the rest of the continent often made clear, to use Giacomo Leopardi’s words, 
that the “the North’s time has come”.136  
 Bertrando Spaventa’s theory of European thought’s “circularity” represented 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ most forceful effort to re-imagine Italy’s contribution to the continent’s 
intellectual history, not only via the identification of the affinities between local and foreign 
philosophical traditions, but also via the recognition of their shared history. The present 
chapter maintained that one can obtain a better understanding of Spaventa’s best-known 
thesis by tracing its origin back to the Neapolitan context of the 1830s and ‘40s, as well as 
Bertrando’s own Turinese experience, in contrast to scholarly verdicts singling it out as 
southern thinkers’ only attempt to engage with the idea of Europe.137 It is possible, in this 
context, to follow the development of Neapolitan Hegelians’ reflections on modern European 
philosophy across three distinct stages.  
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During the initial stage, taking place between the late 1830s and the early 1840s, 
Stefano Cusani, Stanislao Gatti and Francesco De Sanctis emphasised what one may view as 
the “transnational” nature of the continent’s intellectual history: reasoning around the 
assumption that, while the birthplace of modern thought could be identified with Descartes’ 
theorisation of the tension between subjectivity and objectivity, they proceeded to describe 
its evolution on the basis of the existing continuities among national traditions, ultimately 
challenging the extent to which philosophy itself may be categorised as “national” in the first 
place.  
 In its second stage, identifiable with Spaventa’s Turinese years, this outlook led to 
attempts to demonstrate the historical significance of Italian Renaissance philosophy in the 
making of its modern European counterpart. As a reaction to contemporary debates on Italy’s 
orientalisation, Bertrando’s articles of the 1850s attempted a reconciliation of the Italian 
space of experience with a modern dimension of philosophical life, pointing at the earliest 
theorisations, among thinkers in the peninsula, of problems, such as that of Spirit’s freedom, 
or the identity of the human and the divine, which would later represent prime concerns for 
nineteenth-century German Idealists, especially Hegel. Yet, while the 1850s articles revealed 
the extent to which Italian philosophers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries had contributed to the birth and development of the idealist school in Germany, 
Spaventa’s discussion of present-day European thought still relied heavily on a definition of 
modernity that posited Germany at its core, hailing Hegel’s idealism as its undisputed 
champion.  
 In order to effectively contrast Gioberti’s argument that Italy’s relationship with 
Europe in the present ought to be informed by the country’s past “primacy” over it, it was 
mandatory, for Spaventa, to go beyond the mere acknowledgment of the peninsula’s 
centrality in the continent’s intellectual history. Simply put, demonstrating how the historical 
interconnectedness of the Italian and the European dimensions of philosophy was still very 
much observable in the present remained an unsolved issue. With his 1860-61 university 
lectures, later published as La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea, 
Bertrando prompted a third – and final – stage in the characterisation of modern European 
philosophy: not only was this transnational and Italian, but also inherently circular. In the 
nineteenth century, Italian philosophy was returning home, albeit in a much more mature 
and developed form. 
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 Neapolitan Hegelians’ views on a European dimension of thought, as presented in this 
chapter, reflected yet another use of the Vichian/Hegelian amalgam emerging in Neapolitan 
private schools during the 1830s and ‘40s. Broadly speaking, this composite philosophy of 
history enabled them to advance a deeply historicised understanding of the world: as 
illustrated in chapter three, investigating cultural production through the lens of Hegelian and 
Vichian categories allowed Francesco De Sanctis to devise a new approach to aesthetics and 
literary criticism; as discussed in chapter four, it enabled Il Nazionale’s contributors to invoke 
the notion of the Revolution’s historical necessity, while Bertrando Spaventa deployed, a few 
years later, the same historicist categories in his discussion of the relationship between 
freedom and the State. Lastly, this chapter demonstrated how, viewing European philosophy 
within the very same conceptual horizon, Neapolitan Hegelians rehabilitated Italy’s position 
in the continent. 
 Spaventa’s theory of circularity relied on a Hegelian intuition, namely a markedly 
philosophical understanding of European history. Moreover, Bertrando’s account of the 
latter’s development was consistent with Hegel’s, insofar as they both viewed it as a linear 
process, teleologically leading to the emergence of the questions as to how Spirit realises 
itself in history and how this can become intelligible for man. These concerns, as pointed out 
in Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, deepened their roots in the 
tension between the “inwardness” of pure thought and self-consciousness, and the external 
“existent universe”, hinting that the chief philosophical problem of the modern world had to 
do with the “dissolution of this opposition”138. Both Spaventa and Hegel believed that 
nineteenth-century German idealism had offered the most effective set of answers to it, but 
they disagreed insofar as its origin was concerned: for Hegel, the birth of modernity, in a 
philosophical sense, could be traced back to Descartes and Spinoza.139 For Spaventa, one 
ought to go back to Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella, on whom Descartes and 
Spinoza had arguably reflected.  
 Hegel’s account of European philosophy’s history, however, was entirely functional to 
his discussion of the “end of history” in ways that excluded the contribution of the continent’s 
perceived peripheries.140 Despite deploying a Hegelian account of historical development, 
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then, Spaventa managed to refute this implication by appealing to a Vichian concept of 
nationality, regarded as the most concrete, tangible, structure encircling thought’s 
development. As explained in chapter four of this thesis, Il Nazionale had proposed the same 
argument in 1848, when realising a historically necessary notion of Hegelian freedom was 
said to rest on a very specific task: establishing nationality as the chief principle for political 
emancipation.141 In a particularly passionate section of La filosofia italiana, Spaventa levelled 
a powerful charge against Hegel: 
 
I know way too well what is being said among some: “why should we care about Italian and 
non-Italian philosophy? We want the truth; and truth has nothing to do with nationality”. 
Truth surely transcends nationality; but it is an abstraction without nationality. Transplant 
truth as much as you want; it this has no correspondence whatsoever with our national genius, 
it will be truth for itself, but not for us; to us, it will only be a dead, inert, thing. Demonstrating, 
therefore, that we have always lived in the arms of European thought, have always promoted 
it, and always partaken in it, that we have not merely been “us” and outside a shared 
dimension of life, is not an expedient, a diplomatic procedure, or simply a matter of respect: 
rather, it is a noble and rigorous duty for those who make philosophy.142 
  
For Spaventa, the fact that Hegel’s philosophical account of history did not rely on national 
categorisations was not only problematic, but also conceptually untenable. Seen in the 
context of Vichianism and Hegelianism’s amalgamation operated by southern intellectuals, 
this objection is particularly understandable. Thanks to nineteenth-century debates on Vico’s 
Scienza nuova, as discussed in chapter two, Neapolitan Hegelians had come to terms with the 
impossibility of creating a historicist framework independent from national categories, on the 
one hand, and with the possibility, on the other, to merge Hegel’s ideal of absolute historical 
development with Vico’s emphasis on the most tangible structures of history: nations. Italian 
intellectuals of the early 1800s had re-imagined Vico’s understanding of Providence’s role in 
history in a way that resonated with Hegel’s “cunning of Reason” (“List der Vernunft”), the 
idea that Reason directed people’s self-interest in order to realise itself.143 Carlo Cattaneo, for 
instance, believed that, by working through people’s interests, Providence would ultimately 
be embodied in “the world of nations”.144 As such, nations, understood in a Vichian sense, 
namely as stemming from the diachronic layering of a shared culture, customs and traditions, 
represented not only the categories according to which philosophical traditions ought to be 
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organised, but also the conceptual horizon bounding man’s consciousness of the goals and 
the direction of history.  
 These observations thus disclose the full force of La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni 
colla filosofia europea: Bertrando’s best-known text did not “only” represent the final 
achievement of the Neapolitan Hegelian school, nor was it “merely” a powerful critique of 
the historically debatable notion of Italian primacy invoked by Gioberti in 1843, or “solely” a 
(successful) means of rehabilitating Italy’s contribution to the continent’s intellectual history. 
Rather, it represented a sophisticated account of modern European philosophy’s 
development through the lens of Europeans’ evolving consciousness of history’s inherent 
directionality: having fully matured this consciousness in the nineteenth century, Italy could 
unquestionably be regarded as a modern nation. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
On September 7, 1860, Giuseppe Garibaldi entered Naples. Some Neapolitans greeted his 
arrival in the southern metropolis with enthusiasm and many among the local Hegelians 
regarded this event as marking the beginning of a new chapter in the city’s history. Angelo 
Camillo De Meis, who had met Francesco De Sanctis in Basilio Puoti’s private school and later 
established a close friendship with Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa was one of them. On August 
17, 1860, in fact, he had written a letter to Bertrando, disclosing his hopes that Garibaldi’s 
arrival might pave the way for radical changes and prosperity among Neapolitans: “if Garibaldi 
were not involved”, he explained, “there would be no hope of success here. Yet, we will 
succeed, because he is there; it was he, who engineered such a transformation in people’s 
spirits”.1 
 During his lieutenancy, Garibaldi appointed Silvio Spaventa as Police Minister and 
Francesco De Sanctis as Minister for Public Education in the provisional government: the 
latter, who, at the time, was in exile in Zürich, immediately set off for Naples, with the 
intention of bringing about profound changes in the cultural institutions of the city.2 The first, 
and most extensive, project undertaken by De Sanctis was the reorganisation of the Federico 
II University: in particular, he hoped to be able to reunite some of the members of the 
Hegelian youth that had frantically left the city between 1848 and 1849, by assigning them to 
various academic positions. Among the southern patriots summoned by De Sanctis, 
Bertrando Spaventa was unquestionably the most notable one. On October 29, 1860, 
Bertrando was finally appointed professor of theoretical philosophy at the Neapolitan 
university, a post he had been chasing since the 1840s.  
 Spaventa’s return to Naples was a joyful one. As his ship was drawing close to the bay, 
he exclaimed: “I see Vesuvius. After twelve years! I come back to Naples and I suddenly 
recognise it”.3 Partly thanks to the encouragement of his friends and partly thanks to the birth 
of a daughter, the philosopher embarked upon his new professional and intellectual life with 
enthusiasm. By the beginning of the academic year, however, the context had once again 
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3 Quoted in: Gallo, F. (2015) Dalla patria allo stato. Bertrando Spavanta, una biografia intellettuale, p. 106 
  244 
changed: the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies did not exist anymore and Naples was no longer a 
capital, the Bourbons were gone, Italy had been unified. Francesco De Sanctis, in the 
meantime, had become the Kingdom of Italy’s Minister for Public Education. Bertrando’s 
brother Silvio, instead, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, where he sat among the ranks 
of the liberal Destra storica.  
 Bertrando’s first lecture, on November 23, 1861, insisted on the connection between 
the consolidation of the Italian national spirit, a theme dear to the Hegelian youth from the 
1840s onwards, and an active philosophical life. In his speech, Spaventa recounted: 
 
If philosophy is not a mere intellectual exercise driven by vanity, but that true form of human 
life in which all earlier moments of spirit are epitomised and find their true meaning, it is 
natural to think that a true people may recognise and acquire true consciousness of itself 
when looking at its philosophers. Where this acknowledgment is missing, foreign importation 
is useless; this is because consciousness of oneself is not a commodity, which can be bought, 
shout it be missing; it is consciousness of our true selves, our true selves.4 
 
Bertrando then moved on to illustrate his theory of European philosophy’s circularity. 
Observing that “the highest degree to which Italian speculation has elevated itself 
corresponds to the latest results obtained by German speculation”, he incited his audience to 
engage with the study of European traditions of thought: 
 
Let us study ourselves, the history of our own thought, without, however, fearing or despising 
another nation’s thought, in which European speculation’s patrimony is equally enclosed. If 
we study this patrimony, we will better study and understand ourselves; because that is, in 
substance, nothing more than our own thought in a different form. We will thus have two 
consciences in one, that is, a “greater consciousness”.5 
 
For Spaventa, the study of European forms of thought coincided with the most concrete goal 
of philosophical speculation, broadly conceived: negotiating “the autonomy of a people in the 
common life of all people”.6 This, according to the author, depended on the definition of the 
most fundamental characteristic of philosophical modernity: its inherently transnational 
nature. Modern philosophy, according to the author, was, in its inception and development, 
the result of ongoing encounters and exchanges taking place across national borders, 
ultimately providing a characterisation of modern European thought as a constellation of 
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5 Ibid., p. 21 
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splintered traditions nonetheless united by their own interconnectedness and 
interdependence.  
 This understanding of modern thought, for Bertrando, as well as the other members 
of the Neapolitan Hegelian youth, was, both symbolically and intellectually, the endpoint of 
an intellectual project spanning four decades and whose narrative constituted the central 
focus of the present thesis. The present research has illustrated the reception, circulation and 
revision of Hegel’s thought, particularly his philosophy of history, in Naples during the 
nineteenth century, discussed from a transnational perspective. More specifically, this thesis 
has sought to address a number of inter-related questions: what were the mechanisms of 
intellectual encounter and exchange enabling Hegelianism’s penetration in Neapolitan 
intellectual history? How did its reception stand in relation to the local intellectual tradition? 
To what extent were Hegel’s ideas subject to forms of revision by southern authors? How did 
the definition of Neapolitan Hegelianism reflect the experience of local contexts and debates? 
How did this philosophical tradition contribute to shaping debates on the Revolution of 1848? 
How did it inform southern intellectuals’ engagement with the cause of Italian unification? 
How was it conducive to the making of a conceptual horizon able to illuminate the experience 
of a distinctly European dimension of modernity? 
 This thesis considered Hegelianism’s presence in Naples from its initial appearance, 
and examined it in connection with a transnational avenue of exchange linking Germany to 
Naples via France, especially thanks to the mediation of Victor Cousin’s Fragments 
philosophiques. As discussed in chapter one, mainly thanks to Stefano Cusani and Stanislao 
Gatti’s reading of Cousin’s best-known work, Neapolitan Hegelians developed a substantial 
knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy of history, which they systematically proceeded to isolate 
from the French thinker’s view known as “eclecticism”. This was an unorthodox 
amalgamation of an absolute account of historical development, as reflected by the definition 
of history as a linear, rational process, and a rational psychologist sensitivity firmly grounded 
in empirical observation. That evidence allowed this thesis to provide a precise 
characterisation of Hegel’s reception in Naples, especially with regards to three features. The 
first of these was the complex, indirect mechanism of intellectual exchange that introduced 
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Hegelianism in the Mezzogiorno, contrary to scholarly views that emphasised direct 
exchanges and the contributions of southern authors travelling to Germany.7  
The second was Neapolitan Hegelianism’s implications for historians’ understanding 
of nineteenth-century European idealism’s inherently polycentric nature: due to the 
idiosyncrasies of this philosophical movement’s various receptions, different contexts 
produced, within a timespan of little more than twenty years, diverging interpretations of this 
philosophy, as formulated by its initial German theorists. In France, for example, it was seen 
as functional to the solution of problems in rational psychology; in Italy, instead, one could 
observe a much greater interest in its historicist elements, coupled with a broader sensitivity 
for absolute ontology. As a result, historians today should abandon a reified definition of 
idealism, given the plurality and diversity of its local receptions: Hegelianism in Germany, 
post-Kantianism in France and absolute historicism in Italy all stemmed from the same idealist 
doctrine, but reflected dissimilar philosophical agendas and concerns, as well as the 
experience of different contexts. These considerations intuitively call for methodological 
adjustments, in order to effectively engage with the transnational, polycentric nature of 
idealism, on the one hand, while remaining sensitive to how this philosophy was adapted to 
local contexts and intellectual inclinations, on the other. It is, consequently, necessary, as 
suggested by advocates of transnationalism, to avoid the danger of a reified understanding 
of ideas caused by their indiscriminate placement in supra- and transnational contexts, by 
acknowledging the extent to which ideas themselves are the products of those exchanges, 
encounters and patterns of circulation with which transnational history engages.8 Viewing 
Neapolitan Hegelianism as thematically connected to German idealism, yet formally distinct 
from it, and as characteristically informed by local contexts, debates and experiences, yet fully 
part of a European movement of ideas is a clear means of approaching a degree of equilibrium 
between transnational and local analyses. This operation is of crucial importance in order to 
                                                           
7 Aguzzi, L. (1985) Riforma religiosa, hegelismo, comunismo e il problema del Risorgimento in Italia nel pensiero 
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dello hegelismo napoletano, pp. 425-61; Rossi, M. (1957) Sviluppi dello hegelismo in Italia, pp. 6-61 
8 Armitage, D. (2014) The International Turn in Intellectual History, pp. 232-52; Bourdieu, P. (1990) Les conditions 
sociales de la circulation internationale des idées, pp. 3-8; Conrad, S. (2003) Circulation, “National Work” and 
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obtain a precise understanding and characterisation of Hegelianism’s presence in the 
southern capital. 
Thirdly, the initial discussion of Hegel’s Neapolitan reception also highlighted the 
extent to which the German philosopher’s ideas were subject to critical examination, 
reflecting how their reception was not a “passive” process of mere absorption, but one on 
which local intellectuals deliberately acted: having isolated the Hegelian philosophy of history 
from Cousin’s eclecticism, southern thinkers nonetheless recognised the need to amalgamate 
it with a historicist view positing adequate attention on empirically observable conditions, 
thus paving the way for its merging with Giambattista Vico’s historicism.  
This thesis has consistently argued that the image of Giambattista Vico articulated by 
nineteenth-century intellectuals was different from the Neapolitan philosopher’s actual 
intellectual profile in the 1700s. Chapter two sought therefore to investigate the extent to 
which Vichian historicism, as developed in De antiquissima italorum sapientia and, even more 
prominently, La scienza nuova, came to be re-imagined by nineteenth-century thinkers, in a 
way that supported the postulation of a direct continuity between Vichianism and modern 
idealism. This chapter posited that: (i) while a textual and contextual analysis ultimately 
problematises, rather than illuminates, the relationship between Vichianism and idealism, 
viewing it as part of a broader, European history of ideas may yield different results. More 
specifically, (ii) engaging with Vico’s nineteenth-century re-discovery through the lens of 
transnationalism revealed the extent to which French intellectuals, mainly Victor Cousin and 
Jules Michelet, selectively appropriated Hegelian and Vichian elements. In particular, 
Michelet’s 1827 volume Principes de la philosophie de l’histoire de Vico played an important 
role among Italian intellectuals, as reported by Giandomenico Romangosi, who, together with 
Carlo Cattaneo, went on to equate Vico’s historicism with its German idealist counterpart.  
Why, then, were Vico’s ideas seen as kindred with Hegel’s? Chapter two maintained 
that (iii) it was mainly thanks to Southern émigrés’ contribution that the historicist themes 
developed in La scienza nuova were discussed in increasingly idealist terms. Among these 
views, Vincenzo Cuoco’s were undoubtedly the most poignant and most widely discussed: 
Cuoco, in fact, problematised the tension between the Vichian notions of “ideal eternal 
history” and the latter’s concrete, tangible embodiments, ultimately claiming that, according 
to Vico, “that which is true is always ideal” and that, as a result, “those things theorised by 
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the German school in the last few years, have already been thought of, and executed, by Vico 
roughly one century earlier”.9 
If this discussion of Vico’s nineteenth-century re-discovery effectively illustrated the 
extent to which his ideas were increasingly regarded as compatible with German idealism, 
chapter three of this thesis drew attention to the contexts that enabled their full 
amalgamation: Neapolitan private schools of philosophy. Private schools’ contribution to 
Neapolitan intellectual history was traditionally neglected by historians of the Mezzogiorno, 
who usually mentioned them only briefly as part of broader derogatory judgments on the 
dynamics of education in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies during the Risorgimento.10 Chapter 
three sought to address this scholarly imbalance, by maintaining that: (i) historians’ verdicts 
denouncing the allegedly static cultural landscape of the southern capital on the basis of the 
Bourbon monarchy’s failures in implementing effective education policies are myopic and 
empirically inaccurate. This is because, (ii) as observable in a wide range of sources available 
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Education collections currently held at the 
Archivio di Stato in Naples, the Bourbons were very much aware of private institutes’ ability 
to “make up” for public education’s deficiencies and they consequently promoted them, both 
in the capital and the other regions of the Kingdom. 
This intuition underlined, in a provocative fashion, the need for historians to shift their 
understanding of the dynamics of education in the Mezzogiorno from the denunciation of 
failed policies in the public sector to the recognition of a successful synergy of public and 
private branches. This, however, does not mean that a dichotomy between these two spheres 
did not exist: looking especially at the extent to which foreign ideas were discussed almost 
exclusively in education channels, this chapter concluded that (iii) private schools’ progressive 
and liberal attitudes were the bearers of the transnational philosophical sensitivity enabling 
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the dissemination of Hegel’s ideas in Naples, on the one hand, and their amalgamation with 
Vico’s, on the other.  
A precedent, in this sense, had been set by Pasquale Galluppi and Ottavio Colecchi’s 
private schools of philosophy. (iv) These schools played a central role not only in engaging 
with German philosophy, but also in its revision along markedly anti-metaphysical lines, by 
attempting, for instance, the merging of Kantianism and Vichianism. Colecchi’s students, 
whose exploration and critique of Cousin’s eclecticism had been conducive, as explained in 
chapter one, to their interest in Hegel’s philosophy of history, were prompt to transpose their 
mentor’s approach onto the study of German idealism. In their schools, (v) Stanislao Gatti and 
Stefano Cusani amalgamated Hegelianism and Vichianism, as they discussed the possibility to 
contemplate Spirit’s progressive development via the analysis of its “clearest manifestations”, 
such as languages, customs and traditions, in an attempt to replace Hegel’s reliance on 
logical-metaphysical reasoning with a mechanism of philological and anthropological 
validation borrowed from La scienza nuova.11  
Lastly, (vi) it was in Francesco De Sanctis’ school that the encounter of Vico and Hegel 
found its most sophisticated form, consisting of the formulation of a dual, bi-directional 
historicist method. Theorising a dialectic between the two most fundamental intuitions 
advanced by the two philosophers, namely that “that which is rational is real and that which 
is real is rational” (Hegel) and “that which is made is true” (Vico), De Sanctis understood man’s 
experience of history to be an ongoing process of negotiation, discernible via the 
simultaneous application of logical reasoning and historical observation. The former was 
deemed able to allow for the individuation of the rational, directional, nature of history; the 
latter, instead, was understood as a means of rescuing the Hegelian “Wirklich” from a purely 
metaphysical view, consequently coming to view it as a Vichian man-made “factum”.  
If chapter three was an attempt to provide a characterisation of Neapolitan 
Hegelianism by engaging with often neglected authors, such as Gatti and Cusani, and 
contexts, such as that of Neapolitan private schools of philosophy, chapter four sought to 
illuminate the relationship between the Hegelian youth of Naples and the experiences that 
traditionally dominate historians’ discussion of the Risorgimento: the 1848 Revolution and 
the Italian Unification. In particular, this chapter suggested that (i) the amalgamation of 
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Vichianism and Hegelianism provided southern thinkers, gathering around the short-lived 
revolutionary periodical Il Nazionale, with a conceptual horizon enabling them to interpret 
the experience of the Revolution, on the one hand, and direct their participation in it, on the 
other.  
Embracing a Hegelian notion of historical development, Il Nazionale invoked the ideas 
of the Revolution’s inherent rationality and historical necessity; from Vico, instead, it 
borrowed the intuition that political change had to necessarily result in the strengthening of 
Italy’s national character. At the same time, (ii) the poignancy of Il Nazionale’s contribution 
was visible in how the periodical postulated the inseparability of the 1848 Revolution and the 
promotion of Italian emancipation and unification. Seen in their own context, then, (iii) Il 
Nazionale’s articles positioned themselves in contrast to Neapolitans’ general political 
sympathies, as well as those of other Italian patriots who put their hopes in Carlo Alberto and 
Piedmont’s hands. This was because, despite acknowledging the inevitability, for the 
Risorgimento, to be carried out by Piedmont, Il Nazionale plotted its experience of the 1848 
Revolution and of the Italian war of Independence against the idealised reconstructions of 
the 1799 Neapolitan Revolution articulated in Vincenzo Cuoco’s 1801 Saggio storico sulla 
rivoluzione napoletana del 1799 and Pietro Colletta’s Storia del reame di Napoli. As a result, 
the revolutionary periodical advocated a form of democratic constitutionalism reminiscent of 
the ideals that had animated the events of 1799, and fundamentally at odds with the anti-
democratic tendencies exhibited by Piedmontese liberalism’s theorists. 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ involvement in the Revolution of 1848, in this sense, 
complicates the understanding of their relationship with moderate liberal politics, a topic too 
often uncritically taken for granted by later studies.12 This chapter therefore urged a re-
examination of their relationship following the defeat of the 1848 Revolution, in an attempt 
to challenge the verdict that during the final years of the Risorgimento, “Hegel became 
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liberal”.13 Looking at the post-1848 writings and correspondence of one of Il Nazionale’s 
founders, Silvio Spaventa, whose affiliation with Piedmontese liberalism and the “Destra 
storica” are well-documented, this chapter concluded that (iv) his contribution to liberal 
political thought signalled his progressive abandonment of Hegelian speculative positions, as 
demonstrated by his remarkably non-Hegelian discussion of the relationship between 
freedom and the State. 
If, even after 1848, Neapolitan Hegelianism seemed to be at odds with Piedmontese 
moderate liberalism, what political views did it serve to support? To address this issue, this 
thesis turned its attention to Bertrando Spaventa’s writings in Turin, appearing during the 
1850s. It drew attention to (v) the presence, in these articles, of the very same historicist 
sensitivity, Vichian and Hegelian in equal measure, that had characterised his political 
reflections in 1848, appearing in Il Nazionale. This served to rectify another historiographical 
view, portraying 1848 and 1850 as separate moments in Bertrando’s intellectual and political 
formation.14 More importantly, this chapter demonstrated (vi) how, by reflecting on a 
concept of State closely resembling Hegel’s definition of “Ethical State”, Spaventa theorised 
a relationship between institutions and civil society geared towards the promotion of 
collective freedom, and a concept of State understood as the catalyst for the rational 
mediation among particular interests present in society. In consequence, and as visible in 
Spaventa’s commentaries on ongoing debates on freedom of teaching, (vii) his idea of State, 
while being characteristically Hegelian, was more progressive than that advanced by 
Piedmontese liberals, and, as such, more in line with the principles of democratic 
constitutionalism championed in 1848.  
For Neapolitan Hegelians, however, the composite, Hegelian and Vichian, historicism 
elaborated during the 1830s and ‘40s did not exclusively represent a means to provide a 
significant, yet too often overlooked, contribution to Risorgimento political thought. Rather, 
it disclosed a conceptual horizon bounding a distinctly modern and European experience of 
intellectual life. Bertrando Spaventa’s famous statement that the Italian intellectual 
landscape always lived “in the arms of European thought”, in this sense, reflected the 
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centrality of a European dimension of philosophical speculation in southern thinkers’ agenda. 
Chapter five explored this theme, investigating how, in response to European debates on the 
definition of a modern temporality, and as a reaction to the progressive marginalisation of 
Italy in the mental geography of the continent, Neapolitan Hegelians deployed their markedly 
transnational outlook and their composite historicism in order to demonstrate not only (i) 
that Italy was fully engaged in a European dimension of modernity, but also (ii) how the 
emergence of modernity itself largely depended on Italian intellectuals’ contributions.  
In particular, this chapter illustrated (iii) the development of new theories of 
modernity, as well as their internalisation in Italian culture, representing the broad narrative 
that thinkers of the peninsula engaged with and reacted to. By proposing, to use the poet 
Giacomo Leopardi’s words, that “the North’s time has come”, these accounts of modern 
Europe systematically relegated Italy to a peripheral position, suggesting that the ideal of 
modernity embodied by the country was unquestionably defective.15 Clearly, Italian 
intellectuals promptly reacted to this indiscriminate characterisation: (iv) because the 
peninsula’s “otherness” was understood to reflect the misalignment of the Italian space of 
experience and a European horizon of expectations, their responses aimed at re-calibrating 
their relationship, via the systematic re-writing of Italian history.  
Vincenzo Cuoco and Vincenzo Gioberti’s advocacy of the notion of “Italian primacy” 
over the rest of the continent can be cited as a prime example of this tendency. Neapolitan 
Hegelians, however, took issue with Cuoco and Gioberti’s views. Bertrando Spaventa, for 
instance, directly rejected Cuoco’s reliance on a Vichian “ancient Italian genius” and 
advanced, in his best-known work, La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia 
europea, an incendiary critique of Gioberti’s 1843 essay Del primato morale e civile degli 
italiani. La filosofia italiana, was correctly regarded by later commentators as Spaventa’s 
most successful attempt to negotiate a vantage point for Italy in the intellectual life of modern 
European nations; it was, however, too often singled out as Neapolitan Hegelians’ only 
attempt to engage with a European dimension of modernity, too.16 
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Chapter five took issue with this interpretation, maintaining that (v) a more compelling 
appreciation of this text hinges on efforts to view it in connection with often overlooked 
authors, such as Stefano Cusani and Stanislao Gatti and (vi) with Spaventa’s own writings of 
the 1850s. The characterisation of modernity proposed by Bertrando, in fact, owed much to 
Gatti and Cusani’s reflections on the transnational, European, character of modern 
philosophy. Likewise, it relied heavily on Spaventa’s earlier attempts to view Italian 
intellectual history within the framework elaborated by his fellow Hegelian thinkers, 
suggesting that it was among sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Italian 
philosophers, particularly Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella, that one could find the 
earliest theorisations of problems, such as that of Spirit’s freedom, or the identity of the 
human and the divine, which would later represent prime concerns for the most distinctly 
modern of all philosophies: German idealism.  
Lastly, chapter five maintained (vii) that a distinct feature of La filosofia italiana, 
granting this text a status of absolute prominence in the cultural landscape of the 
Risorgimento, was represented by its characterisation of European modernity, in a 
philosophical sense, as inherently circular. This definition stemmed, once again, from the 
deployment of Hegelian and Vichian categories as the conceptual lexicon informing Bertrando 
Spaventa’s interpretation of the continent’s intellectual history: viewing the making of 
modern philosophy as the concerted effort of a constellation of splintered national traditions, 
nonetheless brought together by their interconnectedness and interdependence, the author 
succeeded not only in effectively proving the historical directionality of the emergence of 
modernity, but also in demonstrating that this trajectory was, in the nineteenth century, 
taking an unexpected turn, finally returning to its birthplace: the Italian nation.  
This thesis was a study of the ways in which Neapolitan Hegelianism represented a 
powerful force not only in the intellectual history of the Risorgimento, but in the 
conceptualisation of modern Europe. As such, and given the transnational nature of the 
intellectual encounters that brought this school of thought to life, this research emphasised 
the importance of engaging with the study of ideas’ meaning, reception, circulation and 
revision in ways that go beyond the simple analysis of texts and, to a large extent, of 
immediate contexts. Transnationalism was a useful means of interrogating the spatial 
dimension of these mechanisms: thanks to the adoption of a transnational framework of 
analysis, chapter one attempted to slot the emergence of Neapolitan Hegelianism into a 
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polycentric understanding of European idealism, highlighting the peculiarities of the latter’s 
various receptions, yet viewing these as part of the same movement of ideas across national 
borders. In chapter two, transnationalism enabled the thesis to achieve something that 
stringent textual and contextual modes of analysis simply would not be able to accomplish: 
explaining why Vico and Hegel’s theories of history were regarded as compatible by 
nineteenth-century intellectuals. Thinkers in the Italian peninsula reflected on La scienza 
nuova, and viewed it as the theorisation of an idealist, absolute, conception of historical 
development thanks to the mediation of French intellectuals. Lastly, chapter five focused on 
Neapolitan Hegelians’ reflections on a distinctly European dimension of philosophical 
modernity, maintaining that it was on the basis of a transnational philosophical outlook that 
Stefano Cusani, Stanislao Gatti, Francesco De Sanctis and Bertrando Spaventa contributed to 
rehabilitating Italy’s position in the continent’s intellectual history. 
This is not to say that other methodological approaches are not effective in 
illuminating Neapolitan Hegelianism’s complexities: after all, large sections of chapters two, 
three and four relied on a rather canonical form of contextual analysis to illustrate Neapolitan 
Hegelians’ responses to their experiences of political and intellectual landscapes. It is 
important, however, to emphasise how transnationalism proved to be, in this thesis, an 
indispensable tool to address traditional historiographical verdicts on Neapolitan 
Hegelianism, which are too often anchored to a national framework of analysis only.17 
If transnationalism represented an effective means of engaging with the spatial 
dimension of the ideas investigated in this thesis, their temporal dimension deserved equal 
consideration. The two are intrinsically connected: chapters one, two and three 
demonstrated that the amalgamation of Hegel’s philosophy of history and Vichian historicism 
resulted in a conceptualisation of temporality stemming from a diachronic series of 
intellectual encounters, connecting Victor Cousin’s use of rational psychology alongside a 
Hegelian notion of development with Francesco De Sanctis’ definition of a “dual”, bi-
directional, historiographical method, via Vincenzo Cuoco’s problematisation of the two kinds 
of history presented in Vico’s Scienza nuova. Similarly, chapter four explained that, as a theory 
of history, Neapolitan Hegelianism provided southern intellectuals with a conceptual horizon 
able to direct their understanding of, and participation in, ongoing experience of political 
                                                           
17 See, for example: Oldrini, G. (1964a) Gli hegeliani di Napoli: Augusto Vera e la corrente ortodossa; Oldrini, G. 
(1973) La cultura filosofica napoletana nell’ottocento; Rossi, M. (1957) Sviluppi dello hegelismo in Italia 
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change. Moreover, as discussed in chapter five, it was thanks to his reflections on modernity 
as a mode of temporality, that Bertrando Spaventa negotiated a vantage point for Italy vis-à-
vis a distinctly European dimension of philosophical life. As a result, the characterisation of 
Neapolitan Hegelianism in this thesis was not exclusively concerned with the presence of 
Hegel and Vico’s ideas in southern thinkers’ language and argumentation, but also with how 
their adoption resulted in broader conceptual shifts in the temporal categories adopted to 
make sense of man’s historical existence. The “dual historicist method” perfected by 
Francesco De Sanctis’ in his private school, presented in chapter three, constitutes, in this 
sense, a prime example of Neapolitan Hegelianism’s ability and tendency to interrogate 
historical time and man’s experience of it. Moreover, as claimed in chapter five, Spaventa’s 
use of Hegelian and Vichian notions to re-describe the intellectual history of modern Europe 
and that of Italy within it, can be seen as yet another example of the particularly pronounced 
temporal dimension characterising Neapolitan Hegelianism.  
These observations on the importance of engaging with the study of ideas in ways that 
focus attention on their transnational nature and temporal dimension were very relevant to 
the present work. Relying on transnationalism and Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte will 
hopefully enable it to contribute to historians’ understanding of Neapolitan Hegelianism as a 
school of thought too often ignored by studies of the Italian Risorgimento, despite the recent 
proliferation of historiographical research on this period. By the time Italy became unified as 
a Kingdom in 1861, Neapolitan Hegelians ceased to exist as a unified group, as explained in 
the introduction of this thesis. Their lives took different directions, with Silvio Spaventa and 
Francesco De Sanctis fully committing to political careers, rather than active philosophical 
speculation. Stanislao Gatti struggled until 1861 to publish the periodical he had founded with 
Stefano Cusani in the early 1840s, Museo di Letteratura e Filosofia, and retired the following 
year.  
Lastly, Bertrando Spaventa maintained his post at the University of Naples and sat in 
the Chamber of Deputies on two occasions: 1861-65 and 1867-74. He published a number of 
philosophical treatises before his death in 1883, including Principii di filosofia and Studii 
sull’etica di Hegel. These volumes expanded on the intuitions developed in La filosofia 
italiana, further reinforcing the description of modern philosophy as “circular”, in ways that 
highlighted the connections between the Italian and foreign traditions. While they may 
represent an area for further study, these works lie beyond the scope of the present thesis, 
  256 
as they do not provide a novel perspective on Hegel’s Italian reception and are very consistent 
with Spaventa’s previous writings.  
In 1861, the Italian Risorgimento was formally fulfilled. This thesis sought to examine 
how Neapolitan Hegelians played an important role in the intellectual and political debates 
that characterised this period, how they encouraged Neapolitans to think as Italians, and 
Italians to think as a Europeans, embarking on a voyage of self-discovery fuelled by the sheer 
power of philosophical thought: “philosophy”, as Bertrando put it, “is consciousness of 
ourselves, our true selves”.18 
 
  
                                                           
18 Spaventa, B. (1861), pp. 1-2 
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